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LABOR RELATIONS LAW
I. REPRESENTATIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY
A. Bargaining Unit Determination
1.* Religious/Lay Employee Units: Mercy Hospital of Buffalo v. NLRB'
Determining the proper composition of an employee bargaining unit is a
highly discretionary task and is left largely to the National Labor Relations
Board (the Board). 2 Section 9(a) 3
 of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act)
requires only that a bargaining unit be "appropriate." 4 In reviewing the
Board's determination of what constitutes an appropriate unit, 5 courts will in-
terfere only if the decision is arbitrary or capricious. 6 Thus, it is only in situa-
tions where the record is inadequate to support the decision made that courts
may overturn the Board's judgment.' In exercising its discretionary authority,
the Board's primary test for determining the appropriateness of a bargaining
unit is whether the proposed members share a sufficient "community of in-
terest.' 's Relevant to this inquiry are factors such as the wages, hours, interac-
tion, duties, skills and supervision of the bargaining unit's membership. 9 The
rationale for the community of interest requirement is that by assuring greater
similarity of working conditions of bargaining unit members, a greater
likelihood of effective collective action will belostered." Thus, significant in-
congruities in the composition of a proposed bargaining unit will undermine
• Michael F. Coyne, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 668 F.2d 661, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2388 (2d Cir. 1982).
2
 18C T. KHEEL, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, LABOR LAW 5 14.01[11 (1981).
29 U.S.C. 5 159(a) (1976).
▪ Section 159(a) provides in pertinent part: "Representatives designated or selected for
the purpose of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such
purposes, shall be the exclusive representative of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining. . . ." 29 U.S.C. 5 159(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
5
 Section 8(a)(5) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse
to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of sec-
tion 159(a) of this title." 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5) (1976). For the provisions of section 159(a), see
supra note 4. Thus, the Act mandates that an employer collectively bargain with his employee's
representative when the bargaining unit so represented is "appropriate." See 29 U.S.C. 55
158(a)(5), 9(a) (1976).
6
 Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1974). In Packard the Court held
that the National Labor Relations Act mandates that an employer must bargain with a board-
certified representative, id. at 490, observing:
the issue as to what unit is appropriate for bargaining is one for which no absolute
rule of law is laid down by statute, and none should be by decision. It involves of
necessity a large measure of informed discretion, and the decision of the Board, if
not final, is rarely to be disturbed.
Id. at 491. See also May Department Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376, 380 (1945) (concluding
that the judicial review afforded is not for the purpose of weighing the evidence upon which the
Board acted and perhaps to overrule the exercise of its discretion but to "guarantee against ar-
bitrary action by the Board.")
Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 491-92 (1947).
a See 18C T. KHEEL, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, LABOR LAW 5 14.02 [2] (1981).
Id.
'" Id. Hall, The Appropriate Bargaining Unit; Striking a Balance Between Stable Labor Relations
and Employee Free Choice, 18 WEST. RES. L. REV. 479, 487-88 (1967).
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the unit's "appropriateness," and will release the employer from the statutory
duty to bargain."
In recent years, the community of interest doctrine has been used to
challenge the exclusion of religious order employees from bargaining units con-
taining lay personnel. During the Survey year, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit in Mercy Hospital of Buffalo v NLRB" again con-
sidered the application of this standard to religious order personnel, and con-
tinued a trend toward limiting the exclusion of such persons from bargaining
units for the absence of a community of interests with lay employees.
Challenges to the inclusion of religious order personnel in lay employee
bargaining units have arisen in instances where institutions have been found-
ed, administered or controlled by a religious order to which religious employees
seeking admission to the unit belonged. In its first effort to treat the ap-
propriateness of a mixed lay/religious employee bargaining unit, the Board in
Fordham University"  ordered the inclusion of religious faculty in the unit." In its
next major treatment of the issue, the Board in Seton Hill College" rejected a
challenge to the exclusion of religious faculty," and reversed Fordham University
with respect to any inconsistencies." In excluding the religious faculty, the
Board in Seton Hill based its decision on two grounds. First, the Board reasoned
that the religious faculty "would be subject to conflicting loyalties" if included
in the unit.' 8
 Second, the Board determined that the religious faculty did not
share the same "economic interests" as the lay faculty.' 9
" 18C T. KHEEL, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, LABOR LAW 14.02 [2] (1981). See also
supra note 5.
12 668 F.2d 661, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2388 (2d Cir. 1982).
13 193 N.L.R.B. 134, 78 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1177 (1971).
14 Id. at 140, 78 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1184. In Fordham, seventy of the university's 500
full-time faculty members were members of the Society of Jesus. Id., 78 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at
1184. Most of the Jesuit faculty members lived in a separate building and had their salaries paid
to the order. Id., at 139, 78 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1183. This arrangement, however, was not
mandatory for the order members. Id. The Jesuit faculty were hired and employed under the
same terms and conditions as the lay faculty, and received comparable salaries. Id. The union re-
quested the inclusion of the Jesuits in the faculty bargaining unit, and the employer did not ob-
ject. Id. The Board concluded that as there was "no evidence that membership in the Order is in
any way inconsistent with collective bargaining with respect to a Jesuit's salary or other terms
and conditions of employment," the religious faculty should be included. Id., 78 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) at 1183-84.
15 201 N.L.R.B. 1026, 82 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1434 (1973).
16 3a Id. at 1027, 82 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1435-36.
" Id. at 1027 n.4, 82 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1435 n.4. Seton Hill College was owned and
operated by the Sisters of Charity of Seton Hill College. Id. Over half of the college's faculty were
order members, and members of the order constituted 50% of the institution's board of trustees.
Id. The pay for the religious faculty was sent directly to the order, and there was a contractual
obligation whereby the order returned a substantial portion of the members' salaries to the col-
lege. Id., 82 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1435. The union sought to exclude the religious faculty from
the bargaining unit while the employer requested their inclusion. Id., 82 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at
1434.
18 Id. at 1027, 82 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1435. The Board reasoned that because the order
was in fact the employer, and because the religious employees owed a duty of allegiance to the
order, they were "in a sense part of the employer." Id. Thus, the Board concluded that if they
were included in the bargaining unit, the religious faculty would be torn between their loyalty to
their fellow employees and their duty to the order/employer. Id.
19 Id. The Board reasoned that because the religious faculty had taken vows of poverty
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In the years since Seton Hill College, courts considering the appropriateness
of bargaining units commingling lay and religious personnel of sectarian in-
stitutions have limited that decision's potentially broad application." In 1977,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Niagara University v. NLRB2 ' rendered a
significant decision on the pertinence of religious vows to these bargaining unit
determinations. 22 The Niagara court considered whether a vow of obedience
could constitute a sufficiently conflicting loyalty and whether a vow of poverty
could constitute a sufficiently divergent economic interest to justify exclusion of
the religious faculty from the faculty bargaining unit of an allegedly sectarian
university." The circuit court, distinguishing Seton Hill College, held that under
the facts presented, the religious faculty could not be excluded from the unit. 24
Treating the first theory for excluding the religious faculty, conflicting loyal-
ties," the Niagara court declared that before the possibility of such a conflict
could be demonstrated, the religious order's control of the institution must be
established. 26
 Reviewing Seton Hill College, the Niagara court noted that there
the religious order had owned and operated the institution in question." In
Niagara, however, the order neither held title to the campus nor constituted a
majority of the board of trustees." The court thus concluded that as the thresh-
old requirement of control was not satisfied, the argument that the religious
faculty would be subject to conflicting loyalties was riot viable." The Niagara
court therefore did not need to consider the effect of the religious faculty
and were under a contractual obligation to return a portion of their salaries, they were not in-
terested in economic rewards, and thus did not share the lay employees' interests. Id. Moreover,
the separate treatment of the two groups' fringe benefits was seen by the Board as the employer's
recognition of the groups' diverse economic interests. Id.
20
 See, e.g., NLRB v. Saint Francis College, 562 F.2d 246, 250-51, 96 L.R.R. M. (BNA)
2134, 2136-38 (3d Cir. 1977); Niagara University v. NLRB, 558 F.2d 1116, 1118, 95 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 3354, 3355 (2d Cir. 1977). See generally Note, Religious/Lay Faculty Units: Niagara University:
St. Francis College, 20 B.C.L. REV. 83 (1978).
2i
 558 F.2d 1116, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3354 (2d Cir. 1977).
22 In Sewn Hill, both grounds advanced by the Board for its holding were based in part
on the religious vows taken by the members of the order employed by the college. See supra notes
18-19 and accompanying text. The Board's reasoning, therefore, raised questions whether
religious vows alone would suffice to establish "conflicting loyalties" for religious personnel of
sectarian institutions, or to demonstrate the absence of common "economic interests" between
the religious and lay personnel. In Niagara, the Second Circuit addressed these issues. 558 F.2d at
1117-18, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3354-55. Niagara was factually similar to Seton Hill. Niagara
was a Roman Catholic university founded by the Congregation of the Mission, commonly
known as the Vincentian Order. Id. at 1117, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3354. Twenty-one of the
university's 155 full-time faculty were members of religious orders. Id. The university, which
was chartered by the state of New York, held title to all of the buildings and property on campus.
Id. at 1117-18, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3354-55. A seventeen-member board of trustees, five of
whom were members of the Vincentian Order, governed the university. Id. at 1118, 95
L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3355.
23 Id. at 1120 & n.3, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3356 & n.3.
24 Id. at 1121, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3357-58.
25 Id. at 1119, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3355-56. The Niagara court expressed this con-
cept in terms of an "identity of interest" between the religious employee and the religious
order/employer. Id., 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3356.
26 Id. (citing D'Youville College, 225 N.L.R.B. 792, 92 L.R.R.M. (RNA) 1578 (1976).
27
 558 F.2d at 1119, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3355-56.
26 Id.
29 Id. at 1121, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3357-58.
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members' vows of obedience on their employment situation. 3° The court in-
timated, however, that even if the religious order did control the employer,
vows of obedience could not be relied upon alone to establish that the religious
faculty were subject to conflicting loyalties. 3 ' Considering the second ground
advanced for exclusion, divergence of economic interests, the Niagara court
held that vows of poverty themselves could not establish divergent interests."
The Second Circuit's decision in Niagara therefore had a two-fold effect on
Seton Hill College and its progeny. First, Niagara expressly established as a
threshold requirement the showing of a religious order's "control" over an
employer institution before religious order employees may be excluded for
possible conflicting loyalties." Second, Niagara undercut reliance on religious
vows to establish the presence of either conflicting loyalties or diverse economic
interests. 34 The Niagara court's opinion, however, also left several issues
unresolved. Specifically, Niagara did not address what proof must be adduced
to demonstrate that a religious order "controls" an employer. Furthermore,
assuming an order's control of an employer were to be shown, Niagara did not
deal with what evidence would suffice to establish the potential for conflicting
loyalties of religious order employees.
The Second Circuit's Survey-year decision in Mercy Hospital" readdressed
these issues left unresolved by Niagara, and traced more fully the parameters for
excluding religious order personnel from the bargaining unit of employees of
sectarian institutions. First, the Mercy Hospital court fleshed out the control re-
quirement it had imposed in Niagara for establishing the conflict of interests ex-
clusion theory. 36 The court reaffirmed the position it adopted in Niagara that no
one factor is sufficient to establish that a religious order indeed controls an in-
stitution." Next, the Mercy Hospital court considered what relationship between
religious personnel and the order administering the employer must exist to es-
tablish that the religious employees' interests were closely aligned with the
employer, and thus in conflict with other unit members' interests. 38 The Mercy
Hospital court set out factors which could demonstrate the existence of an iden-
tity of interests between religious personnel and their religious order." The
30 The court stated: "The Board on this appeal understandably has not raised the issue
of the vows of obedience, and we do not consider it an issue." Id., 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3356.
3 ' Id. at 1120 n.3, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3356 n.3. The court noted that the Board had
retreated in its subsequent clarification opinion from its original position that vows of obedience
could suffice to establish an identity of interest between the religious faculty and the order. Id. at
1120, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3356.
32 Id. at 1121, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3358. The Niagara court noted the Board's own
recognition of the irrelevance of vows of poverty to the issue of economic interests. Id. at 1120-21,
95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3357.
33 Id. at 1119, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3356.
36 Id. at 1120 & n.3, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3356 & n.3.
35 668 F.2d 661, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2388 (2d Cir. 1982).
36 Id. at 664-65, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2391-92.
" Id. at 665, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2392.
38 Id. at 665-67, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2392-94. The Mercy Hospital court couched its
discussion in terms of whether the religious employee was "in a sense, part of the employer"
because of her membership in the Order, which allegedly controlled the employer. Id. at 666, 109
L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2392. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
39 668 F.2d at 667, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2393-94.
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Second Circuit's decision in Mercy Hospital thus is the logical extension of its
holding in Niagara University v. NLRB that to exclude religious personnel from a
bargaining unit due to a lack of appropriateness, evidence must be brought de-
monstrating both the order's control of the employer institution, and the reli-
gious employee's identity of interest with the order.
In Mercy Hospital, the hospital had refused to bargain with the certified
representative" of the hospital's full- and part-time business office clerical
employees." The hospital contended that the bargaining unit which had
elected the union as its representative was not appropriate." The facts of the
case showed that in the close representation election, a ballot cast by a religious
order employee was excluded. 43 The challenged ballot was cast by a member of
the Religious Sisters of Mercy (theOrder), a religious order that allegedly con-
trolled the hospital." In the court's view, however, the evidence demonstrated
that the hospital was a New York corporatioh distinct from the Order." The
Order was the sponsoring organization of the hospital, but the hospital cor-
poration held title to the institution's lands and buildings." A seventeen-
member board of trustees, of whom a majority had to be Sisters of Mercy,
governed the hospital." Space in the hospital for a convent was rented by the
Order, and some members of the Order lived there." Twenty-three of the
hospital's 1,500 employees were members of the Order." The Order did not
donate money to the hospita1. 3° The hospital's administrator was a member of
the Order, but she apparently was not under the direct control of the Order in
her supervisory capacity." Finally, the Order-member employee in question
was employed under terms and conditions similar to lay employees." Despite
this evidence of separateness, the Regional Director nevertheless concluded
that the religious employee did not share a community of interest with lay
employees because her Order "controlled" the hospital, and therefore as a
member of the Order she was "related" to the employer." The Regional
Director thus recommended that the challenge to the religious employee's vote
be sustained and the bargaining unit certified. 54
4°
 The union involved was the Buffalo and Western New York Hospital and Nursing
Home Council. Id. at 661, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2389.
" Id. at 662, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2389.
" Id., 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2389.
43 Id., 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2389. The representation election for the contested
bargaining unit produced 33 votes for the union and 32 votes against, with one challenged ballot.
Id., 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2389.








" Id. at 663-64, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2390-91.
21 Id.
" Id. at 662, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2389.
34 Id. at 663, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2390.
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Affirming the Regional Director's findings, the Board distinguished the
Second Circuit's holding in Niagara University." With regard to the issue of the
Order's control over the hospital, the Board in Mercy Hospital read Niagara as
holding that in the absence of control of the institution's board of trustees or
ownership of the institution's facilities, a religious order's control over an in-
stitution could not be established. 56 Thus, the Board reasoned that the converse
situation — majority representation by the Order on the board of trustees —
would be sufficient to establish the necessary control." The Board deemed its
conclusion buttressed by its perception that the Order controlled the hospital's
day-to-day operation, 58 a perception apparently based on the administrator's
membership in the Order. Turning then to the identity of interests between the
religious personnel and the Order, the Board distinguished a decision by the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals apparently in conflict with the Regional Direc-
tor's report." In NLRB v. Saint Francis College, 60 the Third Circuit held that
religious faculty members' vows of obedience and their shared commitment
could not establish the presence of conflicting loyalties sufficient to warrant ex-
clusion from the faculty bargaining unit. 6 ' The Board in Mercy Hospital con-
cluded that Saint Francis was inapplicable, because in the case before it the
Regional Director's decision did not rely on the religious employee's vows of
obedience or poverty. 62 Thus, the Board's decision implicitly adopted the
reasoning that membership in a religious order in itself establishes the presence
of an identity of interests between the order and its members, and therefore
puts the loyalty of religious employees to the order in conflict with their loyalty
to the bargaining unit. Under this analysis, the Order's control of the
employer, which the Board deemed established, automatically severed the
religious employee's community of interests with lay personnel.° Consequent-
ly, the Board adopted the Regional Director's recommendation that the
challenge to the religious employee's ballot be sustained, and certified the
bargaining unit excluding her."
On appeal, the Second Circuit found that the record was insufficient to
support either the Regional Director's finding of control, or his determination
" 250 N.L.R.B. 949 (1980).
36 Id.
5 ' Id. at 949-50. The Board noted that its reasoning in this regard was apparently con-
trary to that of the Third Circuit in NLRB v. Saint Francis College, 562 F.2d 246, 96 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2134 (3d Cir. 1977). Id. at 949 n.3. The Board declared, however, that "No the extent
the court implicitly may have found that a majority control of a board of trustees by a religious
order does not constitute a basis for excluding members of that order from a bargaining unit, we
respectfully disagree." Id.
" Id. at 949.
99 Id. at 949 n.3.
69 562 F.2d 246, 96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2134 (3d Cir. 1977). See also supra note 57.
61 Id. at 255, 96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2141.
52 250 N.L.R.B. at 949.
69 See id., at 949-50.
64 Id. at 950. Subsequently, the hospital refused to bargain with the union in order to
seek judicial review of the certification. 668 F.2d at 662, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2389. The
union filed a charge and the Regional Director issued a complaint alleging that the hospital's
refusal was an unfair labor practice. Id. The Board thereafter issued, without prior hearing, an
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that there was an identity of interests between the religious order employee and
the employer." Turning to the grounds relied upon for finding the absence of a
community of interest between the lay and religious employees, the circuit
court first rejected the Board's reading of the precedent on a religious order's
"control of an institution." 66 The court cited three opinions by the Board in
which members of religious orders were excluded from bargaining units. 67 In
each case, the Mercy Hospital court noted, there had been evidence of a marked
degree of financial control by a religious order over an institution." Such
financial control was absent in Mercy Hospital. 69 Moreover, the Board's reason-
ing that control of a board of trustees established control of an institution's day-
to-day operation was unsupported by precedent, the Mercy Hospital court
declared." The court noted that in both D'Youville College' and Niagara; which
were cited by the Board for support, the absence of majority representation on
the institutions' boards of trustees was relied upon as evidence of the absence of
the orders' control." This factor, however, was not, in the Mercy Hospital
court's estimation, the principal ground of the decision in either of the two
cases." Rather, the Mercy Hospital court declared, "[a]s Niagara makes clear,
reliance on any single factor to the exclusion of others to show control is unac-
ceptable." 74 Thus, the Second Circuit found as unsatisfactory to establish con-
trol the Order's majority representation on the board of trustees, and the hos-
pital administrator's membership in the Order and on the board." The circuit
court therefore remanded the case to the Board for further findings of fact on
the issue of the Order's "control" of Mercy Hospital." The court noted that
on remand, the Board should focus its attention on the responsibilities and
authority of the board of trustees and the administrator of Mercy Hospital."
The court deemed especially important facts demonstrating the board of trus-
tee's actual control of the hospital and whether the Order members serving as
order granting summary judgment to the union, requiring the hospital to bargain with the union,
Id. The hospital appealed, and the Board filed a cross-application for enforcement of its order. Id.
65 Id. at 664, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2391.
66 Id. at 664-665, 109 L.R.R.M. BNA at 2391-92.
67 Id. (citing St. Rose de Lima Hospital, 223 N.L.R.B. 1511, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1181 (1976); Saint Anthony Center, 220 N.L.R.B. 1009, 90 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1405 (1975);
Seton Hill College, 201 N.L.R.B. 1026, 82 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1434 (1973)).
69 668 F.2d at 664-65, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2391-93.
69 Id. at 666, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2394.
7° Id. , at 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2391. The Mercy Hospital court noted that the Board's
conclusion that the Order's majority membership on the board of trustees and the top ad-
ministrator's membership in the Order was sufficient to establish control had been declared in-
sufficient by the Third Circuit in an analogous context. Id. at 666, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at
2392, citing, NLRB v. Saint Francis College, 562 F.2d 246, 250-51, 96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2134,
2136-38 (3d Cir. 1977).
" 225 N.L.R.B. 792, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1578 (1976).
72 668 F.2d at 664-65, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2391-92.
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trustees and the administrator were autonomous, or acted on instructions from
the Order."
Turning to the central inquiry for the exclusion of the religious employee's
vote, the Second Circuit noted that even if the threshold issue of control were
resolved against the Order, it would not necessarily follow that an identity of
interest had been established between the employee and the employer. 79
Rather, the court declared that on remand to gather evidence on the Order's
control, the Board also must justify its finding that the religious employee's in-
terests were those of the employer. 8° The court then considered what facts
could establish such an identity of interest to justify the religious employee's ex-
clusion from the bargaining unit. First, the Second Circuit rejected the Board's
automatic exclusion of the religious employee because of her membership in
the Order." The court recognized that the Board rationalized its per se exclu-
sion by comparing the Mercy Hospital situation to cases involving blood relatives
of management. 82 The circuit court noted, however, that even in those cases,
the blood relationship did not alone establish automatic exclusion." Instead,
the "community of interest" analysis was employed on a case-by-case basis to
determine whether the interests of the family employees differed from those of
the other members of the bargaining unit."
The next ground considered by the court for justifying the religious
employee's exclusion was her religious vows. 85 The circuit court declared that a
natural concomitant of the Board's automatic exclusion in Mercy Hospital was
its reliance on the religious employee's vows, which the court in Niagara had
previously deemed inappropriate." The Mercy Hospital court then turned to the
third justification for exclusion, and declared that differences in the terms and
conditions of employment would suffice to justify the exclusion of religious per-
sonnel from employee bargaining units." The court noted that the wages
received by the lay and religious employees were comparable." The court
declared, however, that other differences in employment terms and conditions,
such as utilization of the privilege of unpaid vacations or differential access to
areas of the hospital could establish grounds for exclusion." The Mercy Hospital
court noted that the religious employee's access to the Order's convent and
dining room," or any other proof showing the religious employee's position
was unique, could suffice to establish such a variance in employment terms."
78 Id
79 Id. at 666, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2392-93.
88 Id., 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2393.
81 Id. at 667, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2393.
" Id. at 666, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2393.
83 Id,
84 Id.
83 Id. at 667, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2393.
86 Id.
87 Id., 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2393-94.
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The practical impact of the Second Circuit's ruling in Mercy Hospital is to
make more difficult the exclusion of religious personnel from employee
bargaining units of institutions affiliated with religious orders. The court's
decision restricts the Board's prior ruling in Seton Hill College to the extent that
proof of a religious order's control of an institution will require some evidence
of financial control. Furthermore, control alone will not suffice to establish
grounds for the exclusion of religious personnel from employee bargaining
units. Rather, evidence demonstrating that the religious personnel are
employed under terms and conditions different from lay personnel must be
produced. The circuit court noted that in Mercy Hospital sensitive competing in-
terests of collective bargaining rights and first amendment rights were in-
volved." Thus, the purpose of the circuit court's ruling requiring evidence to
establish the religious personnel's identity of interest with the employer was
"to strike an appropriate balance between these competing interests without
infringing cherished beliefs." 93
With regard to the effect of proof that the terms and conditions of the
religious and lay personnel's employment differed, however, the Mercy Hospital
court's treatment was somewhat ambiguous. The terms and conditions focused
upon by the court as probative in Mercy Hospital were the wages, the unpaid
vacation privilege, and the differential access to areas within the hospital."
The court's treatment of these factors did not make clear whether differences in
these terms and conditions would themselves suffice to demonstrate an absence
of a community of interest between lay and religious personnel, or would only
be probative if the Order's control of the hospital was first established."
Generally, wages and hours are alone sufficient to determine a bargaining
unit's community of interest. 96 Conversely, differential access would not ap-
pear to be demonstrative of divergent terms and conditions unless the Order
were deemed to control the hospital." The ambiguous treatment of the wage
and hour employment terms, however, could be explained in the context of
levels of proof. The court might well have meant that once control of an institu-
tion by a religious order is established, differences in wages or hours which in
themselves would not be sufficient to justify exclusion of an employee from a
bargaining unit would be sufficient to establish divergent terms of employment
if the employee were a member of the religious order. Thus, a lower threshold
for establishing excludable terms and conditions of employment for religious
personnel would arise upon proof of their Order's control of the employer.
92 Id., 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2394. The court declared that "[n]ot only are the rights
of employees to bargain collectively at stake ... but protected First Amendment rights are also
implicated. . . ." Id.
93 Id.
94 Id., 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2393.
95 See id.
96 See 18C T. KHEEL, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, LABOR LAW § 14.02 [2] (1981).
97 If the Order did not control the employer, the Order member's exclusive access to
areas leased by the Order would bear no relation to the religious personnel's employment situa-
tion. See supra text accompanying note 48.
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2. * Application of "Labor-Nexus" Test to Determine Exclusion of "Confidential
Employees" from NLRA: NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric
Membership Corporation'
Under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act), 2 it is an unfair
labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of employees or to interfere with the right of employees to
engage in activities designed for the purpose of mutual aid or protection.' As
originally enacted in 1935, 4
 the Act in section 2(3) defined "employee" broad-
ly to include "any employee. Section 2(3) also listed specific types of workers
who were excluded from the definition. 6
 Employees with access to confidential
information of their employers ("confidential employees") were not expressly
excluded by the Act. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board),
however, was soon faced with the argument that confidential employees should
be excluded from the Act's definition of "employee" as a policy matter
because they are entrusted with confidential matters and act in the interest of
management.' The Board rejected such an implied exclusion, finding it not
By William J. Hudak, Jr., Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 102 S. Ct. 216 (1981).
Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. 55 151-169 (1976)).
• Section 158(a)(5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 5 158(a)(5) (1976), reads:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer —
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,
subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title.
Id.
Section 158(a)(1) of the Act, Id, 5 158(a)(1), reads:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer — (1) to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157
of this tide.
Id.
Section 157, Id. 5 157, incorporated by reference by section 158(a)(1) reads:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a con-
dition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
Id. 5 157.
* Wagner Act, ch. 117, 46 Stat. 1084 (1931) (current version at 29 U.S.C. 5 48
(1976)).
• Section 2(3) of the Act states:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to
the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states
otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a conse-
quence of or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair
labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially
equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual employed as an
agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home,
or any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any in-
dividual employed as a supervisor. .
29 U.S.C. 5 152(3) (1976) (emphasis added).
6 See supra note 5.
See, e.g., Bull Dog Elec. Prod. Co., 22 N.L.R.B. 1043, 1046 (1940).
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warranted under the Act.' Nevertheless in fulfilling its statutory obligation to
determine the composition of bargaining units under section 9 of the Act,' the
Board adopted a "labor-nexus" test to determine the propriety of excluding
certain employees.° Under this test, employees with access to confidential,
labor-relations information of the employer were excluded from bargaining
units composed of rank and file workers." The Board's rationale for excluding
confidential employees with a labor nexus from bargaining units was that
management should not be required to handle labor relations matters through
employees who are represented by the union with which the company is re-
quired to deal and who may obtain advance information of the company's posi-
tion." Through 1946, the Board applied the labor-nexus test frequently to
identify those individuals who were to be excluded from bargaining units
because of their access to confidential information." In 1946, the Board nar-
rowed the labor-nexus test because, in its view, the definition was too broad
and thus needlessly excluded many employees from bargaining collectively
together with other employees having common interests. 14 Under the "new"
labor-nexus test, the term "confidential" was limited to embrace only those
employees who assist in a confidential capacity persons who exercise
managerial functions in the labor-relations field." Under the original version
of the NLRA as enforced by the Board, therefore, the "labor-nexus" test was
used to determine the propriety of excluding certain confidential employees
from bargaining units.
Congress had an opportunity to review the Board's use of the "labor-
nexus" test in 1947. In that year, Congress amended the NLRA through the
enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act.' 6 The text of the Taft-Hartley Act made no
explicit reference to confidential employees. Congress addressed the scope of
the NLRA's coverage, however, when it discussed the status of confidential
employees in its debate over the Taft-Hartley Act." The House and Senate in-
8 Id.
9 29 U.S.C. $ 159 (1976). The NLRB has been vested with broad discretion to deter-
mine appropriate bargaining units under section 9. See Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330
U.S. 485, 491-92 (1947); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 152-53 (1941).
'° See, e.g., Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 108, 110 (1941); Brooklyn Dai-
ly Eagle, 13 N.L.R.B. 974, 986 (1939).
" See, e.g., NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 102 S. Ct.
216, 222-23 (1981); Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 108, 110 (1941); Brooklyn Daily
Eagle, 13 N.L.R.B. 974, 986 (1939).
" Hoover Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 1321, 1323 (1944).
' 3 NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 102 S. Ct. 216, 222-23
(1981). For a collection of the Board's decisions applying the "labor-nexus" test prior to 1947,
see id., n.11.
14 Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946).
" Id. The Ford Motor approach was followed in three decisions in 1946: Brown &
Sharpe Mfg. Co., 68 N.L.R.B. 487, 489 (1946); St. Louis Indep. Packing Co., 67 N.L.R.B.
543, 547 (1946); Tenn. Gas & Transmission Co., 67 N.L.R.B. 1375, 1379 (1946). In B.F.
Goodrich Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 722 (1956), the Board reaffirmed its previous ruling in Ford Motor
and underscored its intention in future cases "to limit the term 'confidential' so as to embrace
only those employees who assist and act in a confidential capacity to persons who formulate,
determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations." Id. at 724.
16 Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
" NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 102 S. Ct. 216, 224
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itially passed differing bills." Both bills explicitly excluded "supervisors" from
the definition of "employee" in section 2(3). 19 The bills, however, differed in
defining the term "supervisor. " 20
 The House bill defined "supervisor" to in-
clude all confidential employees, 2 ' while the Senate bill made no mention of
confidential employees." The differing bills were submitted to a conference
committee, 23
 and, in committee, the Senate definition of "supervisor," with
no reference to confidential employees, prevailed.'" The Senate version of the
Taft-Hartley Act subsequently became law." The United States Supreme
Court in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, 26
 however, upon examining the House and
Conference Reports, concluded in a footnote that Congress "clearly thought"
that the NLRA did not cover "confidential employees," even under a broad
definition of that term."
The United States Courts of Appeals differ over the propriety of the
Board's practice of excluding from collective-bargaining units only those con-
(1981).
'a Id.
" H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. $ 2(3) (1947); S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. $ 2(3)
(1947).
" NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 102 S. Ct. 216, 224
(1981).
21
 H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. $ 2(12) (1947). Relevant portions of 5 2(12) read as
follows:
The term supervisor means any individual — (C) who by the nature of his duties is
given by the employer information that is of a confidential nature, and that is not
available to the public, to competitors, or to employees generally, for use in the in-
terest of the employer.
Id.
22
 S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. $ 2(11) (1947). Section 2(11) defined supervisor in the
following terms:
The term supervisor means any individual having authority, in the interest of the
employer to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign,
reward, or discipline other employees, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively
to recommend such action if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such









 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
" Id. at 284, n.12. The footnote reads as follows:
The report stated in reference to "confidential employees":
'These are people who receive from their employers information that not on-
ly is confidential but also that is not available to the public, or to competitors, or to
employees generally. Most of the people who would qualib as 'confidential' employees are
executives and are excluded from the Act in any event.
"The Board itself, normally excludes from bargaining units confidential
clerks and secretaries to such people as these." Ibid. (Emphasis added.) In 1946 in
Ford Motor Co. 66 NLRB [sic] 1317, 1322, the Board had narrowed its definition
of "confidential employees" to embrace only those who exercised " 'managerial'
functions in the field of labor relations." The discussion of "confidential
employees" in both the House and Conference reports, however, unmistakably
refers to that term as defined in the House bill, which was not limited , just to those
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fidential employees with a labor nexus while rejecting any claim that all
employees with access to confidential information are beyond the reach of sec-
tion 2(3)'s definition of employee. Some such courts have upheld the Board's
use of the "labor-nexus" test to determine whether confidential employees
should be excluded from bargaining units;" at least one court of appeals has
held that employees working in a confidential capacity without a labor nexus
must be excluded from bargaining units established pursuant to the NLRA. 29
During the Survey year, the Supreme Court in National Labor Relations Board
v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corporation (Hendricks) 30 resolved this
dispute. The Court upheld the Board's practice of excluding from collective-
bargaining units only those confidential employees who assist in a confidential
capacity persons exercising managerial functions in labor relations matters. 3 '
Hendricks involved two companion cases under the same docket number. 32 In
Hendricks, Mary Weatherman, the personal secretary to the general manager of
Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corporation (Hendricks), was
discharged for signing a petition that sought reinstatement of a close friend and
fellow employee who had lost his arm in the course of employment. 33 She filed
an unfair labor practice charge with the Board, alleging that the discharge
violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act." Hendricks argued that Weatherman was
not entitled to the Act's protection since, as a "confidential" secretary, she was
impliedly excluded from the Act's definition of employee in section 2(3). 38 The
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rejected Hendricks' argument, observing
that the Board excluded only those confidential employees who assist and act
confidentially with managers in formulating and effectuating labor relations
policies." The ALJ thus sustained the unfair labor practice charge. 37 The
NLRB affirmed and ordered that Weatherman be reinstated with back pay. 38
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding
that secretaries such as Weatherman who work in a confidential capacity,
in "labor relations." Thus, although Congress may have misconstrued recent
Board practice, it clearly thought that the Act did not cover "confidential
employees" even under a broad definition of that term.
Id.
28 Union Oil of Cal., Inc. v. NLRB, 607 F.2d 852, 853-54 (9th Cir. 1979); NLRB v.
Allied Prod. Corp., 548 F.2d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 1977); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 398
F.2d 669, 670 (6th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Quaker City Life Ins. Co., 319 F.2d 690, 694 (4th Cir.
1963).
29 Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 25, 30 (7th
Cir. 1979).
90 102 S. Ct. 216 (1981).
91 Id. at 221-22.
32 Id. at 219.
33 Id.
34 Id. For the text of section 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C.
	 158(a)(1), see supra note 3.
33 102 S. Ct. at 219-20. For the text of sec. 2(3), 29 U.S.C. S 152(3), see supra note 5.
102 S. Ct. at 220.
37 Id.
98 Id. The Board affirmed "the rulings, findings, and conclusions" of the ALJ. Id.
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without regard to labor relations, must be excluded from bargaining units
established under the Act."
In the companion case, the Malleable Iron Range Company (Malleable)
refused to bargain collectively with the Office and Professional Employees In-
ternational Union (Union) despite certification of the Union by the Board." At
the certification hearing, Malleable had challenged the inclusion of eighteen
employees in the bargaining unit on the ground that they had access to con-
fidential business information." The Board's Regional Director rejected this
objection on the ground that none of the challenged employees was a confiden-
tial employee under the.Board's "labor-nexus" test." Malleable nevertheless
refused to bargain with the union." Seeking relief, the Union filed unfair labor
practice charges with the Board." The Board concluded that Malleable's
refusal to bargain violated sections 8(a)(5) 45 and (1)16
 of the Act and issued an
order requiring Malleable to bargain collectively with the Union.'" Upon
Malleable's petition for review, the Seventh Circuit denied enforcement of the
order because the Regional Director had applied the "labor-nexus" test which
the court had explicitly rejected in its decision involving Hendricks." The
Board petitioned for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court in Malleable
and Hendricks. 49
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases to resolve the conflict
among the courts of appeals over the propriety of-the Board's practice of ex-
cluding from collective-bargaining units only those confidential employees with
a labor nexus." The Court upheld the Board's "labor-nexus" test concluding
that a reasonable basis in laws' existed for the Board to exclude only those con-
fidential employees involved in labor-relations." The Court observed that the
statutory definition of "employee" in section 2(3) embraced the workers whose
status was being challenged in Hendricks." The Court recognized, however,
39 603 F.2d 25, 30 (7th Cir. 1979).






45 29 U.S.C. S 158(a)(5). For text of Section 158(a)(5), see supra note 2.
46 29 U.S.C.	 158(a)(1). For text of Section 158(a)(1), see supra note 3.





51 As a prerequisite to finding that the Board's action had a reasonable basis in law, the
Court has required a finding that the Board applied the proper legal standard and gave the plain
language of the standard its ordinary meaning. See Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 497
(1979); Chem. Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 166 (1971); NLRB v.
Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944).
52
 NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 102 S. Ct. 216, 228
(1981).
53 Id. at 221, 222. For a discussion of these employees, see supra notes 33, 44 and ac-
companying text.
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that the Board had excluded for over forty years those employees who assist
and act in a confidential capacity to managerial persons in the labor-relations
field from the collective-bargaining units determined under the Act. 24 The
Court acknowledged that the respondents both challenged the Board's narrow
labor nexus test and asserted that all employees who have access to any type of
confidential business information of the employer are implicitly excluded from
the definition of employee in section 2(3). 55 The Court emphasized, however,
that the Board's construction of the Act should be followed unless there were
compelling indications that it was wrong." The Court first determined how the
Board treated confidential employees prior to 1947. 57 The Court then reviewed
congressional consideration of this practice which occurred during debates over
the Taft-Hartley Act. 58 Finally, the Court sought to determine whether Con-
gress, in enacting the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 intended to alter the Board's
practice."
The Court reasoned that before 1947 the Board's practice was to exclude
from bargaining units only those confidential employees assisting managers in
the labor-relations field. 6° Soon after the enactment of the NLRA in 1935, the
Court observed, the Board was faced with the argument that individuals who
had access to confidential information should be implicitly excluded from the
definition of "employee" in section 2(3). 6 ' The Court stated that the Board re-
jected such an argument. 62
 The Court observed that the Board did exclude,
however, pursuant to section 9 of the Act, 63 employees with access to confiden-
tial, labor-relations information from bargaining units composed of specified
groups of workers." The Court explained that the Board's rationale for this ex-
54 102 S. Ct. at 222. The Court observed that under a literal reading of section 2(3) any
employee, including Weatherman or the workers in Malleable, would be included in the Act. Id.
This observation implies that the Board's exclusion of confidential employees is under section
2(3). The Court notes, however, that the Board has never accepted the suggestion that confidential
employees are excluded under section 2(3). Id. The Board has, however, chosen to exercise
discretion under section 9 to exclude confidential employees from bargaining units. See supra
notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
55 NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 102 S. Ct. 216, 222
(1981).
" Id.
52 Id. at 224. See also discussion of the Board's pre-1947 practice of excluding from
bargaining units only confidential employees in the labor relations field supra notes 7-15 and ac-
companying text.
" NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 102 S. Ct. 216, 224-25
(1981).
59 Id. See also discussion of the Court's analysis of the legislative history of the Taft-
Hartley Act infra notes 69-88 and accompanying text.
6° 102 S. Ct. at 222. The Court remarked that the Board "routinely applied the labor-
nexus test in numerous decisions to identify those individuals who were to be excluded from
bargaining units because of their access to confidential information" following its formulation of
the test around 1940. Id. at 223. For a collection of cases referred to by the Court, see id. at 222
n.11.
61 Id. at 223.
62 Id.
°' 29 U.S.C. 5 159 (1976). See also supra note 9.
64
 NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 102 S. Ct. 216, 223
(1981).
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elusion was to protect employers who otherwise would be disadvantaged in
labor-relations matters by being required to deal with employees who may ob-
tain advance information of the company's position with regard to contract
negotiations, the disposition of grievances, and other labor-relations matters."
From 1940 to 1946, the Court concluded, the Board routinely applied only the
labor-nexus test to exclude individuals from bargaining units on the basis of ac-
cess to confidential information. 66
 The Court observed that in 1946 the NLRB
limited further the exclusion for access to confidential information by refining
the "labor-nexus" test to extend only to individuals who act in a confidential
capacity to persons who exercise managerial functions in the field of labor-
relations. 67
 The Court, thus, reasoned that when Congress considered the
Taft-Hartley amendments in 1947, the Board's policy regarding confidential
employees was clear: employees having access to confidential information on
labor relations were excluded by the Board from the Act's bargaining units."
The Court observed that the Taft-Hartley Act does not refer explicitly to
confidential employees." According to the Court, however, Congress had con-
sidered the status of confidential employees when it had addressed the scope of
the NLRA's coverage. 74
 The Court observed nothing in the legislative history
of the Taft-Hartley Act that showed that Congress intended to alter the Board's
pre-1947 practice of excluding from bargaining units only confidential
employees in the labor-relations field. 7 ' To the contrary, the Court remarked,
the legislative history indicated that Congress intended to retain the Board's
prior practice."
The Court concluded first that the House conceded to the Senate that not
all confidential employees would be excluded from the definition of
employee." The Court acknowledged that both the House and Senate versions
65 Id.
' Id.
67 Id. at 224.
68
 The Court rejected application of the Bell Aerospace footnote, see supra note 27, to ex-
clude the workers in Hendricks from the definition of "confidential employees." 102 S.Ct. at 227.
In footnote 12 of Bell Aerospace, Justice Powell upon considering the House bill, see supra note 21,
and the Conference Report, see infra note 79 and accompanying text, stated that it was not
necessary that confidential employees be involved in labor relations to be excluded from the Act's
protection. See supra note 27. The Court in Hendricks observed that this discussion was mere dic-
tum in Bell Aerospace because it was not necessary to the determination of the issue raised in Bell
Aerospace, 102 S. Ct. at 227, whether managerial employees are excluded from the Act. NLRB v.
Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 268 (1974). Thus, the court in Hendricks reasoned, Justice
Powell's conclusion with regard to exclusion of confidential employees was entitled to diminished
deference. 102 S. Ct. at 227. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the dictum was incorrect in
light of the Court's discussion of the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act. Id. See discussion
of the Court's analysis of the legislative history infra notes 70-82 and accompanying text.
" NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 102 S. Ct. 216, 224
(1981).
7° Id.
" Id. See also discussion of the Board's pre-1947 practice of excluding from bargaining
units only confidential employees in the labor-relations field, supra notes 7-15 and accompanying
text.
72
 102 S. Ct. at 224.
7 ' Id. at 225 & n.16.
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of the Taft-Hartley Act specifically excluded "supervisors" from the definition
of "employees" in section 2(3). 74 The Court also observed, however, that the
House and Senate bills differed substantially in their definitions." Only the
House bill, the Court emphasized, included confidential employees as within
the scope of the definition of "supervisor.' '76 The Court observed that the Con-
ference Committee ultimately adopted the Senate version which did not in-
clude confidential employees within the definition of "supervisor. "" The Con-
ference Committee, the Court noted, did not feel that it was necessary to make
specific provision for persons working in labor-relations, as was done in the
House bil1, 78 because such employees were already being treated as "super-
visors" by the Board." According to the Court, both Houses 8° concluded that
the Board would continue to treat confidential secretaries as outside the Act,
and adopted the Conference Report. 8 ' Therefore, the Court reasoned, the
court of appeals had erred when it had interpreted the legislative history of
Congress' exclusion of "supervisors" from the definition of "employee" in
section 2(3) as warranting an implied exclusion from the definition of
"employee" for all workers who have access to confidential business informa-
tion of the employer." Furthermore, the Court reasoned, the Taft-Hartley
Act's express inclusion of professional employees" under the Act's covera ge.,
negated an implied exclusion of all employees who have access to confidential
business information." Under the Taft-Hartley Act, the Court observed, Con-
" Id. at 224.
" Id.
7° Id. For the relevant text of the House version's definition of "supervisor," see SUMO
note 21.
" 102 S. Ct. at 225. For the relevant text of the Senate definition of "supervisor," see
supra note 22.
" 102 S. Ct. at 224. See infra note 79 for the relevant text of the conference
Committee's Report and accompanying text.
' The Court observed that the following statement by the House Managers was ap-
pended to the Conference Report:
The conference agreement, in the definition of "supervisor," limits such
term to those individuals treated as supervisors under the Senate amendment. In
the case of persons working in labor relations, personnel and employment depart-
ments, it was not thought necessary to make specific provision, as was done in the
House bill, since the Board has treated, and presumably will continue to treat,
such persons as outside the scope of the Act. This is the prevailing Board practice
with respect to such people as confidential secretaries as well, and it was not the in-
tention of the conferees to alter this practice in any respect.
102 S. Ct. at 225 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep, No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1947)).
8° Id. at 225 & n.16.
,31 Id. at 225.
82 Id. at 225.
83 For the definition of "professional employees" included in the Taft-Hartley Act, see
section 2(12) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. $ 152(12). The Court observed that the definition of "profes-
sional employees" was intended to include such persons as legal, engineering, scientific and
medical personnel together with their junior professional assistants. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 510,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1947). 102 S. Ct. at 225.
81 See section 9(b) of the Wagner Act, 29 U.S.C. 5 159(b) (providing that the Board
may not approve a bargain unit "if such unit includes both professional employees and
employees who are not professional employees unless a majority of such professional employees
vote for inclusion in such a unit." Id.)
" NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 102 S. Ct. 216, 225
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gress intended to cover professional employees and their junior professional
assistants." The Court reasoned that almost all such persons would have ac-
cess to confidential information and thus would fall within the broad definition
of confidential employee under the House bill." The Court, therefore, de-
clined to read an implied exclusion for confidential employees because such an
exclusion would displace almost the entirety of the express professional-
employee inclusion. 88
The Court could find nothing showing that Congress disapproved of the
Board's using a "labor-nexus" test to identify confidential employees whom
the Board would exclude from bargaining units. The Conference Committee,
the Court noted, was aware of the Board's line of decisions excluding from
bargaining units confidential employees in the labor-relations field. 89 The
Court examined the statement appended by the House Manager to the Con-
ference Report which implied that Congress viewed any secretaries with access
to confidential information as being excluded from the Act's coverage." The
Court concluded that the only plausible interpretation of the Conference
Report was that only employees involved in labor-relations, personnel and
employment functions, and confidential secretaries to such persons may be
denied the full benefits of the Taft-Hartley Act. 9 '
Concluding that the Board's treatment of confidential employees had a
reasonable basis in law, 92 the Court returned to the disposition of Hendricks'
and Malleable's claims. In Hendricks, the Court observed that the employer
conceded that Mary Weatherman had no confidential duties with respect to
labor policies. 93 The Court, therefore, ordered her reinstatement." In
Malleable, the Court stated, the employer made no argument that the
employees trying to negotiate as a bargaining unit satisfied the Board's "labor-
nexus" test." The Court concluded that the court of appeals had erred in
ordering the Board to apply a broad definition of confidential employees to in-
(1981).
86
 Id. See also supra note 82.
87 102 S. Ct. at 225.
88 Id. The professional-employee inclusion is set out in section 2(12) of the Taft-Hartley
Act, 29 U.S.C. $ 152(12) (1976).
89
 102 S. Ct. at 227 & n.20. The Court noted that the Board's labor-nexus test has been
brought to the attention of Congress through the NLRB's annual reports. Id. at 227 n.20. See,
e.g., N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 34 & n.92 (1945). Significantly, the Court found the Board's refine-
ment of the "labor-nexus" test in Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946), had been in-
cluded in the NLRB's report submitted to Congress five months before the Conference Corn-
mitee Report was issued. 102 S. Ct. at 227 n.20. See 11 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 32 & nn.18-21
(1947).
90 102 S. Ct. at 227. See the relevant text of the House Manager's statement supra note
79 and accompanying text.
91 102 S. Ct. at 228.
" Id. For a discussion of "reasonable basis in law," see supra note 51.
93 102 S. Ct. at 228. The Court noted that "Weatherman's tasks were 'deliberately
restricted so as to preclude her from' gaining access to confidential information concerning labor
relations." Id. at 229 n.23 (quoting 236 NLRB 1616, 1619 (1978)). See also Id. at 220 n.5.
94 Id. at 229.
9 5 Id.
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elude all possession of confidential business information." The Court therefore
remanded Malleable for further proceedings consistent with the opinion."
In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Powell agreed with the
majority that employees with access to confidential business information are
not for that reason alone excluded from the NLRA as "confidential
employees." 99 Justice Powell concurred that Congress' inclusion of profes-
sional employees indicated that it did not intend to exclude all confidential
employees. 99 Powell observed, however, that Congress intended by enacting
the Taft-Hartley Act to establish a sharp line between management and
labor.'" He therefore dissented from the majority's conclusion that Mary
Weatherman was not a confidential employee who should be excluded from the
Act because he viewed the majority's decision as tending to "obliterate the line
between management and labor.'"°' Moreover, Justice Powell disagreed with
the Court's reading of the Conference Report to include confidential
secretaries within the NLRA.I° 2
Consistent with his perception that a basic purpose of the Taft-Hartley
Act was to establish a statutory line separating management and labor,'" and
that Congress had intended to exclude from the coverage of the Taft-Hartley
Act all individuals allied with management,'" Justice Powell viewed the "con-
fidential employee"'" exclusion and the "labor-nexus" test as part of the ef-
fort to keep the line between management and labor distinct.'" He remarked
that employees who assist and act in a confidential capacity in labor-relations
96 Id.
° Id. The Court remanded the issue whether the Malleable employees should have
been excluded from the Act because the court of appeals had not addressed Malleable's conten-
tion that some of the eighteen employees should have been excluded from the bargaining unit for
reasons entirely unrelated to whether they were confidential employees. Id. The Court noted that
Malleable seeks to argue that thirteen of the challenged persons should be excluded as
"managerial" employees, and that another four should be excluded as "supervisors." Id. at 229
n.24.
98 Id. at 229 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
99 Id.
10° Id. Powell drew support for this congressional intent from the Court's decision in
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974). 102 S. Ct. at 230 (Powell, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
1 °' Id. (citing Packard Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 494 (1947) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting)).
102 102 S. Ct. at 230-31 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
14 ' See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
It was to further this statutory purpose, Justice Powell continued, that the Board
originally adopted the "supervisory employee" exclusion from the NLRA. Id. Justice Powell
observed that the Board developed the "confidential employee" as well as the "managerial" ex-
clusions to insure that employees who by their "duties, knowledge, or sympathy were aligned
with management should not be treated as members of labor." Id.
'°5 NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 102 S. Ct. 216, 230
(1981) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Taft-Hartley Act had been
enacted, Powell observed, because the Board breached the line between management and labor
by deeming supervisors to be "employees" within the Act. Id.
106 Justice Powell cited four Board decisions excluding employees who were sympathetic
to management from the ranks of labor: AFL-CIO, 120 N.L.R.B. 969, 973 (1958) (excluding
employees who "formulate, determine and effectuate an employer's policies"); Dry Goods, 74
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matters clearly fall on the side of management because of their knowledge of
sensitive labor-relations information."' The "labor-nexus" test, however, in
Justice Powell's view, is not exclusive. He criticized the majority and the Board
for their rigid insistence on the labor nexus in the case of confidential
secretaries.'" The Justice concluded that confidential secretaries who work
closely with management and who have access to "the most sensitive details of
management decisionmaking" clearly fall on the side of management.'" Inclu-
sion of confidential secretaries in the ranks of labor, in his view, conflicts with
the basic framework of the labor laws."°
Moreover, Justice Powell disagreed with the majority's reading of the
Conference Committee Report to exclude confidential secretaries from the
definition of "supervisor.'"" Powell stated that Congress decided not to in-
clude an explicit provision in the Taft-Hartley Act excluding confidential
secretaries because it believed that the Board had been treating, and
presumably would continue to treat, such employees as allied to
management.'" He noted that this understanding was not without support in
the case law prior to 1947. 1 ' 3
 Justice Powell concluded, therefore, that Con-
gress intended to exclude all confidential secretaries from the Act." 4 In his
view, the Board even now may not extend coverage to confidential secretaries
because such extension would violate the Act." 5
Justice Powell correctly perceived that prior to the enactment of the Taft-
Hartley Act the Board did not apply only the "labor-nexus" test to exclude
confidential employees from collective-bargaining units. Although the Board
frequently did exclude from bargaining units certain confidential employees
N.L.R.B. 1167, 1175 (1947) (exclusion of assistant buyers who had interests more closely iden-
tified with those of management); Burke Brewery, Inc., 54 N.L.R.B. 1061, 1062 (1944) (ex-
cluding employees who because of their familial relation to management are on an intimate rela-
tionship with officers of the company); Freitz & Sons, 47 N.L.R.B. 43, 47 (1943) (exclusion of
"expediters" who are closely related to management). 102 S. Ct. at 230 (Powell, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
107 102 S. Ct. at 231 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1 " Id. In Powell's view, the "labor-nexus" test is but a "means to the end" of identify-
ing employees who are allied with management. Id.
100 Id.
110 Id.
"I Id. See discussion of the Court's interpretation of the Conference Committee Report
supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
"2
 102 S. Ct. at 231 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
'" Id. at 231 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Powell
noted several NLRB decisions excluding confidential secretaries from the Act irrespective of a
labor nexus: E.P. Dutton & Co., 33 N.L.R.B. 761, 766 (1941) (exclusion of secretaries to officers
of the company from the bargaining unit of clerical employees without any mention of a labor
nexus); Montgomery Ward & Co., 36 N.L.R.B. 69, 73 (1941) (secretaries of store managers ex-
cluded without reference to labor nexus); Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 13 N.L.R.B. 974, 986 (1939)
(private secretaries excluded from bargaining unit where union believes the personal and con-
fidential relationship between the secretaries and the company's officers is such as to create a
possible division of loyalties between management and potential bargaining agent). 102 S. Ct. at
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because of their contact with labor-relations, 16 it also excluded confidential
secretaries from bargaining units without regard to their contact with labor-
relations."' The Board stated that the "nature of a personal secretary's work is such
that much of the confidential matter pertaining to the management passes
through his or her hands. " 1 e Accordingly, the Board excluded such secretaries
from collective-bargaining units because "management should not be required
to handle [confidential] material through employees in the union with which it
is dealing.'" This exclusion was consistent with the Board's practice of ex-
cluding from bargaining units employees who were not privy to confidential in-
formation but who by their duties, knowledge and sympathy were aligned with
management.'" Justice Powell, therefore, was correct in asserting that the
Board's practice prior to the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act was to exclude
confidential secretaries from bargaining units without regard to labor-
relations.
Justice Powell also correctly observed that when Congress enacted the
Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, it intended to exclude confidential secretaries from
the Act. The House and Senate bills differed over whether all confidential
employees should be excluded from the Act"' and the differing bills were sub-
mitted to a Conference Committee.' 22 The Committee adopted th:-. Senate bill
which did not mention confidential employees."' The Committee acknowl-
edged, however, that the Board's prevailing practice was to exclude confiden-
tial secretaries from the Act.'" The Committee stated that it did not intend to
alter that practice."5 Both the House and the Senate were appraised of these
statements and adopted the Report.' 26 The majority's holding that Congress
did not intend to exclude confidential secretaries from the Taft-Hartley Act,
therefore, disregards clear evidence of legislative intent.
The Court's decision in Hendricks, however, will apply only to a narrow set
of factual circumstances. The Court acknowledged that Weatherman was a
unique case inasmuch as her tasks were " 'deliberately restricted so as to
preclude her from' gaining access to confidential information concerning labor
relations.'" 27
 In her case, therefore, the Court remarked that the Board's
"6 For a list of the Board's decisions applying the "labor-nexus" test, see id. at 223
n.11.
1 " See, e.g., E.P. Dutton & Co., 33 N.L.R.B. 761, 766 (1941); Montgomery Ward &
Co., 36 N.L.R.B. 69, 73 (1941); Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 13 N.L.R.B. 974, 986 (1939).
"a Id. (emphasis supplied).
"a Id.
123 See, e.g., Burke Brewery Co., 54 N.L.R.B. 1061, 1062 (1947); Denver Dry Goods,
74 N.L.R.B. 1167, 1175 (1947) (assistant buyers have interests more closely identified with those
of management).
11 See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
122 NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 102 S. Ct. 216, 225
(1981).
'" H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1947).
"4 Id.
125 Id
126 The Clerk of the House of Representatives read the Conference Report to the
Members of the House on June 4, 1947. 93 CONG. REC. 6371 (1947). Senator Taft included the
Conference Report in his statement to the Senate. Id. at 6441.
127 NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 102 S. Ct. 216, 229
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labor-nexUs test was not met.'" It is unlikely, however, that Weatherman's
position is the same as that of executive secretaries in general.' 29 In most cases,
therefore, confidential secretaries to executive officers of corporations likely
will be treated as outside the scope of the Act. After Hendricks, the determina-
tion whether the secretary assists or acts in a confidential capacity to persons
exercising managerial functions in the labor-relations field will depend on the
circumstances of the particular case. It is clear, however, that personal
secretaries to managerial personnel may in some cases be included in bargain-
ing units on the side of labor.
Furthermore, the majority's holding that the "labor-nexus" test must be
satisfied before confidential employees may be excluded from bargaining units
under the Act is contrary to the policy and purposes of the NLRA and the Taft-
Hartley Act. The stated policy of the NLRA is to mitigate and eliminate
obstruction to commerce by encouraging employees to bargain collectively
with their employers."° The Act seeks to encourage collective bargaining by
protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing for the
purpose of negotiating the terms of their employment or other mutual aid or
protection.'" One purpose of the NLRA, therefore, was to establish a line be-
tween management and labor. 132 When the Board breached this line by deem-
ing supervisors to be employees within the NLRA,' 33 Congress passed the
Taft-Hartley Act with its explicit exclusion of supervisory employees.'" Con-
gress determined that supervisors should be excluded from the Act because
their interests were adverse to those of labor. 133 The Court's holding in Hen-
dricks breaches this intended separation by permitting secretaries who work
closely with management and who are privy to all but labor-related details of
management decision-making to be included in bargaining units on the side of
labor.'" The confidential secretary to a "supervisory" or "managerial"
employee occupies a position of trust and loyalty that is inconsistent with labor-
management interest conflicts.'" By virtue of the policy and purposes of the
labor laws, therefore, the personal secretaries of supervisory or managerial
employees should be differentiated from rank-and-file employees regardless of
their contact with labor-relations information. The decision in Hendricks,
n.23 (1981).
126 Id. at 229.
129 Id. at 229 n.23.
13° 29 U.S.C. S 151 (1976).
131 rd.
132 NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275-78 (1974).
133
	
Packard Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 493 (1947).
134 29 U.S.C. S 152(3) (1976).
139 NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974).
"6 Id.
'" NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 102 S. Ct. 216, 231
(1981) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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however, permits confidential employees to bargain on the side of labor if they
do not have access to labor-relations information."a
Hendricks leaves open whether confidential employees with access to labor-
relations information should be excluded totally from the NLRA. The Board's
current policy excludes such employees only from collective-bargaining units
established under the Act.'" The Board argued in Hendricks, however, that
even if Weatherman was a confidential employee excludable from a bargaining
unit, section 8(a)(1) of the Act barred Hendricks from discharging her for
engaging in activity protected by the Act.'" The Court declined to address this
issue because Weatherman did not satisfy the "labor-nexus" test and was thus
not excluded from the bargaining unit."' The dissent:, however, criticized the
Board policy of allowing confidential employees who are excluded from
bargaining units by virtue of their connection with labor-relations to assert the
other protections of the Act.'"
It is unclear whether employees who serve in a confidential capacity to
persons exercising managerial functions in the labor-relations field are com-
pletely excluded from the NLRA. The NLRB permits employees who are ex-
cluded from collective-bargaining units, nonetheless to assert the full protec-
tion of the Act.'" The courts of appeals are divided over whether this policy
should be accepted. Some courts reject the Board's practice of granting
employees who are excludable from bargaining units the same protection as
that afforded employees who may collectively bargain.'" At least one Court
has apparently accepted the Board's practice.'"
Justice Powell rejected the Board's position that confidential employees
are not excluded from the NLRA as a whole but only from collective-
bargaining units.'" In his view, the position is inconsistent with the basic
philosophy of the Act 147 which is to keep the line between management and
labor distinct.'" The Board developed the "labor-nexus" test, Justice Powell
observed, because it recognized that " 'management should not be required to
handle labor-relations matters through employees who are represented by the
union.' "149 Under the Board's policy, the Justice reasoned, confidential
138 102 S. Ct. at 228.
133 See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
' 4° 102 S. Ct. at 220 n.2.
141 Id. at 226 n.19.
' 42 See infra notes 146-152 and accompanying text.
'" See, e.g. Bethlehem Steel Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1230, 1232 & n.2 (1945); Colorado
Power Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 699, 710 (1939), enforced, 111 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1940).
144 Peerless of Am., Inc. v. NLRB, 484 F.2d 1108, 1112 (7th Cir. 1973); NLRB v.
Wheeling Elec. Co., 444 F.2d 783, 788 (4th Cir. 1971).
145 Southern Greyhound Lines, 426 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir. 1970) (assuming without
discussion that confidential employees are not excluded from the Act in its entirety).
144 NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 102 S. Ct. 216, 232
(1981) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
147 Id.
'" See supra notes 104-110 and accompanying text.
143 102 S. Ct. at 232 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Hoover Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 1321, 1323 (1944)).
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employees with a daily access to labor-relations information and the manage-
ment's bargaining position might do anything in furtherance of their allegiance
to labor except join the union.'" In such cases, Justice Powell observed,
management would be powerless to demote or dismiss them or otherwise to
protect themselves, at least without the risk of an unfair labor practice charge
being filed.'" The Justice concluded that management should not be "re-
quired to expose its flank to confidential employees who are overtly committed
to the union or the cause of labor in all but actual membership. "152 Since the
majority, however, refused to address the issue whether confidential employees
are not excluded from the whole Act but only from bargaining units, manage-
ment may for some time find it difficult to maintain confidentiality of its
bargaining position.
B.* Elections, Invalidity of Minority Quotas for Union Elective Offices:
Donovan v. Illinois Education Association'
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 2
(LMRDA) was enacted to insure high standards of ethical conduct in labor ac-
tivity and protect employees' rights to organize, elect representatives and
bargain collectively. 3
 Section 401(e) of the LMRDA requires that all union
elections be held by secret ballot and provides that, "every member [of the
union] in good standing shall be eligible to be a 'candidate and to hold office
(subject to . . . reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed) and shall have the
right to vote for . . . the candidate or candidates of his choice. . . " 4
 The
"D 102 S. Ct. at 232 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Powell
reasoned that employees with a labor nexus would be excluded from bargaining units. Id. They
could, however, join picket lines, sign petitions advocating the cause of labor, speak out against
management at employee meetings, and engage in all manner of concerted activity without fear
of reprisal. Id.
SI Id.
' 1 ' 2 Id.
• Jon S. Rand, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982).
2
 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. SS 401-531 (1976).
29 U.S.C. 4 401 (1976).
• 29 U.S.C. 481(e) (1976) provides in its entirety:
In any election required by this section which is to be held by secret ballot a
reasonable opportunity shall be given for the nomination of candidates and every
member in good standing shall be eligible to be a candidate and to hold office (sub-
ject to section 504 of this title and to reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed)
and shall have the right to vote for or otherwise support the candidate or can-
didates of his choice, without being subject to penalty, discipline, or improper in-
terference or reprisal of any kind by such organization or any member thereof.
Not less than fifteen days prior to the election notice thereof shall be mailed to each
member at his last known home address. Each member in good standing shall be
entitled to one vote. No member whose dues have been withheld by his employer
for payment to such organization pursuant to his voluntary authorization provided
for in a collective bargaining agreement shall be declared ineligible to vote or be a
candidate for office in such organization by reason of alleged delay or default in the
payment of dues. The votes cast by members of each local labor organization shall
be counted, and the results published, separately. The election officials designated
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United States Supreme Court, considering the reference to "reasonable
qualifications," has held that this language should be given a narrow inter-
pretation, allowing only minor qualifications for union office candidates.' In
line with those decisions, during the Survey year the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit held in Donovan v. Illinois Education Association 6 that
union voting provisions which reserve a certain percentage of elective offices
for minorities violate section 401(e). 7
 While the decision may have far-reaching
implications for labor organizations which wish to guarantee minorities
representation, there are indications that the holding in the case may be limited
to its peculiar facts.
The Illinois Education Association (the Association) is a union of 50,000
membersa which represents about half of all public school teachers in Illinois.'
The Association is governed essentially by two bodies: the Representative
Assembly and the Board of Directors.'° The Representative Assembly has 600
members who are elected by the entire union membership." The Board of
Directors (which originally consisted of fifty members) now has members,
some of whom are elected by the Representative Assembly and some by the
union locals.' 2
 In 1974, the Association's membership, by majority vote,
amended its by-laws in two ways." First, members of Black, Asian, Hispanic,
and American Indian minority groups were guaranteed collectively eight per-
cent of the seats in the Representative Assembly.' 4 If during an election these
minority groups did not collectively attain eight percent of the Assembly seats,
the Board of Directors was directed to expand the Assembly with appointments
of minority members until an eight percent minority representation in the
Representative Assembly was obtained.'" Second, the Board of Directors was
expanded to fifty-four members and the four additional seats were reserved for
members from the special minority groups, regardless of how many seats they
might win in the customary fashion."
In 1977, the Secretary of Labor filed a complaint, unrelated to the by-laws
amendments, which alleged that the Association violated Section 401(d) of the
in the constitution and bylaws or the secretary, if no other official is designated,
shall preserve for one year the ballots and all other records pertaining to the elec-
tion. The election shall be conducted in accordance with the constitution and
bylaws of such organization insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions
of this subchapter.
5
 Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club Employees Union, Local 6, 391 U.S. 492, 499 (1968)
("Congress plainly did not intend that the authorization in $ 401(e) of 'reasonable qualifications
uniformly imposed' should be given a broad reach.") See also Local 3489, United Steelworkers of
Am. v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305, 309 (1977).
6 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 641.
a Id. at 639.
9 Id. at 642.
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LMRDA' 7 by appointing rather than electing its Secretary-Treasurer." The
district court ordered an election for the office." While the ground rules for the
election were being adjudicated, however, the government objected to the
amended by-laws on the basis of Section 401(e)" and moved to enjoin their use .
in the election. 2 ' Notwithstanding this motion, the district court ordered that
the election be conducted according to the Association's existing by-laws.".
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit first rejected the Association's contention
that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the legality of the challenged by-laws
because the by-laws were not challenged in the government's initial pleading."
The court concluded that the legality of the by-laws were sufficiently related to
the question of the election of the Secretary-Treasurer to make the by-laws
issue appealable. 24 Since the composition of the Representative Assembly is
brought into question by the challenged by-laws and the Representative
Assembly elects the Secretary-Treasurer, the court reasoned, the by-laws must
be legal under the LMRDA in order to hold a legal election pursuant to the
statute." Similarly, the court stated, the composition of the Board of Directors
is called into question because nominees for the Secretary-Treasurer position
will be nominated by a committee composed of members of the Board. The
court therefore concluded that the challenged by-laws were a properly ap-
pealable issue."
Moving to the merits of the case, the court observed that the challenged
by-laws did not involve questions on the legality of affirmative action under
civil rights statutes or the fourteenth amendment. 27 The court noted that the
LMRDA was enacted before affirmative action became a pressing legal issue;"
that Congress had not in the LMRDA intended to remedy racial discrimina-
tion, 29 and that the Association had never been accused of racial discrimination
for which it was attempting to make amends. 3° Rather, the court found that,
although the Association was attempting to promote affirmative action, its by-
laws should be judged by the same standards developed under the LMRDA as
" 29 U.S.C. 481(d) (1976) provides:
Officers of intermediate bodies, such as general committees, system boards,
joint boards, or joint councils, shall be elected not less often than once every four
years by secret ballot among the members in good standing or by labor organiza-
tion officers representative of such members who have been elected by secret
ballot.
" Donovan, 667 F.2d at 639.
19 Id,









29 Id. See 105 CoNG. REC. 15826 (1959) (Remarks of Sen. Landrum).
3° Donovan, 667 F.2d at 640.
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any other union election practice. 3 ' On the basis of those standards, the court
rejected the challenged by-laws."
The Donovan court then focused on the impact of the challenged by-laws on
the freedom of candidacy and voting guaranteed by Section 401(e). 33 The court
observed that any union member who did not belong to one of the specified
minority groups was precluded from seeking one of the reserved positions,
either on the Association's Board of Directors or in its Representative
Assembly. 34 Although the appeals court acknowledged that no evidence was
available concerning the proportion of whites in the Association, it assumed
that they constituted the vast majority of the union. 35 The court stated that,
while section 401(e) allows "reasonable qualifications" to be set as conditions
for candidate eligibility," the clause had been narrowly construed by the
Supreme Court" and no decision could be located which countenanced the dis-
qualification of a majority of union members from a leadership position — no
matter how reasonable the qualifications seemed." Moreover, the Donovan
court noted, the by-laws at issue raised the possibility of self-perpetuating in-
cumbency, one of the specific practices which the LMRDA was intended to
prohibit." Since the Board of Directors may appoint up to eight percent of the
Representative Assembly, and the Assembly elects many members of the
Board, the court concluded that the Board conceivably could employ their ap-
pointive powers to insure their reelection." In addition, the court stated, the
four reserved positions on the Board guarantee minorities more seats than they
might hope to attain in a democratic election.'"
The Donovan court cautioned that, while the challenged by-laws do have a
great impact on freedom of candidacy and voting, it would not hold that no set
of facts could support the restrictions at issue." Instead, the court merely
declared that the burden of justification had not been met by the Association in
Donovan because neither the purpose nor the choice of the quotas has been ade-
quately explained." The court noted that the absence of information on factors
31 Id.
32 Id. at 641-42.
" Id. at 641.
34 Id.
" Id.
36 Id. 29 U.S.C. 481(e) (1976); see supra note 4.
" Donovan, 667 F.2d at 641. See Local 3489, United Steelworkers of Am. v. Usery, 429
U.S. 305, 309 (1977); Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club Employees Union, Local 6, 391 U.S. 492,
499 (1968).
" Donovan, 667 F.2d at 641. The court acknowledged that some decisions such as Bren-
nan v. Local 5724, United Steelworkers of Am. 489 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1973), had upheld can-
didacy restrictions which disqualified more than half of a union's membership for an elective
position, but that the qualification which Brennan upheld was identical to the one subsequently
struck down in Local 3489, United Steelworkers of Am. v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305, 307 n.3 (1977).
39 Donovan, 667 F.2d at 641. See Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club Employees Union, Local
6, 391 U.S. 492, 499 (1968).
40 See Donovan, 667 F.2d at 641.
41 Id.
42 Id.
" Id. at 641-42.
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such as the Association's racial and ethnic composition, the composition of the
Association's membership among the four specified minority groups, and
minority representation on the Association's ruling bodies influenced its deci-
sion." The Donovan court also stated that there was no indication why Asians
and American Indians, which comprise a very low percentage of Illinois'
school children, were favored over other minorities, and indicated that the by-
laws would allow the "bizzare possibility" of appointing exclusively Asians to
all the reserved positions. 45
 Finally, the court asserted that if the Association's
white members wish to favor minorities in elected position, they may do so "in
sufficient numbers to make unnecessary the electoral restrictions. .
The decision of the court in Donovan is essentially consistent with other
cases construing section 401(e) of the LMRDA, including the Supreme
Court's holding in Local 3489, United Steelworkers of America v. Usery. 47
 In Usery,
the Court found that the statutory exception for "reasonable qualifications""
for candidacy had to be balanced against the statutory command for
democratic union elections." The Usery Court found that a meeting attendance
requirement which disqualified more than ninety-five percent of the member-
ship was unreasonable." Other courts addressing burdensome attendance re-
quirement also have rejected them. 51
 Similarly, courts have rejected several
other voting procedures; nominating procedures which have the effect of giving
some locals a greater voice than others;" continuous membership re-
quirements of five years;" prior office holding requirements which disqualified
93 percent of the membership; 54
 and a parent local membership requirement
which disqualified more than 60 percent of the total membership which be-
longed to branch locals."
Moreover, the only case besides Donovan to deal with racial requirements
— Schultz v. Local 1291, International Longshoremen's Association 56 — is in accord
44 Id. at 642.
" Id.
46 Id.
" 429 U.S. 305 (1977).
48 29 U.S.C. $ 481(e) (1976). See supra note 4.
" Usery, 429 U.S. 312-13. See Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club Employees Union, Local 6,
391 U.S. 492, 499 (1968).
58 Usery, 429 U.S. at 310.
" See, e.g., Marshall v. Local 1402, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 617 F.2d 96, 99 (4th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 205 (1981) (meeting attendance requirement disqualified 93
percent of membership); Usery v. Local Div. 1205, Amalgam Transit Union, 545 F.2d 1300,
1303 (1st Cir. 1976) (meeting attendance requirement disqualified 94 percent of membership).
" See Usery v. Dist. 22 United Mineworkers of Am., 543 F.2d 744, 749 (10th Cir. 1976)
(nominating procedure which called for the assent of five locals allowed five smallest locals com-
prising only five percent of total membership to nominate, while four largest locals comprising
more than 50 percent of membership could not nominate).
" See Wirtz v. Locals 406, 406A, 406B & 406C, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers,
254 F. Supp. 962, 966 (E.D. La. 1966).
54 Ste Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club Employees Union, Local 6, 391 U.S. 492, 502
(1968).
" Hodgson v. Local Union 18, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, 440 F.2d 485 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 852 (1971).
58 338 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Hodgson v. Local 1291, Int'l
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with Donovan in matters of law, although the facts in Schultz differ somewhat
from those in Donovan. In Schultz, the district court invalidated an election held
under by-laws which allocated offices between white and "colored" races.'"
The court found that there was no objective relation between the qualifications
for the offices and the offices' duties." The Schultz court further observed that
the challenged by-laws excluded individuals who might be seen to belong to
neither race."
Although the Seventh Circuit's decision in Donovan is firmly in line with
established precedent, the decision at least partially turned on the inartfully
drafted by-laws and an inadequately developed trial record. The Donovan court
did not hold that no set of facts could support the challenged by-laws, but in-
stead declared that in the case before it the basis for the minority quotas was
unexplained. 60 The by-laws might have passed muster had they been grounded
in the proposition that minority teachers have special knowledge of the learning
problems of children from their specific minority groups, and if the minority
quotas bore some statistical relationship to the number of individuals from
specific minority groups in either the Illinois school population or the Associa-
tion's membership. Moreover, skillfully drafted by-laws may have allayed the
court's objections that the challenged scheme allows for self-perpetuating in-
cumbency on the Board of Directors and the appointment of individuals to the
Association's ruling bodies without regard to the special minority group they
belonged to. In short, the court's concern that the scheme threatened freedom
of candidacy and the scope of the franchise — that the candidacy qualifications
were unreasonable within the meaning of section 40 1 (e) — might have been
overcome if the restrictions were more thoughtfully and precisely drawn. Given
the court's concern about these procedural deficiencies, the decision in Donovan
may be but a minor obstacle to labor organizations which wish to pursue af-
firmative action with respect to their ruling structures.
II. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Employer Unfair Labor Practices
1. * The Selective Disciplining of Labor Union Officials — Two Contrasting Views:
Fournelle v. NLRB' and NLRB v. Armour-Dial, Inc.'
When labor unions engage in illegal strikes, employers may desire to
discipline participating union officials more severely than participating rank-
and-file union members. The legality of this practice by employers has become
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 461 F.2d 1262 (3d Cir. 1972).
57 Schultz, 338 F. Supp. at 1205, 1208.
58 Id. at 1206-07.
59 Id. at 1208.
60 Donovan, 667 F.2d at 641-42.
By Peter E. Hutchins, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW,
' 670 F.2d 331, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2441 (D.C. Cir, 1982).
2 638 F.2d 51, 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2265 (8th Cir. 1981).
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the focal point of recent decisions by the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) and several federal circuit courts of appeals. The question presented
in these cases is whether the imposition by employers of selective disciplining
upon union officials and stewards constitutes an unfair labor practice in viola-
tion of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 3 The provisions of the
NLRA declaring certain actions of employers unfair labor practices and pro-
hibiting such actions are intended to protect from employer interference the
self-organization of employees as well as the process of collective bargaining.*
Therefore, the NLRB and the courts have been asked to determine whether the
selective disciplining of union officials constitutes an impermissible in-
terference with protected employee rights. 5 The NLRB and the courts have
considered whether such actions by employers discourage union members from
accepting union leadership positions, which, in and of itself may constitute an
unfair labor practice. 6
In its response to this inquiry, the NLRB has been inconsistent over the
past decade. The Board initially held that employers could permissibly
discipline union officials more harshly than rank and file union members.'
Recently, however, the Board changed its position, adopting the approach that
the selective disciplining of union officials constitutes a per se unfair labor prac-
tice.a The four circuit courts of appeals to consider this question have rejected
3 Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (N.L.R.A.) reserves for employees the
right to engage in concerted activity for their mutual aid or benefit:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations ... and to engage in other concerted activities for ... other mutual
aid or protection.. . .
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
Section 8 of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for employers to interfere with
these § 7 rights, or to take any employment action which either encourages or discourages
membership in a labor organization:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer —
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the right
guaranteed in Section 157 of this title...
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization.
Id. SS 158(a)(1), (3).
' American Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 317, 58 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2672, 2680 (1965).
See, e.g., Fournelle v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 331, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2441 (D.C. Cir.
1982); Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 663 F.2d 478, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3020, (3d Cir.
1981); Hammermill Paper Co. v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 155, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2001 (3d Cir.
1981); C.H. Heist Corp. v. NLRB, 657 F.2d 178, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2159 (7th Cir. 1981);
NLRB v. Armour-Dial, Inc., 638 F.2d 51, 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2265 (8th Cir. 1981); Gould
Inc. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 728, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2207 (3d Cir. 1980); Indiana & Michigan
Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 227, 101 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2475 (7th Cir. 1979); Precision
Castings Co., 233 N.L.R.B. 183, 96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1540 (1977).
6 Fournelle v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 331, 338, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2441, 2446 (D.C.
Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Armour-Dial, Inc., 638 F.2d 51, 54-55, 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2265, 2267
(8th Cir. 1981).
For a complete discussion of these early Board decisions, see infra notes 26-30 and ac-
companying text. •
' For a discussion of the Board's per se rule, see infra notes 31-41 and accompanying
text.
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the per se rule adopted by the NLRB.° The bases upon which these four circuit
courts have rejected the per se rule, however, are not uniform; two distinct
views concerning when an employer may permissibly act in selectively disciplin-
ing union officials for their actions in an illegal strike have emerged among the
circuits.
The differences among the circuits and the NLRB on the question of selec-
tive discipline have arisen from varying interpretations given the discrimina-
tion guidelines established by the United States Supreme Court.'° In NLRB v.
Great Dane Trailers, Inc. ," the Court found an unfair labor practice when the
employer refused to pay accrued vacation wages to striking employees, but did
extend such benefits to employees who had not struck, as well as to returning
strikers and to strikers' replacements." The Court based its decision upon sec-
tion 8(a)(3) of the Act, ruling that the Board could rightfully find discrimina-
tion and a consequent discouragement of union membership.' 3 The Court
ruled that where the employer's discriminatory conduct is "inherently destruc-
tive" of employee rights, anti-union motivation need not be proven to establish
a section 8(a)(3) violation." Conversely, the Court noted, if the adverse effect
of the employer's discrimination upon employee rights is "comparatively
slight," an anti-union motivation must be demonstrated. 15
Interpreting Great Dane, the circuit courts have agreed that a union official
may be selectively disciplined if he has violated an established higher duty at-
tendant to his holding of union office. ' 6 The courts disagree, however, upon
when the status of holding a union office carries with it a higher duty during il-
legal strikes. The United States Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Eighth
Circuits have suggested that such a higher duty may exist at all times due to the
nature of holding union office itself." The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia has limited the imposition of a higher duty to in-
stances where the collective bargaining agreement has specifically established
the existence of such a duty.'° Where this higher duty has been held to exist,
the courts unanimously have held that the facially discriminatory act of the em-
For a discussion of the positions adopted in the circuit court cases, see infra notes
42-141 and accompanying text.
10 See Note, Harsher Discipline for Union Stewards than Rank-and-File for Participation in Illegal
Strike Activity, 56 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1175, 1176 (1980).
" 388 U.S. 26, 65 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2465 (1967).
12 Id. at 32-33, 65 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2468-69.
" Id. at 32, 65 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2468.
' 4 Id. at 33, 65 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2468.
15 Id. at 34, 65 L. R. R. M. (BNA) at 2468-69.
16 The concept of a "higher duty" suggests that union officials may, either by contract
or operation of law, be under a higher obligation than rank-and-file union members to uphold
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. For a discussion of how courts have handled
this issue, and where union officials have been held to bear a higher duty, see infra notes 43-44,
53-55, 60-61, 66-67, 76-78 and accompanying text.
' 7 See, e.g., NLRB v. Armour-Dial, Inc., 638 F.2d 51, 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2265 (8th
Cir. 1981); Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 227, 101 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2475
(7th Cir. 1979).
" See, e.g., Fournelle v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 331, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2441 (D.C. Cir.
1982); Gould Inc. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 728, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2207 (3d Cir. 1979).
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ployer in selectively disciplining union officials has not interfered with any pro-
tected employee right." The courts have reasoned that since the union official
possesses no right to breach his higher duty, whether imposed by contract or by
law, he suffers no loss of any protected right by being subjected to punishment
for his illegal acts. 2°
This chapter first examines the recent change in position of the NLRB on
this subject. In section 2, the reaction of federal circuit courts generally to the
recently adopted position of the NLRB is discussed. Finally, in section 3, this
chapter focuses on the difference in approaches present in the latest two circuit
court opinions to consider the issue of selective discipline. In 1981, the Eighth
Circuit in NLRB v. Armour-Dial, Inc. , 21
 ruled that the very nature of union of-
fice itself may carry with it a higher duty during an illegal strike." During the
Survey Year, the D.C. Circuit in Fournelle v. NLRB23 joined the Third Circuit in
holding that such a higher duty is established only by express contractual provi-
sions to that effect. 24 This chapter concludes with an analysis of the two ap-
proaches, submitting that the position adopted by the Fournelle court represents
the best approach to this problem.
a. The Position of the NLRB
In determining whether employers may permissibly discipline union of-
ficials more harshly than rank-and-file employees for conduct attendant to an
illegal strike, the NLRB has been notably inconsistent. Moreover, this incon-
sistency exists as well in the position of the NLRB regarding whether an
employer and a union, through collective bargaining, may create higher duties
for union officials during strikes, thereby waiving the rights of union officials to
escape selective discipline." Before 1977, the NLRB had held that because
union officials have a higher duty to uphold their obligations to employers,
union officials may be subjected to harsher discipline than the rank-and-file for
violations of the bargaining agreement. 26 In Super Yalu Xenia," the NLRB
upheld the discharge of two union stewards who had participated in a strike
which violated a no-strike clause contained in the union's bargaining agree-
" See, e.g., Fournelle v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 331, 340, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2441, 2448
(D.C. Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Armour-Dial, Inc., 638 F.2d 51, 55, 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2265,
2267 (8th Cir. 1981); Gould Inc. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 728, 733, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2207,
2210-11 (3d Cir. 1980); Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 227, 230, 101
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2475, 2478 (7th Cir. 1979).
" See, e.g., Gould Inc, v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 728, 733, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2207, 2211
(3d Cir. 1980); Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 227, 230, 101 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2475, 2478 (7th Cir. 1979).
71 638 F.2d 51, 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2265 (8th Cir. 1981).
" Id. at 55, 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2267. For a discussion of Armour-Dial, see infra
notes 122-41 and accompanying text.
23 670 F.2d 331, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2441 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
24 Id. at 341, 109 L.R.R.M. at 2448-49.
25 Id. at 339, 109 L.R.R.M. at 2446.
26 See, e.g., Russell Packing Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 194, 195-97, 48 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1608, 1608-09 (1961).
27 288 N.L.R.B. 1254, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1444 (1977).
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ment. 28
 The Board observed that the collective bargaining agreement imposed
upon union officials the duty to "undertake every reasonable means to induce
[striking] employees to return to their job." 29
 Consequently, the Board rea-
soned that the employer had the contractual right to discharge union officials
failing to fulfill this obligation." Board precedent, including the 1977 decision
in Super Valu Xenia, therefore apparently supported the view that parties to a
collective bargaining agreement may impose higher contractual duties upon
union officials, and that employers may discharge union leaders disregarding
those duties.
Despite this apparently clear precedent, later in 1977, the NLRB changed
its position on the question of-selective discipline for union officials. 3 ' In Preci-
sion Caseings Co. , 32
 the employer selectively disciplined union stewards who par-
ticipated in a walkout in breach of contract." The Board found that the
employer had violated section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA despite the fact that the
parties had included in their contract a provision requiring the union to "take
all reasonable steps to restore normal operations" in the event of such an illegal
strike." The Board rather broadly held that such discrimination against
employees holding union offices violated section 8(a)(3) because it was contrary
to the policies of the NLRA." Specifically, the Board ruled that such selective
discipline violated the right of employees to participate in union activity."
One year later, in Gould Corp. ," the Board reiterated the position adopted
in Precision Castings. In Gould, the Board held illegal the selective disciplining of
a union steward who had joined a work stoppage in violation of the union's col-
lective bargaining agreement." The Board noted that the selective disciplining
in this case was "not validated by a contract clause that specified the respon-
sibilities of union officers. "39
 Rather, the Board ruled that the provision in the
agreement setting forth higher obligations for union officials was "binding be-
tween the Employer and the union, but [did] not grant the employer the power
28
 Fournelle v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 331, 339, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2441, 2446 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
29
 Super Valu Xenia, 288 N.L.R.B. 1254, 1259, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1444 (1977).
58 Id. The Board found that the stewards "were discharged because they joined and
participated in the unauthorized work stoppage and consequently failed to fulfill their obligations
as stewards ... not in response to or in retaliation for legal or protected activities engaged in by
them as a consequence of their union stewardships." Id.
It has been noted by the Supreme Court, however, that the NLRB need not be
bound by its own precedent, and may adopt a different ruling in a subsequent case. NLRB v.
Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 265-66, 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2689, 2696 (1975).
32 233 N.L.R.B. 183, 96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1540 (1977).
33 Id. at 183, 96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1541-42.
34 Id., 96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1542.
55 Id. at 184, 96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1542. The Board ruled that: "discrimination
directed against an employee on the basis of his or her holding union office is contrary to the plain
meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and would frustrate the policies of the Act if allowed to stand." Id.
56 Id.
" 237 N.L.R.B. 881 (1978), enforcement denied, 612 F.2d 728, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2207 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980).
" Id. at 881.
" Id.
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to enforce it by discharging officials."'" In the wake of Precision Castings and
Gould, it appeared that the Board had adopted a per se rule forbidding the selec-
tive disciplining of union officials where an entire bargaining unit acted in
violation of a collective bargaining agreement. The Board appeared willing to
find an unfair labor practice under such conditions even where the parties had
imposed higher duties upon union officials during collective bargaining."
b. The Views of the Third and Seventh Circuits
In general, the per se rule of the NLRB has been unanimously rejected by
the courts of appeals that have considered whether selective disciplining of
union officials constitutes an unfair labor practice. 42
 In rejecting the approach
of the Board, however, the circuits have not promulgated a uniform rule of
their own. The Third Circuit has limited the right of employers to selectively
discipline union officials to those cases where the collective bargaining agree-
ment expressly imposes a higher duty upon those officials during illegal
strikes." The Seventh Circuit likewise held that union officials may be selec-
tively disciplined where such a higher duty exists." The Seventh Circuit,
however, has suggested that the higher duty owed employers by union officials
may arise solely from the holding of a union office itself, resulting in a higher
obligation to uphold the terms of the collective bargaining agreement during an
illegal strike whether or not the agreement expressly so provides." Each of
these views deserves separate consideration.
In vacating the order of the NLRB in Gould, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit ruled that a union official may be discharged for a breach of his
contractual duty. 46 The court reasoned that since a higher duty was imposed
upon union officials in the contract, it must overrule the finding of the Board
that the union steward in this case was "singled out for discipline solely
because he was a steward."" If the disciplining had occurred solely because of
the steward's status as a union official, the court noted, it could be argued that
the act of the employer constituted an interference with the right of employees
to seek and hold union office." The court observed, however, that the steward
" Id. This proposition was explicitly rejected by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia when it stated: "This argument simply ignores the principle that a valid
waiver of an employee's rights to engage in concerted activity renders such activity unprotected
by the N.L.R.A. Rank-and-file employees may be discharged for disobeying a contractual no-
strike clause; there is no reason why a valid provision waiving the rights of union officials should
have any different effect." Fournelle v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 331, 339 n.16, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2441, 2447 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
41 Id. at 339, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2447.
42 Id.
43 See, e.g., Gould Inc. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 728, 733, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2207,
2210-11 (3d Cir. 1979).
44 Set, e.g., Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 227, 231-32, 101
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2475, 2478 (7th Cir. 1979).
4' Id., 101 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2477.
46
 Gould Inc. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 728, 733, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2207, 2211 (3d Cir.
1979).
* 7 Id., 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2210.
48 Id.
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was disciplined because he had failed to fulfill his contractual duties to take
positive steps to put an end to the work stoppage. 49 The court further rejected
the contention of the union that the selective discipline imposed in this case in-
terfered with employee rights. The court maintained that since the steward was
merely being deterred from engaging in an illegal strike and from breaching a
contractual obligation, there existed no employee rights with which the com-
pany could be said to have interfered. 50 The Third Circuit, therefore, conclud-
ed in Gould that a union official could be selectively disciplined if the punish-
ment was for his breach of a contractually imposed higher duty, and not his
holding of union office per se."
The Third Circuit strengthened its position in two similar cases decided in
1981. In Hammermill Paper Co. v. NLRB, 52 the court reiterated its position in
Gould, suggesting that "where a collective bargaining agreement explicitly re-
quires union officers and representatives to terminate an unauthorized 'work
stoppage,' an employer may single out for disciplinary discharge a union
steward who fails to take affirmative steps to terminate that work stoppage.' '"
The court in Hammermill found that the contract in that case was not sufficient-
ly specific to impose upon union officers a higher duty, 54 and ruled that the
union officials in that case could not be disciplined more harshly than the rank-
and-file. 55 The court made it clear that the mere 'status' of union stewardship,
without more, is an insufficient basis upon which to base discipline by the
employer. 56 The court ruled that in determining whether added responsibility
accompanies the status of union stewardship, the basis for such responsibility
must be found in the contract, and not imposed as a matter of law . 57
Later in 1981, the Third Circuit reaffirmed this approach in Metropolitan
Edison Co. v. NLRB. 58 The court noted the policy consideration that the holding
49 Id. The pertinent part of the collective bargaining agreement in Gould provided:
In the event of an illegal, unauthorized or uncondoned strike, work stoppage, in-
terruption or impeding of work, the Local and International Union and its officers
shall immediately take positive and evident steps to have those involved cease such
activity. These steps shall involve the following: Within not more than twenty-four
(24) hours after the occurrence of any such unauthorized action, the Union, its of-
ficers and representatives shall publicly disavow same by posting a notice on the
bulletin boards throughout the plant. The Union, its officers and representatives
shall immediately order its members to return to work, notwithstanding the ex-
istence of any wild-cat picket line. The Union, its officers and representatives shall
refuse to aid or assist in any way such unauthorized action. The Union, its officers
and representatives, will in good faith, use every reasonable effort to terminate
such unauthorized action.
Id. at 730-31 n.3, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2208-09 n.3.
5' Id. at 733, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2211.
" Id.
" 658 F.2d 155, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2001 (3d Cir. 1981).
" Id. at 163, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2007.
54 Id. at 164, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2008. In Hammermill, the court noted the collec-
tive bargaining agreement stated only that "[t]he Union agrees that there will be no strikes,
slowdowns, or work stoppages." Id.
" Id. at 165-66, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2008-09.
56 Id. at 164, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2008.
57 Id.
58 663 F.2d 478, 108 L.R.R. M. (BNA) 3020 (3d Cir. 1981).
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of union office is the essence of protected union activity and that discriminatory
punishment based merely upon the holding of such office constitutes an unfair
labor practice under section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. 59
 As a result, union officials
may be disciplined more severely than rank-and-file workers only when the col-
lective bargaining agreement, in clear language, imposes additional respon-
sibilities upon union officials. 6° The court reasoned that in the case of clear,
contractual obligations, selective discipline may be permissible to deter "pro-
spective union officials from seeking union office because they intend after
assuming office to participate in illegal work stoppages and to repudiate volun-
tarily assumed contractual obligations. " 61 In the absence of such contractual
provisions, however, an employer may not, through the imposition of selective
discipline, impose upon union officials responsibilities the union had not
agreed to in the collective bargaining process. 62
 The court, in a footnote,
however, did mention with approval the position of the NLRB that an
employer may selectively discipline a union official if it is demonstrated that the
official assumed a leadership role in an illegal work stoppage. 63
In these three recent opinions, therefore, the Third Circuit has limited the
right of employers to selectively discipline union officials to instances where
union officials are contractually burdened with higher responsibilities to
uphold the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, specifically, a no-
strike clause. It is apparent that the position of the Third Circuit carries with it
two important consequences. First, it rejects the per se rule of the NLRB by sug-
gesting that any higher duty imposed upon the holding of union office, which
would justify selective discipline, must be derived from express language in a
collective bargaining agreement, and may not be imposed as a matter of law."
Second, it requires employers desiring the right to selectively discipline union
officials during an illegal strike to bargain with the union for that right. By
allowing selective discipline in such instances, however, the Third Circuit
adopts the position that unions, through the collective bargaining process, may
waive the right of union officials not to be subjected to facially discriminatory
selective discipline. The Third Circuit, therefore, emphasizes the importance
and integrity of the collective bargaining agreement in labor relations by grant-
ing employers the right to enforce the express provisions of the contract by
holding union officials to their contractually higher duty to uphold the provi-
sions of the agreement.
The Seventh Circuit has likewise rejected the per se rule of the NLRB, but
in doing so has suggested that the higher duty of a union official during an il-
legal strike need not be contractually imposed. In Indiana & Michigan Electric
59 Id. at 482, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3023.
'° Id. at 483, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3023.
61 Id. at 482, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3023.
62 Id. at 483, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3023.
" Id. at 482 n.2, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3023 n.2 (citing J.P. Wetherby Constr. Co.,
182 N.L.R.B. 690, 76 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1879 (1970)). See also Chrysler Corp., 232 N.L.R.B.
466, 96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1382 (1977).
" See, e.g., Hammermill Paper Co. v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 155, 164, 108 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2001, 2008 (3d Cir. 1981).
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Company v. NLRB," the court held that disciplining union stewards and a
union official more severely than rank-and-file employees for participation in
an illegal strike was not a violation of the NLRA. 66
 This case apparently
represented an even broader rejection of the per se rule of the NLRB than
evidenced in the opinions of the Third Circuit in that there was no specific con-
tractual language in the collective bargaining agreement before the court which
imposed a higher duty upon union officials. 67
 The Seventh Circuit reasoned
that since union officials, like rank-and-file employees, had no right to par-
ticipate in an illegal strike, selective discipline practices did not deter or
penalize the exercise of any employee right. 68
 The court cited earlier Board
decisions which had recognized that the status of union officials was a proper
factor upon which to base more severe disciplinary action. 69 The court then
noted with apparent approval that in these cases the Board had maintained that
union officials were generally subject to an even greater duty than rank-and-
file employees to uphold [the contract] provisions. " 7 ° The court concluded that
the more recent Board decisions which departed from this reasoning, including
Precision Castings," were erroneous." The Seventh Circuit's position in Indiana
& Michigan Electric, therefore, appears to go beyond the Third Circuit's in
Gould by suggesting that union officials may be more harshly disciplined for
duties arising from their status and not merely for those duties delineated in the
collective bargaining agreement. 73
65
 599 F.2d 227, 101 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2475 (7th Cir. 1979).
66 Id. at 232, 101 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2478.
67
 The relevant provision of the collective bargaining agreement in effect in Indiana &
Michigan Elec. provided:
It is expressly understood and agreed that the services to be performed by the
employees covered by this Agreement pertain to and are essential to the operation
of a public utility and to the welfare of a public dependent thereon, and in con-
sideration thereof and of the covenants and conditions herein by the Company to
be kept and performed (a) the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
and the Local Union agree that the employees covered by this Agreement, or any
of them will not be called upon or permitted to cease or abstain from the con-
tinuous performance of the duties pertaining to the positions held by them with the
Company in accord with the terms of this agreement. . . .
Id. at 228, 101 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2476.
68 Id. at 233, 101 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2478.
69 Id. at 231, 101 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2478 (citing University Overland Express, Inc.,
129 N.L.R.B. 82, 46 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1511 (1960); Stockham Pipe Fittings Co., 84 N.L.R.B.
629, 24 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1333 (1949)).
7° Id. See also Riviera Mfg. Co., 167 N.L.R.B. 772, 775, 66 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1175,
1176 (1967).
'' For a discussion of the position of the Board in Precision Castings, see supra notes 32-36
and accompanying text.
71
 Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 299 F.2d 227, 231, 101 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2475, 2477 (7th Cir. 1979).
" See, e.g., Hammermill Paper Co. v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 155, 167, 108 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2001, 2010 (3d Cir. 1981) (Higginbotham, J., concurring).
Two years later, in C.H. Heist Corp. v. NLRB, 657 F.2d 178, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2159 (7th Cir. 1981), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit appeared to limit slightly its
broad holding in Indiana & Michigan Elec.. In Heist, the court upheld the decision of the Board sus-
taining a union charge of an unfair labor practice where a union steward was selectively disci-
plined for failing to cross a picket line during an illegal strike. Id. at 183, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
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c. The Latest Cases: The Approaches of the Eighth and D.C. Circuits.
During the Survey Year, the D.C. Circuit in Fournelle v. NLRB 74 examined
the question of employers' selective disciplining of union officials for the partic-
ipation in illegal strikes. The court followed the reasoning of the Third Cir-
cuit 75 by holding that union officials may be selectively disciplined where the
collective bargaining process has imposed upon them higher duties:18 In 1981,
the Eighth Circuit considered the same question in NLRB v. Armour-Dial,
Inc.," but followed the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit; the Armour-Dial
court left open the possibility of selective discipline even in circumstances
where the collective bargaining agreement does not specifically impose higher
duties upon union officials. 78
In Fournelle, a wildcat strike took place at the shipyard of Bethlehem Steel
Corporation, at Sparrows Point, Maryland. 79 The strike, in protest of the
suspension of a union steward, was in violation of the collective bargaining
agreement then in effect between Bethlehem and the Industrial Union of
Marine and Shipbuilding Workers, AFL-CIO, and its affiliated Local 33. 80 At
a meeting of the strikers on the first night of the strike, Fournelle, an elected
at 2163. The court noted that in this case, any contractual basis for imposing a higher respon-
sibility upon the union steward was "even more tenuous than in Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co. "Id.
at 182, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2162-63. The court observed that such a contractual duty may
not be necessary under the standard of Indiana &Michigan Elec. where "a union steward's mere
presence among illegal strikers may provide 'active approval and encouragement.' " Id. at 183,
108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2163 (quoting Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 227,
231 n.9, 101 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2475, 2478 n.9 (7th Cir. 1979)). The court in Heist concluded,
however, that the actions of the union steward disciplined in this case did not violate any higher
duty that might have arisen due to non-contractual considerations. C.H. Heist Corp. v. NLRB,
657 F.2d 178, 183, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2159, 2163 (7th Cir. 1981). The company had
suspended the union steward in Heist for failing to cross a picket line despite the fact he had ac-
tively "attempted to dissuade the employees from striking before and throughout the strike, and
[had acted as a] mediator between the employer ... and the union." Id. at 182, 108 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) at 2162. The court contended that the actions of the steward in this case were sufficient to
fulfill any added responsibility imposed under the Indiana & Michigan Elec. standard, and that to
force the steward to cross the picket line in this case would "[clause the steward to lose both credi-
bility and the ability and opportunity to mediate a resolution of the strike." Id.
The court noted that under the standard of the Third Circuit in Gould, if the contract
had contained a provision requiring the steward to cross the picket line during an illegal strike,
the action of the employer in Heist may have been deemed to be permissible. Id. In this case,
however, the court concluded that to require such an action on the part of the steward would be
"inherently destructive of employee rights," and therefore would not pass muster even under the
relaxed standard of Indiana & Michigan Elec. Id., 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2162-63.
" 670 F.2d 331, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2441 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
75 For a discussion of the decisions of the Third Circuit, see supra notes 46-64 and ac-
companying text.
" Fournelle v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 331, 341, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2441, 2448-49 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
" 638 F.2d 51, 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2265 (8th Cir. 1981).
79 Id. at 55, 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2267.
" Fournelle'v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 331, 333, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2441, 2442 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
BO Id. The relevant provision, Article XVIII, of the Bethlehem-I.U.M.S.W. agreement
provided:
During the term of this Agreement neither the Union nor any Employee shall in-
stigate, encourage, sanction or take part in any strike, sit-down, slowdown or
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union committeeman, spoke to an interviewer from a local television news pro-
gram." In the interview, Fournelle expressed the opinion that the suspension
of the union steward by Bethlehem was unjustified," and also complained
about the working conditions at Bethlehem." Upon returning to work the next
day, Fournelle refused to cooperate with management officials wishing to ques-
tion him concerning his conduct at the meeting the previous night." Three
days later, Fournelle was suspended for ten days for, according to the
disciplinary report, "participating as an elected union official in a work stop-
page . . . in violation of Article XVIII of the Agreement." 85
 Bethlehem subse-
quently disciplined the rank-and-file strike participants less severely, suspend-
ing them for five days each.".
The Court of Appeals upheld the finding of the Board that Fournelle's
conduct at the union hall was unprotected by the NLRA, and therefore under
the contract Fournelle could be punished for sanctioning and encouraging the
strike." By this holding, the appeals court determined that the company was
justified in imposing on Fournelle the same five-day suspension given rank-
and-file workers." The court next considered whether the company could per-
missibly discipline Fournelle, as a union official, more harshly than the rank-
and-file strike participants. 89 The court pointed out that it was not called upon
to decide whether an employer could selectively discipline a union official when
the contract contained only a general no-strike clause and there was no arbitra-
tion decision construing the contract." The court noted that in such cases, if
the union official was not a leader of the illegal strike, selective discipline by the
employer may be held violative of sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the NLRA." In
this case, the court stated that it had only to decide "whether the parties may,
through the collective bargaining process, create higher duties for union of-
ficials during strikes and whether the parties may thus waive the rights of union
officials to escape selectively greater discipline for their violation of those higher
duties. "92
other stoppage, limitation or curtailment of work or production, or take part in
any picketing, boycotting or other interference or demonstration against any Yard
or its business or operations, either in such Yard or elsewhere. . . . The Company
may terminate the employment of or otherwise discipline any Employee who
willfully violates any of the provisions of this Agreement in any material respect.
Id. at 333-34, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2442.
" Id. at 334, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2443.
" Id., 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2443.
" Id., 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2443. The court record quoted Fournelle as saying:
"They are increasing the amount of work we have to put out. We've been called to the office for
low production. They want us to be their slaves, and they're offering us no other choice but to
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The Fournelle court discussed the development of the per se rule by the
NLRB, noting that in Precision Castings" and Goad," the Board had apparently
forbidden the selective discipline of union officials, regardless of provisions to
the contrary in the collective bargaining agreements." In light of the
unanimous rejection of the per se rule by courts of appeals considering the ques-
tion,96 the Fournelle court observed that the Board may have backed away from
this approach in Armour-Dial, Inc." The appeals court noted that the Board in
Armour-Dial had stated that it did not "reach the issue of whether a union
could, by contract, waive an employee's right to engage in protected concerted
activity through the holding of union office by providing for the discipline of
union officials. " 9s The court therefore concluded that the current position of
the Board concerning the per se rule of Precision Castings was unclear. 99 The
court went on to note that despite the apparent inconsistency of the Board with
regard to the per se rule, the courts of appeals considering the question had
unanimously rejected the doctrine.'" The court then discussed the holdings of
the Third and Seventh Circuits in Gould,'°' Hammermill,'" and Indiana &
Michigan Electric. 103
In joining the Third and Seventh Circuits in their rejection of the per se
rule and allowing for selective discipline where the contract provides for a
higher duty for union officials, the D.C. Circuit in Fournelle reasoned that
general principles allowing a valid waiver of employees' rights to engage in
concerted activity supported its position.'" The court ruled that parties to a
collective bargaining agreement may permissibly seek to increase the effec-
91 For a discussion of the position of the NLRB in Precision Castings, see supra notes
31-37 and accompanying text.
94 For a discussion of the position of the Board in Gould Corp., see supra notes 37-40 and
accompanying text.
" Fournelle v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 331, 339, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2441, 2447 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
96 See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
Fournelle v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 331, 339, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2441, 2447 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
98 Id. (Citing Armour-Dial, Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. 959, 960 n.8 (1979), enforcement denied,
638 F.2d 51, 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2267 (8th Cir. 1981)).
99 Fournelle v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 331, 340, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2441, 2447 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
100 Id.
101 Id. For the position of the Third Circuit in Gould, see supra notes 46-51 and accom-
panying text.
102 Fournelle v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 331, 340, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2441, 2447 (D.C.
Cir. 1982). For a discussion of the position of the Third Circuit in Hammermill, see supra notes
52-57 and accompanying text.
10' Fournelle v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 331, 340, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2441, 2447 (D.C.
Cir. 1982). For a discussion of the position of the Seventh Circuit in Indiana & Michigan Elec., see
supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
104 Fournelle v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 331, 340, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2441, 2448 (D.C.
Cir. 1982). In making this argument, the court stated: "a valid waiver of an employee's right to
engage in concerted activity renders such activity unprotected by the NLRA. Rank-and-file
employees may be discharged for disobeying a contractual no-strike clause; there is no reason
why a valid provision waiving the rights of union officials should have any different effect." Id. at
339 n.16, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2447 n.16.
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tiveness of the no-strike clause by requiring higher duties on the part of union
officials to help avoid or reduce the "disruptive effects" of illegal strikes.'" By
providing for harsher discipline for union officials during strikes, the court
reasoned that union officials may be induced to honor their contractual
duties. 106 The court suggested that giving effect to such contractual provisions
not only furthers the strong policy favoring freedom of contract, but in addition
promotes the national labor policy of substituting peaceful resolution for in-
dustrial strife and economic warfare.'" The court concluded, therefore, that
the Board should not interfere with the "legitimate products of the collective
bargaining process."'"
The Fournelle court concluded its analysis by citing authority for two prop-
ositions supporting its position. First, the court observed that treating one
group of employees differently from another group under the terms of a con-
tract has been held permissible. 109 The court acknowledged the position of the
United States Supreme Court in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,"° which allowed
statutory bargaining representatives a wide range of reasonableness in
reaching terms on a contract."' The Fournelle court reasoned, therefore, that
the only apparent limitation on a bargaining representative's discretion in
reaching contract terms which treat groups of employees differently is the con-
sideration of "good faith and honesty of purpose. ' 112 Second, the Fournelle
court noted that contractual limitations upon the exercise of section 7 rights by
union officials have not been held to be objectionable. 73 The court cited cases
where employers were allowed to discharge union officials for failure to abide
by a contractual provision specifying channels and procedures for the filing of
grievances and complaints.'" The Fournelle court further referred to a D.C.
Circuit decision which upheld contract terms providing for limited supersenior-
ity for union officials."' The court acknowledged that provisions such as these
163 Id. at 340, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2448.
1136 Id.
I" Id. at 340-41, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2448.
1 °8 Id. at 341, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2448,
'"° Id.
"° 345 U.S. 330, 31 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2548 (1953) (upholding a contract term pro-
viding seniority for employees with military service).
"' Fournelle v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 331, 341, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2441, 2448 (D.C.
Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court in Ford Motor Co. stated:
Inevitably differences arise in the manner and degree to which the terms of any
negotiated agreement affect individual employees and classes of employees. The
mere existence of such differences does not make them invalid. The complete
satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected. A wide range of
reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving
the unit it represents, subject always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose
in the exercise of its discretion.
Id. (quoting Ford Motor Company v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953)).
" 2 Fournelle v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 331, 341, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2441, 2448 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
" 3 Id.
114 Id. (citing NLRB v. Wilson Freight Co., 604 F.2d 712, 102 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2269
(1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 962, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3082 (1980)).
ils Fournelle v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 331, 341, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2441, 2448 (D.C.
Cir. 1982), citing Teamsters Local 20 v. NLRB, 610 F.2d 991, 993, 102 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3080,
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may have the effect of encouraging or discouraging union members from seek-
ing union office," 6 but noted that each case allowed the provisions because
they furthered the policy of lessening the dangers of illegal strikes and pro-
moting the smooth and effective administration of the collective bargaining
process.'!'
Given these policy considerations and legal precedent, therefore the
Fournelle court concluded that "where the collective bargaining process has im-
posed higher duties upon union officials than the rank-and-file, the officials
may be more harshly punished than the rank and file for their conduct in viola-
tion of the no-strike clause and an employer's selective discipline of the offend-
ing union official will not constitute an unfair labor practice."'" In holding
that Bethlehem could selectively discipline union committeeman Fournelle in
this case, the court gave full effect to a previous arbitration decision construing
the contract in question. t19 That arbitration decision, which had concerned the
same no-strike clause at issue in Fournelle but a different grievance, held that
union officials under the contract did have higher duties during strikes than
rank-and-file workers, and that a breach of those higher duties would enable
the employer to subject the offending union officials to more severe
discipline.'" The court concluded, therefore, that Fournelle was properly sub-
ject to selective discipline for his conduct in violation of the no-strike clause in
the agreement."'
In 1981, the Eighth Circuit considered the question of the selective
disciplining of union officials in NLRB v. Armour-Dial, Inc. 122 The dispute in
Armour-Dial arose when the union representing the employees of Armour-Dial
threatened to stop handling materials from Iowa Beef Products' 23 in support of
a dispute between an affiliated union and Iowa Beef." 4 The threatened work
stoppage by Armour-Dial employees constituted an illegal secondary boycott
under section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA. 125 The union president and vice-president
supported the refusal of Armour-Dial workers to handle Iowa Beef Products
deliveries, and after meetings between the company and the union it became
clear that the union officials would not act in preventing the work stoppage. 126
After the Armour-Dial employees refused to unload an Iowa Beef truck and the
union officials failed to prevent the work stoppage, the company suspended the
union officials, each for varying lengths of time.'"
3081 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
16 Fournelle v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 331, 341, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2441, 2448 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
117 Id.
"a Id., 109 L.R.R.M, (BNA) at 2448-49.
'" Id. at 345, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2451.
120 Id. at 342, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2449.
121 Id. at 345-46, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2452.
122 638 F.2d 51, 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2265 (8th Cir. 1981).
121
	
at 53, 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2265.
124 Id.
126 Id. at 55, 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2267.
"5 Id. at 54, 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2266.
127 Id.
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In response, the union charged before the NLRB that the suspensions
discriminated against the union officials solely on the basis of their status in the
union,'" and that such discrimination constituted an unfair labor practice
under sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the NLRA."° The Board agreed and held the
suspensions to be prohibited by the Act. 13 °
On appeal, however, the Eighth Circuit denied enforcement of the
Board's order. 13 ' In deciding that the union officials in this case could be sub-
jected to selective discipline, the Armour-Dial court recognized that an employer
may not discipline an employee merely because that employee holds a union
office) 32 Yet, the court ruled that an employee may be disciplined due to acts
and omissions while holding union office)" The Armour-Dial court, however,
did not engage in a detailed discussion concerning specifically what acts and
omissions were sufficient to subject union officials to harsher discipline. Fur-
ther, the court did not discuss union officials' contractually imposed higher
duties to avoid or minimize the effects of an illegal work stoppage, but instead
quoted extensively from the decision of the Seventh Circuit in Indiana &
Michigan Electric.'" The Armour-Dial court adopted the broad language of the
Seventh Circuit that " . . . union officials are subject to 'an even greater duty
than the rank-and-file employees to uphold [contract] provisions.' "135
 The
court observed that in Armour-Dial the union officials had participated in and
induced the illegal work stoppage. 136 The court concluded its opinion with the
rather cryptic statement that "[t]ogether [the union officials] fomented the il-
legal work stoppage and together they should bear the consequences."'"
The Eighth Circuit in Armour-Dial left several important questions
unanswered. First, it did not consider the situation where union officials are
contractually held to a higher duty to uphold the terms of a no-strike clause
during an illegal strike. Second, by quoting extensively and uncritically from
the opinion of the Seventh Circuit in Indiana & Michigan Electric, it apparently
adopted the view of that court that a higher duty may be imposed upon union
officials due to their status in the union despite the lack of contractual provi-
126 Id.
"9 Id., 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2266-67. For the relevant text of sections 8(a)(1) and
(3) of the NLRA, see supra note 3.
"S NLRB v. Armour-Dial, Inc., 638 F.2d 51, 54, 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2265, 2267
(8th Cir. 1981). The company was therefore ordered to cease its unfair labor practices, to provide
back pay for those officials who were suspended, to erase all reprimands issued to union officials
in connection with the affair, and to post an appropriate notice. Id. at 53, 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
at 2265.
16  Id. at 56, 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2268.
162 Id. at 54-55, 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2267 (citing Pontiac Motors Division, General
Motors Corp., 132 N.L.R.B. 413, 415, 48 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1368 (1961)).
1 " NLRB v. Armour-Dial, Inc., 638 F.2d 51, 55, 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2265, 2267
(8th Cir. 1981).
ist
1 " Id. (quoting Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 227, 231, 101
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2475, 2476 (7th Cir. 1979)).
"6
 NLRB v. Armour-Dial, Inc., 638 F.2d 51, 56, 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2265, 2267-68
(8th Cir, 1981).
1 " Id. , 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2268.
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sions to that effect. 138 If the Armour-Dial court did indeed adopt this approach, it
failed to define the parameters of such a higher duty. Moreover, the court
failed to explain how or justify why such a higher duty should automatically be
imposed upon an employee exercising his protected right to seek union office.
Finally, the court did not expressly state that the union officials in this case
were liable due to their apparent leadership role in the illegal work stoppage.
This conclusion seems imminent given the language of the court to the extent
that it determined the union officials in this case did, indeed, induce the illegal
secondary boycott and eventual strike. 139 If this were the reason the Eighth Cir-
cuit held the union officials liable in Armour-Dial, its conclusion would be justi-
fied by accepted authority."° In light of its opinion in Armour-Dial, however, it
appears that the Eighth Circuit may allow the selective disciplining of union
officials in instances where no clear language exists in the collective bargaining
agreement imposing higher duties upon union officials during illegal work
stoppages.' 41
Conclusion
In sum, it appears that there have emerged two distinct views regarding
when an employer may selectively discipline union officials for participation in
an illegal work stoppage. Both approaches allow selective disciplining where
union officials act to lead or instigate illegal activity.' 42 Apart from this,
however, the two approaches adopt different standards. First, the approach of
the Third Circuit"' and the D.C. Circuit in Fournelle' 44 suggests that union of-
ficials may be disciplined more severely than rank-and-file employees only
when higher duties are imposed upon them in the collective bargaining agree-
ment."' The Seventh' 46 and Eighth Circuit in Armour-Dial, adopted what ap-
pears to be a broader approach. These courts suggest that selective discipline
may be imposed upon union officials due to the very nature of union office.
This view submits that a higher duty to uphold the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement naturally attends the status of union office, and as a
result union officials may be more severely disciplined for acts and omissions
with regard to illegal strike activity."'
18 For a discussion of the position of the Seventh Circuit in Indiana Michigan Elec. with
regard to the issue of higher duties for union officials, see supra notes 69-73 and accompanying
text.
"9 NLRB v. Armour Dial, Inc., 638 F.2d 51, 56, 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2265, 2267-68
(8th Cir. 1981).
140 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
1 " See generally Comment, Selective Discipline of Union Officials: NLRB v. Armour-Dial, Inc.,
23 B.C. L. REV. 155, 158 (1981).
I" See supra notes 63, 91, 136-37 and accompanying text.
14 ' See supra notes 46-63 and accompanying text.
' 44 See supra notes 79-121 and accompanying text.
' 4' See, e.g., Fournelle v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 331, 341, 109 L.R.R.M, (BNA) 2441,
2448-49 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 663 F.2d 478, 483, 108
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3020, 3022 (3d Cir. 1981).
146 See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
117 Sie, e.g., NLRB v. Armour-Dial, Inc., 638 F.2d 51, 55, 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2265,
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The Third and D.C. Circuits have adopted the preferable approach.
Holding otherwise suggests that employers and unions can no longer agree .
upon the responsibilities of union officials under the contract.'" This would
result in an inflexible approach in every case, regardless of the circumstances of
the case.'" The parties to a collective bargaining agreement should be allowed
to bargain with regard to the specific duties of union officials during illegal
strikes.' 5° Further, by allowing employers to selectively discipline union of-
ficials in the absence of contractual obligations, it would appear that the effect
of such a burden would be to "discourage members from holding union
office," which would have an inherently adverse effect on employee rights with
regard to seeking and holding union office.'" Finally, as the Third Circuit
noted in Hammermill, where an employer offers no contractual basis for selec-
tively disciplining union officials, "it has failed to establish, as required by
Great Dane, that it was motivated by a legitimate objective. „152
Unions, therefore, should be allowed to waive the rights of union officials
during collective bargaining with regard to selective discipline. Through con-
tractual provisions, the parties should be permitted to specify higher duties for
union officials to uphold the no-strike provisions of a contract. Conversely,
employers should not be permitted to impose these duties in the absence of con-
tractual language to that effect. Further, it should be concluded that to do so in-
herently destroys the protected employee right to seek and hold union office.
To this extent, the approaches adopted by the Third and D.C. Circuits repre-
sent the best resolution to the question of the selective disciplining of union of-
ficials.
2.* Partial Closing Decisions: First National Maintenance Corp.
v. National Labor Relations Board'
The National Labor Relations Act (the Act) provides in section 8(a)(5)
that an employer's refusal to bargain collectively with employees is an unfair
labor practice. 2 The Act further provides in section 8(d), however, that good
2267 (8th Cir. 1981); Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 227, 231, 101
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2475, 2477 (7th Cir. 1979).
"° See, e.g., Hammermill Paper Co. v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 155, 164, 108 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2001, 2007-08 (3d Cir. 1981).
19 See, e.g., id.
' 5° Such bargaining would likely result in a contract specifically delineating the duties of
union officials during illegal strikes, as was evidenced in Gould. For the text of the agreement in
Gould, see supra note 49.
”' See, e.g., Hammermill Paper Co. v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 155, 163, 108 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2001, 2007 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 227,
230, 101 L.R.R.M. 2475, 2477 (7th Cir. 1979)).
152 Hammermill Paper Co. v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 155, 163, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2001,
2007 (3d Cir. 1981).
* By Eric G. Woodbury, Staff Member, BosTorq COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
101 S. Ct. 2573 (1981).
29 U.S.C. 158(a) (1976) provides in part: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for
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faith bargaining is required only "with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment„ . . "3 These provisions, therefore, re-
quire an employer to bargain with employees only over certain subjects.' Yet it
is not clear from legislative history which subjects, aside from wages and hours,
are mandatory topics for collective bargaining. 5 Accordingly, the National
Labor Relations Board (the Board) and the federal courts have been required
to interpret the statute's uncertain bargaining requirements.
One subject of litigation has been whether an employer's decision to close
part of its business is a mandatory topic for collective bargaining under the Act.
Several Supreme Court precedents, dealing with closure decisions, are relevant
in resolving this issue. First, in The Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago &
North Western Railway Co. 6 the Court held that a railroad's decision to close
several stations was subject to the mandatory bargaining requirement of the
Railway Labor Act.' According to the Court, bargaining over this issue was
mandatory because such closings would result in the loss of jobs and because a
strike to force bargaining could not be enjoined under the Norris-LaGuardia
Act.' In reaching its conclusion, the Court stated that job security is a condi-
tion of employment under section 13(c) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 9 a sec-
tion akin to section 8(d) of the Act. Subsequently, in Fibreboard Paper Products
Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board," the Court held that the failure of an
employer to negotiate with a union over its decision to replace union employees
with an independent.contractor's employees violated sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d)
an employer ... (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees. . ."
3 29 U.S.C. $ 158(d) (1976) provides:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incor-
porating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a con-
cession.. . .
4 NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958); NLRB v.
American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 409 (1952).
Note, Labor Law — National Labor Relations Act — In a Partial Closing, the Interests of the
Parties Must be Balanced to Determine Whether the Closing is a Mandatory Subject of Bargaining — Brockway
Motor Trucks, Inc. u. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1978), 47 GEO. W. L. REV. 679, 681-82
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Labor Law]; Case Comment, Duty to Bargain About Termination of
Operations: Brockway Motor Trucks a. NLRB, 92 HARV. L. REV. 768, 771 (1979) [hereinafter Case
Comment].
6 362 U.S. 330 (1960).
7 Id. at 339. 45 U.S.C. 5 152 (1976) provides in part: "It shall be the duty of all car-
riers, their officers, agents, and employees to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain
agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions, and to settle all
disputes. . ."
° 362 U.S. at 335, 340. The Norris-LaGuardia Act provides, in part that, a "labor
dispute" is "any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment..." 29 U.S.C.
113(c) (1976). If there is a labor dispute, the district courts lack jurisdiction 29 U.S.C. 104
(1976), to issue injunctions.
9 362 U.S. at 335.
10 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
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of the Act." The Court relied on its interpretation of the phrase "terms and
conditions of employment" in Order of Railroad Telegraphers to find that termina-
tion of employment is a "condition of employment" under 8(d).' 2 The Court
found that such an interpretation of 8(d) would further the goal of the Act to
promote industrial peace." The Court also noted that because the employer's
basic business operations were not significantly affected by the replacement of
employees, requiring bargaining would not significantly affect the employer's
managerial freedom." Finally, in Textile Workers Union of America v. Darlington
Manufacturing Co. 15 the Court held that a decision to close an entire business is
not an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(3) of the Act,' 6 even if motivated
by antiunion animus, but that a. partial closing motivated by antiunion animus
would violate this provision of the Act." The Court found that legislative
history of the Act did not support requiring mandatory bargaining in a total
closure case." Furthermore, the Court stated that appellate court decisions
correctly reasoned that where a business is terminated entirely, there ceases to
be an employer subject to the Act."
Thus, before the Survey year, the Supreme Court had not directly decided
whether partial plant closing decisions fall under section 8(d) of the Act,
thereby making them mandatory topics of collective bargaining. The Board"
and the federal courts of appeals 21 were divided on the issue. In 1981, however,
the Court held in First National Maintenance Corp. v. National Labor Relations
" Id. at 213.
12 Id. at 210.
13 Id. at 211.
14 Id. at 213.
13 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
16 29 U.S.C. $ 158(a) (1976) provides in part: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for
an employer... (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization.. . ."
' 7 380 U.S. at 275.
' Id. at 270-74.
19 Id.
" The National Labor Relations Board held in Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B.
561, 63 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1264 (1966), that a partial shutdown was a mandatory bargaining
subject "directly affecting terms and conditions of employment." Id. at 567, 63 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) at 1268. In National Car Rental Sys., 252 N.L.R.B. 159, 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1263
(1980), however, a partial closing was not ruled a mandatory subject because it was a significant
business motivated decision. Id. at 162-63, 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1267-68.
" The Second Circuit created a presumption in favor of mandatory bargaining which
could be rebutted by showing that the purposes of the Act would not be furthered by bargaining.
NLRB v. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 627 F.2d 596, 601-02 (2d Cir. 1980). The Third Cir-
cuit created a similar presumption which could be rebutted by showing, that the employer's in-
terests outweighed the employee's interests in mandatory bargaining in the particular case.
Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720, 735-38 (3d Cir. 1978). The Eighth Circuit re-
quired bargaining only where a violation of section 8(a)(3) could be proved. Morrison Cafeterias
Consol., Inc. v. NLRB, 431 F.2d 254, 257 (8th Cir. 1970). The Ninth and Tenth Circuits re-
quired a bargaining only if the decision was not a significant one. NLRB v. International
Harvester Co., 618 F.2d 85, 87 (9th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Transmarine Navigation Corp., 380
F.2d 933, 939 (10th Cir. 1967). Finally, the Fifth Circuit has imposed a duty to bargain over a
partial closing decision. NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 361 F.2d 512, 517 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 935 (1966).
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Board, 22 that a partial closing decision is not part of section 8(d)'s "terms and
conditions" of employment requiring good faith mandatory bargaining under
section 8(a)(5). 23
In First National Maintenance, the petitioner-employer (FNM) was engaged
in the business of rendering housekeeping, cleaning, maintenance, and similar
services to commercial customers." The corporation hired separate employees
for each location." During the spring of 1977, approximately thirty-five FNM
employees were performing maintenance work at the Greenpark Care Center,
a nursing home." Greenpark provided the workers' equipment." On March
31, a majority of FNM's employees selected the District 1199, National Union
of Hospital and Health Care Employees, Retail, Wholesale and Department
Store Union, AFL-CIO as their bargaining agent. 28 On July 6, FNM informed
Greenpark that unless an increase in the management fee were paid, FNM
would cease operations at Greenpark on August 1." On July 12, the union
notified FNM of the union's certification and right to bargain, requesting a
meeting with management. 3 ° FNM did not respond to the union's request."
Subsequently, on July 25, FNM gave final notice to Greenpark that FNM was
terminating its service contract." On July 28, FNM notified its employees at
Greenpark that they would be discharged three days later." FNM refused the
Union's request for a delay of its Greenpark closing for the purposes of
bargaining."
The Union filed an unfair labor practice complaint alleging that FNM's
refusal to bargain violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the Act." An ad-
ministrative law judge ruled for the Union, requiring FNM to bargain in good
faith over both its decision to terminate the Greenpark contract and the effects
of that termination. 36 The administrative law judge also noted that, as in
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., the decision of FNM involved no redeployment
of capital, did not alter the nature of the business, and did not substantially af-
22 101 S. Ct. 2573 (1981).
" Id. at 2584.
24 Id. at 2575.
25 Id. The Court found that the record did not fully disclose the dimensions of FNM's
business. Id. n.l.
26 Id. at 2575.
" Id.
28 Id. at 2575-76.
29 Id. at 2575.
38 Id. at 2576.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 2575.
" Id. at 2576.
34 Id.
" Id. 29 U.S.C. 158(a) (1976) provides in part: It shall be an unfair labor practice
for an employer ... (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their
rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title. . .. (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees. . . ."
96
 First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 242 N.L.R.B. 462, 466 101 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1117, 1178 (1979).
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feet its overall size." The Board concurred with the administrative law judges
ruling that FNM had violated sections 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) of the Act."
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit en-
forced the Board's order. 39 Unlike the Board, however, it did not find a viola-
tion of the Act because of any "per se" violation." Instead, the court used a
balancing test, stating that even where a partial closing decision is an economic
one, section 8(d) created a presumption in favor of mandatory bargaining. 41
Yet, the court noted that this presumption could be rebutted under the appeals
court's analysis "by showing that the purposes of the statute would not be fur-
thered by imposition of a duty to bargain."'" Such a showing could be made,
for example, by proving that "bargaining over the decision would be futile;"
that the decision was due to "emergency financial circumstances;" or that
"the custom of the industry, shown by the absence of such an obligation from
typical collective bargaining agreements, is not to bargain over such
decisions."'" The Second Circuit found that because termination of employ-
ment is part of the terms and conditions of employment and because FNM did
not produce evidence to rebut the presumption favoring mandatory bargaining
over partial closing decisions, the statute was violated." The Supreme Court
granted certiorari because of the conflict between the Board and circuit
courts."
In First National Maintenance, the Supreme Court held that the decision to
shut down part of a business solely for economic reasons is not part of section
8(d)'s "terms and conditions" and therefore is not a mandatory topic for col-
lective bargaining." The majority reached this conclusion by applying a bal-
ancing test which provides: "in view of an employer's need for unencumbered
decisionmaking, bargaining over management decisions that have a substan-
tial impact on the continued availability of employment should be required on-
ly if the benefit, for labor-management relations and the collective bargaining
process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the business." 47 Ap-
plying this balancing test to economically motivated partial closing decisions,
the Court found labor had little to gain from collective bargaining while
management had much to lose.
With regard to the interests of labor, the Court conceded that a union has
an interest in participating in the decision to partially close operations because
of "its legitimate concern over job security. "48 In spite of this interest the
" Id. at 462, 101 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1178.
38 Id. at 446, 101 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1178.
39 NLRB v. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 627 F.2d 596, 603 (2d Cir. 1980).
4a Id. at 601.
" Id. at 601-02.
42 Id. at 601.
43 id. at 601-02.
" Id. at 602.
43 101 S. Ct. 854 (1981).
48 101 S. Ct. at 2584.
47 Id. at 2581.
46
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Court found that workers already are protected 49
 by section 8(a)(5), which re-
quires bargaining over the effects" of such a decision, 5 ' and by section 8(a)(3),
which prohibits partial closings motivated by antiunion animus. 52
 Turning to
an evaluation of management's interests in collective bargaining over a partial
closing decision, the Court found that the bargaining process is disruptive of
management's decision making process." Management's interest in discussing
a partial closing, according to the Court, depends upon the circumstances. 54
When wages are at issue, the majority stated, a voluntary conference probably
would occur." Yet in some partial closing cases, the Court observed, manage-
ment needs to act quickly, unfettered by the public, time-consuming nature of
bargaining." Moreover, the Court found that because in many cases the clos-
ing is inevitable, bargaining will only cause needless additional loss to the
employer." In addition, the Court feared that unions would use mandatory
bargaining in this situation to delay unavoidable closings." Finally, because
collective bargaining agreements rarely contain provisions requiring bargain-
ing over a partial closing decision, the Court reasoned, current labor practice
does not warrant such bargaining. 59
After finding that collective bargaining over the decision to close part of a
business generally would be fruitless, the Court stated that the rebuttable
presumption analysis of the Second Circuit would not promote better labor-
management relations. 60
 Because an employer would be uncertain of the need
for bargaining under this analysis, the Court found that the penalties for er-
roneously deciding not to bargain, such as court ordered payment of back pay,
would be too harsh. 61
 The Court further noted that an employer would have
difficulty determining when bargaining should begin and what kind of bargain-
ing would be needed for the employer to act in "good faith." 62 Likewise, the
majority believed that under a presumption analysis a union would be unsure
of whether its prerogatives could be used to influence a given decision." As a
result of the Court's evaluation of the interests at stake and the merits of a
presumption analysis, the Court adopted a per se rule under which "the harm
49 Id. at 2582.
5° Such effects include "possibility of transfer, reassignment to other duties, disposition
of pensions, and payment of severance pay and vacation pay." T. Kheel, 18 BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS, LABOR LAW 20-29 (1981).
" See supra note 35 for text of section 8(a)(5).
52 See supra text of section 8(a)(3) at note 16.
53
 101 S. Ct. at 2582-83.
" Id. at 2582.
55 Id.
56 Id. The Court stated that management "may face significant tax or securities conse-
quences that hinge on confidentiality, the timing of a plant closing, or a reorganization of the cor-
porate structure." Id. at 2582-83.





62 Id. at 2584.
63 Id. The Court stated that union delay, due to fear of sanctions from the Board, could
constitute a waiver of the right to bargain. Id.
December 1982] 	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 • 101
likely to be done to an employer's need to operate freely in deciding whether to
shut down part of its business purely for economic reasons outweighs the in-
cremental benefit that might be gained through the union's participation in
making the decision . . . . "64 The Court decided, therefore, that an
economically motivated partial closing decision is not a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining under 8(d)."
After adopting this per se rule, the Court emphasized the limits of its
holding by focusing on the specific facts of First National Maintenance. These
facts, the Court observed, differed from those in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.
where the Court required bargaining. 66 In First National Maintenance, no
substitution of employees occurred, which indicated the economic nature of the
closing. 67 Moreover, because the economic dispute that led to the partial clos-
ing was over the management fee, the Court considered the union at Green-
park too far removed from the dispute to affect the fee negotiation." The Court
also noted there were no ongoing or prior negotiations between the union and
FNM. 69 Although the Court stated that the amount of capital involved was not
crucial to its decision, the significance of the change to FNM's operations was
considered great enough to warrant noninterference with the employer's deci-
sion." Thus, the Supreme Court's decision is confined to economically based
discharges where a significant part of a business's operations are curtailed.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented because he found
the majority's test of mandatory bargaining was not neutral." He claimed that
the majority's test considered the interests of the employer only." Moreover,
Justice Brennan found that, even under application of the majority's test, a
partial closing falls within 8(a). 73 Union concessions, he noted, often can keep
a company going. 74 He questioned the majority's belief that employers must
make quick, unpublicized decisions. In his opinion, the decision of whether to
partially close can be made quickly in many cases." He noted that since
bargaining over the effects of such a decision is mandatory, the extra time
needed to bargain over the decision itself should not defeat corporate needs."
Finally he stated that the Board's interpretation of the statute should be accord-
ed deference and that the Second Circuit's analysis was proper." With respect
64 Id.
65 Id.






72 Id. at 2586.
73 Id,
7+ Id.
" Id. at 2586-87.
76 Id. at 2587.
" Id. at 2587 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 495-97 (1979); NLRB v.
Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963).
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to this case, however, he would have vacated the Second Circuit's decision and
remanded the case to the Board for further examination of the evidence."
The dissent's disagreement with the majority stems from the view taken of
the function of the Act in partial closing situations. Although the majority
stated that the Act was designed to maintain industrial peace through "the pro-
motion of collective bargaining as a method of defusing and channeling conflict
between labor and management,"" its decision does not further that goal.
Rather, the majority skews its analysis to evaluate only the employer's benefit
from collectively bargaining over this issue. The majority's analysis may be
consistent with another goal of the Act, namely, to provide for the free flow of
capital." Yet, economic efficiency may not always result from unilateral deci-
sion. First, the external costs of a partial closing, such as unemployment, affect
the community at large and are not likely to enter into management's decision
making process." More importantly, an employer lacks complete information
when he acts without union consultation. 62
 Unions often are able to offer wage
and hour concessions to help keep a business running," as in the case of
Chrysler Corporation." Moreover, unions have provided employers secondary
economic assistance by helping employers obtain substantial loans and
alleviating problems such as crime at the worksite. 85 The First National Mainte-
nance Court, however, presumes that unions are not helpful on indirect
economic issues, such as reducing Greenpark's management fee." More im-
portantly, FNM could not have suffered a substantial loss of capital if termina-
tion of its Greenpark operation were delayed because FNM provided only
employees." Although the Court stated that the degree of change to the
employer's business was the critical factor in this case," not the change in
capital, the administrative law judge had found that "Nile closing of this one
spot in no sense altered the nature of its [Greenpark's] business, nor did it
substantially affect its total size. " 89 Commentators arguing in favor of a per se
nonmandatory bargaining rule at least make a distinction between working
capital, such as wages, and fixed capital, such as invested resources." At the
heart of the distinction these commentators make is a recognition that the prop-
er rule should account for different factual settings.
" Id. (relying on SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94-95 (1943)).
" 101 S. Ct. at 2578.
8° See Comment, "Partial Terminations" — A Choice Between Bargaining Equality and
Economic Efficiency, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1089, 1091 (1967) [hereinafter Comment].
81 Case Comment, supra note 5, at 775.
82 Case Comment, supra note 5, at 775-76.
" Case Comment, supra note 5, at 777-78; R. Rabin, Fibreboard and the Termination of
Bargaining Unit Work: The Search for Standards In Defining the Scope of the Duty to Bargain, 71 C0LUM.
L. REV. 803, 824 (1971) [hereinafter Rabin].
84 101 S. Ct. at 2586 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" Rabin, supra note 83, at 825-26.
86 101 S. Ct. at 2585.
87 Id. at 2575.
88 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
89 First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 242 NLRB 462, 466 (1979). See also supra note 38 and
accompanying text.
9° Comment, supra note 80, at 1095.
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Providing for a rebuttable presumption of mandatory bargaining provides
the flexibility needed. The Second Circuit's test, however, arguably is too
vague to guide employer's decisions on whether to bargain.coIlectively or not.
A more appropriate test is that used by the Third Circuit. Specifically, the
presumption that bargaining is required could be rebutted if the circumstances
indicate that the interests of the employer in a unilateral decision are greater
than those of the workers in a collective decision. 9 ' In applying this rule, the
Third Circuit has upheld a unilateral decision where condemnation pro-
ceedings were imminent, 92 but not where the employer was taking losses over
several months. 93 Such a test would further the goals of distributing the wealth
of the corporation and economic efficiency." Moreover, the feeling of par-
ticipation among workers that would result from such an approach would pro-
mote industrial peace." Case law would develop clear guidelines for employers
to follow.
The language of the Court, however, makes it unlikely the Court will alter
its analysis in future cases. Indeed, the Board already has felt constrained by
the First National Maintenance decision to uphold an employer's decision to
cancel a contract and discharge some sixty employees without mandatory
bargaining over the decision. 96 Moreover, the broad language of the decision
may result in pro-employer judgments when plant relocation" or other
"economically motivated" decisions are at issue. To be sure, unions still have
the power to bargain over the effects of a partial closing decision. 98 Unions can
also bring actions under section 8(a)(3) if the burden of proving antiunion
animus is met. 99 Moreover, the decision making process for partial closings can
be provided for in the collective bargaining agreement. Yet because partial
closing decisions are now only a permissive subject: of bargaining under the
Court's analysis in First National Maintenance, the union cannot insist upon a
resolution of this issue at the bargaining table. 180 Thus, in one stroke the Court
has substantially damaged the bargaining process and arguably impaired the
Act's effectiveness in promoting industrial peace.
9' See Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720, 735-38 (3d Cir. 1978).
92 NLRB v. Royal Plating and Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191, 196-97 (3d Cir. 1965).
" Electrical Prods. Div. of Midland-Ross Corp. v. NLRB, 617 F.2d 977, 982-83 (3d
Cir. 1980).
94 See Case Comment, supra note 5, at 775.
95 See Case Comment, supra note 5, at 779-80.
96 United States Contractors, Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. 152, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1048
(1981).
97 See T. Kheel, 18 BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, LABOR. LAW 20-33 (1981).
98 101 S. Ct. at 2582.
99 Id.
100 See generally T. Kheel, 18 BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, LABOR LAW 20-30 (1981).
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3.* Successor Employer's Duty to Bargain With a Union:
NLRB v. Winco Petroleum Co.'
Section 10(c)2
 of the National Labor Relations Act' (the "Act") em-
powers the National Labor Relations Board (the "Board") to take action
against employers found to have engaged in unfair labor practices. The Act
authorizes the Board to remedy the deleterious effects of such unfair practices
by ordering the reinstatement of an employee or issuing any other appropriate
remedy required to effectuate the policies of the Act. 4
 An important issue raised
by section 10(c) is whether an order by the Board against the predecessor in
interest of a company (the predecessor employer) resulting from the predeces-
sor's unfair labor practice should be valid against the bona fide purchaser of the
company (successor employer). 5
Following a series of inconsistent decisions by the Board and lower courts
dealing with such successor liability, 6
 the Supreme Court in 1973 in Golden State
Bottling Co. v. NLRB' held that a bona fide purchaser, as successor employer,
had to obey an outstanding Board order remedying the unfair labor practices of
a predecessor employer by reinstating a previously fired employee. 5 In its deci-
By Kevin Dennis, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 668 F.2d 973 (8th Cir. 1982).
2 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976) states in pertinent part:
(I)f upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opin-
ion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in any such unfair labor
practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to
be served on such a person an order requiring such a person to cease and desist
from such unfair labor practice, and take such affirmative action including
reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies
of this Act [29 U.S.C. SC 151-158, 159-168 (1976)]: Provided, That where an
order directs reinstatement of an employee, back pay may be required of the
employer or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the discrimina-
tion suffered by him.
s 29 U.S.C. SS 141-197 (1976).
4 See supra note 2.
3 See Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168 (1973); NLRB v. Cott Corp.,
578 F.2d 892 (1st Cir. 1978); Thomas Engine Corp., 73 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1289 (NLRB 1969),
enforced sub. corn. Auto Workers v. NLRB, 442 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1971); Perma Vinly Corp.,
164 N.L.R.B. 968 (1967), enforced sub. corn. United States Pipe and Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 398
F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1968); Syms Grocer Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 346 (1954); NLRB v. Lunder Shoe
Corp., 211 F.2d 284 (1st Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Birdsall Stockdale Motor Co., 208 F.2d 234 (lath
Cir. 1953); Alexander Milburn Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 747 (1947); South Carolina Granite Co., 58
N.L.R.B. 1448 (1944), enforced sub. nom. NLRB v. Blair Quarries, Inc., 152 F.2d 25 (4th Cir.
1945).
6
 After holding initially that a successor employer could not be held responsible for the
unfair labor practices of its predecessor, see South Carolina Granite Co., 58 N.L.R.B. 1448
(1944), enforced sub. nom. NLRB v. Blair Quarries, Inc., 152 F.2d 25 (4th Cir. 1945), the Board
reached a series of inconsistent conclusions on the issue, see Alexander Milburn Co., 78
N.L.R.B. 747 (1947); NLRB v. Birdsall Stockdale Motor Co., 208 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1953);
NLRB v. Lunder Shoe Corp., 211 F.2d 284 (1st Cir. 1954); Syms Grocer Co., 109 N.L.R.B.
346 (1954), and the Board finally determined in 1968 that a successor employer could be held
responsible for the unfair labor practices of the predecessor employer. Perma Vinyl Corp., 164
N.L.R.B. 968 (1967), enforced sub. corn. United States Pipe and Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d
544 (5th Cir. 1968).
414 U.S. 168 (1973).
8 Id. at 172. In Golden State, All Am. Beverages, Inc. (All American) had purchased
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sion, the Court included guidelines for use in successor liability cases. 9 The
Court stressed the importance of two facts of the case that led to the liability of
the successor employer: (1) that the successor employer knew of the unfair
labor practice litigation previous to the purchase of the company;" and (2) that
the successor employer had continued the business without interruption or
substantial change." Given these facts, the Court concluded that the successor
had merely stepped into the shoes of the old employer and therefore had to
assume the duties of the old employer.' 2
 In addition to these two facts, the
Court articulated three other prerequisites necessary for liability to attach to a
successor employer. First, a remedy has to be within the discretionary powers
of the Board under section 10(c)." Second, procedural safeguards, consisting
of notice and a hearing, must protect the rights of the successor employer."
Third, the order by the Board must reach the appropriate balance among the
interests of the bona fide successor employer, the public, and the affected
employees." Applying these requirements in Golden State, the Court concluded
that the order to the successor employer to reinstate the employee was valid
and upheld its imposition."
Despite the completeness of the Golden State decision, one issue left
unresolved involved the scope of a successor employer's duty to bargain with a
union. This issue arises when an employer who has engaged in unfair labor
practices, and as a result has been ordered by the Board to bargain with a
union, sells the company. In this situation, the Golden State result requiring a
successor employer to fulfill an outstanding Board order may conflict with the
Golden State Bottling Co. (Golden State). Id. at 170. Prior to the purchase, Golden State had
been ordered by the Board pursuant to 5 10(c) to reinstate a particular employee because his
discharge constituted an unfair labor practice. Id. at 171. Following the sale of Golden State, the
Board ordered All American, as successor employer, to comply with this reinstatement order. Id.
at 170-71. The Supreme Court affirmed the appeals court enforcement of the order. Id. at 172.
9 Id. at 172-89.
'° Id. at 172-74.
" Id. at 184.
" Id. at 172-74, 184.
" Id. at 176. The Court stated, "We agree that the Board's remedial powers under S
10(c) include broad discretion to fashion and issue the order before us as relief adequate to
achieve the ends, and effectuate the policies of the Act." Id. The Court relied on the language of
5 10(c) that allows the Board to take affirmative action that will effectuate the policies of the Act.
See Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 14 (1945); Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB,
315 U.S. 100, 106 (1942).
'* 414 U.S. at 180-81. The Court relied on the procedural safeguards that were
established in Per,na Vinyl. Id. The Court stated, "There will be no adjudication of liability
against a bona fide successor 'without affording (it) a full opportunity at a hearing, after adequate
notice, to present evidence on the question of whether it is a successor which is responsible for
remedying a predecessor's unfair labor practices.' " Id. at 180.
15 414 U.S. at 181. The Court, in response to an argument made by the successor
employer, also stated that Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, did not bar suc-
cessor liability even when the successor is not responsible for the unfair labor practices. Rule
65(d) provides that injunctions and restraining orders shall be "binding only upon the parties to
the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in
active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by personal serv-
ice or otherwise." FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d).
16 414 U.S. at 172.
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strong public policy favoring union selection through the electoral process." In
Golden State, the Supreme Court addressed in dicta this issue of a successor
employer's duty to bargain with a union."' The Court stated that if a majority
of employees of the predecessor employer were not hired by the successor
employer, the successor employer would not have to satisfy an outstanding
order to bargain with a union.' 9
In 1978 the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, faced
with a factual pattern very similar to the hypothetical posed by the Court in
Golden State, refused to enforce a bargaining order against a successor employer
and overruled the Board. In NLRB v. Cott Corp. , 20 the predecessor employer,
prior to selling the company, had been ordered to bargain with a union. 21 The
successor employer employed only one employee of the predecessor at the time
it received a show cause notice concerning why the successor should be allowed
to ignore the bargaining order that had been issued to its predecessor." Rely-
ing on dicta in Golden State limiting the duty of a successor employer to bargain
if a majority.of employees of the predecessor were not employed by the suc-
cessor, the First Circuit ruled the successor had no duty to bargain." Instead,
the appeals court determined that the policy of the Act would be furthered by
the holding of a secret election among the new employees to determine if they
wanted the union to represent them. 24
During the Survey year the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, in NLRB v. Winco Petroleum Co. ,25
 held that a successor employer could
" Two provisions of the Act give the right to employees to be represented by a union of
their choice. 29 U. S.C. SS 9157, 159(a) (1976). Although the provisions do not explicitly provide
for it, a secret election process has been accepted as the most favorable method by which
employees should select a union. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 614-15 (1969);
Rapid Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 144, 149-50 (3d Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Chatfield-Anderson
Co., Inc., 606 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Cott Corp., 578 F.2d 892, 894-95 (1st
Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 550 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1977); Peerless of
Am., Inc. v. NLRB, 484 F.2d 1108, 1118 (7th Cir. 1973). The Supreme Court in Gissel stated
that only If the Board finds that the possibility of erasing the effects of past practices and of en-
suring a fair election (or a fair re-run) by the use of traditional remedies, though present, is slight
and that employee sentiment once expressed through cards would, on balance, be better pro-
tected by a bargaining order, then such an order should issue." NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. , 395
U.S. at 614,15.
la Golden State, 414 U.S. at 184 n.6. Prior to Golden State, the Supreme Court had deter-
mined that a new employer could be ordered by the Board to bargain with the certified bargain-
ing representative for the old company if the bargaining unit remained essentially unchanged.
NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs. Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972). The situation in Burns must be
distinguished from that of Golden State. Golden State involved orders that originally were made
against the predecessor company and were subsequently imposed on the successor company.
Burns focused on the duty of the successor company to follow orders of the Board originally
directed at the successor company.
12 Golden State, 414 U.S. at 184 n.6. The Court's statements were expressed in a
hypothetical situation meant to demonstrate the limits of a successor employer's duty to correct
its predecessor's unfair labor practices. Id.
2° 578 F.2d 892 (1st Cir. 1978).
21 Id, at 893.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 895.
24 Id. at 894-95. The appeals court relied on NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575
(1969). See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
25
 668 F.2d 973 (8th Cir. 1982).
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have a duty to bargain with a union solely because its predecessor had been
ordered by the Board to bargain with that union." This decision represents the
first time that a court of appeals has upheld the Board's imposition of a
bargaining order against a successor employer when the successor itself has not
been found to have engaged in unfair labor practices.
In Winco, Winco Petroleum Company voluntarily recognized a union
which had received union authorization cards" from a majority of Winco's
employees." Shortly thereafter, however, Winco withdrew its recognition of
the union and discouraged union activity among its employees." As a result,
the union filed unfair labor practices charges against Winco. 3° Following an
administrative hearing, a decision against Winco was rendered by the ad-
ministrative law judges' Subsequently, Winco Petroleum Company was sold
to Cooper Oil Company." The controlling parties in the two companies had
known each other for at least ten years prior to the sale." The buyer, Cooper
Oil, had examined the financial reports of Winco before purchasing, and these
reports indicated a sizeable expenditure for legal fees for unfair labor practice
litigation." The majority of Winco employees were kept in the work force by
Cooper, and the former business of Winco continued without substantial
change or interruption."
After the acquisition by Cooper of Winco, the Board affirmed the findings
of the administrative hearing, and ordered Winco to bargain with the union
that it had previously recognized." This bargaining order was subsequently
issued against Cooper, as successor employer, and Cooper appealed this deci-
sion by the Board to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals."
Relying heavily on Golden State, the Eighth Circuit in Winco affirmed the
Board's decision against Cooper and thereby ordered Cooper to bargain with
26 Id. at 975.
27 Union authorization cards provide another method by which a union can be chosen to
represent employees. It has been recognized that through the interaction of $ 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C.
55 9, 158(a)(5), 159(a) (1976) a union may be certified through the collection of union cards. See
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Corp., 395 U.S. 575, 596-97 (1968); United Mine Workers of America
v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62, 72 n.8 (1956); NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Assn.,
310 U.S. 318, 339-40 (1940),
28 668 F.2d 975. Twelve of the nineteen Winco employees had signed the cards. Id.
29 Id.
3° Id. The union charged that Winco had violated $ 8(a)(1), (3) and (5) of the National
Labor Relations Act 29 U.S.C. $$ 141-197 (1976). Id. The basis of the claim was that Winco had
refused to negotiate with the union, Winco had discouraged union support, that Winco had
discriminatorily discharged one employee and reduced the hours of other employees. 668 F.2d at
975.
" Id.
32 Id. at 976. Two years prior to the actual sale the same parties had discussed the
possibility of a sale but had rejected it. Id.
33 Id, at 975. In addition, the court pointed out that both men were members of the Mid-
America Gasoline Marketers Association. Id.
34 Id. at 976.
" Id. One month following the sale Cooper employed three former Winco employees as
managers and twelve of the sixteen non-supervisory employees. Id.
36 Id.
" Id. A notice of hearing was given to both Winco and Cooper, and a hearing was held
to determine if Cooper should be held to the order rendered against Winco. Id. The Board af-
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the union in its capacity as successor employer. 38
 The court accepted the
Board's factual findings that Cooper had purchased with the knowledge of the
unfair labor practices of the selling company" and that the former business of
Winco proceeded with little change under Cooper." The Eighth Circuit em-
phasized that these two identical facts existed in the Golden State case and con-
cluded that Golden State controlled in Winco. 41
 Thus, the court proceeded to ap-
ply the three standards of Golden State: the power of the Board," the existence of
procedural safeguards," and the balance of equities among the employer, the
public and the employees. 4 4
 Since the court viewed the cases as identical, it
reached the same conclusion as was reached in Golden State — that the bargain-
ing order against Cooper was valid under these three standards.* 5
In addition, the Winco court relied on the dicta of the Golden State decision,
which limited the duty of a successor employer to follow a bargaining order
against a predecessor employer." Since the Supreme Court had stated that a
successor employer would not have a duty to bargain if he did not hire a ma-
jority of the predecessor's employees, the Winco court reasoned that the suc-
cessor employer would have to bargain if he did hire a majority of the
predecessor's employees." The Winco court also distinguished Cott on the
grounds that in Cott unlike Winco there had been a dramatic shift in the com-
position of the work force after the sale of the company" and the predecessor
employer had never recognized the union."
An analysis of the Winco decision reveals that some reliance on Golden Stale
by the Winco court is justified, but that the strong policy favoring an election of
a union to represent a group of workers also should have been considered.
Whereas Golden State concerned the remedial power of the Board to order a suc-
cessor employer to reinstate an employee, Winco involved an order to a suc-
cessor employer to recognize and bargain with a union. Since an election by
the employees is the favored method by which a union should be selected," it is
firmed the findings of the hearing that determined Cooper was liable as successor employer. Id.
38 Id. at 975.
34 Id. at 978. In finding that Cooper had actual knowledge of the unfair labor practices,
the Winco court stated that the Board could reach this conclusion from inferences and credibility
determinations. Id. The following facts provided the basis for the Board's decision on this matter:
the owner of Winco had referred to "union problems" as one of the reasons for Winco included a
large amount for legal fees; testimony directly indicated Cooper was aware of the problem; and
the two companies operated in the same geographical area. Id.
4° Id.
41 Id. at 980-81. The fact that Cooper kept the majority of Winco employees and did not
change the business substantially were crucial to the Winco Court's decision. Id.
47 Id. at 979.
44 Id. at 979 n.3.
*4 Id. at 977-78.
43
 The court stated, "We hold that the Board properly applied the principles of Golden
State Bottling Co. in issuing the bargaining order against Cooper Oil in the present case." Id. at
980.
46
 Id. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
+7 Id.
48 Id. at 981.
49 Id. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
so See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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questionable whether the standards of successor liability announced in Golden
State should automatically control the result in Winco.
Combining the policy favoring union representative elections with the
principles on successor liability set out in Golden State calls into question the cor-
rectness of the Winco holding. First, while the Winco court recognized that the
Board has the discretionary powers under section 10(c) to fashion remedies to
effectuate the policies of the Act," it did not consider whether that authority is
circumscribed by the policy favoring union elections." The election policy em-
bodied in the Act establishes that when bargaining with a union is involved,
elections should be held to choose a union instead of using a bargaining
order." Thus, it is doubtful whether the imposition of the bargaining order on
the new employer solely because of the practices of the former employer "will
effectuate the policies of [the Act] ," 34 to be within the scope of the Board's
authority. 55
Secondly, although the Winco court implicitly adopted the balancing test
of Golden State, 56 involving the interests of the employer, the public, and the
employees, it apparently did not consider the impact of the election policy on
that weighing." Incorporating the strong election policies into the balancing
test creates serious doubts'as to whether the bargaining order should be upheld
against the successor employer. 58
Thirdly, as stressed by the Winco court, the Supreme Court in Golden State
did address the impact of an outstanding bargaining order on the successor
" 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 979.
52 This issue was not addressed in Golden State because the policies of the Act involved
there mandated that the successor employer be held liable for unfair labor practices of its
predecessor. 414 U.S. at 175-77.
" See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
54 See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
55 In Winco, the successor employer may have established a new working relationship
with the employees of the company, and the employees possibly would no longer wish a union to
represent them. There was no showing in the Winco case that the previous unfair labor practices
of the former employer still made a fair election on the union issue impossible. If, due to the
change in ownership, a fair union election could be held, the policies supporting the importance
of elections would demand that an election be held.
56 The Winco court did not expressly apply the Golden State balancing test, but it was a
general basis for the decision. 668 F.2d at 977-78.
" The importance of the balancing test was cited, but the only section of the test
specifically referred to was the interest of the employee. Id.
58 The successor employer in Winco would have his interests best served by an election
which would determine whether he should have to bargain with a union. If an election was held,
the employer would not be ordered to bargain with a union purely because of the predecessor's
unfair labor practices. Although the exact standards of the second part of the following test, the
interests of the public have not been defined, it appears that the courts are concerned that the
public benefit from an equitable rational labor policy. In Golden State, 414 U.S. at 181; NLRB v.
Teamsters Local 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957). The importance of elections in the process of selecting
a union has long been recognized as a beneficial aspect of this rational labor policy. See supra note
17 and accompanying text. The balancing test protects an employee by insuring that there will be
a remedy for any previous unfair labor practices. A change in ownership of the business should
not leave the employee who was injured by the unfair labor practices of the predecessor without a
remedy. Golden State, 414 U.S. at 181-83. When bargaining with a union is the primary issue, the
provisions of the Act and the decisions of the courts have developed the election "remedy,"
which completely protects the rights of the employees.
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employer." The Court's treatment, however, was in a hypothetical case posed
in dicta concerning when an employer would not be duty-bound to bargain,"
and thus was not meant to govern converse situations — where a successor
employer would be bound by an outstanding bargain order. Moreover, the
Winco court's dismissal of Cott as distinguishable may have been hasty, since
Cott, unlike Golden State, did treat the issue of the election policies. 6 ' Likewise,
the Winco court's reliance on the predecessor employer's voluntary recognition
of the union 62
 seems misplaced, since the recognition was short-lived, and the
employer proceeded to withdraw his recognition of the union. 62
In sum, while the Winco court correctly recognized that the standards of
Golden State should be applied to successor employer liability cases, it failed to
recognize a key factual difference — the presence of a bargaining order instead
of a mere reinstatement order — may have caused the court to reach a
mistaken conclusion. The strong election policy present in the Act dictates that
the choice of a union through the democratic process is much favored over
bargaining orders. The Winco court should have used the general standards of
Golden State, but also should have included in its analysis a consideration of the
election policies involved. The court then should have determined if a secret
election was possible with the successor employer in place and the successor
should be allowed to present evidence on this matter. The election, if deter-
mined to be possible, would protect all the parties under the Golden State stand-
ards and would also meet the election standards of Gissel. If such an election is
not possible, as may be the case if the successor employer has completely
adopted the practices of the predecessor, then the bargaining order against the
successor would be appropriate under both Golden State and Gissel.
59 668 F.2d at 980-81.
6° See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
61
 There are factual differences between Cott and Winco, but these do not negate the im-
portance of the election policy that the First Circuit recognized in Cott. In Cott, unlike Winco, the
successor employer did not hire a majority of the predecessor's employees but this does not mean
that the election policies would apply in Cott and would not in Winco. If, as in Cott, there has been
a large turnover in the work force, the need for an election would perhaps be stronger than if the
work force remained constant. The turnover would constitute a very significant change in cir-
cumstance which would make a fair election more possible, and the election would protect the
rights of the new workers. In addition, this large turnover in the work force would remove the case
from the predecessor rules of Golden State, for one of the criteria of Golden State, that the work force
remained the same, is missing. The election policies would, however, still apply in the Winco
case. The Coil case stressed that if any change in circumstances would make a fair election possi-
ble, the election alternative must be pursued. A complete change in ownership and removal of
the employer guilty of the unfair labor practices would seem to be such a change in cir-
cumstances.
62
 Voluntary recognition of a union is, as was stressed in Winco, a favored element of na-
tional. labor policy. 668 F.2d at 981.
" The short-term voluntary recognition of the union by the predecessor employer does
not negate the fact that the successor employer is being ordered to bargain with the union only
because of the past unfair labor practices of the predecessor. There would still need to be a show-
ing that the new employer continued to make an unfair election impossible for the bargaining
order to transfer to the successor.
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4.* Corporate Relocation and Existing Collective Bargaining Agreements:
NLRB v. Marine Optical, Inc.'
Section 8(a) of the National Labor Relations Act 2 provides, in part, that
"Lilt shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . (1) to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of [their organizational rights]. . . ;
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees. . . ." 3 In the past decade and a half, the National Labor Relations
Board has several times ruled on whether a company's refusal to comply with
the terms of an existing collective bargaining agreement upon relocation of
operations from one facility to another constitutes a violation of this section. 4
The general rule developed in these cases is that an "existing and effective
collective-bargaining agreement remains in effect following a relocation, pro-
vided operations and equipment remain substantially the same at the new loca-
tion, and a substantial percentage of the employees at the old plant transfer to
the new location." 5 During this Survey year, the First Circuit, in NLRB v.
Marine Optical, Inc. , 6 became the first circuit to adopt the rule developed by the
NLRB.'
Marine Optical, Inc. ("the Company"), an eyeglass manufacturer, took
over the operations of a Roslindale, Massachusetts facility in 1975.' Since that
year it had recognized Optical Workers Union Local 408 ("the Union") as the
exclusive bargaining representative of its production employees.° The most re-
cent collective bargaining agreement between the parties had been negotiated
in January 1977. 10 During the negotiations, the Company representative in-
formed the Union bargaining agent that the Company might have to move."
Stating that if the majority of workers at the new location were new hires, the
Company's ability to recognize the Union would be jeopardized, he suggested
a one-year only contract be negotiated.' 2
 The Union representative rejected
this suggestion, explaining that in his previous experience with relocation, the
existing agreement was simply transferred with the workers. ' 3 After consulting
with counsel, the Company agreed to bargain for and subsequently signed a
three-year collective bargaining agreement.' 4
" By Jo M. Katz, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
671 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1982).
	2  29 U.S.C.	 151-87 (1976 & Supp. 1982).
	
29 U.S.C.	 158{a)(1), (5) (1976 & Supp. 1982).
+ See, e.g., Westwood Import Co., Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1213 (1980); Tricor Prod., Inc.
and/or C 7 J Pattern Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 65 (1978); Lutheran Homes and Hospitals, Inc., d/b/a
Fairlawn Care Center, 233 N.L.R.B. 1025 (1977); W. T. Grant Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 955 (1972).
5
 Westwood Import Co., Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1213, 1214 (1980).
6 671 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1982).
7 Id. at 17.
8 Id. at 14.
9 Id. The Union had been the exclusive bargaining representative at the facility since
1954. Id. at 14 n.2.
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In August of 1979, while this agreement was still in effect, the Company
notified the Union of a probable move to a Brockton facility due to a
nonrenewal of the Roslindale lease." Soon after, it began, with the Union's
permission, to interview Roslindale employees interested in transferring to
Brockton." During the interviews, the employees were told that the Company
did not intend to recognize the Union at the new plant unless the majority of
workers there desired to be represented." Furthermore, the existing collective
bargaining agreement would not be applicable after relocation.'s In
September, the Union demanded negotiation for a contract to replace the one
that would run out in February of the following year. 19 The Company refused
on the grounds that they could not recognize the Union at the new Brockton
plant unless the majority of employees there indicated their desire to be
represented."
In early October, the Company began the gradual transfer of operations
to Brockton, continuing operations at Roslindale while moving one depart-
ment at a time to the new facility." Its refusal to recognize the Union dated
from the beginning of this process." By December the transfer was complete,
with twenty-six of the sixty-four Roslindale employees now working in
Brockton. 25 During the move, the same officials managed both plants, and the
Brockton facility was run in a fashion almost identical to the Roslindale plant."
An Administrative Law Judge found that the Company's refusal to
recognize the Union at the Brockton plant, refusal to apply the existing collec-
tive bargaining agreement at the new location, and unilateral change in work-
ing conditions at the relocated plant violated sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. 25 The National Labor Relations Board ("the
Board") affirmed his rulings, findings, and conclusions, and adopted his order
with certain modifications." The Board sought enforcement of its order by the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in December, 1981."
The Company presented three basic arguments in support of its actions.
First, the Company asserted that the language of the recognition clause con-
tained in the collective bargaining agreement limited the representational
capacity of the Union to workers employed at the Roslindale facility alone."





20 Id. at 14, 15.
21 Id. at 14.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 15.
23
 Id. at 13-14.
26 Id. at 14.
27 Id. at 11.
28 Id. at 16. The clause read: "The Union shall be the sole collective bargaining agency
for such production employees ... as are employed at the plants at 28 Mahler Road and 28
Lochdale Road, Roslindale, Massachusetts." Id. at 15.
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The Company also contended that the Union's conduct during the 1977
negotiations constituted a waiver of its claim to continued representation
following the move to Brockton. 29 Finally, the Company relied on a prior deci-
sion of the First Circuit to maintain that the "contract-bar" doctrine" was in-
applicable to situations involving relocation."
The First Circuit summarily dismissed the Company's first two
arguments, relying on the absence of evidence in the record indicating party in-
tent either to impose a geographical limit on the bargaining unit or to waive
representational claims. 32 The court then turned to a discussion of the contract-
bar doctrine. Relying on established case law, the court reasoned that pro-
hibiting an employer from petitioning the Board" for decertification of an in-
cumbent union necessarily entails forbidding him from withdrawing recogni-
tion of or refusing to bargain with the union during that same time period." It
noted that to do otherwise would allow the employer to accomplish unilaterally
what the Board would have refused to do had it been petitioned. Therefore, the
court reasoned, a union enjoys a conclusive presumption of majority status for
the life of an existing collective bargaining agreement."
The discussion of the reasoning behind the contract-bar doctrine laid the
groundwork for the court's consideration of the major issue in the case —
whether the doctrine is applicable in a situation of operations relocation. The
court first noted that the Board has held on several occasions that the principles
of continued recognition and adherence to the existing contract survive Com-
pany relocation providing certain circumstances exist in the situation." As
presented in Westwood Import Company, Inc. , 37 the contract-bar doctrine will ap-
ply in cases where 1) operations and equipment remain substantially the same
at the new location and 2) a substantial percentage of ihe workers from the old
plant transfer to the new one. 38 The First Circuit reasoned that under the
standard established by the Board, a reasonable inference could be drawn that
conditions have not significantly changed since the agreement was reached."
This being the case, the court observed, the union may rightfully enjoy the
benefits of the majority status presumption that exists during the uninterrupted
course of any collective bargaining agreement." Having thus accepted the
29 Id.
30 NLRB v. Massachusetts Machine and Stamping, Inc., 578 F.2d 15 (1st Cir, 1978).
31 The contract-bar doctrine prohibits either party from petitioning the National Labor
Relations Board for decertification of an incumbent union during the life of an existing collective
bargaining agreement. NLRB v. Marine Optical, Inc., 671 F.2d at 16. See Pioneer Inn Assocs.
v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 835, 838 (9th Cir. 1978).
32 NLRB v. Marine Optical, Inc., 671 F.2d at 17.
33 Id. at 16.
34 Id. (citing NLRB v. Burns Security Serv., 406 U.S. 272, 290 n.12 (1972);
Osteopathic Hosp. Founders Assoc. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 633, 638 (10th Cir. 1980); Pioneer Inn
Assoc., 578 F.2d 835, 838-39 (9th Cir. 1978).
" Id.
36 Id. at 17.
37 251 N.L.R.B. 1213, 1214. (1980).
3B NLRB v. Marine Optical, Inc., 671 F.2d at 17.
99 Id.
40 Id.
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Westwood test as the correct standard to apply in relocation cases, the First Cir-
cuit went on to find that sufficient continuity existed in the facts of Marine op-
heal, Inc. to justify its application. It therefore affirmed the Board's finding that
the contract signed in Roslindale was effective in Brockton.*'
The court rejected the Company's claim that the decision in NLRB v.
Massachusetts Machine and Stamping Co." supported the Company's right to
question the majority status of the Union at the new Brockton facility."
Although the prior case did include a relocation, the court distinguished it on
two counts. First, the court did not believe that the seventeen mile Roslindale
to Brockton move could be equated with the interstate forty mile relocation in-
volved in Massachusetts Machine.** More importantly, the collective bargaining
agreement negotiated between the parties in the prior case contained a clause
specifically providing that it would not be affected by any relocation within a
thirty mile radius of the old plant." Because the move that eventually was
made exceeded this geographical limitation, the decision to allow the Company
to question the majority status of the union at the new facility "was expressed,
therefore, in a context devoid of consideration of an existing collective bargain-
ing agreement."'" Having earlier dismissed the Company's other two
arguments, and endorsed the application of the Westwood modified contract-bar
doctrine, the conclusion that the Company's reliance on Massachusetts Machine"
was misplaced removed the last obstacle to the First Circuit's affirmation of the
Board's ruling. The First Circuit therefore upheld the Board's conclusion that
Marine Optical, Inc. had violated sections 8(a)(1) and (5) by refusing to
recognize and bargain with the Union at Brockton, refusing to apply the terms
of the existing collective bargaining agreement, and unilaterally changing
working conditions."
The decision in Marine Optical, was correct for several reasons. First, the
facts of the case clearly support the conclusion that the existing agreement
should have been and was still in effect following the Company's relocation to
Brockton. Second, holding management to agreements made prior to reloca-
tion under the circumstances present in this situation promotes the goals of the
National Labor Relations Act as a whole. Finally, the decision that relocated
companies must abide by existing contracts with the union when the specified
conditions are met is a logical extension of the well-established rule that an
alter ego of a company is bound by an agreement between the union and the
first employer.
The principle outlined in Westwood Import, and adopted in Marine Optical,
states that two conditions must be met before a company will be bound in a
new location by the agreement with the union it reached in the old plant. First,
4 ' Id.
" 578 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1978).
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the equipment and operations at the new facility must be substantially the
same as those at the old location. In the present case, the same machinery was
used in the same way, operations were continued under the same name, raw
materials were purchased from the same supplier, job titles and skills remained
the same, and the same supervisory personnel were used at both the old plant
in Roslindale and the new one in Brockton. 49 Furthermore, the same manage-
ment officials had overall responsibility for operations and labor relations at
both plants during the transition period. 30 These facts led the Administrative
Law Judge to make the unchallenged finding that, over the two-month span
during which the relocation was completed, both the Roslindale and Brockton
operations continued as an integral whole." Under such circumstances, there
can be little question that the first prong of the Westwood test was satisfied.
The second requirement of the Westwood or NLRB test is that a substantial
percentage of the workers from the old plant must transfer to the new facility.
In Marine Optical, forty percent of the Roslindale bargaining unit transferred to
Brockton." This was the same percentage found by the Board in Westwood Im-
port Company, to constitute a substantial percentage." Therefore, the second
and only remaining factor for consideration under the modified contract-bar
doctrine was also present in Marine Optical. The conclusion, therefore, that the
existing agreement was still in effect following the Company's move to
Brockton is clearly justified.
The declared purpose of the National Labor Relations Act is to avoid in-
dustrial unrest by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining, and protecting the rights of employees to engage in it." These
goals cannot be achieved in any meaningful way unless workers can rely on
continued compliance with the terms of a collective bargaining agreement by
all parties. If a company can unilaterally withdraw recognition of a union and
stop adhering to an existing contract merely because the physical location of its
operations moves seventeen miles, then, the right to collective bargaining will
be substantially threatened. On the other hand, if relocation legitimately
changed the conditions prevailing at the time the agreement was reached, it is
equally violative of the intent of the Act to hold the relocated Company to
agreements that may no longer be applicable. Therefore, the requirements of
substantial continuity in operations, equipment, and work force following
relocation are valid prerequisites to enforced adherence to any existing
bargaining contract. The modified contract-bar doctrine, containing within it
consideration of the equities involved on both sides, is a fair and just com-
promise. The First Circuit's adoption of it is therefore fully consistent with the
objectives and purposes of the National Labor Relations Act.
It is a well-established rule that an alter ego of a company is bound by the
terms of any contract negotiated between the first employer and its
49 Id. at 15.
5° Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 17.
" Id.
74 29 U.S.C. 151 (1976 & Supp. 1982).
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employees. 55
 In light of this principle, it seems appropriate for a company
which has merely relocated its operations, as opposed to being replaced by an
alter ego, also to be held to existing contracts with a union. To hold otherwise
would be to create a distinction unsupportable by facts or reason.
Marine Optical, Inc. is significant in that this decision marks the first time a
Circuit court has adopted specifically the modified contract-bar doctrine. The
above analysis suggests that the doctrine's application is completely consistent
with both the goals of the National Labor Relations Act and previously
established rulings. Therefore, it is unlikely that the First Circuit will remain
for long the only Circuit to have endorsed it.
B. Union Unfair Labor Practices
1." Individual Employee Liability for Wildcat Strikes:
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis'
Collective-bargaining agreements generally contain a no-strike clause,
from which most labor-management litigation arises. 2 The National Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 (the "Labor Act") 3
 contains section
301(b)1 , a limited liability provision, for such litigation. The latter provision
renders the union and the employer the appropriate parties for no-strike clause
disputes. Accordingly, in Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co. , 5
 the Supreme Court of
the United States held that an employer could not sue individual union
members under section 301(a) when those members acted as agents of the
union. 6 The Atkinson Court, however, expressly left open the question whether
" See, e.g., NLRB v. Tricor Products, Inc., 636 F.2d 266 (10th Cir. 1980); NLRB v.
Sweet Lumber Co., 515 F.2d 785 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 986 (1975); Local 57, Int'l
Ladies' Garment Workers Union v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 942
(1967).
• By Eric G. Woodbury, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
101 S. Ct. 1836 (1981).
7
 T. Kheel, 18E BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, LABOR LAW 27-2 (1981).
29 U.S.C. S 185(a) (1976) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to citizenship of the parties.
• 29 U.S.C.	 185(b) (1976) provides:
Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting com-
merce as defined in this chapter and any employer whose activities affect com-
merce as defined in this chapter shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such
labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees
whom it represents in the courts of the United States. Any money judgment
against a labor organization in a district court of the United States shall be en-
forceable only against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall
not be enforceable against any individual member or his assets.
5
 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
6 Id. at 247.
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employees who, without union consent, violate the no-strike clause can be in-
dividually liable.'
During the Survey year, the Court held in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reiss
that section 301(a) does not create an employer's cause of action against in-
dividual union members and officers who engage in a "wildcat strike" 9 con-
trary to their union's collective-bargaining agreement." The decision resolves
the last major uncertainty on the interpretation of who are proper parties under
section 301. The Court had established in Smith v. Evening News Association"
that an employee could sue an employer for breach of a collective bargaining
agreement under section 301. 12 In addition, the Atkinson decision established
that an employer could not sue an employee who was acting as an agent of the
union. Finally, section 301(b) expressly allows employers and unions to sue
each other.
The petitioners in Complete Auto Transit were three companies that
transported newly manufactured motor vehicles by truck." The respondents
were truck drivers and members of Teamsters Local 332, 14 affiliated with the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America. The companies and the union were parties to a collective
bargaining agreement containing a no-strike clause. 15 Yet, because of disputes
regarding union representation, in June of 1976 the respondent employees of
Complete Auto Transit stopped working."
Objecting to this wildcat strike, the petitioners sought, inter alia, damages
to recover losses and attorney fees pursuant to section 301(a). 17 The federal
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied damage relief,"
Id. at 249 n.7.
6 101 S. Ct. 1836 (1981).
A wildcat strike can be defined as "a work stoppage usually conducted by a majority
of the union membership, without the authorization by the union leadership in violation of the
collective-bargaining agreement." T. Kheel, 18F BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, LABOR LAW
30-125 (1981).
'° Id. at 1839.
" 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
11 Id. at 201.




16 Id. Employees of two like companies also ceased working in June. Complete Auto Tran-
sit, Inc. v. Reis, 614 F.2d 1110, 1111 (6th Cir. 1980).
17 101 S. Ct. at 1838. Injunctive relief to resume business operations also was sought.
Id.
14 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, Memorandum Opinion and Order No.
76-40057 (E.D. Mich. June 8, 1977), reprinted in 14 PETITIONS AND BRIEFS OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 37 (B.N.A. No. 79-1777). The district court also denied the
equitable relief sought because the claim was not arbitrable, it not having arisen from an
employer-employee dispute. Id. at 36. On rehearing, an injunction was granted because the
union dispute was resolved, and a new, arbitrable controversy arose between the union and the
companies over amnesty of the union workers. Id. at 36. The employees were then granted a mo-
tion for dissolution of the injunction and dismissal of the damages claim because of the Supreme
Court's decision in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 438 U.S. 397 (1976), and the congres-
sional purpose behind section 301 id. at 37-38. The Buffalo Forge Court held, in part, that an in-
junction could be issued only where the controversy was precipitated by an arbitrable issue. Buf-
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determining that Congress intended to shield union members and officials
from individual monetary liability." Reconsideration of the dismissal was
denied. 20
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the dismissal
of the damages' claim. 2 ' The appeals court based its decision on the Seventh
Circuit's analysis of legislative intent in Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Oil, Chemical &
Atomic Workers International Union, 22
 where the same issue was decided." The
petitioners then appealed the damages aspect of the case. 24 Because of a conflict
among federal district court decisions on this issue, 25 the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. 26
The Supreme Court held that section 301 does not create a cause of action
for damages against individual union members who, acting without union con-
sent, breach a no-strike agreement. 27
 Justice Brennan, writing for the
majority, 28
 did not find that section 301 on its face resolved the controversy."
Rather, the Court reached its conclusion by examining the legislative history
surrounding section 301. 30
 The Court first determined that section 301(b) of
falo Forge, 438 U.S. at 410. The district court found no such arbitrable issue existed here.
Memorandum Opinion and Order No. 76-40057, supra note 16, at 38.
12
 Memorandum Opinion and Order No. 76-40057, supra note 18, at 37 (relying on
Eazor Express, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 520 F.2d 951, 961 n.5 (3d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 935, re/1'g denied, 425 U.S. 908 (1976); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Oil Chemical &
Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 452 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1971).
2° Memorandum Opinion and Order No. 76-40057 (August 30, 1977), supra note 18, at
40.
21
 614 F.2d 1110, 1116 (6th Cir. 1980). The appeals court also reinstated the injunction.
Id. at 1114. The appeals court stated that Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 428
U.S. 397 (1976), did not require dissolution of the injunction because the strike was transformed
such that its underlying cause had become an arbitrable dispute." 614 F.2d at 1114.
22
 452 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1971).
23
 614 F.2d at 1115-16.
22
 101 S. Ct. 1839.
" For cases in accord with Complete Auto Transit see, e.g., Lakeshore Motor Freight v.
Steel Haulers Local 800, International Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America 483 F. Supp. 1150, 104 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2153 (W.D. Pa. 1980); United
Steelworkers of America v. Lorraine, a Division of Koehring Co., 616 F.2d 919, 103 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2627 (6th Cir. 1980); Putnam Fabricating Co. v. Null, 631 F.2d 311, 105 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2645 (4th Cir. 1980); Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Electrical Workers, 470 F. Supp.
1298 (W.D. Pa. 1979); Benada Aluminum Prod. Co. v. United Steel Workers, 83 Lab. Cas.
(CCH) Par. 10, 612 (D. Utah 1978). Contra, Certain-Tweed v. Local 37A, United Steelworkers
of Am. 484 F. Supp. 726, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2502 (N.D. Pa. 1980); Maita v. Killeen, 465 F.
Supp. 471 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Alloy Cast Steel Corp. v. United Steel Workers of Am., 429 F.
Supp. 471 (E.D. Pa. 1979); New York State United Teachers v. Thompson, 459 F. Supp. 677
(N.D. N.Y. 1978); Alloy Cast Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers, 429 F. Supp. 445 (N.D. Ohio
1977); DuQuoin Packing Co. v. P-156 Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workers of N.
Am., 321 F. Supp. 1230 (E.D. Ill. 1971).
26
 449 U.S. 898 (1980).
22 101 S. Ct. at 1839.
" Justice Brennan was joined by Blackmun, Marshall, Stevens, White, and Stewart,
JJ	 •
25 101 S. Ct. at 1839-40 (relying on Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
448 (1957); Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Interna-
tional Union, 417 U.S. 249 (1974); Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962)).
" Id.
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the Labor Act was adopted as a legislative response to the Danbury Hatters
case." In Danburry Hatters," numerous employees, acting under their union
direction, had boycotted an employer's hats. Subsequently, many of these
employees were held individually liable for their union-sponsored boycott,
and, being unable to satisfy their judgment debts, lost their homes. The Court
in Complete Auto Transit concluded, therefore, that the Labor Act was designed
to make union entities, and not their individual members, liable for union-
sponsored activities. 33
The Court then found that Congress also intended to bar individual
liability where the union did not sanction such a strike, even if the employer is
left without a remedy." The Court stated that the precursor of section 301, sec-
tion 10 of the "Case bill"" which was successfully vetoed by President
Truman, was relevant to ascertaining legislative intent because of its similarity
to section 301. 36 Section 10(d) of the Case bill, as amended by the Senate,
stated that an employer's proper remedy in the event of a wildcat strike is the
discharge of union members." The Court then considered other congressional
activity. According to the Court, when section 301 was debated in Congress,
an amendment to section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act was proposed
in the House which created individual employee liability for participation in
wildcat strikes. 38 Yet the Senate, the Court noted, rejected the amendment,
desiring only union, not employee, liability under section 301(b) because of the
Danbury Hatters tragedy." The joint House-Senate conference committee, the
Court observed, also rejected the imposition of individual damage liability and
felt discharge from employment was a more appropriate remedy." The Court
thus found the legislative history of section 301 and related legislation did not
support a finding that employee damage liability for wildcat strikes was intend-
ed by Congress.
In reaching its conclusion based on pertinent legislative history, the Court
noted that other remedies are available to deter such strikes. 4 ' Specifically, the
Court mentioned damages against the union where the union sanctioned such
activity, employer power to discipline or discharge, and employer-initiated in-
junctive relief where the dispute is subject to binding arbitration. 42 In addition,
the Court concluded that the goal of industrial peace:, which the Labor Act is
3' Id. at 1840.
32 See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908); Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U.S. 522 (1915);
Loewe v. Savings Bank of Danbury, 236 F. 444 (2d Cir. 1916), aff'd, 242 U.S. 357 (1917).
" 101 S. Ct. at 1840.
34 Id.
" H.R, 4908, 79th Cong. 2d Sess. (1948).
3" 101 S. Ct. at 1841 (relying on Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 509
(1962)).
" Senate Amendment No. 3 to H.R. 4908-92 CONG . REC, 5705 (1948).
3" 101 S. Ct. at 1843.
32 Id.
4° Id. at 1844.
4' Id. at 1845 n.18.
42 Id.
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designed to further, could well be frustrated by employer actions for damages
against wildcat strikers."
Justice Powell concurred in the judgment, but not in the majority's belief
that the employer has other remedies that are effective deterrents to wildcat
strikes." Specifically, Justice Powell stated that a suit for damages against a
union usually cannot be maintained unless the union is responsible for the
strike." Additionally, such suits may not be brought, he maintained, since
they enhance industrial strife, open the corporation to discovery and are inef-
fectual because the strikes are usually settled upon the condition that the suit be
withdrawn." Justice Powell also observed that discharge is often ineffective
because in a large strike wholesale discharges are not practical,'" selective
discharges are arguably illegal" or ineffectual," and arbiters often reinstate
discharged strikers. 50
 Union discipline of wildcat strikers does not occur,
Justice Powell stated, because the dispute in wildcat strikes is usually with
union management, not the employer, so any employer attempt to discipline
wildcat strikers would be ineffective or counterproductive." Moreover, he
pointed out, a union normally has no statutory obligation to halt wildcat
strikes. 52
 Finally, with respect to employer-initiated injunctions, Justice Powell
feared that the Norris-LaGuardia Act 53
 renders them unavailable except in the
infrequent situation where the dispute is arbitrable." Moreover, he found that
striking workers often disobey injunctions and that, if contempt penalties are
imposed, they are difficult to enforce. 55
 Justice Powell regretfully concluded
that the failure of the Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947 to provide employers
with effective wildcat strike remedies hurts the general public."
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented, stating that
individuals must be held accountable for breaches of their contracts." The
Chief Justice first found that section 301(b) was designed to prevent employee
liability only where the union is responsible for the strike, as in the Danbury Hat-
" Id. (relying on Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235,
248 (1970); Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 381 n.14 (1974)).
64 101 S. Ct. 1845.
4, Id. at 1848 (relying on Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMW, 444 U.S. 212 (1979)).
66 Id. at 1848 n.9.
4' Id. at 1847 (citing Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S.
235, 248-49 n.17 (1970)).
45 Id.
45 Id. at 1848. Justice Powell stated that selected discharges probably will not force the




52 Id. (relying on Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMW, 444 U.S. 212 (1979)).
" 29 U.S.C. S 104 (1976), Section 4 provides, in part: "No Court of the United States
shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in
any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute. . . ."
54 101 S. Ct. at 1847 (citing Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398
U.S. 235 (1970)).
55 101 S. Ct. at 1847.
56 Id. at 1849.
" Id. at 1849.
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ters case." He believed Congress, in passing the Labor Act, did not wish to
alter the common law rule of individual accountability for contract violations, a
role that the Chief Justice viewed as "essential to an organized society.""
Chief Justice Burger also stated that the Court's decision would enhance in-
dustrial strife because employers will be less likely to enter into collective-
bargaining agreements if workers can breach such agreements with "impuni-
ty. " 60 The Chief Justice further expressed disbelief in the Court's opinion that
a damages action against employees would jeopardize management-labor rela-
tions." The Chief Justice concluded that fewer strikes would occur if union
authority were strengthened by deterring wildcat strikes, which are currently
afforded "artificial, excessively paternalistic protection. ,,62
The dissent's analysis departs from that of the majority because of a fun-
damental difference in the manner in which each viewed the Labor Act. No ex-
press language in section 301 excludes imposition of employee liability for
wildcat breaches of a no-strike clause. Yet the Court has consistently stated
since the landmark Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills decision," that section
301(a) creates a body of substantive federal law." The 1947 Act was designed
to displace state law that formerly allowed suits against employees. According-
ly, the Complete Auto Transit majority found that the "penumbra" of section 301
indicates no congressional intention to impose individual liability upon wildcat
strikers." Conversely, the dissent narrowly construed the Act in finding that
common law concepts should remain in the interpretation of section 301. 66
Given the general purpose of the Act, the majority's analysis is more per-
suasive.
In enacting section 301, Congress was primarily concerned with prevent-
ing the imposition of onerous liabilities on employees. The tragedy of the Dan-
bury Hatters case could, therefore, be avoided only by making entities of limited
liability, the employer and the union, parties to the collective-bargaining
agreement. Employees, in the congressional design, are third-party
beneficiaries who can sue but not be sued. By so shielding the employee, Con-
gress believed that labor-management relations would be more stable thereby
benefiting the general public. Accordingly, Congress did not alter section 301
after Sinclair Oil, where the Seventh Circuit reached the same result.
Aside from the message of the legislative history surrounding section 301,
there are policy reasons which favor the majority's result. First, preventing the
imposition of damage liability upon wildcat strikers furthers the goal of the
58 Id. at 1850.
" Id.
60 Id. at 1851.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 1851-52.
63 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
64 Note, Labor Law — Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act — Individual Liabili-
ty of Employees for an Unauthorized Work Stoppage In Breach of the No-Strike Clause of Collective Bargaining
Agreement, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1657, 1659 (1972).
65
 101 S. Ct. at 1844.
66 Id. at 1850.
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Taft-Hartley amendments to cure "a wave of labor unrest." 67
 A suit against
individuals usually will not end a work stoppage," which is the goal of
employers. 69
 Moreover, as the Court recognized in Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Union," industrial peace is best secured by preventing the aggravating
effect of individual damage suits."
Chief Justice Burger, however, stated that individual liability would deter
industrial strife from occurring." While the Chief Justice's deterrence theory
might be correct, other forms of labor unrest could manifest themselves in
response to damage suit, against individual strikers. Moreover, aggrieved
employees are not likely to understand and assess the impact of a suit in an
emotional dispute." Even if these problems did not arise, however, the deter-
rence provisions Congress has already placed in the Act would be upset by this
novel remedy.
If workers would be deterred from striking without union authorization
because of individual liability, a chilling effect on legitimate concerted activity
may result. 74 Workers are protected under section 7 of the Management Rela-
tions Act when the union does not fairly represent their interests against an un-
friendly employer." Individual damage suits could deter this express form of
congressionally sanctioned activity. Indeed, in Complete Auto Transit, the wild-
cat strike was in response to alleged unfair representation by the union."
In the wake of Complete Auto Transit, employers are not left powerless.
Justice Powell's bleak characterization of current remedies, concurred in by
some commentators," may not be broadly applicable." For example,
discharges have been used and sustained by courts in prior cases." Moreover,
employers can protect themselves by negotiating for stringent discipline and
discharge provisions in their collective bargaining agreements. 8° Courts prefer
67 Id. at 1846 (Powell, J., concurring).
68 Casenote, Labor Law-Strikers-Individual Union Members Not Liable For Breach Of Contrac-
tual No-Strike Clause Even When Strike Unauthorized by Union — Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Oil Workers
Union, 452 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1971), 86 HARV. L. REV. 447, 450 (1972) [hereinafter Casenote].
69 Whitman, Wildcat Strikes: The Unions' Narrow Path to Rectitude?, 50 IND. L. J. 472,
473-74 (1975).
" 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
" Id. at 248.
72
 Id. at 1851-52.
" Casenote, supra note 68, at 951.
74 Id.
75 29 U.S.C. 5 157 (1976) provides in part: "Employees shall have the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.. . ."
76 101 S. Ct. at 1838.
77 See, e.g. , Rosenberg, Individual Employee Liability for Wildcat Strikes, 7 EMPLOYEE RELA-
TIONS L. J. 288 (1981).
" For example, Justice Powell stated that striking workers "often are disinclined to
obey" injunctions. 101 S. Ct. at 1847. Yet the authority relied upon is only in the coal industry
and the commentator he cites states that sympathy strikes are especially common in this industry.
See Gould, On Labor Injunctions Pending Arbitration: Recasting Buffalo Forge, 30 STAN. L. REV. 533,
541 (1978). 101 S. Ct. at 1847 n.6.
79 See, e.g., Emporium Capwell C. v. Western Community Org., 420 U.S. 251 (1975);
NLRB v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944).
88
 Many collective bargaining agreements delineate the parties' rights and liabilities in
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resolving disputes through such provisions." If this procedure proves ineffec-
tive, courts are free to expand section 301 remedies consistent with congres-
sional intent." For example, given the congresssional desire to have unions
represent their employees as an entity, the judiciary could force unions to take
serious efforts to end wildcat strikes under the potential sanction of an
employer-union suit."
In sum, the Complete Auto Transit decision is an important case. The Court
found that Congress enacted section 301 to avoid the onerous individual liabili-
ty imposed in the Danbury Hatters cases and that section 301 of the Labor Act
supplanted common law contract rules. This legislative history compelled the
Court to conclude that the imposition of individual damage liability upon
wildcat strikers would be contrary to the language of section 301. Moreover,
there are important policy reasons, such as promoting industrial peace and en-
suring fair union representation, which support the decision. Finally, the deci-
sion does not render employers powerless to combat wildcat strikes because ef-
fective weapons designed to foster industrial peace remain in the employer's
arsenal.
2.* Federal Criminal Prosecution for Union Violence:
United States v. Thordarson'
Under section 8(b)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), coer-
cive violence by unions or employers is an unfair labor practice. 2 In situations
involving union violence the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) may
refuse to reinstate an employee fired for engaging in violent conduct,' issue
broad cease and desist orders, decertify the offending union as the collective
bargaining agent, or require the offending union to publicize its prohibited ac-
tions.' Furthermore, the NLRB may seek a temporary injunction prohibiting
such cases, which may account for the infrequency of litigation in this area. Casenaie, supra note
68, at 453.
8 ' See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Fivecoat, 484 F. Supp. 824, 825 (D. Utah 1980); Great
Scott! Super Market, Inc. v. Goodman, 764, 50 Mich. App. 635, 213 N.W.2d 762 (1973).
22 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957): "the purpose of sec-
tion (301) was to provide the necessary legal remedies ... (it) was more than jurisdictional." Id.
at 455.
83 Casenote, supra note 68, at 457-58.
* By Douglas W. Jessop, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 646 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 601 (1981).
29 U.S.C. 158(b) (1976). A union's violent conduct used to coerce an employer to
select a collective bargaining representative is an unfair labor practice under 5 158(b)(1)(B). A
separate provision of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. $ 158(b)(1)(A), makes it an unfair labor practice for
a union to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed under 5 7 of the
Act, 29 U.S.0 5 157 (1976). Section 7 gives employees the right to organize, bargain collectively
and engage in concerted activities, as well as the right not to participate in such concerted ac-
tivities. Even acts of violence which are directed at the employer outside of bargaining represent-
ative selection can be an unfair labor practice when employees are likely to learn of them. See,
e.g. , NLRB v. Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 540 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1976); NLRB v. UMW,
429 F.2d 141, 147-48 (3d Cir. 1970).
29 U.S.C. 5 160(c) (1976).
NLRB v. Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 540 F.2d 1, 11-12 (1st Cir, 1976). If
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violent conduct." Besides these NLRB sanctions, employers may be able to
deter union violence through non-administrative means. For example,
employers can seek injunctive relief in the federal courts under the Norris-
LaGuardia Acts or in the state courts.' Employers also have been allowed tort
actions for damages resulting from union violence.' As a third alternative,
federal or state prosecutors may intervene in instances in which union violence
is threatened or has occurred. State initiated injunctive and criminal prosecu-
tions are available and have been held not to be precluded by the comprehen-
sive remedies of the NLRA. 9
 Moreover, federal criminal prosecutions have
been brought against union members for engaging in acts of violence.'°
In 1973, however, the United States Supreme Court in United States v. En-
mons" questioned the propriety of using federal criminal laws to proscribe
union violence. The Enmons Court ruled that a union's use of violence during a
lawful strike to achieve legitimate union objectives did not violate the Hobbs
Act,' 2
 a federal criminal statute prohibiting the obstruction of interstate com-
merce by extortion." The Court, analyzing the Hobbs Act's statutory
language and history," interpreted the statute's proscription of "extortion" to
publicity is ordered, the NLRB can require the union to post notices of the NLRB's rulings at
union offices and meeting places, mail notices to each employee of the company involved, and
publish copies in newspapers of general circulation. Id.
5
 29 U.S.C. 5 160(j) (1976).
6 29 U.S.C. 55 101-113 (1976).
See, e.g., UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266, 274-75
(1956). For examples of state statutes allowing injunctive relief see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch .
214, 6 (West Supp. 1981); N.Y. LAB. LAW 5 807 (McKinney 1977).
a See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Gannon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959);
UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 635 (1958); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr.
Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 657 (1954).
9 See UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266, 275 (1956).
10 See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 586 F.2d 422, 427 (5th Cir. 1978) (strike related
bombings and conspiracy); Lange! v. United States, 451 F.2d 957, 958 (8th Cir. 1971) (strike
related bombings, possession of prohibited firearm, possession of unregistered firearm, and con-
spiracy).
" 410 U.S. 396 (1973).
" 18 U.S.C. 5 1951 (1976). Section 1951 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or
the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion
or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any
person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation
of this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
twenty years, or both.
(b) As used in this section —
(2) The term "extortion" means the obtaining of property from another, with
his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or
fear, or under color of official right.
Id.
" Enmons, 410 U.S. at 404. The specific acts of violence charged by the indictment in-
cluded blowing up a transformer substation owned by the company, firing high powered rifles at
company property and sabotaging company equipment. Id. at 398.
14
 The Hobbs Act had been enacted to correct a perceived deficiency in its predecessor,
2 of the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934, which, while proscribing the use of force, violence, or
coercion to obtain valuable consideration, specifically excluded "the payment of wages by a
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be limited to "wrongful" uses of force — force used to obtain property to
which the alleged extortionist has no lawful claim." Thus, the Court held that
workers seeking better wages and benefits from an employer could not be
engaged in a wrongful taking of property in violation of the Hobbs Act since
the wages sought were in return for services to the employer." To reinforce its
determination, the Enmons Court stated two strong policy reasons why federal
prosecution of union officials for violence arising from -labor dispute should not
be allowed. First, the Court observed that prosecution would work an "ex-
traordinary change" in the pre-existing federal labor law, in effect, putting
"the Federal Government in the business of policing the orderly conduct of
strikes.' 17 Second, the Court noted that federal criminal prosecutions would
be an "unprecedented incursion" into the states' criminal law jurisdiction."
Relying essentially on a rule of clear expression, the Court found that the
statutory language was not explicit enough to require such far-reaching
changes in the federal labor law scheme and federal-state balance." The En-
rnons Court, therefore, refused to expand the federal extortion to include
violence during a legitimate labor dispute. 2°
Building on Enmons, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in United States v. DeLaurentis 2 ' struck down a federal criminal conviction
based on a federal statute other than the Hobbs Act. In DeLaurentis, three union
officers had been convicted under section 241 of chapter 18, an 1870 civil rights
statute which proscribes conspiracies to injure or threaten the exercise of
federal rights." The defendants allegedly had sought by threats of violence and
actual physical assault to intimidate those union members exercising their right
bona-fide employer to a bona-fide employee; . 	 . " 48 Stat. 979, 980 (1934) (current version of
18 U.S.C. S 1951 (1976)). By eliminating the wage exception, Congress had sought to reverse a
Supreme Court decision, United States v. Local 807 of Int'l. Bhd. of Teamsters, 315 U.S. 521
(1942), which had used the exception to prevent an Anti-Racketeering Act prosecution of New
York City truck drivers who extorted wages from out-of-town drivers for unwanted, unneeded
and, at times, unprovided local drivers. Enmons, 410 U, S. at 401-02. Additionally, in passing the
Hobbs Act, assurances were made in floor debates that the Act would not interfere with
legitimate labor activities or make a striker's picket line assault a federal crime. Id. at 404-06.
Enmons, 410 U.S. at 400.
16 Id.
" Id. at 411.
III Id.
19 Id.
2° Id. at 410-11.
Where the coercive acts are used to obtain personal payoffs, wages for unwanted serv-
ices, or other non-legitimate labor objectives, Enmons has been held not to preclude prosecution
under the Hobbs Act. United States v. Quinn, 514 F.2d 1250, 1257 (5th Cir. 1975). See, e.g.,
United States v. Daley, 564 F.2d 645, 650-51 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 933 (1978)
(Hobbs Act held to reach abuse of power by union official who coerced various employers to give
materials and employees to pave the driveway of his summer cabin); United States v. Green, 350
U.S. 415, 417, 421 (1956) (Hobbs Act charge upheld where union had sought to be paid for un-
wanted and fictitious services by use of violence).
2 ' 491 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1974).
22 18 U.S.C. S 241 (1976). Section 241 provides in relevant part:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate
any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured by
126	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 I Vol. 24:47
under section seven of the NLRA 23 not to participate in a concerted labor ac-
tivity. 24
 The court, however, found no congressional intent in the history of the
NLRA to make what were essentially unfair labor practices in pursuit of valid
union objectives punishable by criminal remedies." In light of this lack of in-
tent, the broad spectrum of remedies available and the underlying federal labor
law exemption and federalism rationales in Enmons, the DeLaurentis court ruled
that enforcement of the rights under the NLRA was entrusted exclusively to
the expertise of the NLRB. 26 Given this broad language in DeLaurentis, the
criminal prosecution of union officials under federal statutes other than the
NLRA appeared to be precluded as long as the union was seeking legitimate
labor objectives.
During the Survey year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in United States v. Thordarsonn rejected the "Enmons doctrine" of blanket
immunity, and instead limited Enmons by interpreting it to hold only that the
Hobbs Act could not reach union violence in pursuit of legitimate collective
bargaining objectives." By denying complete federal criminal law exemption
for violent acts accompanying labor disputes, Thordarson endorses the con-
tinued use of federal criminal statutes to remedy violent means regardless of
the legitimacy of the ends sought. As a consequence, the ruling in Thordarson
significantly expands the federal government's participation in labor disputes.
In Thordarson, a Teamsters local had been elected as bargaining agent for
the employees of a moving and storage company. 29 After the employer's refusal
to recognize the Teamsters Union, a strike was called." During the strike,
several of the employer's trucks were destroyed in California, Arizona, and
Connecticut." The five defendants, officers and employees of the two
teamsters locals, were later indicted for their role in the destruction of
property. 32 The ten-count indictment" charged the defendants with violations
of several federal statutes: (1) section 844(i) of chapter 18, an untitled federal
statute which proscribes the use of explosives affecting interstate commerce; 34
the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised
	
the same. .	 .
.	 .	 .





 DeLaurentis, 491 F.2d at 209.
25 Id. at 212-13.
26 Id. at 212-14.
27 646 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir.), cm. denied, 102 S. Ct. 601 (1981).
2° Id. at 1327.




33 Id. at 1325-26.
34 18 U.S.C. 5 844(i) (1976). Section 844(i) provides that:
Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or
destroy, by means of an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other real or personal
property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting inter-
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(2) the Travel Act, which proscribes travel in interstate commerce to commit
arson;" and (3) the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
(RICO), which prohibits conspiracies to conduct an enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity. 36 The district court, relying mainly
on Enmons, dismissed the explosive, Travel Act, and RICO charges after an
analysis of the underlying purposes of each Act." The district court reasoned
that Enmons was not based solely on the statutory interpretation of the Hobbs
Act requirement of a wrongful taking but instead rested on the absence of any
state or foreign commerce shall be imprisoned . . or fined . . . or both. 	 . .
Id.
" 18 U.S.C. 5 1952 (1976). Section 1952 provides that:
(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses any facility
in interstate or foreign commerce, including the mail, with intent to . . . (2) com-
mit any crime of violence to further any unlawful activity; or (3) otherwise pro-
mote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management,
establishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful activity, and thereafter performs or
attempts to perform any of the acts specified in subparagraphs (1), (2), and (3),
shall be fined .	 . or imprisoned . . . or both.
(b) As used in this section "unlawful activity" means (1) any business
enterprise involving gambling, liquor on which the Federal excise tax has not been
paid, narcotics, or controlled substances . . . or prostitution offenses in violation
of the laws of the State in which they are committed or of the. United States, or (2)
extortion, bribery, or arson in violation of the laws of the State in which committed
or of the United States.
Id.
36 18 U.S.C. 5 1962 (1976). Section 1962(d) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provi-
sions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
Section 1962(c) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign com-
merce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. . . .
An "enterprise" as defined by 18 U.S.C. 5 1961(4) (1976) includes:
any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and
any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.
A "pattern of racketeering activity" as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5):
requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the
effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (ex-
cluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racke-
teering activity.
"Racketeering activity" as defined by 18 U.S.C. 5 1961(1) (1980) includes:
(A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery,
bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is
chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one
year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title
18, United States Code: . . . section 1951 (relating to interference with com-
merce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering) . . . (c) any
act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, . . . section 501(c)
(relating to embezzlement from union funds). . .
" United States v. Thordarson, 487 F. Supp. 991, 994-95, 999 (C.D. Cal. 1980), rev'd,
646 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 601 (1981).
The defendants were also charged with violating the Landrum-Griffith Act, 29 U.S.C. 5
501(c) (1976), which prohibits the conversion of union funds. These charges were dismissed by
the district court for the indictment's failure to allege essential elements of the offense. 487 F.
Supp. at 995-98.
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congressional intent to extend the federal criminal jurisdiction to violence for
legitimate union objectives." Finding no congressional intent to reach
legitimate labor disputes with federal acts basically designed to attack organ-
ized crime, the district court dismissed the entire indictment. 39
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, rejected the district
court's broad reading of Enmons as requiring a search for the congressional it-
tent to include union violence." Instead, the Court limited Enmons to its inter-
pretation of the specific language and legislative history of the Hobbs Act. 4 ' Ac-
cording to the Thordarson court, the question was not whether Congress in-
tended to include a union's violent acts in pursuit of legitimate union objectives
but whether Congress intended to exclude such acts from coverage by the
statute. 42
 In the appeals court's analysis, neither the express language of the
criminal statutes nor the policy rationales underlying the Enmons decision led to
the alleged congressional intent." Aci:ording to the appeals court, all three
statutes were written in general terms and did not provide for different treat-
ment based on the status or ultimate objectives of the offender. 44 Based on this
observation alone, the appeals court in Thordarson found it unlikely that Con-
gress had intended to make what the court perceived to be a threat sufficient to
warrant criminal sanction turn on whether the person causing the proscribed
harm did it for himself or the union."
Turning to the federal labor law exemption and federalism policy
arguments articulated in Enmons, the Thordarson court quickly dismissed their
applicability. First, the fear that federal criminal statutes might reach minor
labor violence — thus putting the federal government in the business of polic-
ing the routine conduct of strikes — was not well-founded in this case because,
the court noted, destroying vehicles by means of explosives was not minor
picket line violence. 46
 Second, the court declared, the feared incursion into a
state's • criminal jurisdiction by an overextended federal statute was a
deliberate, intended incursion. 47 RICO and the Travel Act by their own terms,
the court explained, prohibited arson, an offense also forbidden by state laws."
Moreover, according to the court, the legislative history of section 844(i) in-
dicated that Congress enacted the section because of ineffective state and local
laws governing explosives. 49
 Thus, the court concluded, nothing in the plain
language of the Travel Act, RICO, or section 844(i) supported a union
official's immunization from federal prosecution; nor did Enmons compel a
general rule exempting all labor violence from federal criminal statutes. 5°
36
 487 F. Supp, at 992-93.
39
 Id. at 993-95 & n.8, 999.
40 646 F.2d at 1327.
Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 1327-31.
14 Id. at 1328.
" Id. at 1329.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 1329-30.
40 Id. at 1329.
46 Id.
00 Id. at 1330.
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In addition, to the claimed statutory immunity, the defendants urged that
the extensive federal labor laws and regulations which provided special reme-
dies supplanted any federal criminal prosecutions of labor union activities."
The court flatly rejected this contention on several grounds. First, the court
noted that violent acts were not unfair labor practices and thus subject to
redress under the labor laws until found to be so by the NLRB." Moreover,
even if the acts were found to be unfair labor practices, the court admonished,
the labor statutes do not provide the exclusive remedy for violence used to
achieve collective bargaining objectives." Further, the court declared that
nothing in the labor legislation indicated an intent to exclude federal criminal
statutory sanctions from union violence." To the Thordarson court, even
DeLaurentis, which held that the rights contained in section seven of the NLRA
were to be enforced exclusively by the NLRB, did not require a different
result." Rather, the Thordarson court stated that DeLaurentis was distinguish-
able because (1) the existence of applicable state criminal law countered any
finding of NLRA exclusivity and (2) the broad language of section 241 of
chapter eighteen" contrasted markedly with the plainly applicable language of
the statutes allegedly violated." Finding that neither the pre-existing labor
legislation, the Enmons decision, nor the language of the statutes required ex-
empting the defendants from criminal prosecution, the appeals court reversed
the district court's dismissal of the indictment on the Travel Act, RICO, and
explosive charges."
In dissent, Judge Pregerson of the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district
court's application of Enmons' broad concern that the federal government
should not be in the business of policing strikes. 59 According to his dissent, the
majority only saw Enmons as attempting to avoid transformation of minor
picket line violence into federal crimes by a narrow construction of
"extortion." 6° Yet to Judge Pregerson, a narrow treatment of federal extortion
under the Hobbs Act does not avoid the problem of federal government regula-
tion of strikes since extortion is one of the proscribed "unlawful activities" in
the Travel Act and a "racketeering activity" in RICO. 6 ' Further, he noted, in
" Id.
52 Id. at 1330-31.
53 Id. at 1331.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 18 U.S.C. 241 (1976). See supra note 22.
57
 646 F.2d at 1331.
Se Id. The appeals court then considered the district court's dismissal of the union funds
conversion charges for the indictment's failure to allege (1) fraudulent intent and (2) lack of
union authorization or good faith belief in benefit to the union. Id. at 1331-32. The appeals court
rejected a per se rule as articulated in United States v. Boyle, 482 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1076 (1973), which would make union funds used for an illegal purpose auto-
matically within $ 501(c)'s proscriptions, and instead required only that fraudulent intent need
be alleged. 646 F.2d at 1332-37. The appeals court found that the intent was sufficiently alleged
and therefore upheld the conversion charges. Id. at 1337.
59 Id. at 1337-38 (Pregerson, J., concurring and dissenting).
6° Id. at 1338 (Pregerson, J., concurring and dissenting).
6 Id. See supra notes 35 Sr 36.
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both Acts, extortion is defined by state law, not federal law." Finally, the dis-
sent concluded, the real concern of Enmons was that the federal government
should not intrude into an area which is historically the province of the states."
Thus, in the dissent's view, the majority's reinstatement of the federal indict-
ments violated basic principles of federalism."
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Thordarson that acts of violence by union of-
ficials in pursuit of legitimate union objectives are not immune from federal
criminal prosecution significantly limits the holding of Enmons to its facts.
Although the Thordarson court preserves the notion that coercion in a labor con-
text cannot be wrongful under the Hobbs Act if used for legitimate purposes,
the Thordarson court, nonetheless, limits the underlying federalism and labor
law exemption concerns of Enmons. By refusing to give any operative effect to
the broad policy considerations in its interpretation of the Travel Act, RICO,
and section 844(i), Thordarson affirms the federal "criminal remedy" for union
violence.
On the surface at least, the Thordarson analysis appears to be imbued with
strong common sense for several reasons. First, to hold that union violence was
privileged when its purpose is to achieve better wages, benefits, or working
conditions would be to sanction the primitive view that illegitimate means can
be justified by legitimate ends." This result would be contrary to most notions
of civilized behavior as well as to the specific federal labor policy of promoting
industrial peace through the peaceful settlement of labor disputes. 66 Second, by
not creating a criminal immunity, the court merely maintains the equality of
criminal laws. Thus, that which is illegal remains so; the threat or use of
physical force against person or property is no more an option for the union
member than an unaffiliated criminal. Finally, by limiting Enmons to the
Hobbs Act, a fairly bright line is drawn by the court: the Enmons defense is not
available outside of Hobbs Act prosecutions. This line eliminates the element
of uncertainty and vagueness which would have been injected into every
criminal statute if the requirement of a judicial inquiry into the congreSsional
intent to include labor violence within its operative scope had been imposed.
Nonetheless, this bright line is not completely free from problems. The
Enmons case addressed two fundamental problems: (1) federalism questions
arising any time the scope of federal criminal law overlaps the traditional state
criminal law jurisdiction and (2) pre-existing federal legislation overlapping"
later federal legislation. By deciding that Enmons turned more on the legislative
history and the special characteristics of extortion, 67 the Thordarson court in ef-
fect eliminated or at least derogated the underlying policy rationales set forth
by the Supreme Court. Inherent in the Enmons decision was the attempt to har-
" Id. at 1338 n,1 (Pregerson, J., concurring and dissenting).
65 Id. at 1338 (Pregerson, J., concurring and dissenting).
64 Id. (Pregerson, J., concurring and dissenting).
65 Cf. H.R. REP. NO. 1396, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 673 (1980) (supplemental views of
Representative S. Hall, Jr., commenting on the proposed recodification of federal criminal law
and its retention of the Enmons labor limitation on extortion).
66 See NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 257-58 (1939).
67 Thordarson, 646 F.2d at 1327 & n,9.
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monize the Hobbs Act with the balance already struck by the existing federal
labor legislation with the traditional criminal jurisdiction of the states. Imposed
upon these concerns were the unique characteristics of (1) a labor strike, which
is itself a form of coercion designed to force an employer to grant certain
demands and (2) the crime of extortion, which prohibits obtaining property
from another which is induced by the wrongful use or threat of force or
violence. The problem, as expressed by Enmons, was that a broad definition of
extortion ostensibly would include all economic strike behavior which affected
commerce as well as the individual picket line transgression." Taken to the ex-
treme, every strike could be considered, under the Hobbs Act, a criminal con-
spiracy. 69 Thus, the pervasive concern of Enmons was that the federal courts
would be left with the task of policing the routine conduct of strikes." Even the
government had conceded in Enmons that "incidental" or "low level" strike
violence should not be covered by Hobbs Act extortion. 7 '
The Thordarson court, however, dismissed these concerns by noting that
the indicted acts of blowing up trucks, were "hardly the sorts of minor picket
line violence that the Enmons Court feared would be transformed into federal
crimes under the Hobbs Act. "" 2 This analysis misses the point entirely; the En-
mons defendants' extortionate acts also consisted of blowing up an employer's
property." Thus, it could be argued that the exemption carved out of the
Hobbs Act by Enmons did not turn on the type or seriousness of the violent ac-
tivity but on the scope of the Hobbs Act which potentially could reach minor acts
of extortion. It was this potential which raised the attendant concerns of in-
terference with the states' criminal jurisdiction and massive change in the
federal labor law. 74 By resting on the severity of the criminal acts, Thordarson,
in effect, validates the low-level exemption urged by the government but re-
jected by the Supreme Court.
The question, then, is whether the Travel Act, RICO, and section 844(i)
also have the potential to reach low-level coercive actions arising during a
legitimate labor dispute. The Thordarson court did not address the potential
reach of these acts and therefore avoided the troublesome problem of identify-
ing what exactly is low-level violence which is or is not reached by the Travel
Act, RICO, and section 844(i). Arguably, the heated outburst of isolated indi-
viduals in the midst of the tension and frustration generated by a confronta-
tional picket line would not be covered by the Travel Act or RICO for each Act
requires more than individual acts of violence as a basis of prosecution." This
°° Enmons, 410 U.S. at 410. "The worker who threw a punch on a picket line, or the
striker who deflated the tires on his employer's truck would be subject to a Hobbs Act prosecu-
tion and the possibility of 20 years' imprisonment and a $10,000 fine." Id.
69 H.R. REP. No. 1396, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 669 (1980) (separate views of Represent-
atives" Seiberling, W. Hughes, & J. Conyers on the proposed recodification of federal criminal
laws).
70 Dwns, 410 U.S. at 411.
71 Id. at 412 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
72 Thordarson, 646 F.2d at 1329.
" Enmons, 410 U.S. at 398.
74 Id. at 411.
75 See, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 382 F.2d 871, 893 (8th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other
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additional element as well as other statutory predicates contained in the Travel
Act and RICO" thus could be seen as curing the defective overreaching found
in the Hobbs Act.
Notwithstanding the Thordarson court's failure to consider the extent to
which the Travel Act, RICO, and section 844(i) reached low-level violence, it
did consider briefly the effect of the statutes on the state criminal jurisdiction
and pre-existing federal labor law. In this context, the Enmons court had relied
essentially upon a rule of clear expression which required at least explicit
language in the statute and legislative history stating that by enacting the
statute, Congress had intended to change the pre-existing federal-state balance
and the scope of federal labor law." The Thordarson court, however, separated
the two issues and addressed each individually. As to the infringement of state
criminal law jurisdiction by section 844(i), the Thordarson court found that Con-
gress intended to extend section 844(i) into an area of traditional state
concern." Therefore, the court concluded, this intrusion into state criminal
law was permissible." Intention was somewhat casually found in the Travel
Act and RICO merely because each Act prohibits conduct proscribed by state
laws." This analysis is dubious since extortion is also covered by state laws.
Further, it is this very overlap which bothered the Enmons court and prompted
the court to restrain a federal statute's coverage of legitimate labor disputes.
The Thordarson court also gave short shrift to the change worked upon the
federal labor law by the allowance of federal criminal prosecutions. Here
again, the court did not closely follow the Enmons rule of clear expression but
instead examined the history of the NLRA. Thus, the court argued that even if
the NLRA does cover union violence, there was no intent by Congress to make
its comprehensive remedies exclusive. 8 ' In further support of this conclusion,
the Thordarson court again reasoned that the severity of violence charged sup-
ported federal criminal prosecution." These arguments, however, do not meet
the substance of the interrelated policy concerns of Enmons which ask whether
Congress, by enacting the statute in issue, sought to change the federal-state
balance as well as the scope of federal labor law. 83 Although the Thordarson court
grounds, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) (Travel Act prosecution requires (1) interstate travel, (2) intent to
promote, direct, or manage illegal business, and (3) overt act); United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d
436, 441 (5th Cir. 1976) (RICO prosecution requires (1) association with enterprise and (2) pat-
tern of racketeering activity).
" See supra note 75.
77 Enmons, 410 U.S. at 411.
" Thodarson, 646 F.2d at 1329.
" Id. at 1330.
8° Id. at 1329.
B' Id. at 1330-31.
81
 Id. at 1331.
8 ' The Enmons decision and its underlying policy rationales have been the subject of ex-
tensive congressional debate and have, so far, been preserved in Congress' proposed recodifica-
tion of the federal criminal laws. See H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
See generally Cohen & Yellig, Efforts to Apply the Federal Crime of Extortion to Labor-Related Vio-
lence, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 499 (1981) (hereinafter Cohen & Yellig). In support of the
Enmons rule, the Committee on the Judiciary reiterated the Enmons policy rationales and noted
that to use a federal criminal extortion prosecution to reach union violence would be to use a
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did not address the issue, the legislative history of RICO clearly suggests that
Congress did intend to reach local activities and to eliminate fraud and corrup-
tion in labor relations." Further, the Thordarson court's analysis is in keeping
with the better rule of statutory interpretation. By requiring a clear showing of
the congressional intent to exclude union violence, the Thordarson court is in ac-
cord with a recently applied rule of statutory construction which requires that
where a statute's language is unambiguous, it is conclusive absent a clearly ex-
pressed contrary legislative intent. 85
The Thordarson opinion raises but does not deal with the express presence
of extortion as one of the "unlawful activities" of the Travel Act" and as one of
the enumerated "racketeering activities" in RICO." As pointed out by the
dissent, by limiting Enmons to the singular legislative history of the Hobbs Act,
the majority creates an inevitable.conflict with the Travel Act and RICO extor-
tion provisions. 88 If an act of extortion was the basis of a Travel Act or RICO
violation, the Thordarson plain language analysis and its reading of the
legislative history would not preclude the federal government from reaching
the same type of behavior put out of reach under the Hobbs Act by the Enmons
court. The Travel Act's required nexus with interstate travel or an interstate
facility" seems no more difficult a hurdle for the government than the Hobbs
Act requirement that the extortion obstruct, delay, or affect commerce."
Neither does RICO's requirement of a pattern of racketeering activity, which
by definition means at a minimum only two acts of extortion, present a formid-
able barrier to prosecution. 9 ' The majority recognized this problem and in-
timated that when extortion is charged, perhaps the Enmons analysis should
limit the scope of the Travel Act and RICO." Such recognition, however, begs
the question for it tacitly admits the possible validity of the Enmons policy ra-
tionales which sought to balance state and federal criminal concerns with
federal labor law."
Under Thordarson, then, union violence which occurs during the course of
a legitimate labor dispute can be prosecuted under the Travel Act, RICO, and
Section 844(i). Further, the Thordarson court's analysis, by limiting Enmons to
rather "blunt instrument" in an area where there already exist sufficient remedies and which is
better dealt with by state and local law. H.R. REP. No. 1396, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 298-300
(1980). Further, it has been argued that federal criminal prosecution would put a "chill" on the
exercise of the federal right to strike. Cohen & Ye!lig, supra, at 522. Again, these policy type argu-
ments seem equally applicable to restrict the reach of other federal criminal statutes into the
sphere of legitimate labor disputes.
54 See 18 U.S.C. 5 1961 note (1976) (Congressional Statement of Findings and
Purpose). as 
See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (interpreting the scope of
RICO).
85 18 U.S.C. 5 1952(6)(2) (1976).
" 18 U.S.C. 5 1961(1) (1980).
ee Thordarson, 646 F.2d at 1338 (Pregerson, J., concurring and dissenting).
89 18 U.S.C. 5 1952(a) (1976).
9° 18 U.S.C. 5 1951(a) (1976).
91 18 U.S.C. 5 1961(5) (1976).
92 Thordarson, 646 F.2d at 1327 n.9.
93 Id. at 1338 n.1 (Pregerson, J., concurring and dissenting).
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Hobbs Act violations and downplaying the underlying policy rationales, im-
poses few barriers for prosecutions under other federal statutes. The Thordarson
decision leaves undecided, however, whether extortion can serve as a basis for
Travel Act and RICO prosecutions when such extortionate conduct seeks to
further legitimate union ends. From an employer viewpoint, the Thordarson
federal criminal remedy is a salutary ruling which provides another weapon
against reprehensible conduct during collective bargaining. It affords little
relief, however, from damaging pressure when it is most needed: during the
strike. For the union, conduct which was prohibited by the states is now doubly
proscribed.
III. FEDERAL JURISDICTION
A. Exhausting Internal Union Grievance Procedures
Prior to Filing a Federal Claim:
Clayton v. Automobile Workers'
Section 301(a) 2 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947
(LMRA)3 provides that an employee may seek a remedy in federal district
court for an alleged breach of the collective-bargaining agreement between his
union and employer.' The United States Supreme Court in Republic Steel Corp.
v. Maddox' held that an employee seeking such a remedy must first exhaust any
exclusive grievance and arbitration procedures established by that agreement.t
The Court established this rule to protect the integrity of the collective-bargain-
ing process and to further that aspect of national labor policy which encourages
private rather than judicial resolution of disputes arising over interpretation
and application of collective-bargaining agreements.' The Supreme Court's
subsequent decision in NLRB v. Marine Workers,B however, made it clear that
courts have discretion to decide whether to require in addition exhaustion of in-
ternal procedures in the union's constitution whiCh control a union member's
complaint. 9 If a court, under the facts and circumstances of the case, finds that
the requirement to exhaust internal union remedies prior to court intervention
is unreasonable, it may excuse an employee's failure to exhaust them.°
By William J. Hudak, Jr., Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
I 451 U.S. 679 (1981).
29 U.S.C.	 185(a) (1976). Section 301(a) provides as follows:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization rep-
resenting employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter,
or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of
the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without regard to the citizen-
ship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. g 141-187 (1976).
4 See supra note 1.
379 U.S. 650 (1965).
Id. at 652-53.
7 See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 567, 570-71 (1976).
8 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
9 Id. at 426.
" Id. at 428.
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Since Marine Workers, the courts of appeal have divided over whether an
employee alleging that his union breached its duty of fair representation" in
processing his grievance and that his employer breached the collective-bargain-
ing agreement must, in addition to exhausting the agreement's grievance
procedure, also attempt to exhaust the internal union appeals procedure estab-
lished by his union's constitution before he may maintain his suit under section
301. 12 Some courts of appeals have held that the employee's failure to exhaust
internal union procedures may not be asserted as a defense by an employer in a
court proceeding." Others have permitted exhaustion to be asserted as a
defense by an employer if the internal appeals procedures could result in reac-
tivation of the grievance. 14 Soine courts have held that the employee's failure to
exhaust in a suit against his union is excused if union officials would be so
hostile to the employee that he could not hope to obtain a fair hearing. 15 Others
also have excused the employee's failure to exhaust if the substantive relief
available through the internal procedures would be less than that available in
his section 301 action.' 6
During the Survey year, the Supreme Court, in Clayton v. Automobile Workers,"
considered these lower court decisions and set forth three factors to be con-
sidered in deciding whether to excuse employees from exhausting internal
union appeals procedures prior to filing an action under section 301: (1)
whether union officials are so hostile to the employee that he could not hope to
obtain a fair hearing on his claim," (2) whether the internal union appeals pro-
IL
 Since the collective bargaining system necessarily subordinates the interests of an in-
dividual employee to the collective interests of all employees in a bargaining unit, the labor laws
have been interpreted as imposing upon the bargaining agents a duty of fair representation.
Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 564 (1976). As the statutory representative of the
employees, the union must always exercise complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the ex-
ercise of its discretion. Id. Claims of union breach of duty of fair representation typically arise
during the life of a contract when employees claim wrongful discharge or other improper treat-
ment at the hands of the employer. Id. In such cases, individual employees may claim that the
union refused to utilize contractual remedies or utilized them discriminatorily or in bad faith. Id.
12 See Clayton v. Automobile Workers, 451 U.S. 679, 684 (1981).
13 See, e.g., Johnson v. General Motors, 641 F.2d 1075, 1083 (2d Cir. 1981); Geddes v.
Chrysler Corp., 608 F.2d 261, 264 (6th Cir. 1979); Petersen v. Rath Packing Co., 461 F.2d 312,
315 (8th Cir. 1972).
14 See, e.g., Varra v. Dillon Companies, 615 F.2d 1315, 1317-18 (10th Cir. 1980);
Baldini v. Local Union No. 1095, 581 F.2d 145, 150 (7th Cir. 1978); Harrison v. Chrysler
Corp., 558 F.2d 1273, 1278 (7th Cir. 1977). Under Republic Sled, an aggrieved employee is not
entitled to a trial on the merits of his claim unless he has exhausted the grievance procedures
established by the collective-bargaining agreement between his union and employer. 379 U.S. at
652-53. Once the time for filing a grievance under the collective-bargaining agreement has ex-
pired, the employee may appropriately seek judicial relief because he has no other redress. Id. If,
however, the internal union appeals procedure allows the employee to "reactivate" the
collective-bargaining procedures even though the stipulated period has expired, judicial interven-
tion may be forestalled. For a discussion of when the collective-bargaining agreement grievance
procedures in Clayton expired, see infra notes 24-40 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Fizer v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 586 F.2d 182, 183-84 (10th Cir. 1978); Imel
v. Zohn Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 181, 184 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974).
16
 See, e.g., Finsely v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 635 F.2d 1288, 1290 (2d Cir. 1980);
Buzzard v. Local Lodge 1040, 480 F.2d 35, 41 (9th Cir. 1973).
17 451 U.S. 679 (1981).
E8 Id. at 689.
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cedure would be inadequate either to reactivate the employee's grievance or to
award him the full relief he seeks under section 301,' 3 and, (3) whether exhaus-
tion of internal procedures would delay unreasonably the employee's oppor-
tunity to obtain a judicial hearing on the merits of his claim." The court stated
that if any one of these factors are found to exist, a court may excuse the
employee's failure to exhaust any such internal procedures."
The dispute in Clayton arose when Clayton, a member of the United
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Workers of America (UAW or
union)22 and a shop steward of its Local 509, 23 was dismissed from his job at
ITT Gill-Lilian (ITT or employer) for violating a plant rule prohibiting certain
behavior." Clayton, believing his dismissal was not for just cause," asked his
union representative to file a grievance pursuant to the mandatory grievance
and arbitration procedure established by the collective-bargaining agreement
between ITT and Local 509. 26 The union investigated his charges, pursued his
grievance through the third step of the grievance procedure and made a timely
request for arbitration." The union, however, decided not to proceed with
arbitration and withdrew the request." Clayton was not notified of the union's
decision until after the time for requesting arbitration under the terms of
collective-bargaining agreement had expired." The UAW Constitution re-
quired every aggrieved union member to exhaust established internal union
appeals procedures" before seeking redress from a Civil court." Yet, Clayton
did not file a timely appeal from his local's decision not to seek arbitration."
Instead, he filed suit under section 301 in federal district court," alleging that




22 Id. at 682.
23 Id .
24 Id. The Court did not specify what Clayton's improper behavior was. See id. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the alleged misconduct was not material. 623 F.2d
563, 565 (9th Cir. 1980).
25 Clayton v. Automobile Workers, 451 U.S. 679, 682 (1981).
26 Id. The collective bargaining agreement between Local 509 and ITT established a
four-step grievance procedure with binding arbitration as the fourth step. Id. at 682 n. 1.
27 Id. Under the agreement, if the union wishes to request arbitration, it must do so
within 15 working days after completion of the third step of the grievance procedure. Id.
28
 Id. at 682.
29 Id. Neither the union nor the employer contested Clayton's allegation that he re-
ceived this notice more than 15 working days after completion of the third step of the grievance
procedure. Id. at 682 n.2. See supra note 26.
3° These procedures first direct the employee to seek relief from the membership of his
local. Id. at 682-83. If the employee is not satisfied with the result obtained there, he may further
appeal to the International Executive Board of the UAW and eventually to either the Constitu-
tional Convention Appeals Committee or to a Public Review Board composed of nonunion, im-
partial persons of good public repute. Id. at 683. Clayton followed this procedure only as far as
the first step, seeking relief from his local. Id.
3 ' Id.
32 Id. Clayton had 30 days from the date the union withdrew its request for arbitration
to initiate the internal union appeals procedures. Id. at 683 n.3.
33 Id. at 683.
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pursue his grievance past the third step of the grievance procedure, and that
the employer had breached the collective-bargaining agreement by discharging
him without just cause. 34
Both UAW and ITT pleaded as an affirmative defense Clayton's failure to
exhaust the internal union appeals procedure." Finding the procedures ade-
quate, the district court sustained the defense. 36 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed dismissal of Clayton's claim against the union, holding that
the internal appeals procedure would allow Clayton the monetary relief which
he sought against the union in his section 301 suit. 37 The court of appeals
reversed the district court's dismissal of Clayton's claim against his employer,
however, holding that the internal appeals procedure would be unable to pro-
vide the requested relief." ITT appealed, arguing that if Clayton's failure to
exhaust internal union appeals procedures bars his suit against the union, it
must also bar his suit against the employer." The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to resolve the conflict among the courts of appeal" regarding whether an
employee must exhaust the internal union appeals procedures before seeking
redress in federal court.'"
The Court first distinguished the type of exhaustion procedures at bar
from those in Republic Steel. 42 In Republic Steel, the Court stated that an
employee alleging a violation of the collective-bargaining agreement must first
exhaust exclusive contractual grievance and arbitration procedures which were
established by the agreement.'" The Court in Clayton noted that a contrary rule
would deprive the employer and union of the ability to establish a uniform
method for orderly settlement of employee grievances." The Court, con-
cluded, however, that the internal union procedures available in Clayton dif-
fered significantly from the contractual procedures available in Republic Steel. 45
The Court observed that since the procedures in Clayton were wholly a creation
of the UAW Constitution, and not a result of collective bargaining between the
34 Id. To prevail in an action under section 301 against either the employer or the
union, an employee must ordinarily establish both that the union breached its duty of fair
representation and that the employer breached the collective-bargaining agreement. Hines v.
Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 570-71 (1976).
" Clayton v. Automobile Workers, 451 U.S. 679, 683 (1981).
36 Id. at 683-84.
" Id. at 684. The Supreme Court, in reviewing this finding, noted that the record did
not indicate whether this monetary relief included backpay only, or whether it also included pro-
spective monetary relief and incidental or punitive damages. Id. at 690 n.17. The Court noted
further that Clayton was apparently seeking all such forms in his S 301 action. Id.
38 Id. at 685. The court of appeals found that the internal appeals procedure could not
result in either reinstatement of Clayton to his job or in reactivation of his grievance-relief that
Clayton sought from the employer in his 5 301 action. Id.
39 Id.
40 See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
4 ' Clayton v. Automobile Workers, 451 U.S. 679, 686 (1981).
42 See discussion of Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965), supra notes
4-6 and accompanying text.
" Clayton v. Automobile Workers, 451 U.S. 679, 685-86 (1981).
44 Id. at 686.
" Id. at 687.
138	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 24:47
union and employer," such procedures were separate from the collective-bar-
gaining process. 47 Consequently, the Court concluded; failure to exhaust them
would not deprive the union and employer of the ability to establish settlement
procedures."
The Court next reviewed the policy rationale underlying an exhaustion re-
quirement. According to the Court, the union argued that unions would be
unable to regulate their internal affairs without undue judicial interference
unless employees were first required to exhaust internal appeals procedures,"
that an exhaustion requirement would promote the national labor policy goal
of encouraging private resolution of disputes arising out of collective bargain-
ing agreements, 5° and that even if exhaustion were not required with respect to
claims brought against employers, it should still be required with respect to the
union because the relief Clayton sought from the union was available through
such internal union procedures." Clayton conceded that he could have re-
ceived an impartial hearing on his claim had he exhausted internal appeal
procedures of his union." He argued, however, the Court stated, that he
should not be required to exhaust the procedures since they could not provide
him with the requested relief's
The Court rejected the union's argument that because an exhaustion re-
quirement would forestall judicial interference with internal union affairs ex-
haustion should be required. 54 The Court explained that a concern with
forestalling judicial interference has been "strictly limited to disputes arising
over internal union matters such as those involving the interpretation and appli-
cation of a union constitution."" This concern does not extend, the Court
stated, to issues in the public domain." Since Clayton's allegations that the
union breached its duty of fair representation raised issues rooted in statutory
policies extending far beyond internal union interests, the Court reasoned that
improper judicial interference is not a legitimate concern."
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 587-88.
49 Id. at 688.
5° Id.
51 Id. at 684.
32 Id. at 689-90.
53 Id. at 590.
54
 Id. The Court noted that this policy has its statutory roots in $ 101(a)(4) of the
Landrum-Griffin Act, 29 U.S.C. 411(a)(4) (1976). Id. at 688 n.13. Section 101(a)(4) provides:
No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to in-
stitute an action in any court, ... Provided, That any such member may be re-
quired to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a four-month
lapse of time) within such organization, before instituting legal proceedings
against such organization or any officer thereof.
29 U.S.C. S 411(a)(4) (1976).
55
 Clayton v. Automobile Workers, 451 U.S. 679, 688 (1981) (quoting NLRB v.
Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 426 n.8 (1968)).
56
 451 U.S. at 688 n.14.
" Id. at 688. The Court did not discuss the policies to which it referred. See id. Instead,
it made reference to a number of cases: United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 66-67
n.2 (Stewart, J., concurring); Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 562 (1976);
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The Court also rejected the union's argument that an exhaustion require-
ment would promote the national labor policy of encouraging private resolu-
tion of labor disputes." The Court acknowledged that some contractual griev-
ances might be resolved privately if employees were required to exhaust inter-
nal appeals procedures." Nonetheless, the Court refused to require employees
to exhaust such procedures in all cases. 6° The Court reasoned that an unbend-
ing exhaustion requirement would force employees with meritorious section
301 claims to expend their time and resources needlessly by submitting claims
to potentially lengthy internal union procedures that might not be adequate to
redress their grievances." Under Marine Workers, 62 the Court recalled, courts
have discretion to decide whether to require exhaustion of internal union
procedures.° In deciding whether to exercise that discretion, the Court con-
cluded, three factors are relevant." The Court stated that if a court should find
either that union officials are so hostile to the employer that he could not hope
to obtain a fair hearing, that the internal union appeals procedures would be
inadequate either to reactivate or to redress fully the employee's grievance, or
that exhaustion of internal procedures would unreasonably delay the
employee's opportunity to obtain a judicial hearing on the merits of his claim,
then it could properly excuse the employee's failure to exhaust.° The Court
reasoned that the national labor policy of encouraging private resolution of
disputes would not be served by requiring Clayton to exhaust internal union
remedies which could neither reactivate his grievance nor provide him with an
opportunity to obtain the same substantive relief that he sought in his section
301 action." The Court emphasized that exhaustion would merely delay
judicial consideration of Clayton's section 301 action. 67 Judicial resources
would not be saved, the Court reasoned, because regardless of the outcome of
the internal appeal, the employee still would be required to prove in his section
301 suit that the union had breached its duty of fair representation and that the
employer breached the collective-bargaining agreement.° The Court, thus,
concluded that where the internal procedures can neither reactivate the
employee's grievance against the employer nor redress it, an exhaustion
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967); and Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 355
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2031 (1964). Id. at 689.
58 Id.
59 Id. The Court noted, for example, that an employee who exhausts internal union
procedures might decide not to pursue his § 301 action in court, either because the union offered




62 NLRB v. Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
63 Clayton v. Automobile Workers, 451 U.S. 679, 689 (1981).
64 Id.
63 Id
66 Id. at 682.
63 Id.
68 Id.
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requirement would only frustrate the federal policy that underlies section 301
of encouraging relatively rapid disposition of labor disputes. 69
The Court determined that the internal union appeals procedures in the
present case were inadequate either to reactivate Clayton's grievance or pro-
vide him with the full relief sought." The Court noted that Clayton sought
reinstatement from his employer" and monetary damages from both his
employer and his union. 72 Although the Court recognized that the UAW Con-
stitution does permit some monetary relief against the union," it indicated that
the amount of financial relief available at that level may not be equal to that
sought or available in Clayton's section 301 action." The Court noted that the
union could neither reinstate Clayton in his job nor reactivate his grievance
procedure." In the Court's view, these restrictions on the relief available
through the internal UAW procedures rendered them inadequate."
Finally, the Court rejected the union's argument that even if exhaustion is
not required with respect to the employer it should be required with respect to
the union because the relief sought by Clayton against the union in his section
301 suit is available through internal union procedures." The union argued
that the relief sought by Clayton was available through internal union pro-
cedures." The Court acknowledged that this argument might have force if .
Clayton were bringing his section 301 action solely against the union." Since
the employer was included in the suit, however, the'Court reasoned that an ex-
haustion requirement against the union but not against the employer would
force a trial court to choose between two undesirable alternatives." On the one
hand, the Court observed, if the trial court stayed the action against the
employer pending exhaustion of the internal appeals procedure, it would
violate national labor policy by effectively requiring exhaustion with respect to
the employer." If, on the other hand, the Court explained, the trial court per-
mitted the action against the employer to proceed, two separate section 301
suits based on the same facts could result." The Court, thus, chose to permit
69 Id.
7° Id. at 693.
" Id. The Court observed that reinstatement is available only from the employer
because the union has no power to order reinstatement under the collective-bargaining agree-
ment. Id. at 690 n.15.
" Id. at 690. The Court explained that monetary damages could be assessed against
both the employer and the union. Id. at 690 n.15. To determine how such damages would be ap-
portioned between the union and the employer, see Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 197-98 (1967).
73 Id. at 690 & n.16.
74 Id. at 690 & n.17. See also supra note 36.
75 Id. 451 U.S. at 691. The Court acknowledged that the parties had stipulated at trial
that once Local 509 withdrew its request for arbitration, no other remedies would remain
available under the contract. Id. at 691 n.18. In addition, the collective bargaining agreement
contained no provision whereby the parties could waive the 15 day time limit for requesting ar-
bitration. Id.
76
 Id. at 690.
' 7 Id. at 695.
78 Id. at 694-95.
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the section 301 actions against the employer and the union to proceed
simultaneously unless the internal union procedures could redress or reactivate
the employee's grievance." The Court concluded that a reasonable possibility
that the employee's claim will be privately resolved exists only where the inter-
nal union procedures allow for redress or reactivation of the employee's
grievance. 84
Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, disagreed with the majority's conclusion
that exhaustion would not promote private resolution of the employee's
grievance." He contended that the error in the majority's analysis resulted
from its "apparent belief" that internal union remedies must provide a com-
plete substitute for either the- contract grievance procedure or the courts in
order to be deemed "adequate. "86
 To the contrary, Rehnquist reasoned, in-
ternal union remedies are provided only to encourage private resolution of
disputes, not to be a complete substitute for the court5. 87
 Justice Rehnquist
asserted that private resolution would be promoted in Clayton by an exhaustion
requirement because either the employee, convinced by the union during the
internal procedures that the union's decision not to pursue a grievance was cor-
rect, will decide not to pursue his section 301 claim," or the union and
employer, appraised of the strength of the employee's claim, will pursue
private resolution to avoid the additional burdens and costs of litigation."
Exhaustion should be required, Rehnquist concluded, because, even if litiga-
tion ultimately results, exhausting the internal union procedures may have
narrowed the issues in controversy thus saving judicial resources. 9°
The Court's decision in Clayton is consistent with previous Supreme Court
cases. Under the Court's decision in Republic Steel, an employee is required to
exhaust the grievance and arbitration procedures established by the collective-
bargaining agreement between his union and the employer prior to bringing
suit under section 301. 91
 Under the facts in Clayton, the Court found such
procedures to have been exhausted since the union withdrew its request for ar-
bitration and did not notify the employee until after the time for requesting
arbitration had expired. 92
 The question in Clayton was whether the employee
was required to exhaust the internal union appeals procedures established by
his union's constitution before maintaining the subsequent breach of duty of
fair representation claim in federal court under section 301. 93
83 Id.
" Id.
85 Id. at 697 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
88
 Id. at 700-01 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
87 Id. at 701 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).




 Republic Steel Corp v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53 (I 965). See also supra notes 4-6
and accompanying text.
92 Clayton v. Automobile Workers, 451 U.S. 679, 682 (1981). See also supra notes 24-28
and accompanying text (discussing the grievance and arbitration procedures established by the
collective-bargaining agreement between the union and the employer).
92 451 U.S. at 682. See also supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text (discussing the in-
ternal union appeals procedures).
142	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 24:47
In Marine Workers, the Court held that a union could not discipline one of
its members for failing to exhaust internal appeals procedures before filing an
unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB because the unfair labor practice
charge was beyond the internal affairs of the union. 94 The Marine Workers Court
observed that a proceeding by the NLRB is not meant to adjudicate private
rights but to effectuate a public policy." Any coercion used to discourage ac-
cess to such public proceedings, the Court noted, is beyond the legitimate in-
terests of a labor organization." The Marine Workers Court, thus, concluded
that there can be no justification to make the public processes wait until the
union member exhausts internal union procedures which plainly are inade-
quate to deal with "all phases of the complex problem concerning employer,
union, and employee member."" Similarly, the Court in Clayton found that
the employee's grievance went beyond the internal affairs of the union. 98 In ad-
dition, the Court observed, the internal union procedures were inadequate to
redress or reactivate the grievance. 99
 As in Marine Workers, therefore, the Court
in Clayton excused the employee from the requirement that he first exhaust the
inadequate internal union appeals procedure.'"
There is some validity to both views concerning whether internal union
procedures should be exhausted even though the views are completely con-
tradictory. The facts of each particular case should be examined to determine
whether exhaustion should be required. Such an examination reveals that there
are some cases in which exhaustion of internal union appeals is desirable.
Where the internal union appeals process is able to provide the aggrieved
employee with the relief sought or to reactivate the grievance procedure the na-
tional labor policy of encouraging private resolution of labor disputes in order
to save judicial resources"' would be furthered by requiring exhaustion.
Private rather than judicial resolution of the dispute may occur if the employee
could be awarded during the internal procedure the full relief requested.'"
Private rather than judicial resolution of conflicts may also occur if the internal
union procedures could result in reactivation of the employee's grievance
because dispute-resolution procedures, established through collective-
bargaining, would provide the employee with an opportunity to prove that he
was wrongfully discharged or otherwise treated improperly by the employer.'"
Thus, where the internal union process permits redress or reactivation of the
" NLRB v. Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 425 (1968).
n Id. at 424.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 425. The Court remarked that if the union member becomes "exhausted," in-
stead of the remedies, the issues of public policy are never reached and an "airing of the
grievance never had." Id.
98
 Clayton v. Automobile Workers, 451 U.S. 679, 688 (1981).
99 Id. at 690. See also supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text (discussing the inade-
quacy of the internal union appeals procedure in Clayton).
im 451 U.S. at 695.
'°' See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 556 (1976).
1 ° 2 Id. Where the employee receives satisfaction of his claim via private avenues, his S
301 action would become moot and he would not be entitled to a judicial hearing. Id.
"3 Id.
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grievance, exhaustion of internal remedies could make unnecessary judicial
resolution of the employee's grievance.
Moreover, exhaustion of internal union remedies may promote private
resolution of labor disputes even where those remedies cannot provide
reinstatement or reactivation of a grievance. For example, during the internal
appeals process, the union may satisfy the employee that its decision not to pur-
sue a grievance was correct.'" The employee's decision to pursue a section 301
action on the ground that the union breached its duty of fair representation,
thus, would be pre-empted. Furthermore, if the union determines that it
mishandled an employee's grievance, the union and employer may desire to
avoid litigation by pursuing - private resolution of the grievance with the
employee. 105 Finally, even where the collective-bargaining agreement does not
provide for grievance reactivation, many employers may voluntarily permit the
union to reactivate to avoid the additional burden and costs of litigation. 1066 In
such cases, a requirement that the employee exhaust internal union appeals
would promote private resolution of labor disputes.
While there is validity to the view that exhaustion of internal union ap-
peals in some cases promotes national labor policy goals, the adverse conse-
quences of a general requirement of exhaustion weighs against its adoption. In
most cases, a requirement that the employee exhaust internal union appeals
procedures will serve only to frustrate the employee in his quest for relief.
Where the internal appeals procedure cannot redress or reactivate the
employee's grievance, an exhaustion requirement would serve only to frustrate
and delay the employee in his quest for relief under section 301. For example,
during the internal appeals process, the union may fail to satisfy the employee
that its decision not to pursue a grievance was correct."' The employee must
still maintain a section 301 claim to obtain the relief sought. Even if the union
during the internal appeals process determines that it mishandled an
employee's grievance, the union, acting alone, might be precluded by the
collective-bargaining agreement from providing the employee with the re-
quested relief or from reactivating the contractual grievance procedure. 108
Where the employer refuses voluntarily to reactivate the grievance procedures,
the employee must still maintain an action in federal court. In the interim, the
employee would have been forced to expend time and resources to obtain relief
which from the start could not have been granted by the internal union appeals
process. In some cases, therefore, requiring the employee to exhaust internal
union appeals procedures which are inadequate to redress or reactivate the
employee's grievance would be a worthless gesture and would not render it un-
necessary for the employee to seek a judicial hearing.
IG4 See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
105 Id.
106 Clayton v. Automobile Workers, 451 U.S. 679, 700 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
1 ° 7 The UAW, for example, has admitted only once in 20 years that it breached its duty
of fair representation. See Klein, DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION 103 (1977).
1 °' Clayton v. Automobile Workers, 451 U.S. 679, 690 n.15, 691 n.18 (1981). The col-
lective bargaining agreement may provide, for example, that only the employer may reinstate
ing).
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Furthermore, if exhaustion is required, the internal appeals process would
not in all cases save judicial resources at trial. In a section 301 action, the
employee must still prove that the union breached its duty of fair representa-
tion and that the employer breached the collective-bargaining agreement.'"
While a union's admission during the internal union appeals procedure that it
breached its duty of fair representation is certainly evidence a court may con-
sider,"° an employer defending a section 301 suit would still be entitled to
prove that no such breach had occurred."' Requiring an employee to exhaust
internal procedures may, thus, not offer significant savings of judicial
resources.
Since an employee may still be required to maintain a section 301 suit
even after exhaustion of internal procedures the need to exhaust existing pro-
cedures should be obviated where the procedures cannot redress or reactivate
the grievance. On one hand, if exhaustion were required and if the employer
chose not to voluntarily allow reactivation. of the contractual grievance pro-
cedures or reinstatement of the employee, the employee's time and resources
would have been needlessly expended. The employee in such a case must
maintain a second round of arguments to obtain redress for, or reactivation of,
his grievance. On the other hand, if exhaustion were not required, and if the
employer desires to voluntarily reactivate the grievance procedure," 2 the
employer, the employee, and the union would still be free to settle their section
301 dispute by agreeing to private avenues such as arbitration. Excusing ex-
haustion where the internal union appeals process is inadequate to redress or
reactivate the employee's grievance thus does not foreclose or discourage
private resolution of labor disputes. Excusing exhaustion in such cases,
however, does preserve the employee's resources for a meaningful section 301
action.
Under the facts of Clayton, the Court correctly excused Clayton's failure to
exhaust the internal appeals process. Under the UAW Constitution, the Court
observed, the Public Review Board (PRB), with ultimate responsibility to
determine whether the union breached its duty of fair representation, was
without jurisdiction to consider Clayton's claim.'" Clayton claimed that the
union acted "arbitrarily" and "discriminatorily" in deciding not to pursue ar-
bitration."* The UAW Constitution does not permit the PRB to entertain such
claims.'" Moreover, even if the union decided Clayton was correct, the union
did not have authority to reinstate him." 6 Since the union appeal boards had
employees or that time limits for processing grievances may be extended by mutual agreement by
the parties concerned. See id. In Clayton, there was no provision in the collective-bargaining agree-
ment whereby the parties could waive the 15-day limit for requesting arbitration. Id.
122 Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554-, 570-71 (1976).
11:1 See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186-87 (1967).
"' Id.; 451 U.S. at 593 n.23.
"2 Such a case might occur, for example, where the employer wishes to avoid the
burden and costs of litigation.
'" Clayton v. Automobile Workers, 451 U.S. 679, 693 n.24 (1981).
Ilk Id.
" 2 Id. at 694 n.24. See also Klein, DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION 103 (1977).
" 6 Clayton v. Automobile Workers, 451 U.S. 679, 690 n.15 (1981). The Court stated
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no jurisdiction over Clayton's claim, and since the union had no ability to
reinstate Clayton, it is unlikely that Clayton's grievance could have been
privately resolved through the internal appeals procedure. Under the Court's
decision in Clayton, Clayton does not have to exhaust the internal appeals pro-
cedures because they are inadequate to redress or reactivate Clayton's
grievance. "7 The union, however, on remand may privately settle Clayton's
monetary claim rather than pursue judicial resolution of the issue. Likewise,
the employer may reinstate Clayton and settle the monetary claim rather than
litigate. The Court's decision to excuse exhaustion thus appropriately pre-
served Clayton's financial ability to seek redress for his grievance without
foreclosing private resolution of the dispute.
Clayton is important for the legal practitioner because it clarifies" 8 when
an employee must exhaust internal union appeals procedures prior to bringing
an action under section 301. After Clayton, internal union appeals procedures
probably will be required where the union is the only defendant in a section 301
action.'" Where the employer also is sued, such exhaustion likely will be re-
quired if the procedures allow reactivation of the grievance or are adequate to
provide the substantive relief requested.' 2° Exhaustion, however, will be ex-
cused where the employee sues the union and employer but where the internal
union appeals procedures are inadequate to redress the grievance or reactivate
the grievance procedures established by the collective-bargaining
agreement."
B. * Bringing Union Constitutions Within the Sweep of Section 301:
United Association of Journeymen v. Local 334 1
The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (the Act) 2 was enacted
primarily "to promote the achievement of industrial peace through encourage-
ment and refinement of the collective bargaining process." 3 Because the en-
forcement of collective bargaining agreements through the federal court system
was a "logical and necessary step" toward industrial peace, 4 Section 301 was
enacted. 5 Section 301(a) establishes federal court jurisdiction over suits for
that under the collective-bargaining agreement between Local 509 and the employer reinstate-
ment is available only from the employer. Id.
Id. at 695.
118 The decision changes the law in some jurisdictions. See supra notes 10-15 and accom-
panying text.
" 9 Clayton v. Automobile Workers, 451 U.S. 679, 696 (1981).
' 2° Id.
121 Id.
* By Sheree Ung, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 452 U.S. 615 (1981).
2 29 U.S.C. SS 141-87 (1976).
3 Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 509 (1962).
See S. REP. NO. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16, 16-17 (1947) N.L.R.B., 1 LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 422-23 (1948) [herein-
after cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
29 U.S.C. S 185 (1976).
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violations of contracts between employers and labor organizations or between
labor organizations . 6
The meaning of the clause "contracts between an employer and a labor
organization" is well established. The legislative history surrounding Section
301 reveals that Congress specifically intended to include collective bargaining
agreements within the clause.' Less well settled, however, is the meaning of the
clause in Section 301 extending protection of the Act to "contracts between
labor organizations." There is no legislative history relating to this clause, and
the language of the statute does not clarify adequately which contracts Con-
gress intended to include under this clause of Section 301. 8 Thus, the meaning
of this clause has been left entirely to judicial interpretation.
Although several lower courts have addressed the issue of whether a union
constitution is a contract between labor organizations as contemplated under.
Section 301(a), 9 it was not until the Survey year that the United States Supreme
Court decided the question. In United Association ofJourneymen v. Local 334," the
Court held that a union constitution is a contract between a local union and a
parent international union and thus is within the federal courts' jurisdiction as
granted by Section 301(a)."
The respondent in United Association, Local 334 of the United Association of
Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the
United States and Canada (Local 334) was a labor organization affiliated with
the petitioner, United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the
Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada (United
Association)." Local 334 was chartered by the United Association." In an at-
tempt to consolidate some of its local unions the parent, United Association,
issued an Order of Consolidation" on August 4, 1977,  pursuant to a provision
Section 301(a), 29 U.S.C. $ 185(a), provides:
Suits for violations of contracts between an employer and a labor organization rep-
resenting employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter,
or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of
the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount
in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Id.
7 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 421-24. In 1962, the United States Supreme
Court extended the scope of Section 301 to include contracts other than collective bargaining
agreements. Retail Clerks, Int'l Ass'n v. Lion Dry Goods, 369 U.S. 17, 28 (1962). Specifically,
the Court held that it was "enough that [the contract was] clearly an agreement between
employers and labor organizations significant to the maintenance of labor peace between them,"
for it to fall within the scope of Section 301(a). Id.
See Local 334 v. United Ass'n of journeymen, 628 F.2d 812, 815 (3d Cir. 1980),
rev'd, 452 U.S. 615 (1981).
9 See, e.g., Alexander v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, AFL-CIO, 624
F.2d 1235, 1238 (5th Cir. 1980); Local Union No. 657 v. Sidell, 552 F.2d 1250, 1252-56 (7th
Cir.), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 862 (1977); Stelling v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 587 F.2d
1379, 1382-84 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944 (1979).
'° United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Local 334, 452 U.S. 615 (1981).
" Id. at 622.
12 Id. at 616.
" Id.
14 Id. at 617. Local 334 had refused to comply with a request by United Association for
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in the constitution of the United Association.' 5 Local 334, after attempting to
obtain a stay of the Order," brought an action in the New Jersey Superior
Court to enjoin the order's enforcement." United Association removed the
case to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, over the
objection of Local 334. 18 Upon cross-motions for summary judgment, the court
ruled for the United Association and refused to stay the consolidation order. 19
On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals raised the issue of federal
jurisdiction under Section 301(a) sua sponge and vacated the judgment of the
district court." It held that the court had no jurisdiction under Section 301(a)
because the suit concerned an intra-union matter that lacked "a significant im-
pact on labor-management relations or industrial peace.""
Upon review, a divided Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit's deci-
sion, finding that a violation of a union constitution was a breach of a contract
between labor organizations, and was thus subject to federal jurisdiction under
Section 301(a). 22
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan first concluded that a union con-
stitution was essentially a contract between labor organizations." Justice Bren-
nan found support for his holding in a line of Circuit Court decisions holding
that a union constitution could be a contract between labor organizations
within the meaning of Section 301(a). 21 He also noted that at the time of the
voluntary consolidation. The Order called for the consolidation of nine Northern New Jersey
locals, including Local 334, into two locals, one representing plumbers and the other represent-
ing pipefitters.
" Id. Section 86 of the Constitution of United Association provides:
Whenever, in the judgment of the General President, it is apparent that there is a
superfluous number of Local Unions in any locality, and that a consolidation
would be for the best interest of the United Association, locally or at large, he shall
have the power to order Local Unions to consolidate and to enforce the consolida-
tion of said Local Unions, or said territory in one or more Local Unions, provided
such course received the sanction of the General Executive Board.
Id.
16 Id. at 617-18. Local 334 sent a letter to the United Association and received no
response. Id.
" Id. at 618. They also requested an injunction to require the United Association to
return the seal and charter of Local 334 and to prevent threats of expulsion and loss of member-
ship against Local 334's officers and members. Local 334's complaint alleged that (1) 5 86 of the
constitution did not permit division of the chapter's membership into separate work classifica-
tions of pipefitters and plumbers, (2) the action was not a consolidation of local unions, (3) the
General President had abused his discretion by failing to specify facts to support his finding that
Local 334 was a 'superfluous' local. Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 618-19. The court held first that it lacked jurisdiction because Local 334 had
failed to exhaust internal union remedies. Alternatively, it ruled that the United Association's ac-
tions were justified under 5 86 of the Constitution. Id.
20 Local 334 v, United Ass'n of journeymen, 628 F.2d 812, 813 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd,
452 U.S. 615 (1981).
21 Id.
22 United Ass'n of journeymen v. Local 334, 452 U.S. 615, 627 (1981).
23 Id. at 621.
24 Id. The Circuit Court cases, however, limited their holdings to situations where the
union constitution would in some manner have "significant impact" on industrial peace and/or
labor-management relations. See, e.g. , Stelling v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 587 F.2d
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enactment of Section 301(a), the prevailing view of the states' law was that a
union constitution was a contract. 25
 Justice Brennan also referred to the defini-
tion of "labor organization" contained within the Act 26
 as well as to numerous
Supreme Court decisions dealing with local and international unions as labor
organizations." He therefore concluded that both Local 334 and the United
Association were labor organizations under Section 301(a),
Justice Brennan then observed that despite the lack of legislative history
regarding the clause "contracts between labor organizations," 28
 Congress
could have concluded that enforcement of the terms of union constitutions
would "contribute to the achievement of labor stability. " 29
 The Third Circuit
Court had noted that a "significant impact" on labor-management relations
was necessary to trigger Section 301(a), and that federal jurisdiction over a
union constitution amounted to unjustified intervention in intra-union
affairs." Justice Brennan dismissed this contention, noting that "there is an
obvious and important difference between substantive regulation by the NLRB
of internal union governance of its membership, 3 ' and enforcement by the
federal courts of freely entered into agreements between separate labor
organizations." 32
 The Court therefore concluded that Congress intended that
union constitutions be enforced by the federal courts under Section 301(a)."
The majority, however, specifically declined to determine the source of the
federal law to be applied in Section 301(a) cases." In addition, the Court
declined to hold that all contracts between labor organizations were within Sec-
tion 301(a). 35
In a brief dissent, Chief Justice.
 Burger disagreed with the majority's con-
clusion that a union constitution was a contract between labor organizations."
1379 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944 (1979); Local Union No. 657 v. Sidell, 552 F.2d
1250, 1252-56 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 862 (1977),
26 United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Local 334, 452 U.S. 615, 623 (1981).
26
 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1976) defines 'labor organization' as:
any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation commit-
tee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in
whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes,
wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.
27
 United Ass'n of journeymen v. Local 334, 452 U.S. 615, 622 (1981).
76 Id. at 624.
29 Id.
'° Id. at 625.
" In NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 184 (1967), a case involving
substantive regulation of internal union affairs, the Court observed that "Congress expressly dis-
claimed . . . any intention to interfere with union self-government or to regulate a union's in-
ternal affairs." Id.
32
 United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Local 334, 452 U.S. 615, 626 (1981).
" Id. at 627.
34 Id. The Court observed that the substantive law to apply is federal law, which the
courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws." Id. (quoting Textile Workers v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957)). The Court specifically declined, however, to state what
the source of the federal law in this case should be. The majority also left the question undecided
as to whether individual union members may sue a labor organization based on violation of a
union constitution. Id. at n.16.
35 Id. at 627.
36 Id.
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He agreed that a union and its locals were labor organizations and accepted for
the purposes of this case that a constitution could be a contracts' He, never-
theless, asserted that local unions were not separate organizations apart from
the parent union and thus, the constitution was not a contract between labor
organizations. 38 He noted that union constitutions as contracts between labor
organizations were not within the plain meaning of the statute nor provided for
in the legislative history by Section 301(a)." Therefore, Section 301(a) did not
confer federal jurisdiction over disputes under union constitutions." He also
noted that the Court's decision "invites resort to the federal courts for cases
better resolved outside the federal judiciary. " 41
A second dissent was written by Justice Stevens and joined by Justice
Rehnquist. Justice Stevens based his dissent on the premise that the majority
had erred when they interpreted Section 301(a) to include union constitutions
because to do so created federal rights. 42 In its landmark Textile Workers v. Lin-
coln Mills decision,'" the Court had concluded that although the legislative
history behind Section 301(a) was unclear, there was sufficient authority under
the Commerce Clause for Congress to authorize federal courts to create federal
"common" law for the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements."
This conclusion was in part due to the settled principle that collective bargain-
ing agreements have a significant impact on industrial peace.'" Justice Stevens,
however, observed that such authority to create substantive rules to govern
contractual disputes was lacking in the case of union constitutions. 46 First, he
noted that there was no indication in the legislative history that Congress had
concluded that contractual disputes between unions always have an effect upon
industrial peace. 47 Second, he stated that no legislative history supported a con-
clusion that Congress intended for the federal courts to create substantive law
to govern such disputes." Such a policy, he admonished, would create federal
rights for unions in a situation where Congress did not intend them.'" Because
the authorization for the creation of substantive rules to govern contractual
disputes between unions was not given to federal courts, Justice Stevens com-
mented that suits on contracts between labor unions are not to be treated as
arising automatically under federal law." He therefore concluded that federal
" Id. at 628.
35 Id.
39 Id. at 628-29.
40 Id. at 630.
41 Id.
43 Id. at 636.
43 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
44 Id. at 457.
4 ' United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Local 334, 452 U.S. 615, 632 n.2 (1981).
46 Id. at 635.
47 Id .
46 Id.
49 Id. "There is no justification for the conclusion that Congress perceived contracts be-
tween union to involve any federal interest sufficient to warrant the creation of federal rights."
Id.
5° Id. at 636.
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subject matter jurisdiction was lacking in the instant case of a contract dispute
between a parent union and its local chapter."
In analyzing the Court's decision in United Association, it is arguable that
the Court erred in holding union constitutions to be contracts between labor
organizations in all instances. Justice Stevens seems correct in his conclusion
that Congress did not intend to exercise its power to create federal rights for
labor organization contracts unless these contracts affected industrial peace in
some manner. A similar conclusion appears to have been reached by several
circuit courts of appeals when they held that union constitutions might be con-
tracts under Section 301(a) only in certain circumstances. In 1199 DC, National
Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees v. National Union of Hospital and Health
Care Employees," the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit held that absent allegations of "actual threats to industrial peace,"
there was no federal jurisdiction under Section 301(a)." The Seventh Circuit
in Local Union No. 657 v. Sidell54
 likewise ruled that a dispute must involve more
than mere intra-union matters in order to trigger Section 301(a) jurisdiction."
Several other circuits also have adopted this analysis."
Moreover, the limitation on the types of contracts that are to be included
under Section 301(a) is not restricted to contracts between labor organizations.
In Fredericks v. Pennsylvania Social Services Union, Local 668," the District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania held that federal jurisdiction under
Section 301(a) was not invoked in every situation involving a contract between
an employer and a labor organization." The court denied jurisdiction in a
situation where a union was acting as an individual and not as a representative
of employees. 59
 Even the Supreme Court recognized the need to limit the scope
of Section 301(a) jurisdiction. In Retail Clerks v. Lion Dry Goods , 6° although it
concluded that the Section 301(a) clause concerning contracts between
employers and labor organizations encompasses contracts other than collective
bargaining agreements, the Court did not recognize federal jurisdiction over all
labor contracts." Thus, a holding that all disputes concerning union constitu-
tions fall under the federal jurisdiction established by the reference in Section
301(a) to contracts between labor organizations would appear to be overbroad.
In the absence of any evidence suggesting that Congress concluded industrial
'' Id. at 637.
52 533 F.2d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
53 Id. at 1208.
54
 552 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 862 (177).
" Id. at 1255.
56
 See, e.g., Stelling v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 587 F.2d 1379, 1384 (9th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944 (1979); Local Union 1219 v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and
Joiners of Am., 493 F.2d 93, 96 (1st Cir. 1974).




60 369 U.S. 17 (1962).
51
 Id. at 28. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
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peace is affected by union constitutions, the Court's broad holding in United
Association seems inappropriate."
Furthermore, the Court's distinction between the substantive regulation
of internal union governance and the enforcement of freely negotiated
agreements between labor organizations is rather imprecise. As several of the
Circuits have held, suits involving union constitutions are often intra-union
matters without impact on external industrial peace or labor-management rela-
tions." Thus, by granting federal jurisdiction to all disputes involving union
constitutions, the Court apparently frustrated the intent of Congress. As was
noted by the Court in NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.," "Congress
expressly disclaimed . . . any intention to interfere with union self-
government or to regulate a union's internal affairs. In the instant case,
where there was no allegation of any impact on industrial peace or labor-
management relations, the Supreme Court has invited the federal courts to
regulate a dispute between a parent union and its locals.
For several reasons, therefore, the decision in United Association is signifi-
cant. First, the federal courts now have leave to resolve any dispute between
labor organizations involving a union constitution. Second, as pointed out by
Justice Stevens in his dissent, "[a]bsent a limitation restricting Section 301 jur-
isdiction on the basis of the presence of a federal interest or right, it will be diffi-
cult for district courts to determine what contracts are not encompassed by Sec-
tion 301." 66 Consequently, the Court apparently has taken Section 301 and
extended it to include contracts where there may be no impact on industrial
peace or labor-management relations. This construction of Section 301, as
noted, arguably extends the Act beyond the intent of Congress at the time of its
enactment in 1947.
62 See United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Local 334, 452 U.S. 615, 636 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
dissent).
Unless contracts between unions have some form of federal protection, the statute
as the Court construes it is the equivalent of a statute authorizing federal jurisdic-
tion over all litigation between people named Smith, Jones or Stevens, Some such
cases would present federal questions; some would not.
Id.
63 See, e.g., Stelling v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 587 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944 (1979); Smith v. United Mine Workers of Am., 493 F.2d 1241,
1243-44 (10th Cir. 1974).
64 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
65 Id. at 184. See also Smith v. United Mine Workers of Am., 493 F.2&1241 (10th Cir.
1974).
If Congress intended to turn over to the federal courts the control and supervision
of internal union affairs which have no external application to industrial peace or
to collective bargaining agreements we believe that Congress would have said so
explicitly. We agree . . that it was not the intent of Congress for the courts to
use the LMRA to police intra-union problems.
Id. at 1243-44.
66 United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Local 334, 452 U.S. 615, 636 n.9 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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IV. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
A. Employee Benefit Funds Under 302(a) of the
Labor Management Relations Act: UMW Health and
Retirement Funds v. Robinson'
Section 302(c)(5) of the Labor Management Relations Act provides that
payments by an employer to a trust fund established for "the sole and exclusive
benefit of the employees of such employer, and their families and dependents"
are not within Section 302's broad prohibition on payments by employers.to
employee representatives if the fund meets certain requirements.' In order to
qualify for an exemption from the Act's ban on employer-employee payments,
the fund must be held in trust for the purpose of paying certain types of benefits
to the employees.' Included among the permissible categories of benefits are
payments for medical and hospital care, pensions on retirement or death, com-
pensation for illness or injury resulting from occupational activity, unemploy-
ment benefits, life insurance or disability, illness, or accident insurance.* The
basis upon which payments are to be made must be set out in a written agree-
ment between the employer and the representatives of the employees.' In addi-
tion, the statute requires that the fund be administered by an equal number of
representatives of the employer and the employees, 6 and that it be subject to an
annual audit.'
• By Janice Duffy, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 102 S. Ct. 1226 (1982).
2 29 U. S.C. S 186(c)(5) (1976 & Supp. 1979). Section 302(a) of the Labor Management
Relations Act prohibits employers from paying or lending money or any other thing of value to
employees, representatives of employees, or labor organizations. 29 U.S.C. S 186(a) (1976). Sec-
tion 302(b) makes unlawful the receipt of such payments by employees or their unions. 29
U.S.C. 5 186(b) (1976). In addition, the statute provides for criminal penalties for violations of
these sections and gives the district courts of the United States the power to enjoin violations. 29
U.S.C. SS 186(d) & (e) (1976).
The statute also contains exceptions for payments as compensation for services, 29
U.S.C. S 186(c)(1) (1976 & Supp. III 1979), payments in satisfaction of a court judgment, 29
U.S.C. S 186(c)(2) (1976 & Supp. III 1979), payments for goods, 29 U.S.C. 5 186(c)(3) (1976 &
Supp. III 1979), and payments for union membership dues deducted from employee wages, 29
U.S.C. S 186(c)(4) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
29 U.S.C. S 186(c)(5) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
Id. Section 302(c)(6), 29 U.S.C. S 186(c)(6) (1976 & Supp. III 1979), also allows the
establishment of trust funds to provide benefits for employee vacations, holidays, severance pay,
and apprenticeship programs. In addition, S 302(c)(7) and 5 302(c)(8), 29 U.S.C. 55 186(c)(7) &
(c)(8) (1976 & Supp. III 1979), permit employer payments for the purpose of providing scholar-
ship benefits, child-care centers, and legal services for employees and their dependents. The trust
funds established under each of these provisions are required to meet the standards set out in
5 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. S 186(c)(5) (1976 & Supp. III 1979), for health and retirement benefit
funds. 29 U.S.C. SS 186(c)(6)-186(c)(8) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Finally, 5 302(c)(9), 29 U.S.C.
S 186(c)(9) (Supp. III 1979), permits payments by an employer to certain labor-management
committees.
5 29 U.S.C. S 186(c)(5) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
6 Id. The employer-employee agreement is required to provide for the appointment of
an impartial umpire to decide disputes over the administration of the fund in cases where the
employer and employee representatives are deadlocked. Id. The agreement must also provide
that, in the event that the parties fail to agree on the appointment of an impartial umpire within a
reasonable time, either group may petition to the district court for the appointment of an impar-
tial person to decide the dispute. Id.
Id. The statute establishes an additional requirement for the structure of welfare funds
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The United States Supreme Court has, in several cases, been confronted
with the issue of the proper construction of section 302(c)(5)." In NLRB v. Amax
Coat, 9 the Court held that employer representatives who act as trustees of a
welfare fund established under section 302(c)(5) are fiduciaries of the employee
beneficiaries and not representatives of the employer.'" The Amax Court's deci-
sion, that administrators of a welfare fund established pursuant to section
302(c)(5) act as fiduciaries for the beneficiaries of the fund, was based on its
conclusion that Congress intended the common law of trusts to govern the ad-
ministration of such funds." The Court specifically relied on language in sec-
tion 302(c)(5) which provides that employer contributions are to be "held in
trust ... for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees ... and their
families and dependents. 12
During the Survey year, the Court addressed whether the statutory require-
ment that welfare funds be held for the sole benefit of employees, in addition to
whose purpose is to provide pensions or annuities for employees. Id. The funds contributed by
the employer for these purposes must be held in a separate trust from those created for the pur-
pose of providing other permissable types of benefits. Id. In addition, the statute provides that
funds contributed to the pension trust may be used only to pay employee pensions or annuities.
Id.
For example, the Court has held that employers may be required, by the collective
bargaining agreement, to make contributions to the employee welfare fund measured by the
hours worked by a subcontractor's employees. Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401, 408-11 (1977).
The Court held that such an agreement will not violate 5 302 as long as the payments are used
solely to benefit the employees of the employer-contractor. Id. at 407. The Court noted that if the
clause in the collective bargaining agreement were construed to require that payments be made
for the benefit of the sub-contractor's employees, the payments would be unlawful under the
statute. Id. The Court observed that 5 302(c)(5) exception extends only to trust funds established
pursuant to a written agreement between the employer and the employees and the sub-contractor
was not a party to the agreement between the contractor and his employees. Id.
In addition, the Court has held that, unless clearly stated in the collective bargaining
agreement, a breach of the union's contractual obligations to the employer does not excuse the
employer from its duty to make contributions to a trust fund established pursuant to 302(c)(5).
Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459, 470-71 (1960).
9 453 U.S. 322 (1982).
i° NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322 (1981). The employer in Amax Coal argued
that 5 8(b)(1)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 5 158(b)(1)(B) (1976), which
makes it an unfair labor practice to coerce the employer in the selection of his representatives for
collective bargaining purposes, applied to a strike by the union to compel the employer to con-
tribute to a multi-employer trust fund because the employer representatives of the fund had
already been selected and Amax would, therefore, have no voice in the selection of the trustees.
453 U.S. at 327. The Court found that the language and legislative history of the provision in
5 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. 5 186(c)(5) (1976 & Supp. III 1979), that employer contributions to
welfare funds be held in trust for the sole benefit of employees and their dependents
demonstrated Congress' intent that the law of trusts would apply to welfare funds established
under the statute. Id. at 329-30. The Court concluded, therefore, that the administrators of the
trust, whether appointed by the employer or the employees, have a complete duty of loyalty to
the beneficiaries of the trust and no duty to represent the interests of the party that appointed
them. Id. at 329-30. The trust administrators who were appointed by the employer for purposes
of collective bargaining and the union's activities aimed at compelling the employer to contribute
to a multi-employer fund when he could not personally participate in the selection of the trustees
did not constitute an unfair labor practice under S 8(b)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. 5 158(b)(1)(B) (1976),
453 U.S. at 335-36.
" 453 U.S. at 329-30.
1 2 Id. at 329 (quoting 29 U.S.C. S 186(c)(5) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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creating a fiduciary relationship between the administrators and the
beneficiaries of the fund, imposed a requirement that collectively bargained
agreements, allocating benefits among potential beneficiaries, satisfy. a
reasonableness standard." The Court, in United Mine Workers of America Health
and Retirement Funds, held that the statutory language did not require that
benefit eligibility rules established by a collective bargaining agreement meet a
reasonableness standard." The Administrators of the fund were, therefore,
held not to have violated any fiduciary duties in administering the fund accord-
ing to the collective bargaining agreement whether or not the standards for par-
ticipation established therein were reasonable."
The dispute in Robinson arose when a group of widows of coal miners
challenged benefit eligibility rules established by a collective bargaining agree-
ment between the United Mine Workers and the National Coal Operators
Association." Under an earlier agreement, the operators had agreed to con-
tribute to a fund which would provide pension and health benefits to miners
and their dependents.' 2 This prior agreement did not itself establish benefit
eligibility conditions." Rather, the authority to determine the amount of
benefits and eligibility rules was delegated to the trustees of the fund." Pur-
suant to this authority, the trustees adopted rules which accorded disparate
treatment to two classes of widows of miners." Widows of miners who were
employed, but eligible for pensions at the time of their death were granted
health benefits for five years." In contrast, widows of miners who were receiv-
ing pensions at the time of their death were eligible for health benefits for only
two years."
Concern about the actuarial soundness of the benefit fund caused the
union and the mine operators to agree to restructure the fund. The parties fur-
ther agreed that the amount of benefits and the eligibility rules would be
specified in the collective bargaining agreement rather than being left to the
discretion of the fund's trustees. 23 During the negotiations over the benefit
eligibility rules, the union demanded initially that all unremarried widows en-
titled to health benefits under the prior agreement, whether for two or five
" United Mine Workers of Am. Health and Retirement Funds v. Robinson, 102 S. Ct.
1226 (1982).
" Id. at 1233.
" Id.
" Id. at 1230.
" Id. at 1228-29.
" Id. at 1229.
19 Id,
20 Id. The rules adopted by the trustees granted widows of miners who were receiving
pensions at the time of their death a death benefit of $2000 payable over a two-year period and
eligibility for hospital and medical care benefits for the same two-year period. Id. The widows of
miners who were still working at the time of death but who were eligible for pensions were
granted a death benefit of $5000 payable over five years and eligibility for health benefits for an
equivalent period. Id.
21 Id. See supra note 20.
22 Id. See supra note 20.
22 Id.
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years, be afforded lifetime health coverage." The operators objected to this
proposal because of uncertainty over its cost." Eventually, the mine operators
agreed to extend lifetime health benefits to wives of miners widowed after the
effective date of the new agreement, regardless of whether their husbands were
working or receiving pensions at the time of their death. 26 The mine operators
also agreed to extend lifetime health benefits to wives of miners widowed prior
to the effective date of the new agreement and whose husbands had been
receiving pensions at the time of their death. 27
While the agreement between the United Mine Workers and the mine
operators extended lifetime health benefits to all widows of retired miners, it
denied such benefits to widows of miners who died while employed, prior to the
effective date of the agreement. 28 The benefit terms established by the collec-
tive bargaining agreement thus accorded fewer benefits to the group of widows
who were eligible for the most benefits under the earlier agreement." The
widows thus excluded from eligibility for lifetime health benefits under the col-
lective bargaining agreement brought suit against the trustees of the fund. 3°
The widows alleged that the discrimination between widows of miners receiv-
ing pensions at the time of their death and those miners eligible for pensions
but still working at the time of death bore no rational relationship to the pur-
pose of the trust fund and, therefore, violated section 302. 31 The widows asked
that the trustees of the fund be ordered to provide them with permanent health
care benefits."
The District Court for the District of Columbia held that the plaintiffs had
made a prima facie showing of arbitrariness," but found that proof presented
by the trustees, demonstrating that the eligibility requirements were the subject
of "explicit, informed and intense bargaining," was sufficient to rebut the con-
tention that the eligibility requirements were arbitrary and capricious." The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed, holding that the provi-
sion of section 302(c)(5) which requires that the fund be maintained for the sole
and exclusive benefit of the employees establishes a reasonableness standard
for benefit eligibility rules." The appeals court rejected the district court's find-
24 Id.




29 See supra notes 19-32, 26-30 and accompanying text.
'° Robinson v. United Mine Workers of Am. Health and Retirement Funds, 449 F.
Supp. 941, 943 (D. D.C. 1978).
" Id. at 943-44.
32 Id. at 942.
33 Id. at 944. The court ordered the defendant trustees to come forward with evidence to
rebut the plaintiff's showing of arbitrariness. Id. at 945. If they failed to do so, the court stated
that summary judgment would be entered for the plaintiffs. Id.
" See Robinson v. United Mine Workers, 640 F.2d 416, 425-26 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(Robb, J., dissenting) (quoting from the unreported memorandum and order of the district
court, C.A. 77-0698 (D.D,C. June 20, 1978) which directed that judgment be entered for the
defendant trustees.).
55 Robinson v. United Mine Workers, 640 F.2d at 420-21.
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ing that explicit bargaining surrounding the eligibility rules was sufficient to
rebut a prima facie showing of arbitrariness." The court held that since the
trustees were unable to present any reason for the discrimination between
classes of widows which was related to the purpose of the fund, widows in the
plaintiffs' class could not be excluded from the eligibility for lifetime health
benefits."
The United States Supreme Court, in an unanimous opinion, rejected the
court of appeals' reading of section 302(c)(5). 38 The Court held that the
statutory requirement that funds be used solely for the benefit of employees
and their dependents did not embody a reasonableness requirement." Accord-
ing to the Court, the purpose of section 302(c)(5) is simply to restrict the
beneficiaries of employer contributions to welfare funds to employees and their
dependents." The Court noted that its prior decisions construing section
302(c)(5) were in accord with this interpretation." In particular, the Court
referred to its decision in Amax Coal which had imposed fiduciary duties on the
trustees of welfare benefit funds." The Court noted that, in Amax, it had
recognized that the sole purpose of section 302(c)(5) is to ensure that employee
benefit funds are used to provide benefits to employees and not diverted to
other purposes."
The Robinson Court also stated that its reading of section 302(c)(5) was
supported by the legislative history of the statute." According to the Court, the
legislative history demonstrates that Congress enacted section 302(c)(5) to en-
sure that funds contributed by an employer for the benefit of its employees are
not appropriated by the union or its officials for other purposes." The Court
determined that the statutory standards which welfare funds are required to
meet in order to qualify for the section 302(c)(5) exception to the prohibition on
employer-employee payments are consonant with this purpose." The Court
emphasized that the requirements — that the fund must be established for the
sole benefit of the employees, that contributions must be held in trust and be
used only to provide specified types of benefits, that the basis for making
payments must be set out in a written agreement, and that the fund must be
administered jointly by representatives of both the employer and the employ-
ees" — were designed to promote the basic requirement that employer contribu-
36 Id. at 422-23.
" Id. at 424. The court of appeals, noting that every exclusive eligibility requirement
would lessen the cost of benefit plans, also rejected the trustees attempt to justify the discrimina-
tion between classes of coal miners' widows on financial grounds. Id. at 423-24.
36 102 S. Ct. at 1233.




44 Id. See NLRB v. Amax Coal, 453 U.S. at 331 (quoting 93 CoNG. REC. 4678 (1947)
(remarks of Sen. Bau), reprinted in 2 N.L.R.B., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGE-
MENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 at 1305 (1948)).
44
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tions be used only to benefit employees." The Court found no basis in any of
the statutory requirements for any substantive restrictions on the allocation of
benefits among employees."
In the course of its opinion, the Court recognized that several courts of ap-
peals had held that the reasonableness of decisions made with respect to benefit
levels and eligibility rules were subject to judicial scrutiny." The Court
distinguished these cases on the ground that they involved agreements which
gave the trustees complete discretion to establish eligibility rules and benefit
levels." The Court noted that these decisions rested on a determination that
Congress intended trustees of. benefit funds under section 302(c)(5), acting as
fiduciaries for the beneficiaries of the funds, to have a duty to refrain from act-
ing in an arbitrary or capricious manner toward the beneficiaries of the trust."
While noting that its decision in Amax Coal established that Congress did intend
to impose fiduciary duties on trustees of benefit funds created pursuant to sec-
tion 302(c)(5), the Court declined to decide whether the courts of appeals were
correct in their determination that federal courts may invalidate trustee deci-
sions on benefit levels or eligibility standards on the ground that the standards
are arbitrary and capricious." The Court found it unnecessary to decide this
issue because it concluded that the rationale of the decisions subjecting eligibili-
ty requirements established by trustees to judicial review was not applicable to
cases where the conditions for the receipt of benefits were established in a col-
lective bargaining agreement."
After so holding, the Court turned its attention to the facts of Robinson. 55
The Court noted that the trustees were required by the terms of the trust to en-
force the conditions established by the collective bargaining agreement. 56
Asserting that measurement of the trustees' duties by the terms of the trust is
consistent with the common law of trusts," the Court concluded that the
trustees did not breach any fiduciary duty by administering the trust in accord-
ance with the rules established in the collective bargaining agreement."
48 Id.
49 Id.
5° Id. at 1233. See Pete v. United Mine Workers of Am. Welfare and Retirement Fund,
517 F.2d 1275, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en bane); Roark v. Boyle, 439 F.2d 497, 499 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Kosty v. Lewis, 316 F.2d 744, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 964 (1964). See
also, Toensing v. Brown, 528 F.2d 69, 72 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that the trustee decision was
not arbitrary).
102 S. Ct. at 1233.
" Id. (citing Kosty v. Lewis, 319 F.2d at 747).
53 102 S. Ct. at 1233 n.12.
54 Id. at 1233.
" Id.
56 Id, at 1233 & n.13 (quoting from the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of
1974, art. XX, (h)(5), App. to Pet. for Cert. 106a, United Mine Workers of Am. Health and
Retirement Fund v. Robinson, 102 S. Ct. 1226 (1982)).
37 102 S. Ct. at 1233. The Court cited S 164(a) of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS. 102 S. Ct. at 1233. This section provides that the nature and extent of the trustee's
duties is to be determined by the terms of the trust. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS S
164(a) (1959).
68 102 S. Ct. at 1233.
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Having concluded that section 302(c)(5) does not impose a reasonableness
requirement on the terms of a collectively bargained welfare fund, the Court
considered whether any other provision of federal law required invalidation of
the discriminatory eligibility standards. 59 In so doing, the Court noted that,
generally, federal courts have no authority to modify terms of a collective bar-
gaining agreement unless the bargaining process or the terms of the agreement
violate some provision of federal law." The Court then outlined several princi-
ples of existing federal law which may, if applicable, require the invalidation of
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement." The Court noted that benefit
plans must comply with the provisions of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act and the National Labor Relations Act, and must be consistent
with federal laws which prohibit discrimination on the grounds of race,
religion, sex or national origin." The Court found that the Robinson agreement
violated none of these federal laws." In addition, the Court acknowledged that
the union, in the collective bargaining process, must fairly represent all of its
members." This duty of fair representation was not violated in Robinson, ac-
cording to the Court, because the duty does not extend to potential benefici-
aries who are not members of the bargaining unit." Concluding that the agree-
ment to extend fewer benefits to coal miners' widows whose husbands died
while still working did not violate any of these applicable federal laws, the
Court disclaimed the authority to modify the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement. 66
The Robinson Court's conclusion that the purpose of section 302(c)(5) was
simply to prevent diversion of employer contributions to employee benefit
funds to uses other than the benefit of employees is supported by the legislative
history of the provision. The enactment of the general prohibition on
employer-employee payments contained in Section 302(a) and (b) apparently
was motivated in part by congressional concern over a demand by United
Mine Workers' president John L. Lewis that coal operators contribute ten
cents to a union benefit fund for every ton of coal mined by union workers."
Several senators speaking in support of the prohibition on employer-employee
59 Id, at 1233-34.
" Id. at 1234. This principle has been emphasized repeatedly by the Court. See, e.g.,
Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers, 444 U.S. 212, 218-219 (1979); H.K. Porter Co. v.
NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 105-108 (1970); NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, AFL-CIO, 361
U.S. 477, 488 (1960); Local 24, International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 295-96
(1959); NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952).
61 102 S. Ct. at 1234.
62 Id, The Employee Retirement Income Sec. Act, 29 U.S.C. 55 1001-1461 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979), sets out rules governing employee retirement plan. Its purpose is to protect the
interests of participants by requiring disclosure of financial information and establishing stand-
ards of conduct for the fiduciaries of retirement plans. 29 U.S.C. 1001(b) (1976). The National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 55 151-187 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), contains comprehensive
rules governing the labor-management negotiating process. Id.
63 102 S. Ct. at 1234.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 1233 (quoting Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,
404 U.S. 157, 181 n.20 (1981)).
66 102 S. Ct. at 1234.
67 See 92 CONG. REC. 4892 (1946) (statement of Senator Byrd); 93 CONG. REC. 4678
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payments contended that permitting unrestricted employer payments to
employee representatives would create a substantial potential for corruption of
employee representatives and for diversion of funds solicited for the benefit of
employees to the personal use of union officials. 68 During the debate on the ex-
ception for welfare benefit funds, the sponsor of section 302(c)(5) stated that the
"sole purpose of the amendment is not to prohibit welfare funds, but to make
sure that they are legitimate trust funds, used actually for the specified benefits
to the employees ... and that they shall not degenerate into bribes." 69 In the
Senate report and during the floor debate prior to its adoption, section
302(c)(5) was consistently characterized as a necessary safeguard against ap-
propriation of the assets of welfare funds for uses other than the provision of
benefits for employees." There is no indication in the legislative history that
Congress, in enacting section 302(c)(5), intended to confer on the federal
courts the power to inquire into the reasonableness of welfare fund benefit
levels or eligibility conditions established in a collective bargaining
agreement."
Moreover, as the Court in Robinson recognized," there already exists a
substantial body of federal law which may be used to invalidate eligibility con-
ditions which discriminate among certain classes of potential beneficiaries. The
Court held that the terms of a collective bargaining agreement must comply
with federal laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex,
or national origin." In addition, the Court held that the union has a duty to
represent fairly all members of the bargaining unit. 74 The existence of this duty
imposes restrictions on the extent to which the agreement may discriminate be-
tween classes of employees." Further, although the Court held that the union's
(1947) (statement of Senator Byrd). The legislative history of section 302(c)(5) is somewhat com-
plex. A bill proposing a ban on employer-employee payments was first introduced in the 79th
Congress in 1946. See R. Goetz, Employee Benefit Trusts Under Section 302 of Labor Management Rela-
tions Act, 59 Nw, U.L. REV. 719, 721-23 (1965) (review of the legislative history of S 302) [here-
inafter cited as Goetz, Employee Benefit Trusts]. The legislation was then introduced again in the
80th Congress, passed by both houses, and again vetoed by the President. Seel N.L.R.B., LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at vii, x (1948);
Goetz, Employee Benefit Trusts, at 722. Both houses then voted to override the veto. Seel N.L.R.B.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at x (1948);
Goetz, Employee Benefit Trusts, at 722.
88 See, e.g., 92 CONG. REC. 5181 (1946) (statement of Senator Overton); 92 CONG.
REC. 5345-46 (1946) (statement of Senator Ball).
69 93 CONG. REC. 4678 (1947) (statement of Senator Ball).
7° See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1947) (reprinted in 1 N.L.R.B., LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, 458 (1948)); 93
CONG. REC. 4877 (1947) (statement of Senator Ball).
" See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text. See also Goetz, Employee Benefit Trusts,
supra note 67, at 721-23.
72 102 S. Ct. at 1234.
78 See, e.g., Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188,.208-210 (1974); Brother-
hood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768, 774 (1964) (union may not use its position
and power as federally recognized bargaining representative to destroy black workers' jobs in
order to benefit white workers).
74 See, e.g. , Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345
U.S. 330, 337 (1953); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 203-04 (1944).
78 See cases cited supra note 73.
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duty of fair representation does not extend to former union members or their
families, it recognized that both contract law and section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act protect these persons against unilateral changes in
vested retirement benefits. 76
As a result of the restrictions on the content of the terms of collective
bargaining agreements imposed by these various provisions of federal law, the
scope of the immunity from judicial review of welfare fund eligibility and
benefit terms conferred by Robinson is limited. Essentially, the protection from
judicial scrutiny accorded by Robinson extends only to benefit eligibility condi-
tions established in a collective bargaining agreement which do not discrimi-
nate on the basis of race, sex or some other basis prohibited by federal law,
which do not discriminate among classes of beneficiaries covered by the
union's duty of fair representation, and which do not attempt to alter unilater-
ally benefits previously conferred on beneficiaries not currently members of the
bargaining unit." Consequently, only in cases where the collective bargaining
agreement discriminates between classes of beneficiaries outside of the collec-
tive bargaining unit, with respect to benefits not previously conferred, will the
immunity from judicial scrutiny afforded by Robinson be completely effective.
As the preceding analysis suggests, the Robinson Court's sanction of
discriminatory eligibility requirements for employee pension trusts is limited.
Such a limited power to discriminate may be beneficial. Permitting discrimina-
tion in the eligibility conditions and benefits levels of section 302(c)(5) welfare
funds established by collective bargaining agreements in the narrow class of
cases where the discrimination does not violate any other provision of federal
law provides the union and management with a degree of flexibility to bargain
which may be necessary to reach agreement. In Robinson, for example, the
union's acceptance of the management proposal, which extended fewer
benefits to widows of miners who were still working when they died than to
widows of miners who were collecting pensions at the time of death, made it
possible to conclude a complex collective bargaining agreement and avoid the
possibility of lengthy strike. 78
 On balance, the need to promote agreements and
prevent strikes justifies the conferral of a limited power to discriminate in the
allocation of welfare funds.
After the decision in Robinson, the parties to a collective bargaining
negotiation will have greater flexibility to negotiate over the terms of employee
benefit funds because the reasonablenes of eligibility conditions and benefit
levels will not be subject to judicial review. As the preceding discussion in-
dicates, the flexibility afforded by the limited ability to discriminate sanctioned
by the Robinson decision is not extensive. Nevertheless, the ability to make even
limited concessions on benefit eligibility conditions may be necessary to enable
76 See Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. at 181
n.20. Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. S 185(a) (1976), estab-
lishes a federal cause of action for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization. Id.
77 See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
" 102 S. Ct. at 1230.
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the parties to reach agreement. As the Robinson Court recognized, however, the
terms of employee welfare funds are not always established by the collective
bargaining process." In some cases, the collective bargaining agreement mere-
ly provides for the establishment of the fund and the level of employer contribu-
tions." The eligibility conditions and benefit levels are then determined by the
trustees of the fund.'" The Robinson Court did not reach the issue of the obliga-
tions of trustees who are given authority to determine eligibility rules and
benefit levels. 82 It remains to be seen if the Court will concur in the judgment of
those federal courts which have already asserted the power to review and in-
validate arbitrary decisions by welfare fund trustees. 83
V. ADEA
A. * Willful Violations of the ADEA:
Kelly v. American Standard, Inc.' and
Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Manufacturing Co.'
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) 3 prohibits
employers from discriminating against individuals because of their age.* The
ADEA protects individuals between the ages of 40 and 70. 5 The Act is enforced
in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA)6 rather than through independent ADEA remedies.'
Yet, in one important respect, the ADEA modifies the remedies which would
be available under the FLSA. The FLSA mandates an automatic doubling of
damages for any violations. 8 Section 7(b) of the ADEA, however, allows the
79 Id. at 1232-33.
8° See Pete v. United Mine Workers of Am. Welfare and Retirement Fund, 517 F.2d at
1280; Kosty v. Lewis, 319 F.2d at 745-46.
81 See Pete v. United Mine Workers, 517 F.2d at 1280; Roark v. Lewis, 401 F.2d 425,
427 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Kosty v. Lewis, 319 F.2d at 745-46.
82 See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
" See cases cited supra note 50. A determination that trustee decisions should be subject
to judicial scrutiny would be consistent with the common law of trusts, which imposes on trustees
a duty to refrain from acting in an arbitrary or capricious manner. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS S 187 & comm. e (1959) (courts may interfere when a trustee, in the exercise of dis-
cretion conferred by the trust instrument, acts dishonestly, with improper motives, fails to use
judgment, or acts beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment).
* By Raymond Pelletier, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 640 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1981).
2 665 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1981).
3 29 U.S.C. 55 621-634 (1976).
Section 4(a) of the ADEA provides in pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful for an
employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's age . . . ." 29 U.S.C. 5 623(a)(1) (1976).
5 Id. 5 631 as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-256, 5 3(a), 92 Stat. 189 (1978).
6 29 U.S.C. 55 201-219 (1976).
7 Id,	 626(b).
B See id. 5 216(b).
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doubling of damages only in cases of "willful violations" of its standards. 9
Consequently, an employer who willfully violates the ADEA is liable not only
for back wages and benefits, but also for "an additional equal amount as liq-
uidated damages.""
Despite the importance of "willfulness" for determining the amount of
damages which may be awarded, neither the text of the ADEA nor its
legislative history has defined the term." The courts have reached divergent in-
terpretations of the term. For example, the Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit has defined willfulness to require that the employer's discriminatory act be
voluntary, intentional, and done with a specific intent to violate the ADEA."
In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld a finding of
willfulness on a jury instruction that defined "willful" merely as action that
was deliberate, intentional, and knowing." The court added that willfulness
also could be found if the employer's discriminatory act was done "in reckless
disregard of the consequences. ,,I4
The "willful violation" provision of the ADEA was interpreted by two ad-
ditional circuit courts during the Survey year.' 5 At issue in both cases was
whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on the standard for deter-
mining if the alleged violation of the ADEA was willful." The courts adopted
two differing approaches in answering the question. The Ninth Circuit held
that a violation is willful if committed knowingly or voluntarily, even if the
employer acted without knowledge of the ADEA." The Seventh Circuit held
that in order to prove willfulness under the ADEA, a plaintiff must show that
the defendant's actions were knowing and voluntary, and that he knew or
should have known that those actions violated the ADEA." This chapter
discusses the reasoning employed by each court in reaching its decision and
assesses the merits of this reasoning.
The first of the two cases was Kelly v. American Standard, Inc. ," decided by
the Ninth Circuit. In Kelly, the plaintiff was a sales representative who was
discharged by American Standard, Inc. (American), when the company sold
one of its plants and decided to reduce its nationwide sales personnel by forty
9 29 U.S.C. 626(b) (1976).
'° Id. S 216(b).
" Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 979 (9th Cir. 1981); Syvock v.
Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 154, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 610, 614 (7th
Cir. 1981).
12 Loeb v, Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1020 n.27, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA )
29, 41 n.27 (1st Cir. 1979).
13 Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 283, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 994,
998 (3d Cir. 1980).
14 Id.
15 Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 94
(9th Cir. 1981); Syvock v. Milw. Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 610 (7th Cir. 1981).
Syvock, 665 F.2d at 156, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 615-16; Kelly, 640 F.2d at
979, 25 Fair Empl. Prac.,Cas. (BNA) at 96-97.
17 Kelly, 640 F.2d at 980, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 98.
15 Syvock, 665 F.2d at 155-56, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 615.
19
 640 F.2d 974, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 94 (9th Cir. 1981).
December 1982]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 163
employees. 28 At trial, the plaintiff introduced statistical evidence to prove a
pattern of age discrimination in American's nationwide discharge plan. 2 ' The
plaintiff also introduced evidence of American's discriminatory intent. 22
Although the jury awarded the plaintiff damages for lost wages and benefits, by
agreement of the parties the availability and amount of liquidated damages
were determined by the trial court. 23 The trial judge denied the plaintiff's re-
quest for liquidated damages because he found no evidence that American's
violation was willful. 24 The trial court concluded that to establish a willful
violation, the plaintiff must prove the defendant intentionally and knowingly
discharged the plaintiff, and the defendant knew that its actions had implica-
tions under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. 25 The court of appeals
reversed the trial court's interpretation of the term "willfulness" under the
ADEA and remanded the case to the district court for determination of the
availability of liquidated damages under the willfulness standard adopted by
the court of appeals. 26 The court of appeals held that the plaintiff need not
prove that the employer had any knowledge of the ADEA to establish
willfulness. 27 The court held that the plaintiff need only prove the employer's
act was "knowing and voluntary. "28
In reaching its holding, the court of appeals relied upon several decisions
from other jurisdictions in which courts awarded liquidated damages without
requiring proof of the employer's knowledge of the A.DEA. 29 These courts had
looked only to the knowing and voluntary nature of the violation. 3° In par-
ticular, the appeals court relied on Wehr v. Burroughs Corp. , 3 ' decided by the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Kelly court found persuasive the
Wehr court's reasoning that the term "willful" is subject to many interpreta-
tions, but that a lower standard, not requiring specific intent to violate the
statute, should apply to civil as opposed to criminal statutes."
In addition to its reliance on decisions from other jurisdictions, the Kelly
court resorted to a policy reason for not requiring proof of knowledge of the Act
in order to establish a willful violation. The court reasoned that such a require-
2° Kelly, 640 F.2d at 977, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 95.




25 Id. at 979, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 97.
28 Id. at 981 & 987, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 99 & 103.
27 Id. at 980, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 98.
28 Id.
29 Id. , citing Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 283, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 994, 998 (3d Cir. 1980); Buchholz v. Symons Manufacturing Co., 445 F. Supp. 706,
713, 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1084, 1089 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Rogers v, Exxon
Research & Engineering Co., 404 F. Supp. 324, 334, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 776, 784
(D.N.J. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 550 F.2d 834, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 518 (3d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022, 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 501 (1978).
'° Kelly, 640 F.2d at 979-80, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 98.
" 619 F.2d 276, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 994 (3d Cir, 1980).
52 Kelly, 640 F.2d at 979-80, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 98 (citing Wehr, 619
F.2d at 282).
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ment "could have the anomalous effect of encouraging employers to know as
little as possible about the ADEA so that they would not be liable for liquidated
damages.' 133
The defendant in Kelly had argued that the lower standard of liability
adopted by the court would render liquidated damages automatic. 34 In effect
the defendant argued recovery of liquidated damages would be virtually
assured for every violation since an employer's unfavorable treatment of an
employee is almost always in some sense knowing and voluntary. 35
 The court
observed, however, that an employer's act may violate the ADEA although not
shown to be knowing and voluntary. 36
 The court noted that a plaintiff need not
introduce evidence of the defendant's state of mind to establish a prima facie
case of age discrimination." A plaintiff could build his case solely on statistical
evidence." Thus, according to the court, a finding that the employer's act was
knowing and voluntary was not a crucial element in every ADEA action." For
this reason, it could not be said that every successful ADEA action would result
automatically in doubling of damages. 40
The second of the two cases decided during the Survey year which assessed
the appropriate standard for defining willfulness under the ADEA was Syvock v.
Milwaukee Boiler Manufacturing Co.. 41 In Syvock, the plaintiff, Syvock, sued his
former employer alleging that by laying him off and failing to rehire him his
employer violated the ADEA." The jury found for Syvock, determining that
the defendant had discriminated against Syvock and that the discrimination
was willful.'" While upholding the jury's finding of discrimination, the trial
court granted the defendant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the
issue of willfulness." The plaintiff appealed, claiming that the trial judge set
too high a standard for a willful violation because the judge's standard required
that the defendant's actions be intentional, that is, willful and voluntary as
distinguished from accidental or unknowing, to constitute a willful violation."
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals nonetheless affirmed the trial court's
" Kelly, 640 F.2d at 980, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 98.
'4 Id,
" See Smith & Leggette, Recent Issues in Litigation Under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 349, 369 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Smith & Leggette], cited in Kelly,
640 F.2d at 980, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 98.
36 Kelly, 640 F.2d at 980, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 98.
37 Id. To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA, a plaintiff
must prove 1) his membership in the protected class, 2) his discharge, 3) his qualifications for the
position, and 4) his replacement by one outside the protected class. Id. Accord, Haring v. CPC
Intl, Inc., 664 F.2d 1234, 1237, 27 Fair Empl Prac. Cas. (BNA) 575, 578 (5th Cir. 1981); Geller
v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1034, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 920, 925 (2d Cir. 1981); But
see Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 128, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1381,
1387 (5th Cir. 1981) (proof of fourth element not required in ADEA reduction-in-force cases).
' 11 Kelly, 640 F.2d at 980 n.9, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 98 n.9.
39 Ste Id. at 980, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 98.
4° See Id.
" 665 F.2d 149, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 610 (7th Cir. 1981).
92 Syvock, 665 F.2d at 151, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 611.
" Id.
44 Id.
4 ' Id. at 156, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 615-16.
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judgment with respect to willfulness and, indeed, adopted an even more
demanding standard than that applied by the trial court." The court of appeals
held that to prove willfulness, a plaintiff must show not only that the
defendant's actions were knowing and voluntary, but also that he knew or
reasonably should have known that those actions violated the ADEA. 47
In reaching its holding, the court of appeals first reviewed the divergent
interpretations reached by other courts in defining the term willfulness." The
court then reasoned that by allowing liquidated damages only for willful viola-
tions, Congress did not intend the doubling of damages to be automatic." The
(court recognized that in Kelly v, American Standard, Inc. , 50 the Ninth Circuit had
concluded that defining willfulness as not requiring actual knowledge of the
ADEA would not result in the automatic doubling of damages. 5 ' The Kelly
court had reasoned that liquidated damages would not be automatic in cases
where the plaintiff relied on statistical evidence to establish his prima facie case
instead of relying on proof of the defendant's state of mind." Although the
Syvock court did not directly criticize the Ninth Circuit's decision in Kelly, it ex-
pressed concern with some of the implications of the reasoning in Kelly. The
court observed that in one recent case" the Second Circuit, using reasoning
similar to that of the Ninth Circuit in Kelly, had implied that liquidated
damages will always be available to a plaintiff who establishes liability on a
discriminatory treatment rather than a discriminatory impact theory." Thus,
according to the Second Circuit, liquidated damages should always be
available to a plaintiff who establishes liability by proving that the defendant
took certain unfavorable employment actions towards the plaintiff on the basis
of age considerations. 55 Conversely, double damages might not be available to
46 Id. at 157-58, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 616-17. The court of appeals held
that even under the trial court's standard there was no evidence to sustain a verdict of willfulness.
Id.
47 Id. at 155-56, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 615.
48 Id. at 154-55, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 614.
+9 Id.
" 640 F.2d 974, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 94 (9th Cir. 1981).
" Syvock, 665 F.2d at 154-55, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 614 (citing Kelly, 640
F.2d at 980 n.9, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 98 n.9).
" Id.
" Goodman v. Heublein, Inc., 645 F.2d 127, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 645 (2d
Cir. 1981).
34 Syvock, 665 F.2d at 155, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 614, (citing Goodman v.
Heublein, Inc., 645 F.2d at 131 n.6), 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 647-48 n.6. A case of
disparate treatment occurs where the employer "simply treats some people less favorably than
others" on the basis of some impermissible factor such as race, religion or age. Geller v.
Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1031-32, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 920, 923 (2d Cir. 1981)
(quoting International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15, 14 Fair
Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 1514, 1519 n.15 (1977). In a disparate treatment case "[p]roof of
discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact
of differences in treatment." Id. A case of disparate impact, however, results from the use of
"employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in
fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity."
Id. Proof of discriminatory motive is not required to sustain a claim of disparate impact. Id.
55 See Goodman v. Heublein, Inc., 645 F.2d at 131 n.6, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 647-48 n.6.
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a plaintiff who establishes liability by proving that the defendant instituted
employment practices which were facially neutral in their treatment of different
age groups but which in fact fell more harshly on the plaintiff's age group. 56
The Syvock court stated that it found nothing in the ADEA or its legislative
history to support the conclusion that liquidated damages will always be
available to a plaintiff who establishes liability on a disparate treatment
theory . 57
According to the court, the ADEA requires that a standard of willfulness
be developed which distinguishes those cases of disparate treatment in which
an employer consciously discriminates against an employee because of age
from cases in which discrimination is unconscious." The Syvock court noted
that the available legislative history and commentary suggested Congress
thought that cases of non-willful discriminatory treatment, like cases of non-
willful discriminatory impact resulting from facially neutral employment prac-
tices, were possible. 59 Such non-willful discriminatory treatment is possible,
the court observed, because employers usually tend to discriminate in their
treatment of older employees as a result of unconscious stereotyped assump-
tions about the ability of older employees to perform their work, rather than as
a result of a conscious desire to treat older employees adversely." According to
the court, the need to distinguish cases of conscious from unconscious
discrimination is just as important in disparate treatment cases as in disparate
impact cases. 6 ' The court concluded, therefore, that a finding of willfulness
should lie only where the plaintiff can demonstrate that the defendant had
some knowledge of the illegality of his actions." Consequently, the standard
adopted by the court in Syvock requires that the plaintiff prove not only that the
defendant's actions were knowing and voluntary, but also that the defendant
knew or reasonably should have known that his actions violated the ADEA. 63
The Syvock court did not directly criticize or analyze the standard adopted
by the Ninth Circuit in Kelly. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit's adoption of a
different standard compels the conclusion that it considered the Ninth Circuit
standard flawed with respect to the goal of differentiating cases of willful from
unwillful disparate treatment. It is necessary, therefore, to examine more
closely each court's reasoning to determine which standard is consistent with
the Congressional intent.
A major difficulty in interpreting the court's opinion in Kelly is that the
court defined a willful violation as a knowing and voluntary violation without
specifying the nature of the specific knowledge that the employer must have."
56 Id.
57 Syvock, 665 F.2d at 155, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 615.
5U Id.
59 Id. See supra note 54 for adiscussion of the distinction between disparate treatment




63 Id. at 155-56, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 615.
64 Kelly, 640 F.2d at 980, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 98.
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The Kelly court will not require the plaintiff to demonstrate that the employer
had knowledge that he was violating the ADEA. 65 The court, however, did not
clarify whether the plaintiff must show merely that the employer was aware he
was taking certain actions with unfavorable consequences for an employee
rather that the employer was also aware that he was taking these actions because
of the employee's age. Where this distinction is blurred it becomes possible that,
contrary to the intent of Congress, all violations of the statute could lead to the
doubling of damages.
Since Congress provided specific remedies in the ADEA for willful viola-
tions, it may be presumed not to have intended the availability of liquidated
damages to be automatic for all violations. 66 If the Kelly standard is interpreted
to require that a plaintiff prove merely that the employer was aware of the ac-
tions it was taking toward the plaintiff, then the court's standard would con-
travene the presumed Congressional intent. Interpreting the Kelly standard to
require proof merely that the employer was aware of its actions would result in
an automatic doubling of damages for virtually all violations since presumably
few employers are unaware of their own actions. 67 The court concluded,
however, that an employer's act may still violate the ADEA and not be know-
ing and voluntary. 6a The court reasoned that statistical evidence alone could be
used to prove discriminatory impact, without any proof of the employer's state
of mind. 65 This reasoning, however, does not fully dispose of the criticism that
to require proof merely that the employer was aware of his actions would result
in a doubling of damages for virtually all violations of the ADEA. To be sure, a
plaintiff seeking to show a willful violation in order to establish that the
employer acted knowingly may have to introduce evidence of the employer's
state of mind which he would not otherwise have to introduce. Nevertheless, it
would seem that plaintiffs would not find it difficult to convince a jury of the
tautology that the employer who discharged the plaintiff in fact was aware that
he was discharging the plaintiff. Likewise, in actions brought on a discrimina-
tory impact theory, that is, where the employer is shown to have adopted some
facially neutral employment practice which has a disproportionate impact on
older workers," recovery of liquidated damages would seem virtually
guaranteed. Presumably most such employers can be shown to be aware of
their employment practices, although they may not be aware that their prac-
tices have a disproportionate impact on older workers. Thus, if the standard
adopted by the Kelly court required only a showing that the employer had
knowledge of the actions he was taking toward an employee, the standard
legitimately could be criticized for making virtually every violation of the
ADEA willful.
65 Id.
66 See Syvock, 665 F.2d at 154-55, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 614.
67
 See Smith & Leggette, supra note 35, at 369.
68 Kelly, 640 F.2d at 980, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 98.
69 Id. at 980 n.9, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 98 n.9.
70 See supra note 54 for a discussion of the distinction between disparate treatment and
disparate impact cases.
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A better interpretation of the standard adopted by the Kelly court is that in
order for a violation to be willful, an employer must know not only that he is
taking certain actions toward the employee, but also that he is doing so because
of the employee's age. Since the Kelly standard allows liquidated damages for
knowing violations, 71
 the requisite knowledge should extend to all elements of
the violation. An employer's discharge of an employee is not in itself a violation
of the Act. The discharge becomes a violation only if it occurs because of an
employee's age. 72
 Arguably, therefore, for a violation to be willful, an employ-
er must know not only that he discharged the employee, but also that his ac-
tions were taken because of age considerations. Courts allowing liquidated
damages on the basis of a standard similar to the Kelly standard have in fact
cited evidence that the employer was conscious that age was the reason for the
unfavorable treatment of the employee."
Interpreting the Kelly standard to require knowledge that age is the reason
for unfavorable treatment avoids the criticism that the standard would lead to a
doubling of damages for virtually all violations. Under this interpretation of the
standard it is possible to point to discriminatory impact cases as one clear ex-
ample of instances in which an employer may not have knowledge that the ac-
tions he is taking are motivated by considerations of age." The employer may
simply have adopted a practice which he considered neutral, but which in fact
affects older workers disproportionately. Although it is reasonable to require
that an employer have knowledge that age was the reason for a discriminatory
employment decision before liquidated damages are awarded, the opinion in
Kelly does not delineate specifically this or any other standard. Such impreci-
sion is confusing and leaves considerable uncertainty about how the Kelly
standard should or will be applied.
Unlike the Kelly opinion, the Syvock opinion contains considerable discus-
sion of the extent of employer awareness necessary to sustain a finding of
willfulness. The Syvock court emphasized that the standard for determining
willfulness must differentiate those cases in which an employer consciously
discriminates against an employee because of age from those in which the
discrimination is unconscious." In addition, the court stressed that it was just
as necessary to distinguish between conscious and unconscious discrimination
in disparate treatment cases as in disparate impact cases." Although the
" Kelly, 640 F.2d at 98, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 98.
72 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
73 See, e.g., Buchholz v. Symons Mfg. Co., 445 F. Supp. 706, 713, 16 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1084, 1089 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (statements by employee's superiors acknowledging
that discharge was due to employee's age established intentional, knowing and voluntary viola-
tion); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Engineering Co., 404 F. Supp. 324, 335, 11 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 776, 784 (D.N.J. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 550 F.2d 834, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 518 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. den., 434 U.S. 1022, 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 501 (1978)
(testimony corroborating plaintiff's allegations of a scheme by employer to rid itself of older
workers supported award of liquidated damages).
74
 See supra note 54 for a discussion of the distinctions between disparate treatment and
disparate impact cases.
" Syvack, 665 F.2d at 155, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 615.
76
 Id. See supra note 54 for a discussion of the distinctions between disparate treatment
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court's insistence on distinguishing between conscious and unconscious
discrimination even in disparate treatment cases raises incidental problems," it
seems to have some support in the legislative history of the ADEA" and in the
commentary on age discrimination." In disparate treatment cases, however, it
is difficult to conceptualize the court's dichotomy between conscious and un-
conscious discrimination. It is difficult to understand how an employer can
violate the act by treating an employee unfavorably "because of age, " 80 and at
the same time to be totally unconscious of the fact that the unfavorable treat-
ment is related to the employee's age. Perhaps, as the court suggests, age
discrimination is different from other forms of discrimination. 8 ' Unlike
discrimination based on race Or religion, age discrimination does not necessari-
ly result from invidious class-oriented biases which transcend the workplace. 82
Instead, age discrimination may result from unconscious stereotyped assump-
tions about older workers' abilities, rather than from a desire to treat older
workers unfavorably. 83 Yet precisely because age discrimination may be dif-
ferent, it would seem difficult to draw a clear line between those instances of
discriminatory treatment which are consciously motivated by age and those
which are not. For example, in cases in which an employer discharges or
refuses to hire an older worker because of the unconscious stereotyped assump-
tion that older workers are less productive, conceiving of the employer as being
totally unconscious of the fact that age at least played a role in his decision is
difficult. True, the employer may be unaware that he has made an erroneous
assumption about the effect of age on productivity. He may simply apply that
assumption to the older worker. Yet in doing so, he may be at least partially
aware that his application of the assumption is related to the worker's age.
and disparate impact cases.
" One problem with distinguishing between conscious and unconscious discrimination
in disparate treatment cases is that it plays havoc with the requirement of discriminatory intent or
motive traditionally deemed crucial in disparate treatment cases. In Title VII cases alleging
disparate treatment, the Supreme Court has indicated that an inference of discriminatory motive
is crucial. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15, 14 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1514, 1519 n.15 (1977). If an inference of discriminatory motive is re-
quired in ADEA disparate treatment cases as well as in Title VII cases, then the Syvock court's
suggestion that some cases of unlawful disparate treatment arising under the ADEA are un-
conscious poses a problem. It seems impossible on the one hand , to say that an employer pos-
sessed a discriminatory motive or intent in treating an employee unfavorably and thus violated
the ADEA, and on the other hand to say that the employer did not consciously discriminate and
thus is not guilty of a willful violation. The Syvock court apparently recognized this problem.
Syvack, 665 F.2d at 155 n.7, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 615 n.7. The court implied,
however, that an inference of discriminatory intent is not crucial in an ADEA case. Id. Whether
this view will produce significant consequences, and if so whether it will survive challenge is open
to question.
" See, e.g., 113 CONG. REC. 34, 742 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Burke). See also authorities
cited in Syvock, 665 F.2d at 155 n.8, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 615 n.8.
" See, e.g., Smith & Leggette, supra note 35, at 371. See also authorities cited in Syvock,
665 F.2d at 155 n.8.
aQ See supra note 4 and accompanying text for pertinent ADEA provisions.
a' Syvock, 665 F.2d at 155, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 615.
82 Id.
85 Id.
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Thus, while there may be different levels of consciousness in disparate treat-
ment cases, the instances in which an employer discriminates against an
employee "because of age" unconsciously likely are rare.
Despite conceptual problems with the court's view that some instances of
discriminatory treatment are unconscious, the court's insistence in Syvock that
only conscious discrimination should be deemed willful may have merit. The
merit of the court's position depends on the interpretation given to the term
conscious discrimination. If the court intended to limit conscious discrimina-
tion to cases in which there was "a deliberate desire to remove older workers
from the workplace, " 84
 then the court's view arguably would be too restrictive.
Read in the context of the court's opinion, the phrase "deliberate desire to
remove older workers . . ." suggests some sort of invidious bias against older
workers as a class. 85
 The court itself pointed out that Congress believed few in-
stances of age discrimination stem from such well-defined ill-intentioned feel-
ings toward older people as a group." Just as Congress could not have in-
tended to make recovery of liquidated damages virtually automatic, so also it
must not have intended to virtually rule out recovery of liquidated damages
either. Interpreting conscious discrimination to mean a deliberate desire to
remove older workers from the workforce, however, suggests a more restrictive
standard than the one actually adopted by the Syvock court. For a finding of
willfulness, the court would require a finding that the employer knew or should
have known that he was violating the ADEA. 87
 It seems likely that there can be
violations of the ADEA which are not marked by deliberate discriminatory
animus but which may result in a finding that the employer knew or should
have known that his actions violated the ADEA. For example, an employer
may refuse to hire an older worker simply because he believes that the older in-
dividual, because of his age, will not perform as well in a particular job. The
employer may have no desire to disadvantage older workers as a class.
Nonetheless, the employer may know from previous cases that his refusal to
hire the older applicant will violate the ADEA. Thus, the standard adopted by
the Syvock court would seem to allow recovery against the employer even
though the employer's actions are not marked by deliberate discriminatory
animus toward older people as a group, since the standard adopted by the court
for determining willfulness is not consistent with the notion of deliberate
discriminatory animus toward older workers as a group, the court probably did
not intend to limit recovery for willful violations to cases of deliberate
discriminatory animus.
If the court's use of the term conscious discrimination is construed more
broadly to include any cases in which an employer is aware that his
discriminatory actions are motivated by considerations of age, then the court's
position seems to have merit. Liquidated damages would neither be available




" Id. at 155-56, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (DNA) at 615.
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about the meaning of the term "willful,"" a standard which makes some but
not all violations willful seems consistent with Congress' presumed intent, in
providing a special remedy for one category of violations. Furthermore, since
the liquidated damages provision can be viewed as a form of punitive
damages," limiting such an award to those violations which are knowing seems
proper.
If the Syvock court interpreted the ADEA to allow recovery for willful viola-
tions in cases where the employer was aware that his actions were taken
because of age considerations, then the court's interpretation of the ADEA is
similar to that of the Ninth Circuit in Kelly. Based on the interpretation of the
Kelly standard previously suggested, it would seem that both courts intended to
define as willful violations those cases in which the employer knows that he is
treating the employee unfavorably because of age. 9° It is not clear why the
Syvock court further conditioned an award of liquidated damages on a finding
that the employer knew or should have known that his actions violated the
ADEA."
One reason for the Syvock court's adoption of a different standard may
stem from its view that not all disparate treatment cases involve conscious
discrimination." Although the court did not criticize the Kelly opinion directly,
it seemed concerned that following the Kelly court's standard might result in
liquidated damages being available in every case in which the plaintiff
establishes liability on a disparate treatment theory as opposed to a disparate
impact theory." To support its reasoning the court cited one case in which the
Second Circuit suggested that whenever liability is established on a disparate
treatment theory, the violation is necessarily intentional." The Syvock court ap-
parently imputed the Second Circuit's reasoning to the Kelly court, and con-
cluded that under the Kelly standard whenever liability could be established on
a disparate treatment theory, the violation would be knowing and voluntary.
Because the Syvock court believed distinguishing between conscious and un-
conscious violations even in disparate treatment cases was necessary, it ap-
parently concluded that the Kelly standard had to be rejected. Yet, ironically, it
seems that the Syvock court's complaint was with the reasoning of the Second
Circuit, not with the standard adopted by the Kelly court. Properly interpreted,
the Kelly standard seems to achieve the result desired by the Syvock court of
allowing an award of liquidated damages only for knowing or conscious acts of
discrimination." Furthermore, the Kelly court never stated that it expected
liquidated damages to be available in every action in which liability is estab-
lished on a disparate treatment theory. The Syvock court could have adopted the
88 See supra, note 11 and accompanying text.
89 Kelly, 640 F.2d at 979, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 97.
9° See supra notes 71-73 and 87-89 and accompanying text.
Syvock, 665 F.2d at 155-56, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 615.
Id. at 155, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 615.
93 See Id. at 155, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 614-15.
94 Id. (citing Goodman v. Heublein, Inc., 645 F.2d 127, 131 n.6, 25 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 645, 647-48 n.6 (2d Cir. 1981)).
" See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
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Kelly standard while making clear that it did not view as knowing violations all
instances of discriminatory treatment.
Despite the Syvock court's limitation of liquidated damages to cases in
which the employer knew or should have known that he was violating the
ADEA,98 in most cases the Syvock standard is likely to produce the same result
as the Kelly standard. One would expect that in most cases where an employer
is shown to have been aware at the time of taking discriminatory actions that
such actions were motivated by age considerations (thus satisfying the Kelly
standard), the plaintiff will argue that the employer also knew or should have
known that he was violating the ADEA. Thus, the Syvock court can be criticized
for introducing one more standard for determining willfulness without giving
clearly articulated and persuasive reasons for rejecting the standards already
established by the other circuits.
Both the Kelly and Syvock opinions have added to the uncertainty
surrounding the meaning of a willful violation of the ADEA. As a result of the
Syvock opinion, at least four apparently different standards for determining a
willful violation now exist. 97 The Kelly and Syvock standards may differ little,
however, in practical effect. It appears that under either standard an employer
may be liable for liquidated damages when he takes actions which impact older
employees unfavorably and when he is aware that those actions were taken
because of age considerations. 98
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS
A. Standards for "Reverse Discrimination" Suits Under the
Equal Protection Clause and Section 1981:
Valentine v. Smith' and Setser v. Novak Investment Co.'
1. Valentine v. Smith
Decisions about hiring and admissions made by either faculties or admin-
istrations of state universities are subject to scrutiny under the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitutions In Regents v. Bakke, a rejected
ss Syvock, 665 F.2d at 1555, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 615.
" The First and Third Circuits have both interpreted the term willful somewhat dif-
ferently than the Kelly and Syvock courts. See, e.g., Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 283,
22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 994, 998 (3d Cir. 1980) (proof that discharge was precipitated in
reckless disregard of consequences would have been sufficient to support finding of willfulness);
Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1020 n.27, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 29, 41 n.27
(1st Cir. 1979) (finding of willfulness requires that employer's discriminatory act be voluntary,
intentional, and done with specific intent to violate the Act).
93 See supra notes 90 and 96 and accompanying text.
* By Stephen J. Brake, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 654 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1981).
638 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 615 (1982).
3 See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Missouri ex rel. Guines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 378 (1958).
December 1982]
	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 173
white applicant to the University of California at Davis Medical School chal-
lenged, as violative of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause, a
special admissions program that set aside sixteen of the one hundred available
places in the entering class for members of specifically designated minority
groups. 4 Although there was no majority opinion in Bakke, Justice Powell's
plurality opinion held that racial or ethnic distinctions of any sort call for strict
judicial scrutiny.' Therefore, distinctions draw on the basis of race, albeit in
furtherance of an affirmative action plan, are nonetheless subject to something
resembling strict scrutiny. 6
In order for the state to justify the use of a race-conscious classification, it
must first show that its purpose or interest, in furtherance of which the classifi-
cation is adopted, is both constitutionally permissible and substantial. 7 Bakke
recognized that a state has such a legitimate and substantial interest in amelio-
rating or eliminating, where possible, the disabling effects of identified discrim-
ination' Before such a substantial interest can exist, however, there must be a
judicial, legislative or administrative finding of a constitutional or statutory
violation. 9 Only when findings of such a wrong have been made by an appro-
priate body can the state's interest be characterized as substantial and remedial
action be taken.'° If such remedial action involves a race-conscious classifica-
tion the state must show the use of the classification is necessary to the accom-
plishment of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest." As the Court noted
in Bakke, when a classification touches upon race, the person affected is entitled
to a judicial determination that the burden he is asked to bear on the basis of
race is precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest." This
standard was similarly phrased in Fullilove v. Klutznick, where the court noted
that racial criteria could only be used by the government when they were nar-
rowly tailored to achieve their objectives." Thus, a state has a substantial in-
terest in remedying the effects of past discrimination where the discrimination
has been clearly identified by an appropriate governmental body." Any
4 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
5 Id. at 291. Justice Powell rejected the notion proposed by Justice Brennan that the
level of scrutiny to be applied depended upon the group adversely affected by the classification.
438 U.S. at 295-97. Under this system, if the minority group adversely affected by the statute
had historically been burdened by the majority strict scrutiny would apply. lf, however, the ma-
jority was singled out, then the level of scrutiny would be lower. Id. at 296-97. Justice Powell re-
jected this system as unworkable. Id. at 298.
6 Chief Justice Burger, for instance, in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980),
held that all racial preferences should receive a searching judicial inquiry to insure they do not
conflict with constitutional guarantees. Id. at 491.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305 (citing in re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973)).
B Id. at 307.
9 Id.
'° Id. In Bakke, the University was held not to be an appropriate body to make a finding
that past discrimination had occurred justifying the use of a race-conscious remedy. Id. at 309.
" Id. at 305 (citing In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 721-22.)
" Id. at 299.
15 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 487. In Fullitave, the Court upheld a congres-
sional "set-aside" to minority contractors of 10% of Federal funds for public works projects. Id.
at 492.
14 Bakke at 308.
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remedy adopted, however, must be precisely or narrowly tailored to achieve its
objectives if it is to withstand scrutiny under the equal protection clause.
In neither Bakke nor Fullilove, did a majority of the Court adopt standards
defining when a remedy could be considered precisely or narrowly tailored."
In his dissent in Bakke Justice Brennan set forth the standard he would apply.
Use of a race-conscious program, in his view, should be allowed where the pur-
pose of the program is to remove disparate impact of a governmental decision
resulting from past discrimination, as long as the program used race reason-
ably in light of its objectives and did not operate to stigmatize any group or in-
dividual. 16 In Fullilove, Justice Powell, writing separately in an analysis consist-
ent with his opinion in Bakke, would consider, in deciding whether a given
remedy was constitutional, the efficacy of alternative remedies," the planned
duration of the remedy," the relationship between the percentage of minority
workers to be employed and the percentage of minority group members in the
relevant population or workforce," the availability of waiver provisions if the
plan could not be met," and the effect of the remedy on innocent third
parties." Other than these statements, lower courts have no guidance in deter-
mining when a race-conscious remedy adopted by a state is sufficiently precise
to withstand scrutiny under the equal protection clause.
During the Survey year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit in Valentine v. Smith 22 attempted to establish a standard for determining
when race-conscious plans are constitutionally permissible. In Valentine, the
plaintiff, Valentine, sought employment in 1976 at Arkansas State University
as a member of the business education faculty. 23 Among the sixteen candidates
for the job, Valentine appears to have been the most qualified."' A list of candi-
dates headed by Valentine's name was presented to the University's vice presi-
dent for his consideration." After discussions with the University's affirmative
action officer, however, a new list was drawn up from which Valentine's name
was deleted." The new list contained only the names of two black candidates,
one of whom eventually was hired."
" In Valentine v. Smith, 564 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1981), the court noted, "The Supreme
Court has not yet defined guidelines for permissible affirmative action for employing state uni-
versity faculty." Id. at 508. In Bakke, the choice of remedy was not discussed by the majority of
the justices. 438 U.S. 265.
16 Id, at 373-74 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
' 7 Fulliloee, 448 U.S. at 510.




21 Id, at 514.
22 654 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1981).
23 Id. at 506. Valentine taught at the school from 1967 until 1974, when she resigned.
In 1976 her replacement, Adena Williams, a black, had resigned, whereupon Valentine reap-
plied for her former position. Id. at 506-07.
24 Id. at 507. Several members of the faculty search committee recommended Valentine
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Valentine asserted that she was discriminated against on the basis of her
race in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment."
In order to prevail, it was necessary for her to show that the University's
employment decision had in fact been made on the basis of race." Both the
district court and the court of appeals concluded that the decision to reject
Valentine was based upon race." This race-conscious choice, however, was
made in deference to the University's affirmative action plan." Under Bakke,
before such a plan can be adopted, there must be a finding by an appropriate
governmental body of a previous constitutional or statutory violation. 32
Federal courts have the competency to make such findings" and the District
Court for the District of Columbia had made a finding that the Arkansas higher
education system was not in compliance with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. 34 Consequently, the adoption of some type of race-conscious remedy
by Arkansas was permissible.
The court then turned to decide whether the particular plan adopted by
Arkansas was constitutionally permissible. A race-conscious affirmative action
plan was held by the Eighth Circuit to be substantially related to remedying
past discrimination." Being so related, it would be permissible, according to
the court, under the equal protection clause if its implementation results or is
designed to result in the hiring of a sufficient number of minority applicants so
that the racial balance of the employer's workforce approximates roughly, but
does not unreasonably exceed, the balance that would have been achieved ab-
sent past discrimination." In addition, the court observed, the plan should en-
dure only so long as it is reasonably necessary to achieve its legitimate goals,"
should not result in hiring unqualified applicants," and should not completely
bar whites or otherwise invidiously trammel their interests. 39
The court then applied its test to the University's affirmative action plan.
Under the University's plan, twenty-five percent of new faculty hired over a
four year period were to be black." This plan, it was hoped, would serve to
raise the number of black faculty members to five percent of the total Univer-
sity faculty.'" Since the University attracted its students from an area that was
'I' Id. at 505.
29 Id. at 507. "[T]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
3° Valentine, 654 F.2d at 507. This finding was made despite the University's assertion
that Valentine was rejected because she was overqualified.
31 Id.
32 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265.
" See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Ed. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 419-20 (1977); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of. Ed., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
34 Adams v. Richardson, 356 F. Supp. 92, 94 (D.D.C. 1973).
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one quarter black, these goals were held to be substantially related to the legiti-
mate purpose of the plan. 42
 That is, in the court's view, the number of minority
applicants hired under the plan would not lead to minority participation
beyond that which would have been achieved absent past discrimination. In
addition, the four year period contemplated for the plan was held not to exceed
the time substantially necessary for the accomplishment of the plan's
purpose." The court then determined that the plan did not lead to the hiring of
unqualified applicants, inasmuch as the person hired instead of Valentine was
fully qualified.** Furthermore, according to the court, the plan did not in-
vidiously trammel the interests of white employees since it neither required
white employees to be fired to make room for black applicants, nor required
white employees to be deprived of employment rights or benefits already
earned." Also, since it was intended under the plan to hire minority applicants
for only twenty-five percent of the available positions, it could not be said there
was an absolute bar to the hiring of whites for faculty positions." Thus, the
University's plan was narrowly tailored to serve its constitutionally permissible
end.*'
The standard adopted by the court in Valentine seems to be drawn largely
from Justice Brennan's majority opinion in United Steelworkers v. Weber." Weber,
however, involved an alleged violation not of the equal protection clause, but of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." It might intuitively seem difficult to
appreciate that standards of review under the Constitution would be derived
from standards already adopted under a statute. Rather, one might expect a
different standard to be applied to decisions of the government if they are to
withstand scrutiny under the equal protection clause. In fact, employer's deci-
sions have been scrutinized in the past more carefully under Title VII than
under the Constitution. 5 ° Thus, by adopting the same or a similar test under
both the Constitution and Title VII, the standard of review under the Consti-
tution is perhaps being raised.
There is a clear advantage to adopting a similar standard for determining
the permissibility of affirmative action plans under both the equal protection







 443 U.S. 193 (1979). In Weber, Justice Brennan did not actually attempt to "define
in detail the line of demarcation between permissible and impermissible affirmative action
plans." Id. at 208. He did, however, note that a plan should not "invidiously trammel" the in-
terests of white employees. Id. The plan also should not require the discharge of white workers
and their replacement with black hirees, or pose an absolute bar to the hiring or advancement of
whites. Id. Each of these criteria are part of the court's test in Valentine.
48 Id. at 200.
5° For instance, in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), the Court held a test ad-
ministered to applicants by the Washington, D.C. police did not violate the equal protection
clause merely because it had a disproportionate negative impact upon blacks. Id. at 237. Rather,
a violation of equal protection required proof of discriminatory intent. Id. at 240. Title VII,
however, proscribes employment practices that are merely discriminating in operation. Griggs v.
Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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clause and Title VII. Part of the court's purpose in adopting the test in Valentine
is to prevent employers from being subject to inconsistent obligations." Where
an employer has no affirmative action plan he risks liability to blacks and the
cutoff of federal funds. Where, however, the employer adopts such a plan, he
risks liability to whites. Thus, if a court adopts a clear standard for determining
the permissibility of affirmative action plans, employers can structure their
plan accordingly and avoid such inconsistent obligations. Where, however,
both Title VII and the Constitution apply (i.e., state action exists), the prob-
lem would be much greater if different standards existed under the different
bases of liability. This would be especially true if the standard were clear under
one prohibitive provision and 'not under the other. The employer might struc-
ture his plan along the lines of the clear standard, and yet still turn out to be
liable to a reverse discrimination plaintiff, if the unclear standard turned out to
be higher. The court seems to have tried to avoid this situation by equating the
standards for permissibility of affirmative action plans under the equal protec-
tion clause, where the Supreme Court had offered virtually no guidance, with
those under the Title VII, where the Court in Weber had offered at least some
guidance. Thus, even where an employer is subject to both provisions, he can
structure an affirmative action plan that will allow him to avoid inconsistent
liability.
After Valentine, a state in the Eighth Circuit can, by taking certain precau-
tions, establish an affirmative action plan which will be permissible under the
equal protection clause (and since the standard is derived from Weber, perhaps
under Title VII as well). The stated goal of the hiring plan should be related to
the minority population in what might be called the relevant population group.
This could be the area population as in Valentine," or perhaps the minority
population in the local workforce. Secondly, a plan should avoid the suggestion
of permanence, but rather, have a planned existence for a specific limited term.
In Valentine, for instance, the fact the plan was to exist for only four years led
the court to hold it was to exist only as long as reasonably necessary for the ac-
complishment of its purpose. Thus, rather than establishing plans with longer,
perhaps more realistic terms, an employer would be wise to use short term
plans which can be extended if unsuccessful. Third, the plan should not lead to
the hiring of any obviously unqualified minority applicant. Fourth, the plan
should not completely bar whites from vacancies. Finally, the plan should not
require that any white employees be fired or deprived of employment benefits
already earned. Where these steps are followed, employers in the Eighth Cir-
cuit can adopt affirmative action plans which will wii hstand scrutiny under the
equal protection clause.
2. Setser v. Novak
In the companion case to Valentine v. Smith, Setser v. Novak Investment Co. ,"
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit established standards for deal-
" 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 522.
52 Id.
55 638 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 615 (1982), reheard en bane, 657
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ing with challenges under section 1981 to affirmative action plans adopted by
private employers." The Supreme Court in Steelworkers of America v. Weber" had
earlier addressed a similar challenge brought under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 56 In Weber, the employer entered into a collective bargain-
ing agreement with a union which contained, among other provisions, an af-
firmative action plan designed to eliminate the disparity between the percent-
age of minority workers in the skilled craft workforce and the percentage of
minority workers in the employer's workforce as a whole. 57 The plan reserved
for black workers fifty percent of the openings in an in-plant craft-training pro-
gram until the percentage of black craft workers equalled the percentage in the
workforce as a whole." During 1974, the first year the program was in opera-
tion, of the thirteen workers chosen, seven were black." The most senior black
worker selected for the program had less seniority than several white workers
whose bids for admission were rejected." Thereafter, one of the rejected white
applicants brought an action alleging that the program violated sections 703(a)
and (d) of Title VII. 6 '
The Weber Court, however, held the employer's plan did not violate the
statute. 62 The Court noted that Title VII, on its face, prohibits discrimination
on the basis of race in the allocation of employment benefits, 63 and that the
statute has been held to prohibit discrimination against whites as well as
minorities." In so holding, however, the Court specifically reserved the ques-
tion of whether a racial preference that discriminates against whites adopted as
part of an affirmative action program was permissible under Title VII."
In deciding whether such plans could be permissible, the Weber Court
looked to the legislative history of Title V11. 66 The purpose of the statute
according to the Court was not only to remove barriers to participation by
blacks in American economic life, but to promote measures that would allow
blacks to move out of their traditional role in the economy as unskilled workers
and into "jobs with a future." 67 Inasmuch as voluntary activity by private
F.2d 962 (1981).
54 Id. at 1143-44.
" 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
'6 42 U.S.C.	 2000(e)-2(j) (1976).
57 Weber, 443 U.S. at 197-98.
58 Id.
5g Id. at 199.
6° Id.
61 Id. at 199-200. 42 U.S.C. 5 2000(e)-2(a) (1976) reads in relevant part:
it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer —
(I) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual . . . because of such individual's race.
62 Weber, 443 U.S. at 199.
" MacDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Trans. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976). See also, Griggs
v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971) (where Title VII was held to prohibit a discrimina-
tory preference for any (racial) group minority or majority).
64 MacDonald, 427 U.S. at 281 n.8.
65 Id.
66 Weber, 443 U.S. at 201-04.
67 Id. at 202-03.
December 1982] 	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW 	 179
employers was one means to accomplish this end, the Court felt that Title VII
could not be interpreted as an absolute prohibition of all forms of private race-
conscious affirmative action." The Court thus held permissible the employer's
plan in Weber. 69
In so holding, however, the Court declined to define the line of demarca-
tion between permissible and impermissible plans." It did, however, imply
that a plan would be impermissible if it invidiously trammelled the interests of
white employees,'" required the discharge of white workers and their replace-
ment with new black hirees, 72 or created an absolute bar to the advancement of
white employees." In addition, the Court seemed to find it important that the
plan was a temporary measure, designed only to last until the percentage of
black workers in the employer's skilled labor force was equal to the percentage
in the labor force as a whole." Thus, after Weber, private voluntary affirmative
action is sometimes permissible under Title VII.
Although Weber did not attempt to give a complete answer as to when a
given plan would be permissible, it did provide some reasonably helpful
guidance. Weber, however, provided no answer as to the permissibility of af-
firmative action plans under statutes other than Title VII forbidding racial dis-
crimination in employment. In addition, neither Weber nor any other Supreme
Court decision has attempted to establish what a plaintiff must show to succeed
in a "reverse discrimination" suit, or the extent to which a defendant may rely
upon an affirmative action plan as a defense.
In the Survey year, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit addressed these questions in Setser v. Novak Inv. Co.. 75 In Setser, a white
male was refused employment and subsequently brought an action under 42
U.S.C. 1981. 76 Although section 1981 on its face relates to racial discrimina-
tion in the making and enforcement of contracts," federal courts, including the
Supreme Court, have long recognized that the statute provides a remedy for
discrimination in private employment." Section 1981 and Title VII have been
recognized as providing independent avenues of relief." Whether, therefore,
affirmative action plans are permissible under a given statute, the question
68 Id. at 204.






75 638 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 615 (1982).
76 Id. at 1139.
77 42 U.S.C. 1981 (1976) reads in relevant part: "All persons within the jurisdiction
of the U.S. shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts
. . as is enjoyed by white citizens. . . . "
78 Johnson v. Railway Express Agency Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975); Waters v. Wisconsin
Steel Works of Int. Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970).
79 Johnson v. Railway Express, 421 U.S. at 460. This independence between the post
Civil War statutes and the civil rights statutes of the 1960's was recognized in Jones v. Alfred
Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 416-17 n.20 (1968).
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resolved in Weber under Title VII, needs also to be answered under section
1981
In Sesser, the court reasoned that by approving race-conscious affirmative
action plans under Title VII in Weber, the Supreme Court implicitly approved
them under section 1981. 80 The court noted that, as in Weber, the purpose of
the statute involved, to improve the social and economic situation of blaCk
Americans, meant it should not be used to prevent an effective remedy for past
discriminatory employment practices." In addition, the court noted that in
fashioning a body of substantive principles under section 1981, courts should
look to principles created under Title VII in order to avoid undesirable con-
flicts." Thus, the court held standards for permissible affirmative action plans
under section 1981 should be identical to those under Title VII." Were the
standards to be different, an employer might be prevented by section 1981
from adopting a plan to remedy a past discriminatory practice that violated Ti-
tle VII. Thus, such discrimination might be "locked in" to the system." Fur-
thermore, the adoption of identical standards for each of the statutes obviates
the possibility of an employer incurring inconsistent obligations." Private
employers already face a dilemma when adopting affirmative action plans,
since the plan may be impermissibly drawn, thus creating liability to whites. If,
however, they adopt no such plan, the possibility exists of liability to blacks.
Divergent standards for determining the permissibility of plans under different
statutes would, in the court's view, exacerbate this dilemma." Therefore, the
court in Setser adopted the same standard for determining the permissibility of
affirmative action plans under either statute. 87
The court then set out what each party mustestablish in order to prevail in
a section 1981 or Title VII reverse discrimination suit. The employer must first
come forward with "some evidence" that its affirmative action program was a
response to a conspicuous racial imbalance in its workforce." This can be
established by showing that either a governmental body or the employer itself
made a finding of the existence of such a conspicuous racial imbalance." The
employer must then produce some evidence that its plan is reasonably related
to its remedial purpose." To do so, the plan should comply with the criteria
established in Weber. Under these criteria, the plan should be temporary, have
a numerical goal for minority hiring related to the minority population in a
relevant workforce, should not require the discharge of white workers and their
8° Setser v. Novak Inv. Co., 657 F.2d 962, 966-67 (1981). The case when originally
heard did not address this question directly. 638 F.2d 1137. It was, however, re-heard en bane and
reversed in part. 657 F.2d 962 (1981).
a' 657 F.2d at 967.
82 Id. at 967 n.5.




87 See supra note 80.
ee Setser, 657 F.2d at 968.
89 Id.
9° Id.
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replacement with blacks, and should not create an absolute bar to the hiring of
whites." Courts are admonished to be flexible in determining if plans are per-
missible in order that employers will not be subject to inconsistent
obligations." Once a plan is established as legitimate, the employer need only
show that the treatment of plaintiff was a consequence of the plan to be entitled
to judgment as a matter of law." Thus, the race-conscious choices made to im-
plement a legitimate affirmative action plan are themselves legitimate.
The plaintiff, if he or she is to prevail, must show either that some reason
other than a remedial reason motivated the plan, or that the plan adopted
unreasonably exceeds its remedial purpose." This could be done, the court
points out, by showing that the plan was adopted in the absence of a conspicu-
ous racial imbalance in the employer's workforce. 95 Plaintiff must also establish
to the satisfaction of a jury that the decision not to hire him or her was not the
result of some legitimate nondiscriminatory purpose." Thus, plaintiff can only
prevail where he or she can show that the employer's plan is not legitimate, and
that his or her treatment was a consequence of the plan and not some legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason.
This standard might seem rather harsh on prospective plaintiffs. When
Sesser was first heard by the court of appeals, plaintiff was held to a lower stand-
ard in establishing his cause of action." Under the lower standard, where a
white applicant could be told that but for his race he would be employed, the
court would find an absolute preclusion of whites." Such an absolute preclu-
sion is a violation of either Title VII or section 1981. 99 The existence of an af-
firmative action plan could be raised by the employer as an affirmative
defense.'°° The court recognized this created the possibility of liability on the
employer's part if he either did or did not institute a plan.'°' Nonetheless, in its
view, to allow a plan to serve as an absolute defense to a reverse discrimination
suit would be allowing a license to discriminate.' 02 In the court's view, a re-
jected white applicant should be able to challenge the plan as invalid or, if
valid, as invalidly applied.'"
Under this scheme, a plaintiff who is rejected in the implementation of a
legitimate plan can still prevail in a section 1981 action. The court wisely
rejected this upon rehearing en banc. If affirmative action plans are to exist as a
remedy for past discrimination, then some race-conscious choices have to be






97 638 F.2d 1137, 1143 (8th Cir. 1981).
99 Id.
99 443 U.S. at 208.
"° 638 F.2d at 1145.
'°' Id.
102 Id. at 1143-44.
103 Id. at 1145.
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made. To allow every white applicant rejected as a result of such a plan, where
the plan was permissibly drawn under the criteria previously enunciated, to
show the invalidity of the plan by his mere rejection, would put an end to af-
firmative action. The interests of white applicants are sufficiently protected by
the court's later opinion, which allows a successful challenge under section
1981 and Title VII where the plan itself can be shown to be impermissible.
The court's opinion is also to be praised for equating standards for the
permissibility of an affirmative action plan under section 1981 with those under
Title VII. An employer, therefore, can structure a plan and be confident that it
will withstand challenge under both statutes.'" Were the standards different
from each other, it is possible an employer could devise a plan permissible
under one statute, which might be fatally framed under the other. This
underscores the advantages of the court's adopting a Weber-type standard to
determine the permissibility of affirmative action plans in Valentine. The same
standard is to be applied to a plan in determining if it withstands all three likely
challenges. After Valentine and Setser, an employer in the Eighth Circuit can
structure a voluntary affirmative action plan along the lines enunciated in
Weber confident it will withstand all likely challenges.
B.* Another Limitation on National League of Cities:
United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road Co.'
The Railway Labor Act' (RLA) was enacted in 1926, after more than fifty
years of federal regulation of the railroads.' Drafted jointly by representatives
of the railroad unions, the RLA establishes a framework for collective bargain-
ing between all interstate railroads and their employees.* In the Act Congress
gave all interstate railroad employees the right to organize and bargain collec-
tively.' To assist in the resolution of disputes between the railroads and their
employees, Congress also created a series of intricate procedures which in-
cluded hearings before the National Railroad Adjustment Board, 6
 and the Na-
tional Mediation Board' as well as detailed guidelines for arbitration. 8
 These
104 See supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
By Sheree Ung, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
102 S. Ct. 1349 (1982).
2
 45 U.S.C. 55 151-164 (1981).
' See 102 S. Ct. at 1355 n.13. Federal authority over the railroads began before the first
transcontinental railroad was completed. See Pacific Railroad Act of 1862, 12 Stat. 489. The first
comprehensive federal regulation was enacted in 1887. Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379
(1887).
102 S. Ct. at 1355.
45 U.S.C.	 152 (1976).
6 45 U.S.C. 5 153 (1976).
45 U.S.C. 5 154 (1976).
8 45 U.S.C. 55 157-159 (1976).
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complex procedures 9 were enacted to help achieve one of the primary goals of
the RLA — avoidance of disruptions in rail service."
The RLA which explicitly covered privately-owned railroads, was first
help applicable to state-owned railroads in California v. Taylor." In Taylor, the
Supreme Court noted that other federal statutes regulating interstate railroads
and their employees had consistently been held to apply to publicly
(state)-owned railroads despite a lack of explicit language referring to state-
owned carriers.' 2 Furthermore, the Court commented that the RLA was a
comprehensive statute that may be obstructed by state action as well as by the
actions of individuals." The Taylor Court therefore held that a state subjects
itself to congressional regulation of its employment relationships through the
commerce power when the state engages in interstate commerce by rail."
Thus, according to the Court, the state's authority is subordinate to the con-
gressional power to regulate interstate commerce, even when the state acts in
its sovereign capacity in operating a railroad."
In its landmark 1976, National League of Cities v. Usety" decision, the
Supreme Court again looked at federal regulation of employment relationships
9 In 1981, Congress made these procedures even more drawn out for disputes between
publicly-owned commuter rail lines and their employees. 45 U.S.C. 5 159a (1981). The Supreme
Court in United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. R. Co. summarized the new process:
The law now provides for a "cooling-off period" of up to 240 days after failure of
mediation. Any party to the dispute, or the Governor of any State through which
the rail service operates, may request appointment of a Presidential Emergency
Board to investigate and report on the dispute. If the dispute is not settled within
60 days after creation of the Emergency Board, the National Mediation Board
must hold a public hearing at which each party must appear and explain any
refusal to accept the Emergency Board's recommendations. The law then requires
appointment of a second Emergency Board at the request of any party or Gover-
nor of an affected State. That Emergency Board must examine the final offers sub-
mitted by each party and must determine which is the most reasonable. Finally, if
a work stoppage occurs, substantial penalties are provided against the party refus-
ing to accept the offer determined by the Emergency Board to be most reasonable.
102 S. Ct. at 1357 n.21,
'° See California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, 566 (1957). The purposes of the RLA also are
set forth in 45 U.S.0 5 151a (1976):
The purposes of the chapter are: (1) To avoid any interruption to commerce or to
the operation of any carrier engaged therein; (2) to forbid any limitation upon
freedom of association among employees or any denial, as a condition of employ-
ment or otherwise, of the right of employees to join a labor organization; (3) to
provide for the complete independence of carriers and of employees in the matter
of self-organization to carry out the purposes of this chapter; (4) to provide for the
prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules, or
working conditions; (5) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all
disputes growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of
agreements covering rates of pay, rules or working conditions.
Id.
" California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, 560 (1957).
' 2 Id. at 562.
" Id. at 566.
" Id. at 568.
" Id.
16 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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in state-owned service organizations." National League of Cities involved the con-
stitutionality of commerce clause-based congressional efforts to regulate the
wages and hours of state employees. 18 The Court held that the Constitution
limited congressional power to regulate commerce under the commerce clause
by prohibiting the exercise of that power in such a way as to take from states the
ability to make decisions essential to their existence as states. 19 The Court
based its decision in part on the tenth amendment and in part on a more
general notion of federalism." The Court also established standards for deter-
mining when congressional regulation of states was invalid. 2 '
During the Survey year, in United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail
Road Co. , 22
 the Supreme Court addressed whether a state's operation of com-
muter rail lines fell within the range of activities immune from federal regula-
tion under the National League of Cities doctrine. According to the Court, if the
operation of the commuter rail lines was included within the sphere of func-
tions traditionally regulated by the states or was an activity considered essential
to a state's separate and independent existence, then federal regulation of
employment relations through the RLA might be deemed inappropriate if
other criteria set out in National League of Cities were met." In United Transporta-
tion Union, the Court confirmed that the regulation of railroads, including corn-•
muter lines, was within the category of traditional federal functions." Thus,
federal regulation of employment relations between the state-owned railroad
and its employees was not precluded by the tenth amendment or the more
general federalism concerns discussed in National League of Cities; the commuter
lines were subject to the provisions of the RLA."
The respondent in this Survey case, Long Island Rail Road Co. (LIRR),
was a privately-owned carrier until it was acquired by the State of New York in
1966. 26
 The railroad provides both freight and passenger service, although the
vast majority of its business arises from its commuter services to and from NeW
York City." After the acquisition of the LIRR by the State, LIRR continued
to operate under the collective bargaining procedures of the RLA. 28 In 1978,
" Id.
18 Id. at 837.
19 Id. at 842-43, 855.
" Id. at 851. The tenth amendment provides:
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
" These standards recently have been clarified and condensed into a three-prong test
established in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264,
287-88 (1981). See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
22 102 S. Ct. 1349 (1982).
" Id. at 1353. The Court had previously reaffirmed California v. Taylor in National
League of Cities. 426 U.S. at 854 n.18. The Court noted that operation of an interstate railroad
was not an integral part of a state's governmental activities. Id.
24 102 S. Ct. at 1354.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 1351 n.l.
28 Id. at 1331.
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the petitioner, the United Transportation Union (Union), notified the LIRR
that it wished to start negotiations. Collective bargaining began pursuant to the
RLA procedures. 29 A thirty-day "cooling off" period was triggered when the
National Mediation Board released the case from mediation for lack of agree-
ment. 30 RLA procedures 31 permitted the Union to strike at the end of this
thirty-day period.
One day before the expiration of the "cooling off" period, in anticipation
of a challenge by the RLA, the Union sought a declaratory judgment in federal
court." The Union asked that the court decide whether the dispute was
governed by the RLA or by the Taylor Law, a state statute prohibiting strikes
by public employees." The next day, a brief strike ensued. Pursuant to the
RLA, 34 the President of the United States imposed an additional sixty-day
"cooling off" period." A few days before this sixty-day period expired, the
LIRR filed suit in state court, seeking to enjoin the impending strike under the
Taylor Law. 36 Before the state court heard the case, the District Court for the
Eastern District of New York ruled in the Union's action for a declaratory
judgment." The District Court held that the LIRR was within the definition of
a carrier under the RLA" and thus subject to its provisions rather than the
Taylor Law." Declaratory relief was ordered." The District Court also con-
sidered and rejected a National League of Cities doctrine argument that operation
of state-owned commuter railroads was an integral state function and therefore
immune from federal regulation under the RLA.*I
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's holding, and
found that National League of Cities did provide immunity from the RLA. 42 The
court held that transportation of commuters was within the National League of
29 Id.
'° The case had gone through preliminary negotiations and mediation before the Na-
tional Mediation Board without success. Id.
31 Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 156 (1976).
52 102 S. Ct. at 1352.
33 N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAWS 210(1) (1978). The Taylor Law, N.Y. Ctv. SERV. LAW §§
200-214 (1978), also governs collective bargaining by public employees. This law was enacted to
protect the public by assuring "the orderly and uninterrupted operations and functions of
government" through the prohibition of strikes by public employees. See United Transportation
Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 634 F.2d at 25.
34 Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 160 (1976).
" 102 S. Ct. at 1352.
36 The LIRR had responded to the declaratory judgment suit by asserting that there was
no controversy because it did not believe that the Taylor Law applied to the LIRR. Id. at 1352
n.2. After responding to the declaratory judgment suit, however, the LIRR converted to a public
benefit corporation. The LIRR believed that this conversion removed the LIRR from the RLA's
regulation and put it under the provisions of the Taylor Law. Id. at 1352.
" United Transportation Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 609 F. Supp. 1300
(E.D.N.Y. 1980).
38 Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. $ 151 (1976).
'° 609 F. Supp. at 1305.
4° Id. The court permanently enjoined the LIRR from proceeding under the Taylor
Law in state court and enjoined the Union from striking until the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals had reviewed the decision. Id. at 1309.
4 ' Id. at 1306 n.4.
42 United Transportation Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 634 F.2d 19 (1980).
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Cities definition of an integral governmental function, particularly since the
local government could step in to provide the important public service of com-
muter transportation when it was unavailable in the private marketplace."
The court also applied the balancing test of federal versus state interest" pro-
posed by Justice Blackmun in his concurrence in National League of Cities. 45 This
test weighs the state's interest in regulating an activity against the federal in-
terest." If the federal interest is found to be "demonstrably greater" than the
state interest, then federal regulation of an integral state function is ap-
propriate.'" The Second Circuit determined that the federal interest in preserv-
ing the commuter railroad employees' right to strike was not "demonstrably
greater" than the state interest, as expressed in the Taylor Law, of preventing
strikes in order to ensure continuous commuter service."
Reversing the Second Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court, in a
unanimous opinion, held that congressional regulation of labor relations, when
applied to a state-owned passenger railroad, does not impair the State's ability
to carry out its sovereign function. 49 The Court reached this holding by apply-
ing the three-prong test recently developed in Hodel a. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Association, Inc. 50 for evaluating claims under the National League of
Cities doctrine. This three-prong test calls for a showing that the federal' regula-
tion regulates the "States as States," that the regulation addresses matters that
are "attributes of State sovereignty" and that the regulation impairs the state's
ability to "structure integral operations in areas of traditional functions.""
The third prong of the test, the Court noted, was the key to the resolution of the
LIRR's claim of immunity, from federal regulation under the National League of
Cities doctrine." Based on its examination of precedent, the Court found that
the third prong of the test was not satisfied and that "operation of a railroad
engaged in interstate commerce is not an integral part of traditional state ac-
tivities generally immune from federal regulation. . . "53 The status of the
43 Id. at 27, 29. See also infra note 68.
44 Id. at 29.
45 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976) (Blackmun, J:, concurring).
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 634 F.2d at 30.
49 102 S. Ct. at 1354.
'° 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
" In Hodel, the Court stated:
[I]n order to succeed, a claim that congressional commerce power legislation is in-
valid under the reasoning of National League of Cities must satisfy each of three re-
quirements. First, there must be a showing that the challenged statute regulates
the 'States as States.' Second, the federal regulation must address matters that are
indisputably 'attributes of state sovereignty.' And, third, it must be apparent that
the States' compliance with the federal law would directly impair their ability 'to
structure integral operations in areas of traditional functions.'
Id. at 287-88. (Citations omitted).
Meeting the three prongs of the test is not always sufficient to find federal regulation in-
valid, however. In Hodel and United Transportation, the Court noted an override factor of a federal
interest "demonstrably greater" than the state's interest. Id. See infra notes 72-74 and accompa-
nying text.
52 102 S. Ct. at 1353.
53 Id. at 1354.
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LIRR as a passenger railroad, the Court observed, did not warrant a result dif-
ferent from previous holdings by the Court involving freight carriers."
The Court also noted that operation of passenger railroads traditionally
has been a function of private industry rather than of state or local
authorities." Therefore, it observed, states should not be allowed to circum-
vent federal regulation of railroads simply by acquiring them." The Court
pointed out that just as the federal government could not seek to regulate tradi-
tional state functions, the state may not erode federal authority in areas tradi-
tionally subject to federal regulation by assuming functions that were previous-
ly performed by private industry." The Court reasoned that permitting states
to circumvent federal regulations would "destroy the uniformity thought
essential by Congress and would endanger the efficient operation of the in-
terstate rail system. "5a
Moreover, the Court maintained, application of the RLA to the state's
operation of the LIRR was not likely to impair the state's ability to act as a
state or to endanger its separate and independent existence." The Court noted
that the state had acquired the LIAR knowing that it was subject to the RLA
and had operated it under federal regulation for thirteen years following its ac-
quisition. 6° Thus, the state's claims that application of the RLA would en-
danger its separate and independent existence or its ability to make essential
decisions regarding integral governmental functions were unjustified.
The United Transportation Court correctly decided the issue of whether
federal regulation of labor relations through the RLA was appropriate for state-
owned commuter lines. This decision is a logical extension of the Court's
holdings in prior railroad cases. The Court has, in several previous cases, held
that regulation of the railroads is a federal function. 6 ' It even specifically has
held that regulation of employment relations through the RLA was applicable
to state-owned railroads." These past holdings," the long history of federal
regulation of the railroads," and the apparent importance of a uniform
regulatory scheme for railroad labor relations" provide ample justification for
a determination that the regulation of railway employment relations is not
within the range of state activities immune from federal regulation under the
National League of Cities doctrine.
The Supreme Court's decision, however, summarily rejected the Second
Circuit's effort to distinguish past decisions from the instant case on the basis
54 Id. This was particularly true in light of the recent amendment to the RLA applying
to publicly owned commuter rail lines. See supra note 9.
55 Id. at 1354.
56 Id. at 1356.
" Id. at 1355.
" Id. at 1356.
59 Id.
66 Id.
61 Parden v. Terminal R.R. Co., 377 U.S. 184 (1964): California v. Taylor, 353 U.S.
553 (1957); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
62 California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, 568 (1957).
63 See supra note 49.
66 See 102 S. Ct. at 1354.
65 Id.
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that they had dealt with freight carriers rather than commuter railroads. 66 The
Court noted only that operation of passenger railroads, like the operation of
freight carriers, has traditionally been a function of private industry. 67 Even if
the Court had addressed the issue of whether the transportation of commuters
by railroad or other means is an activity immune from federal regulation under
the National League of Cities doctrine, however, the same conclusion would haVe
been reached in this case. The Second Circuit's determination that the regula-
tion of commuter line labor relations was an integral part of the state's govern-
mental activities was based upon a finding that provision of commuter
transportation was an important public service not available in the private
marketplace." Yet, the test as recently articulated by the Court in Hodel, is not
whether the service provided by the state is important to the public, but rather
is the three-prong test derived from National League of Cities. G 9 Clearly, the
operation of the railroad under federal regulation for thirteen years indicates
that federal regulation does not endanger the separate and independent ex-
istence of the state — the third prong of the National League of Cities test — nor
do the facts of this case show that the other two prongs of the test are met.
Thus, federal regulation of commuter railroads is justifiable. Whether federal
regulation of other forms of commuter transportation is appropriate was not an .
issue in this case.
United Transportation Union was not the first case to establish the three-
prong test for National League of Cities claims. In Hodel, the Court first clarified
the National League of Cities decisions by articulating the three-prong test. 7° The
Court also added an over-ride factor" derived from Justice Blackmun's
"balancing test" as proposed in National League of Cities. 72 This over-ride factor
comes into consideration when a state interest has successfully met the re-
quirements of the three-prong test." If there is a federal interest that is
''demonstrably greater" than the state interest, then the state interest is subor-
dinate to the federal interest and federal regulation is warranted." Considera-
tion of Hodel and United Transportation Union indicates the Court's reluctance to
expand the range of activities immune from federal regulation under the Na-
tional League of Cities doctrine. By re-affirming that the tightened requirements
for a new activity to be included among the immune state functions consist of
both the three-prong test and the federal interest over-ride factor," the Court
has suggested that such a classification will not be granted lightly.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Both the nature of the public service and its availability in the marketplace were sug-
gested as parts of the test to determine "integral governmental functions." United Transporta-
tion Union v. Long Island A.R. Co., 634 F.2d 19, 29 (2d Cir. 1980).
69 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
7° 452 U.S. at 287-88. See also supra note 51.
" Id. at 288 n.29.
72
 426 U.S. at 856. See also supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
75 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288
n.29 (1981).
" Id.
" 102 S. Ct. at 1353 n.9.
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There is further support for this inference in the Court's comment that
states may not erode federal authority in areas traditionally subject to federal
regulation:26 This statement appears to cut off one avenue of expansion of the
range of immune interests. At least three ways to expand the category of im-
mune activities may be imagined. Immune activities might include: 1) ac-
tivities traditionally performed and regulated by the states; 2) activities
previously performed by private industry subject to neither federal nor state
regulation and now assumed by the state; 3) activities previously performed by
private industry subject to federal regulation and now assumed by the state. In
United Transportation Union, the Court apparently has ruled out expansion of the
immune functions by the third method. Whether this "erosion of federal
authority" would be prohibited even when a state were forced to assume a
previously private function that was federally regulated" presents an in-
teresting question not addressed by the Court. Certainly, in light of the current
administration's proposals that states assume certain functions now performed
by the federal government,'" such a question may become crucial. If this United
Transportation Union is an indication of the Court's current attitude toward Na-
tional League of Cities, future decisions may very well see a further restriction of
that doctrine.
C.* Employee Free Speech and Agency Shop Agreements: School Commitee of
Greenfield v. Greenfield Education Association'
Section 2(2)2 of the National Labor Relations Act leaves regulation of the
labor relations in state and local governments to the states.' In exercising this
" Id. at 1355.
22 An example of such a situation is the case of a state forced to assume certain public
assistance programs. Many of these programs were handled through the private sector in the
past. Once the government assumed the function of providing public assistance, however, the
programs were subjected to federal regulation. If a state were now forced to assume the function
of providing these programs, the question whether the state would then be required to comply
with all the federal regulations arises.
" The Reagan administration has proposed that the states assume responsibility for
several programs dealing with health, social welfare and education. See, e.g. , N.Y. Times, Mar.
3, 1981, at 1, col. 4.
* By Michael F. Coyne, Staff Member, BOSTON COLI.EGE LAW REVIEW.
385 Mass. 70, 109 L.R.R.M. 2420 (1982).
2 29 U.S.C.	 152(2) (1976).
Section 2(2) states in pertinent part:
The term "employer" includes any person ... but shall not include ... any State
or political subdivision. . . .
29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976). By excluding state governments from the statutory definition, the Act
exempts them from all restrictions imposed on employers in subsequent sections. Id. While there
is no uniform national legislation regulating state employees, most states have enacted legislation
recognizing public sector collective bargaining and other fundamental labor rights. See ZWERD-
LING, The Liberation of Public Employees: Union Security in the Public Sector, 17 B.C. IND. & COMM. L.
REV. 993, 993-94 & n.5 (1976) [hereinafter cited as ZWERDLING, Public Employees].
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regulatory authority, a significant decision made by a state is the selection of
the "shop" model it will authorize for its employees.* One alternative, which
has been adopted by a number of states, 5
 is to authorize the "agency shop"
agreement. Under this arrangement, government employees need not join the
union representing their bargaining unit, but nonetheless must contribute
toward the financial support of that union.°
In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,' the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of such an agency shop arrangement.a Abood dealt with a
Michigan statute° whereby every employee represented by a union — even
though not a union member — could be required to pay to the union a fee
equal to union dues.'° The statute was challenged first on the ground that by
requiring any contribution to unions, it effectively forced dissenting employees
to "join" the union in violation of their first amendment rights to freedom of
association;" and second, on the contention that by compelling payments
which unions used toward political and ideological activities, the statute im-
pinged upon objecting employees' rights to freedom of speech." The Abood
Court held that the Michigan statute could constitutionally compel the pay-
ment of that portion of the agency fee used to finance unions' exclusive
bargaining, contract administration and grievance adjustment activities." The
• The form of the shop agreements authorized by state statute for its public sector
employees will determine to a degree the rights and responsibilities of the individual members of
employee bargaining units. ZWERDLING, Public Employees, supra note 3, at 1004. Thus, once a
bargaining unit selects a union as its exclusive bargaining agent, each employee may be required
to join or to contribute proportionally to the financial support of the union, depending on the
shop model in force. Id. The rationale for allowing any such shop agreement is to ensure the fair
distribution of costs for collective bargaining among all employees who benefit therefrom. Id. at
1004-05. The forms these union security devices have taken include the closed shop, the union
shop and the agency shop. Id. at 1005. The closed shop, which ensured union financial support
by precluding employment of non-union workers, was outlawed by the National Labor Relations
Act. 29 U.S.C. 5 158(a)(3) (1976). The union shop agreement mandates that all bargaining unit
members represented by an exclusive bargaining agent must, within a specified period after com-
mencing work, join the union and pay all dues and initiation fees as a condition of continued
employment. ZWERDLING, Public Employees, supra note 3, at 1006. The agency shop allows
employees the choice of gaining or refusing union membership. Id. at 1007. Employees who
refuse to join the union, however, are still required to pay a fee to the exclusive bargaining agent,
while having no voice in the union's affairs. Id.
5 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. 55 23.40.110, 23.40.220 (1979); HAWAII REV. STAT. 55
89.3, 89.4 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT, 5 34.050 (1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 150E 5 12
(West 1982); MicH. COMP. Laws 5 423.210 (1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.65 (1977);
MONT. CODES ANN. 5 59-1605 (1981); OR. REV. STAT. 55 243.650(10), 243.672(1)(c) (1981);
R.I. GEN. LAWS 55 28-9.3-7, 36-11-2 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 5 1722, 1726 (1966); Wis.
STAT. ANN. 55 111.70, 111.81 (West 1979).
6 See supra note 4. See also Ball v. City of Detroit, 84 Mich. App. 383, 98 L.R.R.M.
3137 (1978), construing, MICH. COMP. LAWS 5 423.210.
7
 431 U.S. 209, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2411 (1977).
" Id. at 211, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2413.
9 1973 Mich. Pub. Acts, No. 25, codified as MICH. COMP. Laws 5 423.210(1)(c).
'° 431 U.S. at 211, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2413.
" Id. at 222, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2416.
12 Id. at 234, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2420.
" Id. at 225-26, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2417, n.10. The Court in Abood rejected the
claim that compelled support of a union is equal to compelled membership. Id. at 217, n.10, 95
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Court also held, however, that the statute could not mandate the payment of
such fees to finance union political activities. 14 The Court noted that its deci-
sion would require difficult line-drawing by courts between permissible and
prohibited agency fees." Because Abood dealt merely with a motion to dismiss,
however, the Court did not have to dwell on what would constitute an ade-
quate remedial scheme if impermissible service fee charges were proved. 16
Nonetheless, the Abood Court in passing did note with apparent approval the
presence of an internal union rebate procedure to facilitate the refunding of im-
properly exacted agency fees."
During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in
School Committee of Greenfield v. Greenfield Education Association" considered more
fully the adequacy of such a rebate procedure in light of Abood's guiding prin-
ciples. While noting Abood's apparent approval of the procedure, the Supreme
Judicial Court in Greenfield refused to read a state statute as mandating that
dissenting employees submit to internal union rebate remedies, and declared
that if the statute were so construed it would run afoul of the free speech prin-
ciples announced in Abood."
The Abood Court's determination that only a portion of the service fee
could be compelled was a result of the Court's recognition of the strong com-
peting interests at issue." The Court reasoned that in fashioning an ap-
propriate remedy once an impermissible service fee was shown, "the objective
must be to devise a way of preventing compulsory subsidization of ideological
activity by employees who object thereto without restricting the Union's ability
L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2414. The Supreme Court noted that it had previously upheld statutes re-
quiring employee financial support of union representatives in the union shop context, id. , and
concluded that those cases were controlling on the issue of agency shop statutes. Id. at 226, 95
L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2417. The Court apparently has not yet addressed the issue of whether a
state statute could in fact require employees to join, rather than merely contribute toward the
financial support of, their bargaining unit representative. Id. at 217, n.10, 95 L.R.R.M. at 2414,
n.10.
14 Id. at 235, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2421.
" Id. at 236, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2421.
16 Id. at 236-37, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2421-22.
" Id. at 240 and n.41, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2423.
" 385 Mass. 70, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2420 (1982).
" Id. at 79, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2425.
20 431 U.S. at 222, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2416. The Abood Court recognized that com-
pelled financial support of labor union representatives involved a balancing between the public
interest and individual first amendment rights. Id. The Court reasoned that the public's interest
in promoting labor peace and stability through effective collective bargaining representation,
funded by a fair distribution of costs to all benefiting employees, validated the statutory require-
ment that all employees contribute toward the union costs for collective bargaining activities. Id.
at 225-26, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2417. Conversely, the Court concluded that an individual's
right to his own beliefs invalidated any statutorily compelled contribution toward a union's
political or ideological activities. Id. at 234-35, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2420-21. "For at the
heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an individual should be free to believe as he will,
and that in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather
than coerced by the State." Id. Thus, the Abood Court established a "two-tiered analysis" in
which infringements of first amendment free speech guarantees were accorded greater protection
than free association rights in the context of compelled financial support of labor unions. Id. at
254, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2428 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
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to require every employee to contribute to the cost of collective-bargaining ac-
tivities."" The Abood Court then implied that an internal rebate procedure, by
which an objecting employee could gain refund of the proportional share of his
service fee charge used by the union for political activities, satisfied these twin
aims." While recognizing the competing interests involved in service fee ap-
portionment, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Greenfield
disagreed with the Abood Court's implied conclusion regarding internal union
rebate procedures. 23 The Greenfield court noted that requiring a dissenting
employee to resort to a union's internal rebate mechanism after payment of the
service fee would work an interim constitutional deprivation of his freedom of
speech. 24
 On the other hand, the state court pointed out, enjoining the collec-
tion of any fee prior to a determination of the appropriate amount would
deprive a union only of a right created by statute and contractual agreement. 25
The Greenfield court's analysis thus contained a subtle alteration in the com-
parative significance accorded to the principles of free speech and labor peace
by Abood. By refusing to require prepayment of the agency fee, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded that on balance, the protec-
tion of individual constitutional rights to free speech must take precedence over
union statutory rights to collective financial support. The adverse impact on
union interests stemming from this subtle shift was mitigated to a degree,
however, by the Greenfield court's conclusion that dissenting employees could
constitutionally be required to pay an initial service fee into an escrow account
pending final determination of an appropriate apportionment".
In Greenfield, two non-union member teachers refused to pay agency serv-
ice fees required by the agency shop clause of the collective bargaining agree-
ment between the School Committee of Greenfield (the committee) and the
Greenfield Education Association (the association). 27 The agency shop ar-
rangement was expressly authorized by state statute." The association
demanded the teachers' dismissal." The committee refused, and the associa-
tion sought arbitration of the dispute pursuant to a bargaining agreement pro-
vision. 3° The committee (joined by the teachers) then brought an action against
21 Id. at 237, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2422. The Court then canvassed the procedural
requirements that any restitutional remedy scheme would have to satisfy. Id. at 238-40, 95
L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2422-23. The Court declared that a dissenting employee could only be re-
quired to pay a fraction of the total union dues equal to the fraction of the total union budget used
for permissible purposes. Id. at 238 and n.38, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2422. Moreover, in lodg-
ing a protest to the use of his service fees for political activities, a dissenting employee need only
manifest a general opposition to any political expenditure. Id. at 240-41, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at
2423. Once such a protest is entered, the burden of proving the validity of the apportionment of
the dissenter's agency fee swings to the union. Id.
22 Id. at 240, n.41, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2423, n.41.
25 385 Mass. at 81 & n.7, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2426.
24 Id. at 83, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2426.
25 Id. at 83-84, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2426-27.
26 Id. at 84-85 & n.9, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2427.
27 Id. at 73, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2422.
28 Id. at 72 & n.1, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2422.
29 Id. at 73, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2422.
90 Id., 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2422.
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the association for declaratory judgment on whether the committee could
dismiss the teachers on the association's demand without violating the
teachers' statutory or constitutional rights." All parties agreed that the
teachers constitutionally could be compelled to pay their proportional share of
the collective bargaining, contract administration and grievance adjustment
expenses. 32 Furthermore, all agreed that the teachers could not be compelled to
support the association's social, political or speech activities." The association
admitted that a portion of the agency fee at issue was used for the latter pur-
poses." The association contended, however, that Massachusetts law required
the teachers to pay the service fee charge set by the union, and then to exhaust
the association's internal rebate procedure before challenging that apportion-
ment before another tribunal." Conversely, the teachers claimed that the in-
ternal rebate procedure for impermissibly obtained service fees violated their
first amendment rights to freedom of speech." The trial court ordered the
teachers to pay the disputed fee into the court and then reported its decision to
the appeals court for further proceedings."
Granting the association's request for direct appellate review, the
Supreme Judicial Court affirmed with modifications the order of the Superior
Court judge. 38 The Greenfield court rejected the association's contention that
Massachusetts law compels full payment of agency service fees and exhaustion
of internal union rebate procedures prior to adjudication of the permissible
amount." The state court noted that the rebate procedure envisioned by the
union would not ensure that the "onus of justification" for the apportionment
of the service fee would "remain at all times on the association."" Further-
more, the court declared that mandating resort to rebate procedures would
work an interim deprivation of the dissenting employees' opportunity to
engage in expressive activities with those funds, while forcing them to subsidize
temporarily the ideologically objectionable activities of the union.'" The court
reasoned, therefore, that if the state statute in question did mandate prior
recourse to internal union rebate procedures, the statute would be constitu-
tionally suspect." The Greenfield court avoided striking down the state law,
31 Id. at 71, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2421.
" Id. at 78, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2424.
" Id., 109 L.R:R.M. (BNA) at 2424 (citing, Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S.
209, 95 L.R.R.M. 2411 (1977)).
34 385 Mass. at 78, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2424.
35 Id., 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2424.
35 Id. at 78-79, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2424.
" Id. at 71, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2421. The trial court also granted summary judg-
ment to the committee on certain other issues, and denied the association's motions for summary
judgment. Id., 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2421. The trial court's action in reporting its decision to
the appeals court was done pursuant to , a state procedural rule allowing such certifications after
verdicts or findings of fact. MASS R. Civ. P. 64, 365 Mass. 831 (1974).
38 385 Mass. at 71, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2421.
39 Id. at 79, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2425.
" Id. at 82, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2426. The Greenfield court in this regard was ap-
parently referring to the procedural requirements for a valid remedial scheme set out in Abood. See
supra note 19.
41 385 Mass. at 84, 190 L.R,R.M. (BNA) at 2426.
42 Id. at 79, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2425.
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however, by tailoring its construction of the statute to meet the constitutional
constraints announced in Abood." The Greenfield court found that the language
of the challenged statute was permissive only, and did not require that an inter-
nal rebate procedure, once set up, must be employed by objecting employees in
the first instance." Rather, the court deemed the state statute only to impose a
duty on unions to create rebate procedures by which an objecting employee
may challenge his service fee charge. 45 The court then concluded that the
statute affords a dissenting employee the option of filing a prohibited practice
complaint before the state Labor Relations Commission." The Court declared
that in considering such a complaint the Commission would then determine the
appropriate amount of the disputed fee. 47 Furthermore, the Greenfield court de-
cided that the commission could require the objecting employee to pay the
challenged service fee into an escrow account." Finally, the court charged the
Commission with the duty of giving prompt attention to service fee complaints,
and called upon the agency to adopt procedures for prompt preliminary
delivery to the union of that portion of the fee clearly payable. 49 The court then
remanded the case to the Superior Court with orders to enter declaratory judg-
ment consistent with its holding, and to transfer the disputed fee, which was on
deposit with the trial court, to the state Labor Relations Commission. 5°
The Greenfield court's determination that mandating recourse to internal
union rebate procedures would be constitutionally suspect was essentially a
policy determination. The Abood opinion, while mentioning the rebate
mechanism, expressly refused to consider whether that procedure would
safeguard dissenting employees' first amendment free speech rights. 5 ' Hence,
the Greenfield court's conclusion that the procedure would infringe free speech
rights resulted from its consideration of the delicate balance of interests at
issue." The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's analysis focused upon
the source of the competing interests it was weighing." The high court then
concluded that because the employees' free speech right sprang from the Con-
stitution, it took precedence over the union's right to financial support, which
was based on statute and contractual agreement." The Greenfield court's
reasoning apparently did not take into account the fact that the Supreme Court
43 Id. at 79-80, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2425.
" Id. at 81, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2425.
43 Id. at 85, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2427. In conformity with the procedural re-
quirements laid down in Abood, see supra note 19, the Greenfield court declared that once a general
objection to the use of service fee proceeds toward any ideological activity by a union is voiced,
the burden of proving the accuracy of the service fee's apportionment between collective bargain-
ing and ideological expenses would swing to the union. Id., 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2427.
45 Id., 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2427.
'" Id., 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2427.
48 Id., 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2427.
49 Id, , and n.9, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2427.
5° Id. at 85, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2427.
31
 431 U.S. at 242, n.45.
32 385 Mass. at 85, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2427.
33
 Id. at 84, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2426-27.
" Id., 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2426-27.
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in Abood, weighing unions' statutory rights to financial support against dissent-
ing employees' constitutional rights to freedom of association, concluded that
that constitutional guarantee could be overshadowed by the legislatively
created right. 55 The Greenfield court's holding nevertheless is consistent with
Abood because it recognizes the Supreme Court's placement of free speech
guarantees on a higher tier of protection than associational rights in the context
of service fee disputes. 56 Thus, the Abood ruling that free speech rights prevailed
over the state's interest in securing labor peace and stability was construed by
the Greenfield court to mean that even temporary infringements of the freedom
of speech to facilitate union financial support cannot be allowed."
Whether Abood demands the Greenfield extension of free speech protection
in the apportionment of service fees to temporary deprivation, however, is a
close question. Other state courts, considering the balance between union
financial support rights and employee free speech guarantees have reached the
opposite conclusion, holding that dissenting employees must pay the initial
service fee to the union pending determination of the permissible amount. 58
Recognizing Abood as controlling on the issue, these courts construe that prece-
dent to allow the temporary deprivation of free speech rights." A court's deci-
sion on the validity of mandating employee recourse to internal union rebate
procedures will therefore turn on the relative importance placed on the com-
peting interests of union stability and free speech by a court. In Greenfield, the
Massachusetts high court deemed the guarantee of the dissenting employees'
freedom of speech to be the paramount consideration, and thus construed the
state statute to impose no burdens on that right."
The Greenfield court, however, did recognize the significance of ensuring
continued employee collective-bargaining representation, and tailored its
remedial scheme to minimize the decision's adverse impact on unions." By
disallowing the collection of service fees from objecting employees prior to
determination of the appropriate amount, the state supreme court noted that it
was depriving the association of both the amount in dispute and the amount to
which the union was clearly entitled. 62 Moreover, the: Greenfield court noted that
its refusal to allow pre-determination fee collection was in apparent conflict
55 431 U.S. at 225-26, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2417.
See supra note 20.
37 385 Mass. at 85, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2426-27.
58
 See, e.g., White Cloud Educ. Ass'n v. White Cloud Bd. of Educ., 101 Mich. App.
309, 319 (1980); Browne v. Milwaukee Bd. of School Directors, 83 Wisc.2d 316, 335-40, 98
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2574, 2581 (1978); Association of Capitol Powerhouse Engineers v. State, 89
Wash.2d 177, 188 (1977).
59 See, e.g., White Cloud Educ. Ass'n v. White Cloud Bd. of Educ., 101 Mich. App. 309
(1980). Significantly, the Michigan appeals court in While Cloud, while agreeing that the Abood
Court considered free speech guarantees paramount, ordered the initially determined service fee
paid, and declared that free speech rights were adequately safeguarded by state statutes affording
immediate access to declaratory judgments. Id. at 319. Thus, in its balance of the competing in-
terests involved in agency shop fees, the White Cloud court implicitly deemed union rights to sup-
port to weigh more heavily than free speech rights.
48 385 Mass. at 85, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2427.
fit Id., 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2427.
62 Id. and n.9, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2427.
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with Supreme Court rulings on the use of injunctive remedies in fee collection
disputes. 63 The Greenfield court declared, however, that the injury to the union
could be minimized, and the conflict with prior Supreme Court rulings avoided,
by requiring the objecting employees to pay the disputed service fee into an
escrow account." The Greenfield court declared that the state Labor Relations
Commission could constitutionally require such escrowing pending that agen-
cy's determination of the permissible fee amount." By escrowing the chal-
lenged service fee, the Greenfield court reasoned that delivery to unions of the
permissible portion could be more quickly effected once the Commission's
determination was made, thus shortening the duration of the union's depriva-
tion." The Massachusetts high court also called on the state agency to adopt
procedures to aid in the prompt determination of fee disputes, including an im-
mediate preliminary procedure to return the undisputed portion of the service
fee to the union. 67 The state court concluded that by escrowing the challenged
fees, and establishing procedures for prompt determination and delivery of the
permissible amount, the free speech rights of objecting employees would be
protected without "allowing an association to be 'crippled by nonaccess to that
portion of the fee which will be used for collective bargaining, contract ad-
ministration and grievance adjustment. ' "68
The Greenfield court's determination that dissenting employees could con-
stitutionally be required to pay the disputed service fee into an escrow account
is somewhat at odds with its conclusion that free speech rights are paramount
over union support rights. As noted by the court, mandatory payment of serv-
ice fees to finance union political or ideological activities is unconstitutional not
only because it forces the support of objectionable speech, but also because it
hinders dissenting employees' ability to finance the expression of their own
views." The court recognized that internal rebate procedures would force
dissenting employees to support objectionable union ideological activities tem-
porarily, and concluded that such procedures would be constitutionally
63 Id. at 84, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2427, citing, Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v.
Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 119-20, 53 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2128, 2134 (1963). The Greenfield court noted
that the Supreme Court in Allen had rejected the use of the injunctive remedy against fee collec-
tion because it was too damaging to the union. 385 Mass. at 85, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2427.
The Greenfield court thus implicitly recognized that by denying pre-determination fee collection, it
was effectively enjoining that collection in contravention to Allen. Id., 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at
2427.
84 Id. at 84-85, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2427. While the Greenfield court did not detail
who would be responsible for the administration of the escrowing process, the court did declare
that the account must be "neutral." Id., 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2427. This requirement of
neutrality was apparently meant by the court to reject the result sought by the association in its
effort early in the controversy to force the dissenting employees to pay the disputed fee into an
escrow account under its control. Id. at 73, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2422. Thus, the Greenfield
opinion appears to require that the escrow account be controlled by the state Labor Relations
Board pending determination by that agency of the appropriate amount.
69 Id. at 85, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2427.
88
 Id., 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2427.
67 Id. and n.9, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2427.
68 Id. at 85, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2427, quoting, White Cloud Educ. Ass'n v. White
Cloud Bd. of Educ., 101 Mich. App. 316, 319 (1980).
69 385 Mass. 84, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2426.
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suspect." The Greenfield court did not note, however, that by requiring dissent-
ing employees to pay the challenged fee into an escrow account, those
employees would be deprived in the interim of the ability to finance the expres-
sion of their own views. The Greenfield opinion initially accorded equal
significance to both aspects of infringement of free speech rights by impermissi-
ble service fee charges. 7 ' Sensitive to the competing interests involved,
however, the Supreme Judicial Court apparently concluded that only depriva-
tions of free speech by the compelled interim support of objectionable union
political activities could be avoided.
For the practitioner, the Greenfield opinion is significant as a demonstration
of the difficult balancing necessitated by the competing interests present in
establishing remedies for the apportionment of service fee charges. The interest
in protecting free speech rights from even temporary deprivations swayed the
Greenfield court to enjoin the collection of any service fees prior to determination
of permissible amounts." Conversely, the interest in ensuring continued finan-
cial support of the employee collective bargaining representative swayed the
court to conclude that the challenged fee could be escrowed by the state Labor
Relations Commission pending consideration of the appropriate fee. That
these conflicting interests forced the Greenfield court into an inconsistent posi-
tion with regard to the interim deprivation of employee free speech rights" is
evidence of the fine line drawing required. Other courts, faced with a similar
line-drawing dilemma, could well and reasonably exercise equal discretion and
reach a contrary result. 74
VII. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A. Liberal Construction of the National Labor Relations Board's Procedural
Regulations: Livingston Powdered Metal, Inc. v. NLRB' and Kessler Institute
for Rehabilitation v. NLRB'
Pursuant to section 156 of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act), 3
the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) has the authority to pro-
mulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act. 4
7° Id. at 79, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2425.
7 ' Id. at 84, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2426.
72 Id. at 83-84, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2426-27.
73 Id, at 85, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2427.
74 See supra text accompanying notes 70-71.
By Douglas G. Verge, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
669 F.2d 133, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2457 (3d Cir. 1982).
2 669 F.2d 138, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2461 (3d Cir. 1982).
3 29 U.S.C.	 156 (1976).
4 Id. Section 156 provides in pertinent part that "the Board shall have authority from
time to time to make, amend, and rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the provisions of this subchapter." Id.
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One regulation, section 102.121 of Title 29 of the Code of Federal
Regulations,' directs the Board to construe its regulations liberally to effectuate
the purposes and provisions of the Act. 6 Despite this regulation mandating
liberal construction of its rules and regulations, the Board in some cir-
i cumstances has urged narrow, restrictive interpretations of its regulations.'
During the Survey year, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals on two occa-
sions reviewed Board determinations in which restrictive interpretations of its
regulations were advanced. In Livingston Powdered Metal, Inc. v. NLRB, 8 the
Board propounded a narrow construction of its regulations relating to the late
filing of an answer to a complaint. 9 Similarly, in Kessler Institute for Rehabilitation
v. NLRB,'° the Board advanced a rigid, restrictive interpretation of its regula-
tion relating to the granting of a three-day time extension for filing responses to
notices or other pleadings served by mail." Criticizing the Board's narrow and
inflexible interpretations of its regulations," the Third Circuit in both cases re-
jected the Board's construction of its regulations." The court instead adopted a
liberal construction of the Board's procedural regulations."
1. Livingston Powdered Metal, Inc. v. NLRB"
Under section 102.20 of Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations," an
answer to a complaint must be filed within 10 days from the service of the com-
plaint." This regulation, however, authorizes the regional director to exercise
discretion to extend the time within which an answer must be filed." This
29 C.F.R. 5 102.121 (1981).
Id. Section 102.121 states that the rules and regulations in this part shall be liberally
construed to effectuate the purposes and provisions of the act." Id.
E.g., Kessler Institute for Rehabilitation v. NLRB, 669 F.2d 138, 140, 109
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2461, 2462 (3d Cir. 1982); Livingston Powdered Metal, Inc., 669 F.2d 133,
135, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2457, 2459 (3d Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Zeno Table Co., Inc., 610 F.2d
567, 568 (9th Cir. 1979).
8
 669 F.2d 133, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2457 (3d Cir. 1982).
9 Id. at 135, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2459.
'° 669 F.2d 138, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2461 (3d Cir. 1982).
" Id, at 140, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2462.
" See Kessler Institute for Rehabilitation v. NLRB, 669 F.2d 138, 141, 109 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2461, 2464 (3d Cir. 1982); Livingston Powdered Metal, Inc. v. NLRB, 669 F.2d 133,
137-38, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2457, 2461 (3d Cir. 1982).
" Kessler Institute for Rehabilitation v. NLRB, 669 F.2d 138, 141, 109 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2461, 2463-64 (3d Cir. 1982); Livingston Powdered Metal, Inc. v. NLRB, 669 F.2d 133,
137, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2457, 2459 (3d Cir. 1982).
14 See Kessler Institute for Rehabilitation v. NLRB, 669 F.2d 138, 141, 109 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2461, 2463-64 (3d Cir. 1982); Livingston Powdered Metal, Inc. v. NLRB, 669 F.2d 133,
136-38, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2457, 2459, 2461 (3d Cir. 1982).
" 669 F.2d 133, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2457 (3d Cir. 1982).
16 29 C.F.R. S 102.20 (1981).
17 Id. That section provides in pertinent part:
The respondent shall, within 10 days from the service of the complaint, file an
answer thereto .. All allegations in the complaint, if no answer is filed shall
be deemed to be admitted to be true and shall be so found by the Board, unless
good cause to the contrary is shown.
Id.
" 29 C.F.R $ 102.22 (1981). That section provides: "Upon his own motion or upon
proper cause shown by any other party, the regional director issuing the complaint may by writ-
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regulation then states that if an answer is not filed on the due date, the allega-
tions stated in the complaint will be deemed admitted as true, absent a showing
of "good cause" to the contrary."
Despite the "good cause" standard set out in section 102.20, the Board
has urged that the Act" expressly provides for the late filing of answers, and re-
quires a higher standard than mere "good cause. "" Section I0(e) of the Act,
deemed by the Board to control in late filings of answers, states that a court
shall not consider an objection not urged before the Board, unless the failure or
neglect to urge such an objection is excusable due to "extraordinary cir-
cumstances. "22 In 1979, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit rejected the Board's contention that extraordinary circumstances must be
shown in order to excuse the late filing of an answer," and determined instead
that good cause will excuse the untimely filing of an answer."
During the Survey year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit aligned itself with the Ninth Circuit on the appropriate standard
governing late filings of answers. 25 In Livingston Powdered Metal, Inc. v. NLRB, 26
the Third Circuit held that the less stringent standard of "good cause," rather
than the "extraordinary circumstances" test that applies to failure to file ex-
ceptions, governs the late filing of an answer." Moreover, the court held that
where the answer mailed on the last day of the designated period set out a
meritorious defense to very serious charges and where permission to file it
would not have delayed the previously scheduled hearing, the circumstances
constituted good cause to allow the pleading to be filed." In its holding, the
Livingston court noted that in instances where "wooden and unreasoning in-
sistence upon technical procedural rules" results in injustice, rather than in the
proper disposition of the cause, a failure to take remedial measures constitutes
an abuse of discretion."
The dispute in Livingston arose when the NLRB General Counsel served a
complaint upon Livingston Powdered Metal, Inc. (Livingston), alleging that
the company had violated sections 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act. 3° Livingston
ten order extend the time within which the answer shall be filed." Id.
19 29 C.F.R, 5 102.20 (1981). See supra note 17,
20 29 U.S.C. 5 160(e) (1976). This section provides in pertinent part: "No objection
that has not been urged before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, shall be considered by
the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objections shall be excused because of extraor-
dinary circumstances." Id.
21 See, e.g., Livingston Powdered Metal, Inc. v. NLRB, 669 F.2d 133, 135, 109
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2457, 2459 (3d Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Zeno Table Co., Inc., 610 F.2d 567, 568
(9th Cir. 1979).
22 29 U.S.C.	 160(e) (1976). See supra note 20.
23 See NLRB v. Zeno Table Co., Inc., 610 F.2d 567, 568-69 (9th Cir. 1979).
24 See id. at 569.
25 See Livingston Powdered Metal, Inc. v. NLRB, 669 F.2d 133, 136, 109 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2457, 2459 (3d Cir. 1982).
26 669 F.2d 133, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2457 (3d Cir. 1982).
" Id. at 136, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2459.
28 Id. at 137, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2461.
29 Id.
'° Id. at 134, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2458. 29 U.S.C. 5 158 (1976) provides in perti-
nent part:
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had operated a production plant in Livingston, Tennessee for several years. 31
Its parent company, Brockway Pressed Metals Company (Brockway) was
located in Brockway, Pennsylvania." The NLRB General Counsel's com-
plaint alleged that Livingston had closed its Tennessee plant and moved its
operation to Pennsylvania in 1980 because the United Automobile, Aerospace
& Agricultural Implement Workers Union (UAAAIWU) had won a represen-
tation election at the Tennessee location during the prior month." The com-
plaint further alleged that Livingston had discharged unlawfully its employees
and had refused to bargain with the elected union representatives."
On the company's failure to answer the complaint by the due date, June
26, 1980, 35 a field attorney for the NLRB General Counsel telephoned the of-
fices of Livingston's attorney in Pennsylvania on several occasions." The
agency's attorney, however, was unable to reach the company's attorney, so he
sent a letter on July 24, stating that a motion for summary judgment might be
filed by the Board if an answer was not forthcoming."
In a July 31, 1980 letter to the Board, Livingston's attorney requested an
extension for filing the answer to Monday, August 11, 1980." The Board, in a
letter dated August 6, 1980, agreed not to seek summary judgment if the com-
pany filed an answer no later than August 11, 1980." Livingston then forward-
ed an answer to the Board on August 11, 1980, which was not received until
August 18, 1980. 40 The company also sent copies of the answer on August 11,
1980 to the union's offices in Nashville, Tennessee' which were delivered on
August 13, 1980. 42 On the day the answer was received by the Board, the
regional attorney submitted a motion for summary judgment." The next day
he acknowledged receipt of the answer and requested and received from the
company four additional copies.** The Board then issued a show cause
notice." The company replied that it was not responsible for the mail delay
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer —
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guarantee in Section 157 of this title; .. .
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization: .. .
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,
subject to the provisions of Section 159(a) of this title.
Id.
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and noted that the union in Tennessee had received the letter and copies of the
answer even before the General Counsel's office had begun preparation of the
motion for summary judgment." Moreover, the company stated that the
plant's closing was compelled by financial losses, not union representation,
and that it had ceased to be an operating manufacturer at all locations. 47
On December 5, 1980, the Board determined that Livingston had failed to
show good cause for its failure to file the answer by August 11, 1980 and, as a
result, the allegations of the complaint were considered to be true." According-
ly, Livingston was ordered to reopen its Tennessee plant; reinstate the
employees, and bargain with the union over the plant closure, wages, and con-
ditions of employment.° Livingston hired new counsel and filed a motion for
reconsideration. 50 Livingston contended that the default should be set aside
because its former counsel had a small, rural law office and had never handled
an administrative appeal such as the instant one. 51 Livingston also asserted
that, as a result of the August 6, 1980 telephone conversation with the field at-
torney, its own attorney was led to believe that time was not of the essence and
that August 11, 1980 was not an absolute deadline." Additionally, an affidavit
by Livingston's president stated that the plant was closed because of financial
losses and pressures applied by lending institutions, and that if the Board's
orders were carried out, Livingston would become bankrupt and Brockway,
the parent company, would also suffer dire financial, effects."
The Board denied the motion for reconsideration on March 17, 1981,
stating that the motion was "without merit. " 54 Livingston petitioned the Third
Circuit for review of the Board's denial, and the Board cross-appealed for en-
forcement." The Board contended that it did not abuse its discretion in grant-
ing the default judgment and that Section 10(e) of the Act precluded judicial
review." In contrast, Livingston maintained that the Board's action was ar-
bitrary and capricious, depriving Livingston of a fair hearing, and that good
cause was shown for the delay in filing the answer."
Holding that the "good cause" standard of section 102.20 governed the
late filing of an answer in Board proceedings," the Third Circuit indicated that
" Id. These points substantially mirrored arguments previously made by the company
in an April 1980 letter to the Board. Id. At the time the 1980 letter was sent, the Board was in-
vestigating charges by the union similar to those presented in the instant case. Id. at 134 & n.1,
109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2458 & n.l.
47 Id. at 134, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2458.




52 Id., 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2458-59, Livingston also submitted an affidavit aver-
ring that its answer was delayed because of the death of the father of its legal counsel. Id., 109






'a Id. at 136, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2459.
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it agreed with the Ninth Circuit's decision in NLRB v. Zeno Table Co." on this
issue. 6° The Third Circuit reiterated the Zeno court's determination that the
purpose of the good cause standard " 'is to ensure that the Board makes deci-
sions on the merits despite technical and inadvertent noncompliance with pro-
cedural rules.' "51 The Livingston court agreed with the Ninth Circuit that the
"extraordinary circumstances" test applied to the failure to file exceptions, not
to the late filing of an answer." The Livingston court observed that Section 10(e)
was intended to prevent matters which had never been presented to the Board
for its consideration from being raised by a litigant in the courts. 63
 The court
noted that since Livingston had brought the matter to the Board's attention,
the Board had had an opportunity to rule on the question. 64
 Recognizing that
the statutory purpose had therefore been served, the Third Circuit rejected the
Board's contention that Section 10(e) barred review of the case."
Turning to the Board's contention that a pleading mailed on the day for
filing is always late because it would not reach the Board by the end of the
business day, the Livingston court noted that an answer would be accepted if
mailed before the filing date, even though it might arrive late. 66 The court in-
dicated that the equities of the instant case were strongly in favor of acceptance
of the answer even though it was not mailed until the due date of the extension
period." The Livingston court ascertained that the Board's action, although
nominally a summary judgment, was actually a default." The court observed
that the possibility of an injustice occurring was much greater in cases of
default, as opposed to summary judgments, because defaults are decided upon
a procedural technicality rather than a ruling on the merits." Accordingly, the
court of appeals indicated that more exacting judicial scrutiny was required in
a default case."
59 610 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1979).
60
 669 F.2d at 136, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2459.
6 ' Id. at 135, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2459 (quoting NLRB v. Zeno Table Co., Inc.,
610 F.2d 567, 569 (9th Cir. 1979)).
62 Id.
63 Id. at 136, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2459.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. For example, in NLRB v. Marshall Maintenance Corp., 320 F.2d 641 (3d Cir.
1963), the company's attorney deposited the company's exceptions to a Board Trial Examiner's
order in a mailbox which had a scheduled pickup time that would ensure that the exceptions were
delivered to the Board on time. Id. at 641-42. The exceptions, however, were delivered one day
late, because the mail had been picked up earlier than scheduled. Id. at 641-42. The Board re-
jected the exceptions as being untimely filed. Id. On appeal the Third Circuit denied the Board's
petition for summary entry of a decree enforcing its order, holding that the mail pickup before
schedule, thereby causing the company's exceptions to be delivered late, constituted "extraor-
dinary circumstances" under Section 10(e) of the Act. Id. at 645.
67
 669 F.2d at 136, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2459-60. Indeed, the court said that these
equities were stronger than those present in Marshall Maintenance. Id.
66 Id. at 136, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2460. The court noted that in a summary judg-
ment proceeding there is no dispute about the relevant facts. Id. The court explained that in a
default, however, the ex parte allegations of the adversary are accepted as true; the defendant's
contentions are not considered. Id.
69 Id.
7° Id. The court observed that the interests of a litigant in an administrative proceeding
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The Livingston court recognized that it was reluctant to permit the final
disposition of a substantial controversy by default." It further acknowledged
its past caution that, since the interests of justice are best satisfied by a trial on
the merits, matters with significant amounts at stake should not be determined
by default judgment if it can be reasonably avoided. 72 Moreover, the court
observed that in cases of default judgments, "two questions must be con-
sidered: (1) whether there would be prejudice to the plaintiff, and (2) whether a
meritorious defense had been asserted by the defendant."'" The court
reiterated its prior holding that a standard of liberality, rather than strictness,
should be applied in answering those questions, and that the favored policy of
deciding cases on their merits dictated that any doubt should be resolved in
favor of setting aside the judgment. 74 Additionally, the court of appeals noted
that whether the defendant willfully caused the default was also a relevant fac-
tor."
Dealing with the willfulness factor first, the court determined that Liv-
ingston did not intentionally or willfully cause the default." The court ex-
plained that although Livingston's attorney, Ferraro, did not provide represen-
tation which was as diligent as is normally expected, there were countervailing
points to be considered." The Third Circuit stated that the Board should have
given some weight to both Ferraro's inexperience in Board cases and the
disruption of his practice caused by his personal problems."' The court of ap-
peals also observed that there was nothing in the record suggesting that Ferraro
was " 'a chronic late filer or a promoter of vexations and dilatory pro-
ceedings.' '' 74
Discussing next the question of prejudice to the plaintiff, the Livingston
court ascertained that the ultimate resolution of the case on the merits would
not have been delayed by the late filing of the answer." The court indicated
that the hearing date recited in the complaint was October 20, 1980. 8 ' The
court of appeals recognized that a continuance of the hearing would not have
been required simply because the answer was not filed until August 8, 1980. 82
deserve as much protection as the interests of a litigant in a district court proceeding. Id. The
court further stated that the standard for opening default judgments should not be less demand-
ing in agency cases than in district court cases, especially when an injustice might otherwise
result. Id.
n Id. at 136, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2460 (quoting Hutton v. Fisher, 359 F.2d 913,
916 (3d Cir. 1966)).
72 Id. at 136-37, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2460 (quoting Tozer v. Charles A. Krause
Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1951)).
" Id. at 136, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2460.
" Id. (quoting Medunic v. Lederer, 533 F.2d 891, 894 (3d Cir. 1976)).
75 Id.
" Id. at 137, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2460.
" Id.
78 Id. The court noted that "lack of expertise is not uncommon among general practi-
tioners who have little opportunity to participate in administrative proceedings." Id.
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Moreover, the court observed that Livingston had not requested any such con-
tinuation . 89
The court determined, however, that the most compelling factor in the
case was that Livingston had been barred from presenting what appeared to be
a meritorious defense potentially sufficient to prevent imposition of the broad
remedy decreed." The Third Circuit noted that the Board had not challenged
Livingston's assertion that it was forced to close its plant because of business
losses and pressures from creditors." The court emphasized Livingston's con-
tention that the prescribed remedy would have drastic consequences for it and
its parent company, threatening the job security of its unionized work force in
Brockway. 86 Moreover, the Livingston court stressed the fact that Ferraro's
April 1980 letter gave General Counsel notice that Livingston did not close its
Tennessee plant for anti-union reasons." The court noted that the Board was
not likely to inspire confidence in its proceedings by ignoring such contentions
already in its files and instead entering a default judgment." Additionally, the
court of appeals noted that the United States Supreme Court's recent holding
in First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 89 that an employer is not required
to bargain with a union about a partial closing of a business, would have to be
considered when the Board reviewed the merits."
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals suggested that the sweeping remedy
applied by the Board in Livingston may be acceptable when justified by an ac-
tual violation, but was questionable when precipitated simply by Livingston's
attorney being one business day late in mailing an answer." The court recog-
nized that the Board's heavy caseload burdens required reasonable compliance
with time limitation and procedural rules." Nevertheless, the court indicated
that rigid insistence upon adherence to technical procedural rules could result
in injustice." Accordingly, the Livingston court denied the petition for enforce-
ment, granted the petition for review, and remanded the case to the Board for a
hearing on the merits."
The Livingston court's determination that the good cause standard, rather
than the extraordinary circumstances standard, applies to the late filing of
answers in Board proceedings, is consistent with the Board's policy of liberally
construing its rules and regulations to effectuate the purposes and provisions of
the Act." Indeed, the language of section 120.20, governing the filing of
83 Id.
9+ Id.




89 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
90 669 F.2d at 137, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2460-61.
9  Id., 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2460.
92
 Id., 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2461.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 138, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2461.
95 See 29 C. F.R. S 102.121 (1981). That section provides: "The rules and regulations in
this part shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purposes and provisions of the act." Id.
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answers, indicates that the good cause standard should apply. 96 Additionally,
the good cause standard appears to be "less stringent" than the extraordinary
circumstances test regulating the application of section 10(e) of the Act." The
purpose of section 10(e) is to let the Board hear a labor problem first so that a
reviewing court will have the benefit of the Board's expertise in reviewing the
Board's decision." The purpose of the good cause standard, however, is to
make certain that the Board decides cases on the merits as opposed to decisions
based upon careless or unintentional noncompliance with procedural rules. 99
Courts, therefore, should favor a trial on the merits over a procedural device
which would unfairly or unnecessarily prevent such a determination.'"
2. Kessler Institute for Rehabilitation v. NLRB"'
National Labor Relations Board (the Board) regulations grant an
automatic three-day time extension for filing responses to notices or other
pleadings served by mail.'" This three-day extension provision is somewhat
ambiguous because the language of the regulation relating to certain computa-
tions is susceptible to two different interpretations.'" Thus, when the original
period for filing a response ends on a weekend or a holiday, it is unclear
whether the three days are to be added to the last day of the initial period, even
if the last day falls on a weekend or a holiday, or whether the three days must
	96 See 29 C.F.R. 5 102.20 (1981). That section provides in pertinent part: " 	 All
allegations in the complaint, if no answer is filed ... shall be deemed to be admitted to be true
... unless good cause to the contrary is shown." Id.
" NLRB v. Zeno Table Co., Inc., 610 F.2d 567, 569 (9th Cir. 1979).
913 Id.
99 Id.
10° Keegel v. Key West & Caribbean Trading Co., Inc., 627 F.2d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
A liberal standard should be applied in considering a motion to set aside a default.
Medunic v. Lederer, 533 F.2d 891, 894 (3d Cir. 1976). Since the interests of justice are most ap-
propriately satisfied by a trial on the merits, a court should refuse to open default judgments only
after a careful examination of all considerations. Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 190
F.2d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1951). If the reviewing court is uncertain as to whether to set aside the
default judgment, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the petitioner. Id.
'°' 669 F.2d 138, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2461 (3d Cir. 1982).
102 29 C.F.R. 5 102.114(a) (1981). This section provide; in pertinent part:
In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, the day
of the act, event, or default after which the designated period of time begins to run,
is not to be included. The last day of the period so computed is to be included,
unless it is a Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end
of the next day, which is neither a Sunday nor a legal holiday. When the period of
time prescribed or allowed is less than 7 days, intermediate Sundays and holidays
shall be excluded in the computation 	 (A) Saturday on which the Board's of-
fices are not open for business shall be considered as a holiday 	 . Whenever a
party has the right or is required to do some act or take some proceeding within a
prescribed period after service of a notice or other paper upon him, and the notice
or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed
period. . .
Id. The National Labor Relations Board's authority to issue such regulations is found in 29
U.S.C. 5 156 (1976). See supra note 4.
103 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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be added to the last day of the "prescribed period," which under the regula-
tions ends on the next day which is neither a weekend nor a holiday.'" The
particular construction adopted could make the difference between the filing of
a timely response or the entry of a default judgment.
Despite the potential for controversy created by this ambiguity, no federal
court decision prior to the Survey year case of Kessler Institute for Rehabilitation v.
NLRB 1 ° 5 had interpreted the time extension regulation.' 06 In Kessler, the Third
Circuit considered the proper interpretation of the three-day time extension
provided for in section 102.114(a) of Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regula-
tions.'" The court unanimously held that the correct construction of the
Board's regulation required that the expiration date for the "prescribed
period" must first be fixed, with due allowance for its holiday and weekend ex-
clusion, and only then should the three-day extension be calculated.'" The
court thereby adopted a construction of the time extension language which
gives a party the additional benefit of the weekend and holiday exclusions.'"
Kessler revolved around efforts by the Jersey Nurses Economic Security
Organization of the New Jersey State Nurses Association to represent the
nurses employed by the Kessler Institute for Rehabilitation."° On November
8, 1977, a petition for election was filed and on January 27, 1978, balloting
took place." Kessler, however, contended that the Association was not a bona
fide labor organization because the Board of Directors of its parent entity in-
cluded statutory supervisors.'" Board proceedings were instituted prior to the
election and continued until the time of the Kessler decision." 3
On August 21, 1979, the Board referred the case to a hearing officei for a
supplemental report. 114 The Board's order granted both parties the right to file
exceptions to the report with the Board in Washington, D.C. within ten days
from the date the report was issued." 3 The hearing officer's report, which was
mailed on December 26, 1979, 116 reiterated the Board's directive that any ex-
ceptions to the report should be filed within ten days. 1 " Kessler's counsel
received the report on December 28, 1979. 18
104 See supra note 102.
1 °5 669 F.2d 138, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2461 (3d Cir. 1982).
106 Discussion of section 102.114(a) by the federal courts, where it has occurred at all,
has not involved the mail extension provision of the regulation. See, e.g., NLRB v. Preston H.
Haskell Co., 616 F.2d 136, 141 n.14 (5th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline &
Steamship ClerkS, 498 F.2d 1105, 1109 n.4 (5th Cir. 1974).
107 29 C.F.R. $ 102.114(a) (1981).
106 669 F.2d at 141, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2463.
105 See id.
10 Id. at 139, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2462.
III Id.
72 Id. The litigation involved matters of representation and unfair labor practices. Id.
"3 Id.
114 Id.
'" Id. The order specifically provided that: " 'within 10 days from the date of issuance
of such report, either party may file with the Board in Washington, D.C., eight copies of excep-
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The tenth day after the report was issued was Saturday, January 5,
1980." 9 Kessler mailed its exceptions to the Board in Washington, D.C., and
they were received by the Board on Thursday, January 10, 1980. 120 The
Board's Associate Executive Secretary then wrote to Kessler's counsel explain-
ing that the exceptions were considered late and that the Board would not
entertain them.'" Kessler's appeal to permit filing of the exceptions was re-
jected by the Board on February 4, 1980. 122 On September 15, 1980, the Board
issued a pro forma order adopting the hearing officer's recommendations,
noting that timely exceptions to the hearing officer's report had not been filed
by either party.'" The Board eventually issued its final decision and order
based on the hearing officer's, report, granting the NLRB General Counsel's
motion for summary judgment in the case.' 24
Kessler subsequently appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.'"
In its petition for review, Kessler contended that its exceptions had been timely
filed, and that the court should address the substantive issues involved.'" The
Board cross-petitioned for enforcement, arguing that if the court ruled against
it on the procedural issue, the case should be returned to it for a decision on the
merits in light of Kessler's exceptions.'" The court denied the petition for en-
forcement because it concluded that under a liberal construction of the regula-
tion, the exceptions had been timely filed. ' 28 The court declined to address the
merits, however, and instead remanded the case to the Board for further pro-
ceedings consistent with its opinion.' 29
The central issue in Kessler turned on a determination of the proper con-
struction of the automatic three-day extension of time provision of section
102.114(a)." 0 As the Kessler court noted, the Board contended that the exten-
sion date should be determined by adding three days to the number of days
constituting the initial time period without regard to any weekend days or
holidays falling on the last day of the initial period."' The court observed that,
under this view, three days would be added after the tenth day, which fell on
Saturday, January 5, 1980, thereby making Tuesday, January 8, 1980, the
final day for filing the exceptions. 1 S 2 The court indicated that, Kessler contend-
ed, in contrast, that since the original time period ended on a Saturday, the








"6 Id. Kessler sought a determination of the merits by the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals because it believed that the Board would rule unfavorably upon remand. Id.
127 Id. at 139-40, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2462.
"8 Id. at 141-42, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2463-64.
' 29
 Id., 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2464.
"° Id. at 140, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2462.
121 Id.
' 32 Id.
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determine properly the "prescribed" ten-day period.'" Under this interpreta-
tion, the court explained, the "prescribed period" of ten days did not expire
until Monday, January 7, 1980.' 34
 Thus, the court noted, Kessler argued that
the three days should be added after this date, making the last day for filing the
exceptions Thursday, January 10, 1980, which was the date the exceptions
were in fact received by the Board.'"
Indicating that both interpretations were reasonable, the Kessler court
stated that in most cases it would be inclined to accept the administrative agen-
cy's interpretation of its own regulation. 136
 The court of appeals asserted,
however, that in this instance it was not justified in subordinating its own judg-
ment to that of the Board for two reasons.'" First, the court observed that,
because the language of the Board's rule was almost identical to that found in
various other federal procedural rules,'" the decision in this case would affect
the interpretation of procedural rules in cases outside the Board's
jurisdiction.'" Second, the Kessler court determined that the issue presented
155
 Id., 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2462-63.
"4 Id.
195 Id. , 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2463.
156 Id.
1 " Id.
139 Id. (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (e), FED. R. CRIM, P, 45(a), (e), and FED. R. APP.
P. 26(a), (c)).
FED. R. CD/. P. 6(a) provides in relevant part:
In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by the
local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any applicable statute, the
day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to
run shall not be included. The last day of the period so computed shall be in-
cluded, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event the
period runs until the end of the next day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a
legal holiday. When the period of time prescribed or allowed is less than 7 days, in-
termediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall be excluded in the com-
putation .. .
Id. Section (e) further provides:
Whenever a party has the right or is required to do some act or take some pro-
ceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other paper
upon him and the notice or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be add-
ed to the prescribed period.
Id.
The corresponding language in FED. R. CRIM. P. 45(a), (e) is identical to that noted
above in FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a), (e) except for one minor variation. The first sentence of FED. R.
CRIM. P. 45(a) states: "In computing any period of time the day of the act or event from which
the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included." Id. FED. R. APP. P. 26(a) pro-
vides in relevant part:
In computing any period of time prescribed by these rules, by an order of court, or
by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the
designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the
period shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday or a legal holiday, in
which event the period extends until the end of the next day which is not a Satur-
day, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time prescribed or allowed is
less than 7 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be ex-
cluded in the computation „
Id. Section (c) further provides: "Whenever a party is required or permitted to do an act within a
prescribed period after service of a paper upon him and the paper is served by mail, 3 days shall
be added to the prescribed period." Id.
139
 669 F.2d at 140, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2463.
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was one of law and that the Board's administrative expertise was not involved
in this matter."° The court therefore concluded that deference to the agency in-
terpretation was not warranted."'
•	 The Third Circuit indicated that, while the Board's view of the mail ex-
tension provision, requiring three days to be added to the last day of the
original period, had "the virtue of simplicity" 142 and was supported somewhat
by two state court decisions construing similar language in different procedural
regulations,'" it did not find those cases persuasive.'" The court instead deter-
mined that the purpose of the Board's time extension rule was to give a party
more time to respond to a specific matter when the document containing the
matter is transmitted by mail.'" The court suggested that denying such an
allowance would be tantamount to penalizing a party by allotting him less time
to complete his task when his adversary mails a document to him than he
would have if the document had been personally delivered to him.'"
The circuit court also recognized that an important aspect of the time ex-
tension rule was its emphasis on working days. 14 7 The court observed that
when a time period normally would end on a weekend or holiday, the regula-
tion would require an extension to the next regular business day.'" Also, the
court added that when the time period is for less than seven days, intermediate




' 43 Id. In Wheat State Tel. Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n., 195 Kan. 268, 403 P.2d 1019
(1965), a Kansas district court dismissed the telephone company's application for review of the
State Corporate Commission's orders denying the company's application to take over an aban-
doned telephone service, and allowing another company to do so on grounds that the application
was not timely filed. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the district court,
holding that the Commission's mail extension rule required that the three additional days should
be added on to the original period for the purpose of computation. Id. at 268-72, 403 P.2d at
1020-23. (Emphasis added.)
Similarly, in In re lonfredo's Estate, 241 Minn. 335, 63 N.W.2d 19 (1954), a Minnesota
district court dismissed an appeal filed by the creditors of a decedent's estate on the grounds that
the appeal was not taken within the time prescribed by law. Under the applicable state statute,
the creditors had 30 days to take an appeal. Also, since notice was served on the creditors by
mail, the applicable state civil procedures provided for three days to be added to the prescribed
period. The creditors argued that they had 34 days to file the appeal because the original period
ended on a Sunday and thus the three days should be added to the following Monday. On ap-
peal, the Supreme Court of Minnesota, affirming the district court, held that the creditors had
only 33 days to file the appeal. The three days had to be added to the original period, and since
the last day of the 33-day period did not end on a weekend or a holiday the creditors filed their ap-
peal one day late. Id. at 335-39, 63 N.W.2d at 20-21.
I" 669 F.2d at 140-41, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2463. The court indicated that it
believed that the state courts did not adequately consider the purpose of the extension rule or the




'" Id. The court observed that, in the interest of fairness, the number of working days
assigned to each litigant should be as closely identical as possible. Id.
148 Id.
149 Id. Other holidays also are excluded when the period is less than seven days. See
supra note 102.
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court noted the slow pace of the postal service was an additional factor to con-
sider. 150 Indeed, the court took judicial notice of the delays in the postal system
which have increased over the years.'" These factors, the court determined,
required a liberal construction of the regulation.'"
In addition, the court observed that the Board's restrictive construction of
the three-day extension language did not give Kessler the full benefit of the pro-
vision; 153 the Board's interpretation, the court reasoned, served only to
frustrate the purpose of the rule by diminishing the time allowed to respond. 154
Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded that the proper interpretation of
the provision was the one advanced by Kessler.' 55 The court stated that the
final day of the "prescribed period" must be determined by taking the holiday
and weekend extension into account. 156 Once this determination is made, the
three-day mail extension should be added.'" Having failed to follow this pro-
cedure, the Board erred in refusing to accept the exceptions.'"
Finally, after resolving this procedural issue, the Kessler court refused to
reach the merits of the case.' 59 The court emphasized that a court of appeals
should not engage in the original resolution of issues entrusted to an ad-
ministrative agency. 16° Accordingly, the court concluded that the Board should
render a decision on the merits after a full consideration of Kessler's excep-
tions.'"
The Third Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in Kessler is significant in
several respects. Read narrowly, the court's decision stands for the proposition
that the three-day mail extension provided in section 102.114(a) must be added
to the prescribed time period only after such period has first been determined
by taking weekends and holidays into account. 162 This interpretation of the
regulation is significant because it provides a party with more time to respond
when the final day of the initial period is a weekend or a holiday. In a broader
context, this decision indicates the disposition of the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals to closely scrutinize the Board's decisions when they rest upon purely
i'a 669 F.2d at 141, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2463.
" I Id. The court noted that; whereas a mailing from Newark to Westfield, New Jersey
previously took only one day, today such dispatch was so rare that the Postal Service charged
premium rates for the overnight service called "Express Mail". Id. The court also noted that
postal delays hindered the work of the judges so badly that an electronic mail system had been in-
stalled. Id. at n.4, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2463 n.4.
' 52 See id. at 141, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2463.
"I Id.
"4 Id. Under the Board's interpretation of the mail extension provision, as a result of
the weekend, Kessler would effectively have only one working day beyond the original ten-day
deadline, rather than three. See id. While the actual time available for Kessler to respond was
shortened by two days as a result of the Board's use of the mail, as compensation Kessler was




"8 Id., 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2464.
"9 Id.
16° Id. at 142, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2464.
161 Id.
162 See Id. at 141, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2463.
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procedural considerations. In such cases, the court is likely to give the Board's
regulations a liberal construction.' 63 In this case, the court favored a construc-
tion of the mail extension language which would give parties responding to
notices or other pleadings the full benefit of the provision.'" Additionally, the
court was wary especially of the effect that its interpretation of the Board's mail
extension provision would have on the construction of the nearly identical
language found in rules and regulations' 66 outside the Board's jurisdiction. 166
The court apparently sought to set a liberal standard for the interpretation of
language similar to that contained in section 102.114(a) in other contexts. The
Kessler decision may indeed provide both precedent and persuasive authority in
this area.
Conclusion
The Livingston and Kessler decisions evidence the Third Circuit's policy in
favor of liberal construction of the Board's rules and regulations. 1 fi 7 Moreover,
the Third Circuit's decision to adopt a liberal construction of the Board's
regulations is consistent with the Board's policy of construing its regulations
liberally. 169 Essentially, the Board should try to interpret procedural rules flex-
ibly to enable it to reach the merits of a case;' 69 it should not use a rigid inter-
pretation of procedural rules to decide a controversy.'" The Board has much
discretion in the resolution of unfair labor practice disputes, but it may not ap-
ply this authority in a way which deprives a party of a fair and adequate hear-
ing. 17' Rigid, inflexible insistence upon procedural rules can sometimes result
in injustice, especially where such procedures preclude a review of a party's
case on the merits. /72 Moreover, where the injustice occurs because of a narrow
1 " See id., 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2463. The court reiterated its dissatisfaction with
the Board's "wooden and inflexible attitude on procedural matters" which the court found to be
"unfortunate" in Livingston Powdered Metal, Inc. v. NLRB, 669 F.2d 133, 109 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2457 (3d Cir. 1982). Id., 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2464.
164 Id., 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2463.
I" See supra note 138.
166 669 F.2d at 140, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2463.
167 See Kessler Institute for Rehabilitation v. NLRB, 669 F.2d 138, 141, 109 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2461, 2463.64 (3d Cir. 1982); Livingston Powdered Metal, Inc. v. NLRB, 669 F.2d 133,
136-38, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2457, 2461 (3d Cir. 1982). See also NLRB v. Marshall
Maintenance Corp., 320 F.2d 641, 645 (3d Cir. 1963).
The Third Circuit reaffirmed its position in National Book Consolidators Inc. v. NLRB,
672 F.2d 323, 326-27, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3035, 3037-39 (3d Cir. 1982). In National Book, the
court of appeals again held that the good cause standard applied to the Board's determination of
whether it should accept an answer filed after the due date. Id. at 326, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at
3037. Moreover, the court held that where the company was "lulled into the belief that a settle-
ment would be acceptable in lieu of an answer," good cause was demonstrated to justify the late
filing. Id. at 327, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3038.
"6 Set 29 C.F.R. S 102.121 (1981). See supra note 6.
169 See NLRB v. Zeno Table Co., Inc., 610 F.2d 567, 569 (9th Cir. 1979).
170 See id.
"' Id.
12 See Livingston Powdered Metal, Inc. v. NLRB, 669 F.2d 133, 137-38, 109
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2457, 2461 (3d Cir. 1982).
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interpretation of procedural rules, failure by the Board to take appropriate
remedial measures may constitute an abuse of discretion.'"
Furthermore, the Board's insistence upon strict compliance with its pro-
cedural rules unnecessarily creates additional cases for already overburdened
courts. " 4 As the Third Circuit noted in NLRB v. Marshall Maintenance Corp.:'"
"the zeal of the Board in demanding inflexible adherence to the strict letter of
the law . . . might well have been expended in a worthier cause. "176 In light of
the clear policy expressed in section 120.121 mandating a liberal construction
of the Board's rules,"' it seems somewhat contradictory that the Board has fre-
quently urged restrictive interpretations of its own regulations."' For better or
worse, it appears that the courts have acquired the task of ensuring that the
Board's rules actually receive such a liberal construction.' 79 The courts ensure
that the Board does not abuse its discretion on such matters.'" Perhaps if the
Board would relax its rigid insistence on technical compliance with its rules, the
burden on the courts would be reduced and overall efficiency in the determina-
tion of disputes would be achieved.
The Livingston and Kessler decisions may induce other federal courts of ap-
peals to construe the Board's regulations liberally so as to give parties the full
benefit of each regulation's provisions.' 8 ' Such a policy is desirable because it
ensures that the Board addresses cases on their merits, rather than disposing of
them summarily because of noncompliance with rigid or narrowly construed
regulations.' 82 Such a judicial outlook will likely lead to continued scrutiny
when the Board's decisions rest on procedural grounds. So long as the Board
chooses to overlook its responsibility to forego procedural resolutions of cases
before it in favor of decisions on the merits, the courts undoubtedly will con-
tinue to review such cases for abuse of discretion by the Board. Perhaps this
continued judicial scrutiny will cause the Board to reassess its inflexible posi-
tion and to overlook minor procedural infractions where a meritorious position
is advanced by the delinquent party.
"3 See id. at 137; 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2461.
"4 NLRB v. Marshall Maintenance Corp., 320 F.2d 641, 645 (3d Cir. 1963).
'" 320 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1963).
16 Id. at 645.
1 " See supra note 6.
18 See, e.g., Livingston Powdered Metal, Inc. v. NLRB, 669 F.2d 133, 135, 109
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2457, 2459 (3d Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Zeno Table Co., Inc., 610 F.2d 567, 568
(9th Cir. 1979).
19 See, e.g., Livingston Powdered Metal, Inc. v. NLRB, 669 F.2d 133, 137-38, 109
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2457, 2461 (3d Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Zeno Table Co., Inc., 610 F.2d 567, 569
(9th Cir. 1979).
188 See supra note 179.
181 Along with the Third Circuit, the Ninth Circuit has also recently recognized the need
for a liberal construction of the Board's regulations. See NLRB v. Zeno Table Co., Inc., 610 F.2d
567, 569 (9th Cir. 1979).
182 See id.




A. * Equitable Modification of Title VII Filing Requirements:
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines'
An individual seeking relief from employment discrimination must file a
claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 2 with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within :180 days of the alleged
discriminatory act. 3 The time limitation for filing the claim insures that the in-
dividual will file his claim promptly and that the employer will be protected
from liability for actions which occurred in the distant past.* Although Title
VII has this time limitation for filing a claim, Title VII fails to indicate what
the consequences will be if an individual does not file within the prescribed
time period.'
Prior to the Survey year, the circuit courts of appeals disagreed about
whether an individual's failure to file within the time limit barred his cause of
* By Anne L. Gero, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
102 S. Ct. 1127 (1982).
2 42 U.S.C. 55 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976). 42 U.S.C. 	 2000e-2(a) (1976) reads as
follows:
It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer —
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. $ 2000e-2(a).
3
 Id.	 2000e-5(e). The statute reads in part:
A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days
after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred and notice of the charge
(including the date, place and circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment
practice) shall be served upon the person against whom such charge is made within
ten days thereafter...
The remainder of the statute provides that if the claim is filed with a state or local agency the
employee has 300 days from the date of the alleged unlawful employment practice to file the claim
with the EEOC.
Title VII originally provided that a claimant had 90 days from the time of the alleged
unlawful act to file his claim with the EEOC. Id. S 2000e-5(d) (1970). The period was extended to
180 days in 1972. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(1972).
Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1980).
The provision of Title VII which grants jurisdiction of Title VII claims to federal
district courts makes no reference to the 180 day filing requirement. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(3)
(1976). The jurisdictional provision reads in pertinent part:
Each United States district court and each United States court of a place sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions
brought under this subchapter. Such an action may be brought in any judicial
district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have
been committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant
to such practice are maintained and administered, or in the judicial district in
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action in all cases. 6
 A majority of the circuits held that the Title VII filing
period was similar to a statute of limitations and therefore was subject to
equitable modification in appropriate cases.' One circuit, the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, held that filing within the time period was a jurisdic-
tional prerequisite and that failure to file in a timely manner barred the claim
regardless of the reason for the delay in filing. 8
 The remainder of the circuits
had not yet decided the issue. 9
During the Survey year, the United States Supreme Court in Zipes v. Trans
World Airlines"' rejected the view that failure to file a Title VII claim within the
prescribed time period will bar the claim in all cases. The Zipes Court held that
the filing period is not a jurisdictional prerequisite and is subject to equitable
waiver, estoppel and tolling." The Zipes decision, therefore, resolves the split
in the circuits and indicates that, under the proper circumstances, failure to file
a Title VII claim within the statutory time limits will not bar the claim.
In Zipes, the plaintiffs were class representatives in a Title VII class action
suit which was brought against Trans World Airlines (TWA) to challenge
TWA's alleged policy of discriminating against women employees." The suit
was initiated in 1970 by a union which represented all flight attendants
employed by TWA." The union alleged that TWA's policy of grounding
female flight attendants who became mothers while allowing male flight attend-
ants who became fathers to continue to fly violated Title VII.J4 The union
which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful
employment practice, but if the respondent is not found within any such district,
such an action may be brought within the judicial district in which the respondent
has his principal office.
Id.
In addition, the provision designating a 180 day filing period for Title VII claims is an
entirely separate provision and does not refer to the jurisdiction of the courts. Id. § 2000e-5(e).
See supra note 3 for the text of the filing provision.
6 See infra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
7 Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1213, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 855, 858 (9th
Cir. 1980); Hart v. J.T. Baker Chemical Co., 598 F.2d 829, 833, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1347, 1350 (3d Cir. 1979); Leake v. University of Cincinnati, 605 F.2d 255, 259, 20 Fair
Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 964, 966 (6th Cir. 1979); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d
429, 475, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1068, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied,. 434 U.S.
1086 (1978); Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 928, 11 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 235, 238 (5th Cir. 1975); Sanchez v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 499 F.2d
1107, 1108, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 627, 628 (10th Cir. 1974).
Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142, 1151, 17 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1513, 1520 (7th Cir. 1978).
9 The First and Second Circuits expressly have reserved deciding the issue. Daughtry
v. King's Dept. Stores, Inc., 608 F.2d 906, 909, 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 333, 335 (1st
Cir. 1979); Smith v. American President Lines, Ltd., 571 F.2d 102, 109, 16 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 712, 717 (2d Cir. 1978). The Fourth and Eighth Circuits have not yet addressed the
issue.
10 102 S. Ct. 1127 (1982).
" Id. at 1132. The Zipes opinion was written by Justice White and was joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, O'Connor, Burger, Powell and Rehnquist on the issue of timely
filing of a Title VII claim. Id. at 1136. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or deci-
sion of the case. Id.
23 Id. at 1129-30.
23 Id. at 1129.
14 Id. at 1129-30.
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therefore brought the suit on behalf of all female flight attendants who had been
terminated from their positions as flight attendants on or after July 1965.' 5
As a result of the suit, TWA changed its policy and made a tentative set-
tlement with the union which was approved by the district court." The Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however, found that the union could not
represent adequately both the present and past employees of TWA.' 7 In 1974,
the district court therefore appointed several women who had been discharged
from TWA upon becoming mothers as class representatives." Once the peti-
tioners had been appointed as class representatives, and five years after com-
mencement of the suit, TWA moved to exclude the petitioners as well as other
class members from the class.' 9 TWA asserted that the petitioners and many
others in the class should be excluded from the class because they had not filed
Title VII claims within ninety days of the termination of their employment by
TWA. 2 °
The district court denied TWA's motion to exclude from the class all in-
dividuals who had not filed charges within ninety days of termination from
TWA. 2 ' In denying the motion, the district court first stated that the Title VII
filing requirements were indeed jurisdictional and therefore were not waived
by TWA's delay in pleading the lack of timely filing as a defense." The district
court maintained, however, that the Title VII violation was a continuing viola-
tion against all the class members which ended only when the airline changed
its employment practice." So characterizing TWA's employment practice as a
continuing violation," the district court held that the filing of the Title VII
claim was timely for all the class members."
15 Id. at 1130 n.I.
The class was composed of female flight attendants terminated after July 1965 since Title
VII's prohibition on sex discrimination became effective on July 2, 1965, one year after the date
of its enactment. 42 U.S.C. 2000e (1976).
1° Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 102 S. Ct. 1127, 1130 (1982).
" Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Ass'n, Local 550 v. American Airlines, Inc., 490
F.2d 636, 643, 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1197, 1202-03 (7th Cir. 1973).
The appeal was brought by several members of the class who contended that the union
which represented them and negotiated the settlement had interests antagonistic to their own. Id.
at 637, 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1197-98.
Airline Stewards and Stewardesses Ass'n, Local 550 v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
No. 70 C 2071, slip op. (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 1974) (mem.).
" Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 102 S. Ct. 1127, 1130 (1982).
2° Id. At the time the suit was filed in 1970, the filing period for a Title VII claim was
within 90 days of the alleged discriminatory act. 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-5(d) (1970). In 1972 the pro-
vision was amended to extend the time limit to 180 days. See supra note 3.
21 Airline Stewards and Stewardesses Ass'n, Local 550 v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
Nos. 70 C 2069 & 70 C 2071, slip op. (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 1976) (mem.).
The district court also granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs and held that
TWA's employment practice violated Title VII. Id.
22 Id.
" Id.
24 For a complete discussion of Title VII and the continuing violation theory see Tide
VII and Continuing Violations, 24 B.C. L. Rev 	 (1983).
Si Airline Stewards and Stewardesses Ass'n v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., Nos. 70 C
2069 & 70 C 2071, slip op. (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 1976) (mem.).
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The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated the decision of the
district court and held that members of the class who failed to file a Title VII
claim with the EEOC within ninety days of their termination by TWA were
barred from the class action. 26 After finding that TWA's policy violated Title
VII," the Court of Appeals rejected the argument that a continuing violation
of Title VII against all members of the class existed until the airline changed its
employment practice." Moreover the Court of Appeals held that filing within
the time period was a jurisdictional prerequisite." The filing requirement
therefore, was not subject to waiver or estoppel because of TWA's failure to
plead untimely filing as a defense in the initial stages of the proceedings. Con-
sequently, class members who had not filed charges within ninety days of being
discharged from TWA, ninety-two percent of the plaintiffs," were barred from
the class and were denied a Title VII claim against TWA. 3 '
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding
that the timely filing of a Title VII claim is not a jurisdictional prerequisite but,
instead, is like a statute of limitations which is subject to waiver, estoppel and
equitable tolling." After noting that the express language of Title VII does not
limit Title VII claims only to cases in which there has been a timely filing," the
Court examined the legislative history of Title VII." Recognizing that the
legislative history of the original enactment was sparse," the Court found in
the history of the 1972 amendment to Title VII" evidence indicating that Con-
gress intended the filing period to operate as a statute of limitations." The
Court referred to the Senate Conference Committee Report on the 1972
amendment which states:
" Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airlines Cases, 582 F.2d 1142, 1150-52, 17
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1513, 1520-21 (7th Cir. 1978).
27
 Id. at 1147, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1517.
28 Id. at 1149, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1518-1519. The court did hold,
however, that the employees who were terminated from their positions as flight attendants and
were reinstated to ground duty positions after their maternity leaves were subject to a continuing
violation and, therefore, were properly included within the class. Id. at 1149-50, 17 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1519. The court reasoned that females who were reinstated to ground posi-
tions were in a continuing employment relationship and were therefore directly subject to TWA's
discriminatory actions. Id. at 1150, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1519.
29 Id. at 1151, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1520.
" Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 102 S. Ct. 1127, 1130 (1982).
31
 Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142, 1150-52, 17
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1513, 1520-21 (7th Cir. 1978).
32
 Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 102 S. Ct. 1127, 1132 (1982). In addition to consider-
ing the issue of whether the Title VII filing period was subject to equitable modification, the
Court considered whether an award of retroactive seniority was appropriate for all members.
The Supreme Court noted that retroactive seniority was generally an appropriate remedy in Title
VII cases and that the district court had found that TWA discriminated against all members of
the class. Id. at 1135. Consequently, the Court affirmed the district court's granting of retroac-
tive seniority to all the class members. Id. at 1136.
" Id. at 1132-33. See supra note 5.
" Id. at 1133.
33 Id.
36
 Se supra note 3.
37
 Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 102 S. Ct. 1127, 1133 (1982).
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This subsection as amended provides that charges be filed within 180 days of
the alleged unlawful employment practice. Court decisions under the pres-
ent law have shown an inclination to interpret this time limitation so as to
give the aggrieved person the maximum benefit of the law; it is not intended
that such court decisions should be in any way circumscribed by the exten-
sion of the time limitations in this subsection."
After examining the legislative history of Title VII, the Court noted that
prior Supreme Court cases also have suggested that the filing requirement is
not jurisdictional. 39 Although several Supreme Court cases had referred to the
filing period as jurisdictional," the Court acknowledged that such language
was dicta and that in subsequent cases the Court had referred to the filing
period as a limitations period. 4 ' The Zipes Court then reviewed several
Supreme Court decisions which indicated that the filing period was not
jurisdictional. 42 First, in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., Inc.," the Court
had held that awarding seniority to unnamed members of a class who had
failed to file a claim with the EEOC was an appropriate remedy in a Title VII
suit." The Zipes Court noted that if the Title VII filing requirement were in-
deed jurisdictional, the Franks Court would not have had the power to award
seniority to the plaintiffs who had not filed with the EEOC. 45 Subsequently, in
Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers," the Court had held that the Title VII fil-
ing period was not tolled when the plaintiff was participating in a grievance
procedure. 47 The Zipes Court emphasized that in Robbins & Myers it had con-
sidered the merits of the argument that the grievance procedure should toll the
filing period." According to the Zipes Court, such consideration of the merits
would have been unnecessary if the filing requirement were indeed a jurisdic-
tional prerequisite."
39 118 CONG. REC. 7167 (1972).
39 Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 102 S. Ct. 1127, 1133-35 (1982).
4° See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973); Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974).
41 Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 102 S. Ct. 1127, 1133 (1982). For cases in which the
Supreme Court referred to the filing periods as a limitations period, see Occidental Life Ins. Co.
v. E.E.O.C., 432 U.S. 355, 371-72 (1977); Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429
U.S. 229, 241, 242 (1976).
" Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 102 S. Ct. 1127, 1134-35 (1982).
" 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
" Id. at 762.
" Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 102 S. Ct. 1127, 1134 {1982).
46 429 U.S. 229 (1976).
47 Id. at 236-40.
4° Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 102 S. Ct. 1127, 1134-35 (1982).
49 Id. at 1135. The Court also cited its opinions in Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522
(1972) and in Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980) as supporting the view that the Title
VII filing period is not a jurisdiction prerequisite. In Love, the Court indicated that the filing pro-
vision of Title VII should not be interpreted literally. Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522, 526-27.
Subsequently, in Mohasco Corp. , the Court dismissed a Title VII claim when the respondent had
failed to file his claim with the EEOC or a state agency within the prescribed period. Mohasco
Corp. v. Silver, 825-26. The Court noted, however, that the respondent "did not exercise the
diligence required by [Tide VII]." Id. at 815.
The Supreme Court opinions have served as signals to several lower courts that the filing
period was subject to equitable modifications. See, e.g., Coke v. General Adjustment Bureau,
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Finally, the Court reasoned that equitable modification of the 180 day fil-
ing requirement would be consistent with the purpose of Title V11. 50
 The
Court noted that equitable modification would further the remedial purposes of
Title VII. 5 ' In addition, the Court emphasized that equitable modification
would not interfere with the purpose of the 180 day filing requirement since it
would continue to insure prompt filing of Title VII claims. 52
The decision of the Supreme Court in Zipes strikes an appropriate balance
between the remedial purposes of Title VII and the desire for a filing require-
ment which will protect employers from discriminatory conduct which oc-
curred in the distant past. Equitable modification of the 180 day filing require-
ment is consistent with the remedial purposes of Title VII. By its very terms,
Title VII was enacted to provide a broad remedy for employment discrimina-
tion." Title VII claims, however, often are filed by individuals who were
unaware of the discriminatory acts of an employer when they first occurred."
Therefore, in order to effectuate the broad remedial purposes of Title VII in
redressing employment discrimination and to avoid penalizing an aggrieved
individual, the 180 day filing period should be flexible. As the Supreme Court
has noted, "technicalities are particularly inappropriate in [Title VII, where]
laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process." 55
Although Title VII was enacted to provide maximum protection against
employment discrimination, Congress imposed timely filing requirements in
order to encourage individuals to file their claims promptly and to protect
employers from liability for acts which occurred in the distant past." Permit-
ting equitable modification of the time period does not undermine these pur-
poses. First, equitable modification will continue to require individuals to file a
Title VII claim as soon as possible. When an individual fails to file a timely
claim as a result of his own lack of diligence, equitable modification will not
preserve his claim." Second, equitable modification of the filing period will not
Inc., 640 F.2d 584, 587-89, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 433, 434-36 (5th Cir. 1981); Hart v.
J.T. Baker Chemical Co., 598 F.2d 829, 833, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1347, 1349-50 (3d
Cir. 1979).
'° Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 102 S. Ct. 1127, 1135 (1982).
51 Id.
52 Id.
" The Conference Report for the 1972 amendments to Title VII provides:
The provisions of [Title VII] are intended to give the courts wide discretion
exercising their equitable powers to fashion the most complete relief possible. „ .
[T]he Act is intended to make the victims of unlawful employment discrimination
whole, . . . the attainthent of this objective requires that persons aggrieved by
the consequences and effects of the unlawful employment practice be, so far as
possible, restored to a position where they would have been were it not for the
unlawful discrimination.
118 CONG. REC. 7168 (1972).
35 E.g., Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 926, 11 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 235, 236 (5th Cir, 1975).
33 Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522, 526 (1972).
56 See supra note 4.
" Lower courts consistently have held that lack of diligence in filing a Title VII claim
will not toll the 180 day period. E.g., Hart v. J.T. Baker Chemical Co., 598 F.2d 829, 834-35, 19
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force an employer to defend an act for which he should no longer be held
responsible. In considering whether to extend the filing period, courts may take
into account the potential prejudice that an employer would suffer in defending
a claim which was not filed within the statutory period." If, however, the
employer had misled the plaintiff as to the reasons for the employer's actions,"
or if the employer had failed to object to an untimely filing at commencement
of the suit, it is unlikely that a court would find an employer unduly burdened
by defending an untimely claim." A proper application of equitable modifica-
tion to the Title VII filing period therefore will insure that an individual who
files his claim in an untimely manner through no fault of his own will have a
Title VII cause of action for employment discrimination while guaranteeing
that an employer will not have to defend a stale claim which is unjustifiably
burdensome.
Although the Zipes Court resolved a split in the circuits by holding that the
Title VII filing period is subject to equitable modification when the employer
fails to raise the defense of untimely filing in the initial stages of the pro-
ceedings, it is unclear what other situations may give rise to an equitable
modification of the filing period. As the Supreme Court has held in Robbins v.
Myers, pursuing an alternative remedy for employment discrimination will not
toll the 180 day period.' In addition, lower courts consistently have held that
when an employer misleads the plaintiff concerning the reasons for the
discriminatory act" or the necessity of filing a timely claim," the filing period
is subject to equitable tolling. It remains uncertain, however, to what extent ill-
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1347, 1350 (5th Cir. 1979).
58 See Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522, 526 (1972); Reeb v. Economic Opportunity
Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 930, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 235, 239 (5th Cir. 1975).
59 In Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
stated:
Secret preferences in hiring and even more subtle means of illegal discrimination,
because of their very nature, are unlikely to be readily apparent to the individual
discriminated against. Indeed, employers that discriminate undoubtedly often at-
tempt to cloak their policies with a semblance of rationality, and may seek to con-
vey to the victim of their policies an air of neutrality or even sympathy. These
tendencies may even extend to the giving of misleading or false information to the
victim .. .
516 F.2d 924, 931, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 235, 240-41 (5th Cir. 1975),
60 As Justice Black stated, "IN]o man may take advantage of his own wrong. Deeply
rooted in our jurisprudence this principle has been applied in many diverse classes of cases by
both law and equity courts and has frequently been employed to bar inequitable reliance on
statutes of limitations." Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 232-33 (1959).
61 429 U.S. 229, 236-40 (1976); see also Bronze Shields v. New Jersey Dept, of Civil
Serv., 667 F.2d 1074, 1084, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 749, 759 (3d Cir. 1981).
62
 See, e.g., Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 930-31, 11 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 235, 240-41 (5th Cir. 1975) (employer sought to mislead plaintiff by in-
forming her that funds were no longer available for her position).
63 See, e.g., Leake v. University of Cincinnati, 605 F.2d 255, 258, 20 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 964, 966 (6th Cir. 1979) (Express statements by employer that if plaintiff gave
employer time to investigate her complaint employer would not raise a statute of limitations
defense).
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ness, 64
 or reliance on incorrect advice from counsel" or from a state officia166
will justify an extension of the filing period.
In the aftermath of Zipes, an individual who believes he has been
discriminated against in employment should continue to file a Title VII claim
as soon as he becomes aware that an employer may have discriminated against
him or else the claim may be barred as untimely. If circumstances existed,
however, which prevented the plaintiff from filing in a timely manner or if the
employer fails to assert the defense of untimely filing in the initial stages of the
proceedings, counsel should argue that an equitable modification of the filing
period is appropriate. Likewise, employers should be on notice that engaging
in conduct which misleads the individual as to the reason for the discriminatory
act or the necessity of filing promptly will not prevent the court from hearing a
Title VII claim which was filed beyond the time period. Finally, after Zipes an
employer must be careful to assert promptly the defense of an untimely filing
otherwise he may be estopped from doing so later in the proceeding.
B. Title VII And Continuing Violations:
Bronze Shields, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Civil Serv.t
In order to bring an employment discrimination claim under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 2
 an individual believing he or she has been
discriminated against must file a claim with the Equal Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC) within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act. 3
 If the claim is
not filed with the EEOC within the 180 day period, the claim will be dismissed
64 See, e.g., Hays v. Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d 1307, 1312, 12 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1654, 1657 (5th Cir. 1976) (illness insufficient to toll filing period under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act).
65
 See, e.g., Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256, 1261, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 12, 16 (10th Cir. 1976) (complaint allowed after plaintiff relied on incorrect advice from
counsel in failing to file a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); McQueen v.
E.M.C. Plastic Co., 302 F. Supp. 881, 884-85, 1 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 796, 798-99
(E.D. Tex. 1969) (plaintiff's court appointed counsel failed to file a Tide VII claim within the fil-
ing period and the application for counsel was found to be sufficient compliance with the filing
period).
66
 Chappell v. Emco Mach. Works Co., 601 F.2d 1295, 1303, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1059, 1065 (5th Cir. 1979) (the promise of a state official that he would file plaintiff's Title
VII claim was not sufficient to toll the statutory period).
• Anne L. Gero, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 667 F.2d 1074, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 749 (3rd Cir. 1981).
42 U.S.C. SS 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
3
 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(e) (1976). The statute reads in part:
A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days
after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred and notice of the charge
(including the date, place and circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment
practice) shall be served upon the person against whom such charge is made within
ten days thereafter. . .
Id.
The remainder of the statute provides that if the claim is filed with a state or local agen-
cy the employee has 300 days from the date of the alleged unlawful employment practice to file
the claim with the EEOC. Id.
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as untimely.' The purposes of the 180 day filing requirement are not only to
guarantee the Title VII rights of individuals who file their claims promptly but
also to protect employers from liability for actions which occurred in the distant
past.'
, For several reasons courts have not rigidly applied the 180 day time limita-
tion of Title VII." First, courts have recognized that a liberal application of the
filing limitation is consistent with the remedial purposes of Title VII and with
the liberal interpretation to be given to all Title VII provisions.' Second, courts
have construed the 180 day limitation liberally to avoid penalizing employees
who are unfamiliar with Title VII filing requirements." The courts' propensity
to interpret the 180 day limitation broadly has led to the development of the
"continuing violation" theory." This theory is based on the notion that a Title
VII violation can occur over a period of time. Courts have found that a contin-
uing violation exists and that the 180 day provision is satisfied if a dis-
criminatory act which occurred prior to 180 days before the filing of a claim
with the EEOC was part of a continuing discriminatory act, pattern, or policy
which extended to within 180 days of filing.'" Thus, if a court finds that a viola-
tion continued into the filing period, the employer's liability under Title VII
will be extended to the first instance of the continuing violation even if it oc-
curred prior to the 180 day filing period."
The Supreme Court has considered the applicability of the continuing
violation theory in two cases. In United Air Lines v. Evans," the Court held that
a seniority system which merely continued the effects of a prior discriminatory
6 See, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 555 & n.4 (1977).
Del. State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1980).
6 See generally Jackson & Matheson, The Continuing Violation Theory and the Concept of
Jurisdiction in Title VII Suits, 67 GEO. L.J. 811, 819-841 (1979).
E.g. , Hart v. J.T. Baker Chem. Co., 598 F.2d 829, 831-32, 19 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1347, 1348-49 (3d Cir. 1979). In addition, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.31 (1981) provides that
the "rules and regulations shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purpose and provisions of
Title VII."
See Jackson & Matheson, supra note 6, at 812 & n.4.
9 The continuing violation theory was first articulated in King v. Georgia Power Co.,
295 F. Supp. 943, 946, 1 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 357, 359 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
Jenkins v. Home Ins. Co., 635 F.2d 310, 312, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 990,
992 (4th Cir. 1980); Reed v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 613 F.2d 757, 760-61, 22 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1049, 1051 (9th Cir. 1980); Acha v. Beame, 570 F.2d 57, 65, 16 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 526, 532 (2d Cir. 1978); Bethel v. Jendoco Constr. Corp., 570 F.2d 1168,
1175, 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 978, 982 (3d Cir. 1978); Cedeck v. Hamilton Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 551 F.2d 1136, 1137, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1571, 1572 (8th Cir. 1977);
Clark v. Olincraft Inc., 556 F.2d 1219, 1222, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 374, 376 (5th Cir.
1977); Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 348, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 211,
223 (10th Cir. 1975); Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d 979, 987, 5 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 994, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289,
290-91, 1 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) 714, 715-16 (7th Cir. 1969).
" See, e.g., Acha v. Beame, 570 F.2d 57, 65, 16 Fair Ernpl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 526, 532
(2d Cir. 1978); Egleston v. State Univ. College at Geneseo, 535 F.2d 752, 755, 12 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1484, 1486 (2d Cir. 1976); Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d
979, 987, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 994, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
" 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
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act did not constitute a continuing violation of Title VII. 13 The Evans Court
established that for a Title VII claim to be timely, a present violation of Title
VII, rather than merely the continuing effects of a past violation, must exist
within the filing period." More recently, in Delaware State College v. Ricks,' 5 the
Supreme Court again considered the application of the continuing violation
theory. In Ricks, the respondent contended that his Title VII claim was filed
timely because the claim was based on a continuing violation of Title VII."
The respondent, a Liberian faculty member at Delaware State College," was
officially notified that the College had denied him tenure." Pursuant to its
customary practice, the College then offered him a one year non-renewable
contract which he accepted.' 9 Two months before the expiration of his con-
tract, the respondent filed a Title VII claim with the EEOC alleging that the
College had discriminated against him by denying him tenure and by ter-
minating his employment at the expiration of the one year contract." In con-
sidering whether the claim was timely, the Court reasoned that since the col-
lege terminated the respondent's contract in the same manner in which it ter-
minated similar contracts," the termination of employment upon expiration of
the contract was not a discriminatory act." The Court maintained that ter-
mination of the contract was merely an inevitable consequence of the denial of
tenure." Referring to Evans, the Court again emphasized that the continuing
effects of a past discriminatory act do not constitute a continuing violation of
Title VII for purposes of extending the 180 day filing requirement." To deter-
mine the timeliness of a Title VII claim, the Ricks Court stated that a court
must "identify precisely 'the unlawful employment practice' of which [the
plaintiff] complains!" 25 Concluding that the only alleged discrimination oc-
curred at the time of the tenure decision, 26 the Court held that the termination
of employment upon expiration of the one year contract was not part of a
continuing violation 27 and dismissed respondent's claim as untimely. 28
" Id. at 557-58.
" Id. at 558. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans,
431 U.S. 553 (1977), lower courts also had found that a continuing violation of Title VII existed
as long as the effects of a discriminatory act which occurred in the past continued to within 180
days of filing with the EEOC. E.g. , Williams v. Norfolk & W.Ry. Co., 530 F.2d 539, 542, 11
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 836, 839 (4th Cir. 1975)..
" 449 U.S. 250 (1980). For a complete discussion of Ricks, see Timely Filing under 5 1981
of Title VII in Denial of Tenure: Delaware State College v. Ricks, 23 B.C. L. REV. 82, 235-45.
16 Del. State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257 (1980).
" Id. at 252.
le Id. at 253 & n.2.
" Id.
2° Id. at 257.
2 ' Id. at 257-58.
22 Id. at 257.
23 Id. at 257-58.
24 Id. at 258.
25
 Id. at 257.
26 Id. at 258.
27 Id. at 259.
29
 Id. at 262. In denying plaintiff's Title VII claim the Court did not decide the exact
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Thus, in Evans and in Ricks, the only two cases in which the Supreme
Court has considered the continuing violation theory, the Court did not find a
continuing violation of Title VII. In neither case, however, did the Court ex-
plicitly reject the continuing violation theory. Rather, the Court merely held
that based on the facts of these cases no continuing violation existed.
During the Survey year, in Bronze Shields, Inc. v. New Jersey Department of
Civil Service, 25 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit relied on the Supreme
Court's decisions in Ricks and Evans to find that the existence of a hiring list
compiled from the results of a discriminatory test given to job applicants did
not constitute a continuing violation of Title VII." The Bronze Shields court
recognized that the creation of the hiring list may have been a discriminatory
act3 ' but noted that the Title VII claim had not been filed with the EEOC
within 180 days of the creation of the list." The Bronze Shields court applied the
Ricks standard stating that it needed to identify the unlawful employment prac-
tice and separate it from the "inevitable, but neutral, consequences" of the
discriminatory practice. 33 Viewing the continuing existence of the hiring list
merely as an effect of the discriminatory creation of the list, the court dismissed
the plaintiffs' Title VII claim. 34 Bronze Shields is significant because it indicates
that the Third Circuit is reluctant to find that a continuing violation of Title
VII exists after the Supreme Court's decisions in Evans and Ricks. In addition,
the reasoning utilized by the Court of Appeals in Bronze Shields indicates that a
split in the circuits may develop on the issue of whether hiring from a
discriminatory eligibility list is a continuing violation of Title VII.
The plaintiffs in Bronze Shields35 were two black women who applied for
positions on the Newark, New Jersey Police Force." Pursuant to the hiring
policy of the City of Newark, the plaintiffs were required to pass a series of
written, physical, and medical exams administered by the New Jersey State
date on which the denial of tenure occurred for purposes of commencing the 180 day filing
period. Since the plaintiff had failed to file within 180 days of being notified of the decision by the
College Board of Trustees to deny him tenure or within 180 days of being informed that he would
be offered a one year employment contract for the following year the Court found it unnecessary
to decide which of the two dates started the running of the 180 day filing period. Id, at 262 n.17.
25
 667 F.2d 1074, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 749 (3d Cir. 1981).
3° Id. at 1084, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 757.
" Id. at 1083, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 756.
37 Id. , 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 757.
" Id., 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 756.
34
 Id. at 1085-86, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 759.
35 The plaintiffs in Bronze Shields initially filed a complaint alleging that by creating the
discriminatory hiring list the defendants had violated 42 U.S.C. SS 1981 and 1983 and the thir-
teenth and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution. Id. at 1078, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 752. Four years later, the Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)
held that a showing of discriminatory intent is necessary for all constitutionally based claims of
discrimination. 426 U.S. at 244-45. The plaintiffs in Bronze therefore amended the complaint and
added a claim based on Title VII. Bronze Shields, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Civil Serv., 667
F.2d 1074, 1079, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 749, 753 (3d Cir. 1981). On appeal, plaintiffs
raised only the § 1981 and Title VII claims. Id. at 1076-77, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at
750-51.
36 Id. at 1080, 1089, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 754, 761.
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Department of Civil Service." The Department used the results of these exams
to create an eligibility list from which the City of Newark hired its policemen."
Because the plaintiffs failed the written exam, their names were not placed
on the hiring list created in May 1975. 39 Since the eligibility list was to be in ef-
fect for three years, the plaintiffs would have had to wait three years before they
could have been included on a new eligibility list." In July 1976, more than
180 days after the creation of the hiring list, but before the City of Newark had
actually hired from the list," the plaintiffs filed a Title VII claim with the
EEOC. 42
 The plaintiffs alleged that the creation of the hiring list violated Title
VII since the list was based on test results which excluded a disproportionate
number of minorities." The plaintiffs asserted that the filing of their claim was
timely because a continuing violation of Title VII existed as long as the hiring
list was in effect." In an unpublished opinion, the district court dismissed the
Title VII complaint as untimely."
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision to dismiss the Title VII claim." The court first acknowledged that it
had previously recognized the validity of the continuing violation theory in
Title VII cases" and that Congress had approved a liberal interpretation of the
37 Id. at 1077, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 751.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 1080, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 754.
411 Id.
41 Id. Newark used the list only once in November 1977 when it hired 27 recruits for
police training. Id,
42 Id.
" Id. at 1083, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 756.
Based on the results of the written exams which were administered 11 times between
May 1972 and June 1975, the following percentages of applicants passed the exams: White males
— 57.8%, Black males — 26.7%, and Hispanic males — 26.4%. Id. at 1088 n.1, 27 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 761 n. 1.
44 Id. at 1081, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 754.
In addition to the continuing violation theory, plaintiffs maintained that the Title VII
claim was timely due to an equitable tolling of the 180 day filing limit. Id. at 1084, 27 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 757. The plaintiffs argued that since they had relied to their detriment on
the continuing violation theory and that the parties had been litigating the same issues since
1972, four years prior to the filing of the Title VII claim, the limitation period should be tolled.
Id. at 1085, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 758. Although the Third Circuit had held
previously that the filing limits under Title VII are subject to equitable tolling, Hart v. J.T.
Baker Chem. Co., 598 F.2d 829, 833, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1347, 1349 (3d Cir.
1979), the Third Circuit in Bronze Shields held that the reasons given by the plaintiffs were not suf-
ficient for an equitable tolling of the 180 day filing limitation. Bronze Shields, Inc. v. New Jersey
Dep't of Civil Serv., 667 F.2d 1074, 1085, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 749, 758-59 (3d Cir.
1981).
Although the circuits were split concerning whether Title VII filing limitations are sub-
ject to equitable tolling, the Supreme Court recently resolved the issue in Zipes v. Trans World
Airlines, 102 S. Ct. 1127, 1132 (1982) and held that the filing period is subject to equitable toll-
ing. Id.
43
 Bronze Shields, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Civil Serv., 667 F.2d 1074, 1076 & n.3,
27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 749, 750-51 & n.3. (3d Cir. 1981).
46 Id. at 1087, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 760.
47 Id. at 1081, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 755. See Bethel v. Jendoco Constr.
Corp., 570 F.2d 1168, 1174, 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 978, 982-83 (3d Cir. 1978).
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180 day filing period." The court maintained, however, that use of the contin-
uing violation theory to extend the Title VII filing period is limited by the need
to protect employers from liability for discriminatory acts committed in the dis-
tant past." Moreover, the court noted that even though many lower courts
have applied the continuing violation theory liberally, the Supreme Court
refused to apply this theory to extend the filing period in both Evans and
Ricks. 5° Finally, the court reviewed the Supreme Court's decision in Ricks and
applied the reasoning of Ricks to the facts of Bronze Shields.."
Applying the Ricks standard, the court first identified the exact employ-
ment practice which the plaintiffs alleged was discriminatory." The court
determined that the final act of which the plaintiffs complained was the crea-
tion of the hiring list in May 1975." Conceding that this may have been a
discriminatory act since the list was based on allegedly discriminatory exam
results, 5 * the court noted that the plaintiffs had received final notice that their
names were not on the list on May 3, 1975." Plaintiffs did not file their claim
within 180 days of that date. 56 The court then determined whether existence of
the eligibility list constituted a continuing discriminatory act or whether, like
the dismissal which inevitably followed the denial of tenure in Ricks, the
eligibility list was merely a discriminatory effect of a previous discriminatory
act. In refusing to apply the continuing violation theory, the court first noted
that the City of Newark had not used the list prior to plaintiffs' filing of charges
with the EEOC." The court then observed that even if Newark had used the
list 180 days prior to the filing date, the plaintiffs had not alleged that Newark
would have used the list in a discriminatory manner. 5 " The court reasoned that
because applicants would be hired from the list in the order in which their
names appeared, the use of the hiring list would be a nondiscriminatory act."
Finally, quoting Ricks, the court stated that the failure to hire the plaintiffs was
simply "a delayed, but inevitable consequence" of the creation of the hiring
list. 6° Thus the court viewed the continued existence of the hiring list over three
years as a discriminatory effect rather than a discriminatory act. Following the
approach taken in Ricks, the court therefore held that the existence of the hiring
list was not a continuing violation and denied plaintiffs' Title VII claim as un-
timely . 61
4° 667 F.2d at 1081, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 755.
49 Id. at 1082, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 756-57.
" Id.
Id. at 1082-84, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cat. (BNA) at 756-57.
52 Id. at 1083, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 756.
53 Id. at 1084, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 757.
54 Id. at 1083, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 756.
53 Id.
56 Id
. , 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 756-57.
37 Id., 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 757.
5° Id.
5° Id.
Id. at 1084, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 757 (quoting Delaware State College
v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257-58 (1980)).
61 Id. at 1085-86, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 759.
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Circuit Judge Higginbotham dissented from the majority's holding that
the Title VII claim was untimely." In his dissent, Judge Higginbotham main-
tained that the majority had misconstrued the plaintiffs' complaint. 63 Accord-
ing to Judge Higginbotham, the plaintiffs had complained not only that the
creation of the hiring list was discriminatory but also that the life of the hiring
list prevented Newark from hiring policemen in a nondiscriminatory manner
for three years." Judge Higginbotham emphasized that the facts of Bronze
Shields were different from those in Ricks and Evans. 65 Neither Ricks nor Evans,
he observed, involved a situation in which plaintiffs were discriminatorily
denied employment and then prevented from reapplying for the position for
several years because of the existence of a "frozen" eligibility list." Due to this
factual difference, Judge Higginbotham concluded that Ricks and Evans were
not controlling.° In considering the facts of Bronze Shields, Judge Higgin-
botham reasoned that the existence of the hiring list was part of an ongoing
discriminatory policy which violated Title VII. 68 Judge Higginbotham
therefore maintained that a hiring list based on discriminatory test results con-
stitutes a continuing violation of Title VII for the life of the list regardless of
whether the list is used for hiring purposes. 69
The Bronze Shields decision is significant because it demonstrates that the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is adopting a narrow view of the contin-
uing violation theory in light of Evans and Ricks. Under the Bronze Shields ap-
proach, the mere existence of a discriminatorily promulgated eligibility list will
not be considered a continuing violation of Title VII. Therefore, the existence
of such a list will not extend the Title VII filing period. In addition, the Bronze
Shields court suggested that the use of the eligibility list within 180 days of filing
will not constitute a continuing violation of Title VII." Thus, the language of
After dismissing the plaintiff's Title VII claim, the court of appeals turned to whether
the plaintiffs alleged a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. S 1981. Since the Third Circuit had held
previously that intentional discrimination is a necessary element in a S 1981 claim, Croker v.
Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975, 989, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1569, 1577-78 (3d Cir. 1981),
the court of appeals in Bronze Shields dismissed the 5 1981 claim against the New Jersey Depart-
ment of Civil Service and remanded the S 1981 claim against the City of Newark to allow plain-
tiffs the opportunity to prove intentional discrimination. Bronze Shields, Inc. v. New Jersey
Dep't of Civil Serv., 667 F.2d 1074, 1086-87, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 749, 759-60 (3d
Cir. 1981).
The issue of whether a plaintiff must prove discriminatory intent as an element of a
1981 cause of action is currently pending appeal with the United States Supreme Court: Guard-
ians Ass'n of the N.Y. City Police Dep't v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232, 23 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 677 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 997 (1982).
62 Bronze Shields, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Civil Serv., 667 .F.2d 1074, 1087, 27
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 749, 760 (3d Cir. 1981) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting and concur-
ring). Judge Higginbotham concurred in the majority's judgment on the S 1981 claim. Id. See
.supra note 61.




67 Id., 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 764,
69 Id. at 1092, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 764.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 1083-84, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 757.
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Bronze Shields indicates that unless the plaintiff files a claim within 180 days of
the creation of the list, the existence and use of a discriminatory fist for hiring,
as well as for possible use in promoting or terminating employees over a period
of years will not support a Title VII claim.
Although the applicability of the continuing violation theory undoubtedly
was narrowed by the Supreme Court decisions in Evans and Ricks, the result in
Bronze Shields was not mandated by those recent decisions. The Bronze Shields
majority incorrectly treated the existence and use of the hiring list as merely a
neutral effect of the discriminatory promulgation of the list. The majority
recognized the validity of the continuing violation theory, yet, it seemed to sug-
gest that a discriminatory act. can be only a discrete event which occurs at a
specific point in time rather than a continuous event which occurs over an ex-
tended period. Judge Higginbotham, in his dissent, correctly analyzed the ex-
istence and use of the hiring list as part of a discriminatory hiring policy which
violated Title VII. The approach adopted by Judge Higginbotham represents a
reasonable balance between insuring that the remedial purposes of Title VII
are given effect and that employers are protected from stale claims.
The Supreme Court in Evans and Ricks did not reject totally the continu-
ing violation theory. In both cases the Court rejected the Title VII claims
because the plaintiffs had failed to identify discriminatory acts which continued
or occurred within 180 days of the filing of their claims!' The Supreme Court
noted in Evans and in Ricks that the plaintiffs had shown only that the original
discriminatory acts had a continuing effect on their lives. 72 Therefore, although
the Supreme Court has rejected the view that the present effects of a past act
constitute a continuing violation of Title VII, the decisions in Evans and Ricks
do not preclude a lower court from finding that a continuing violation exists
when a plaintiff can point to specific discriminatory acts or • policies by an
employer which continued to within 180 days of filing."
The majority in Bronze Shields was incorrect in holding that Evans and Ricks
were controlling in the case before the court. As Judge Higginbotham correctly
noted, there are factual differences between the Supreme Court cases and
Bronze Shields. In both Evans and Ricks the employment practices which alleged-
ly constituted continuing violations of Title VII were independent of the
original discriminatory act. For example, in Evans, the discriminatory termina-
tion of respondent's employment was an employment practice totally separate
from the maintenance of the seniority system. The respondent in Evans was a
female flight attendant who was forced to resign from her job pursuant to a
company policy which prohibited stewardesses from marrying.'" This policy
was subsequently changed and the respondent was rehired four years later."
" United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977); Del. State College v.
Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257-58 (1980).
72 431 U.S at 558; 449 U.S. at 258.
" See Jackson & Matheson, supra note 6, at 829; Note, The Continuing Violation Theory of
Title VII After United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 929, 947 (1980).
" United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 554 (1977).
" Id. at 554-55.
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Under the company's seniority system, however, the respondent was provided
with no credit for her prior employment with the company. 76 In denying
respondent's Title VII claim, the Evans Court maintained that the seniority
system was a neutral employment practice which continued the effects of the
respondent's forced resignation by denying credit for their previous years of
employment to all employees who had left the company and ihen returned. 77
Likewise, in Ricks, the denial of tenure and the termination of the one year con-
tract involved two separate employment practices. 78 In Ricks, once the denial of
tenure was official, the respondent was given the option of entering into the one
year employment contract." The respondent voluntarily entered into the con-
tract8° and in doing so created a new employment relationship between himself
and the College. Although the respondent would have had no occasion to enter
into the contract if he had not been denied tenure, employment under the con-
tract constituted an independent employment practice. In Bronze Shields,
however, the discriminatory creation of the hiring list and the continued ex-
istence of the list for hiring purposes were not independent employment prac-
tices. The list was created for the express purpose of hiring from that list. Since
the creation of the list would be meaningless unless it were used to hire ap-
plicants, the creation of the list should not be considered separately from its
subsequent use. Rather, the creation, existence, and use of the list for hiring
purposes should be viewed as parts of a general hiring policy by the City of
Newark. Under this approach, if the initial promulgation of the list is
discriminatory, then the existence and use of the list constitute a discriminatory
policy or act which occurs over an extended period. Therefore, while Evans and
Ricks involved independent employment practices which merely continued the
effects of a prior discriminatory act, the existence of the hiring list in Bronze
Shields was a part of the city's general hiring policy and, as such, constituted a
continuing violation of Title VII. 81
Viewing the existence and use of an eligibility list as a continuing violation
of Title VII is consistent with the purpose of the 180 day filing requirement. 82
78 Id. at 555.
77
 Id. at 557-58. Before considering whether the seniority system constituted a continu-
ing violation of Title VII, the Court first determined that the seniority system by itself did not
discriminate against women since both men and women who were re-employed by the company
received no seniority credit for their prior employment. Id. at 557.
" Del. State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 253 (1977).
79 Id.
80 Id, at 253-54.
E" The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Guardians Ass'n stated:
The failing of the department's hiring system is therefore not that it perpetuates the
eects of past discrimination, but rather that it perpetuates discrimination. It is one
thing to utilize a system that locks in the effects of past discriminatory hiring deci-
sions; it is a very different thing to lock in a discriminatory method of making hir-
ing decisions.
Guardians Ass'n of the N.Y. City Police Dept v. Civil Serv. Comm., 633 F.2d 232, 253, 23 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 677, 692 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 997 (1982) (emphasis in
original).
82
 In 1972, when Congress extended the filing period under Tide VII from 90 days to
180 days, the Senate Conference Report stated:
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Although the filing requirement serves to protect employers from liability for
past discriminatory actions," Congress has acknowledged that the filing re-
quirement may be liberally construed to effectuate the elimination of employ-
ment discrimination under Title VII." Moreover, 'Title VII expressly pro-
hibits the use of discriminatory test results in the context of seniority and merit
systems." Prohibiting the use of discriminatory test results in the hiring of
employees, therefore, would be consistent with other provisions of Title VII.
Thus, in light of the liberal construction to be given to the filing requirement
and the express disapproval of the use of discriminatory test results in other
contexts, finding that the continued existence or use of a discriminatory hiring
list is a continuing violation would not be inconsistent with the purpose of Title
VII.
The practical effect of the majority's holding is that an employer can
create an eligibility list which discriminates against minorities. As long as ap-
plicants fail to file a Title VII claim within 180 days of the creation of the list,
the employer can engage in discriminatory hiring for an indefinite p-eriod. 86 In
effect, long term employment practices which are based on discriminatory
testing and which could have a severe impact on the number of minorities hired
would be immune from suit under Title VII. As Judge Higginbotham stated in
his dissent, it is doubtful that Congress intended the 180 day filing requirement
to be applied rigidly to such a situation." Viewing the continued existence of a
hiring list as part of a discriminatory hiring policy rather than merely as an ef-
Court decisions under the present law have shown an inclination to interpret this
time limitation so as to give the aggrieved person the maximum benefit of the law;
it is not intended that such court decisions should be in any way circumscribed by
the extensions of the time limitations in this subsection. Existing case law which
has determined that certain types of violations are continuing in nature, thereby
measuring the running of the required time period from the last occurrence of the
discrimination and not from the first occurrence is continued, and other inter-
pretations of the courts maximizing the coverage of the law are not affected.
S. REP. No. 681, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. REC. 7167 (1972).
83 See supra note 4.
84 See supra notes 6 & 81.
85 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-2(h) (1976). This provision reads in pertinent part:
[N]or shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to
act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such
test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used
to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. . . .
Id.
In both Guardians Ass'n of the New York City Police Dep't, Inc., 633 F.2d 232,
251-54, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 677, 691-93 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 997
(1982) and Ass'n Against Discrimination in Employment, Inc, v. City of Bridgeport, 647 F.2d
256, 272-73, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1013, 1025-26 (2d Cir. 1981), the Second Circuit
considered whether the language of 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-2(h) (1976) applied to the use of
discriminatory testing for hiring purposes. After noting that 5 2000e-2(h) is typically applied only
to seniority and merit systems, the Second Circuit found it unnecessary to decide the issue. 647
F.2d at 273, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 273; 633 F.2d at 252, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 691.
86 Bronze Shields, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Civil Serv., 667 F.2d 1074, 1093, 27
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 749, 765 (3d Cir. 1981) (Higginbothamj ,, dissenting and concur-
ring).
87 Id.
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fect of the discriminatory promulgation of the list would prevent an employer
from insulating himself from liability for ongoing discriminatory hiring." At
the same time, such an approach would continue to protect employers from
claims such as those presented in Evans and Ricks in which neutral employment
practices merely continued the effects of a prior discriminatory act.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Ricks, two other circuits have con-
sidered cases involving either the creation or use of allegedly discriminatory
hiring lists." In Yates v. Mobile County Personnel Board," the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that an applicant who fails an employment test must file his
claim within 180 days of receiving notice that his name will be excluded from a
hiring list. 9 ' The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the act of discrimination against
the applicant is complete when he receives notice that his name will not be on
the list. 92
 Thus, the Fifth Circuit appears to be in agreement with the Third
Circuit that the mere existence of a hiring list is not a continuing violation.
Moreover, the language in the Yates opinion that the discrimination against the
applicant is complete once he receives notification that his name was not placed
on the list suggests that the Fifth Circuit may follow the reasoning of the Bronze
Shields court and find that the use of a discriminatory list for hiring purposes is
not a continuing violation of Title VII.
Although the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has not considered whether
the mere existence of a discriminatory hiring list constitutes a continuing viola-
tion of Title VII, it has ruled that the use of such a list constitutes a violation of
Title VII. In Association Against Discrimination in Employment, Inc. v. City of
Bridgeport, 93 the city had hired firefighters from a discriminatory eligibility list,
but, not within the filing period." After concluding that hiring from the list
violated Title VII," the court relied on other discriminatory acts against the
applicants within the filing period 96 to find that a continuing violation
existed." Thus, the court in Association held that the city was liable for hiring
" Whether or not the list was used to hire employees may relate to the amount of
damages recoverable by the plaintiff. See id. at 1093 n.4, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 765
n.4 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting and concurring).
89 See infra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
9° 658 F.2d 298, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 112 (5th Cir. 1981).
9 ' Id. at 299, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 113.
92 Id.
" 647 F.2d 256, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1013 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102
S. Ct. 1611 (1982).
94 Id. at 274, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1027.
93 Id., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1026.
96 Id. at 275, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1026. The district court found that the
city gave another exam that was not job related and engaged in individual acts of discrimination
against several candidates within the filing period. Id. In addition, the district court found that
the history of the city's hiring of firefighters demonstrated a continuing policy of discrimination
against minorities. Id.
97 Id. at 274-75, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1026-27.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Rich, the Second Circuit had held that hiring
from a discriminatbry eligibility list within the filing period constituted a continuing violation of
Title VII. Guardians Ass'n of the N.Y. City Police Dep't, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 633 F.2d
232, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 677 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981)
(whether exam with a disproportionate failure rate for whites and minorities violates Title VII),
December 1982]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 231
from an eligibility list based on discriminatory exam results. 98 The Bronze
Shields court, on the other hand, stated in dicta that it rejected the approach of
the Second Circuit. 99
The language and reasoning in Bronze Shields, therefore, indicates that a
split in the circuits is developing on the issue of whether the use of a
discriminatory hiring list within 180 days of the filing of the claim is a continu-
ing violation of Title VII."° Although in Bronze Shields the Third Circuit was
not confronted with a situation involving the use of a hiring list, the majority
suggested that as long as the city hired from the eligibility list in a neutral man-
ner, the use of the list would not violate Title VII."}' According to the majority,
hiring from the list would be. simply a continuing effect of the discriminatory
promulgation of the list. 102 Thus, the language of the Bronze Shields and Yates
courts indicate that if the Third and Fifth Circuits were confronted with a case
involving the use of a discriminatory hiring list, they would reach a result op-
posite from that reached by the Second Circuit.
Both the potential split in the Circuits concerning the use of an allegedly
discriminatory hiring list and the failure of the Bronze Shields court to find that
the existence of a discriminatory hiring list constitutes a continuing violation of
Title VII demonstrate that the Third Circuit is narrowly applying the continu-
ing violation theory to Title VII cases after Ricks and Evans. Although the
holdings of Ricks and Evans were that an employment practice which merely
perpetuates the effects of a prior discriminatory act is not a continuing violation
of Title VII, the Bronze Shields court misapplied the standard set forth in these
cases. The Bronze Shields court failed to recognize that the existence and use of
an eligibility list cannot be viewed separately from the discriminatory creation
of the list. As a result, the court treated the existence of the list as an independ-
ent practice which merely continued the effect of the discriminatory creation of
the list rather than as part of a continuing policy of discrimination in hiring. In
the aftermath of Bronze Shields, it seems that the only remaining basis for a con-
tinuing violation of Title VII in the Third Circuit is when the employee can
cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 997 (1982) (whether intent is a necessary element of a claim under 42
U.S.C. $ 1981), petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3157 (U.S. Aug. 31, 1981) (No. 81-432)
(whether use of a discriminatory hiring list is a continuing violation of Title VII).
Although the Bronze Shields court referred to the decision in Guardians, the Bronze Shields
court suggested that the Supreme Court's opinion in Ricks invalidated Guardians. Bronze Shields,
Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Civil Serv., 667 F.2d 1074, 1082 & n.21, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 749, 755-56 & n.21 (3d Cir. 1981). The decision of the Second Circuit in Association,
however, demonstrates that the Second Circuit does not read Ricks as precluding a finding that a
discriminatory hiring list violates Title VII.
98 Ass'n Against Discrimination in Employment, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 647 F.2d
256, 275, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1013 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1611
(1982).
99 Bronze Shields, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Civil Serv., 667 F.2d 1074, 1082 &
n.21, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 749, 755-56 & n.21 (3d Cir. 1981).
too The issue of whether the use of a discriminatorily promulgated hiring list constitutes
a continuing violation of Title VII has been filed for certiorari. See supra note 97.
191 Bronze Shields, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Civil Serv., 667 F.2d 1074, 1083, 27
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 749, 757 (3d Cir. 1981).
102 Id. at 1084, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 757.
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point to specific acts of discrimination, other than the existence or use of an
eligibility list, which occurred within 180 days of filing the claim. Unless such
acts have occurred, the practitioner should file the Title VII claim within 180
days of the day the employee received notice that his name would not be on the
list or the Title VII claim will be dismissed as untimely.
II. SENIORITY SYSTEMS
A. Broadening the Substantive Scope of Title VIPs Seniority System Exemption:
American Tobacco Company v. Patterson'
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the Act) 2 prohibits employment
practices that discriminate on the basis of an individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.' In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,* the Supreme Court held
that the Act prohibits employment practices which operate to perpetuate or
freeze prior discriminatory practices,' and therefore, that a prima facie viola-
tion of the Act may be established by employment practices which are facially
and intentionally neutral, yet discriminatory in effect.' Seniority systems pre-
sent special problems in dealing with this standard. In particular, section
703(h) of the Act allows employers to make certain employment distinctions
pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system.' Seniority rights, typically
based on either length of service with a particular employer or within a par-
ticular department, provide an objective means for determining promotions
and transfers and establishing a hierarchy for layoffs and recalls.' Yet, the use
of these objective criteria may perpetuate economic hardships on minorities
* By Jon S. Rand, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 102 S. Ct. 1534 (1982).
' The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e-1 to 1000e-17 (1976).
3
 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976).
' 401 U.S. 224 (1971).
5 Id. at 430.
o Id. See also General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 137 (1976); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246-47 (1976).
5 703(h) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(h) (1976) provides in
its entirety:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of
compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pur-
suant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earn-
ings by quantity or quality of production or to employees who work in different
locations, provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, nor shall it be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to act upon the
results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its ad-
ministration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. It shall not be
an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any employer to dif-
ferentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or com-
pensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation
is authorized by the provisions of section 206(d) of Title 29.
° See generally Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75
HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1962).
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when prior discriminatory employment practices leave minorities with less ac-
crued seniority than they would have otherwise earned. 9 Despite the Griggs ra-
tionale and the propensity for seniority systems to perpetuate the effects of
previous discriminatory practices, in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States ,'° the Supreme Court held that under section 703(h) of the Act ac-
tual intent to discriminate must be proved, and discriminatory impact alone is
insufficient, to invalidate an otherwise neutral bona fide seniority system."
In this Survey year, the Supreme Court again addressed the substantive
scope of the seniority system exemption under section 703(h). In American
Tobacco Company v. Patterson, 12 the Court held, in a five to four decision, that the
defense available under section 703(h) was not intended merely as a retrospec-
tive, "grandfather" provision to defend those seniority systems adopted prior
to the effective date of the Act and to the routine post-Act application of such
systems. Instead, the Court held that this defense is also available to seniority
systems adopted after the effective date of the Act." This decision thus extends
the Teamsters holding to immunize all bona fide seniority systems from invalida-
tion on the basis of disparate impact without a simultaneous showing of
discriminatory intent. The Court's broad reading of section 703(h) has far
reaching implications for minority employees who may find it increasingly dif-
ficult to contest negotiated seniority agreements which have the effect of pre-
serving advantages for whites and males in job security, promotions, and
wages.
The facts in American Tobacco underscore the impact of the decision. The
American Tobacco Company operated two manufacturing plants, each di-
vided into prefabrication and fabrication departments.'* Prior to 1963, both
the union and the company practiced overt racial discrimination." The union
maintained dual segregated locals." The company assigned Blacks to lower
paying prefabrication departments, reserving the more lucrative fabrication
positions for white employees." An employee could transfer from one depart-
ment to the other only by forfeiting his seniority." Under government pressure
in 1963, the union merged the two locals and the company eliminated the
departmental seniority system and instituted a plant-wide system. 19 From 1963
9 See Discrimination in Employment Benefits: Seniority Systems, 20 B.C. L. REV. 169, 170
(1978). See generally Poplin, Fair Employment in a Depressed Economy: The Layoff Problem, 23
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 177 (1975); Comment, Last Hired, First Fired, Seniority Layoffs, and Title VII:
Questions of Liability and Remedy, 11 COLUM. J. LAW & SOC. PROB. 343, 343.46 (1975);
Blumrosen, Seniority and Equal Employment Opportunity: A Glimmer of Hope, 23 RUTGERS L. REV.
268 (1969); Cooper & Sobel, Seniority and Testing under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to
Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598 (1969).
10 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
" Id. at 349, 353-54.
" 102 S. Ct. 1534 (1982).
18 Id. at 1542. Title VII went into effect on July 2, 1975. Id. at 1535.
1+ Id. at 1535-36.
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to 1968, however, nearly all the vacancies in the higher paying fabrication
departments were filled by white employees owing to supervisors' discretion to
determine which individuals were qualified for the positions." In 1968, the
company proposed, and the union accepted and ratified, the establishment of
nine lines of progression, each of which consisted of two related jobs; 2 ' an
employee could not fill a top position without first holding a bottom position. 22
Four of the lines of progression consisted of virtually all-white top positions in
the more lucrative fabrication department, linked with virtually all-white bot-
tom jobs in the same department. 23 Similarly, two of the lines of progression
consisted of all-Black top positions in the prefabrication department, linked
with all-Black bottom positions in the same department."
In 1969, Patterson and two other Black employees complained to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) that, through this
system of promotions, the company and union had discriminated against them
on the basis of race." Ultimately, both the EEOC and the employees brought
actions." The district court consolidated the suits and held that the defendants'
seniority, promotion, and job classifications violated the Act because the six
lines of progression perpetuated prior race and sex discrimination and were not
justified by business necessity. 27 The court also enjoined the company and
union from further use of that promotion system. 28 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed and remanded for proceedings on the
remedy question," and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 3°
On remand, the company and union moved to vacate the district court's
enjoining orders and also sought a dismissal on the basis of the Supreme
Court's holding in Teamsters that section 703(h) insulates bona fide seniority
systems from invalidation absent a showing of discriminatory intent." The
district court held that the seniority system at issue was not a bona fide system
under Teamsters because the system operated to the day of trial in a
discriminatory manner." A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed,
holding that the lines of progression were not a seniority system within the
meaning of section 703(h)." The Fourth Circuit reheard the case en bane, but
did not decide whether the lines of progression constituted a seniority system.








27 Id. The district court's decision was unreported.
26 Id.
29 Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (1976).
30 American Tobacco Co . v. Patterson, 429 U.S. 920 (1976).
31 American Tobacco, 102 S . Ct. at 1536. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 349, 353-54 (1977); supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
ss American Tobacco, 102 S. Ct. at 1536-37. The district court's decision was unreported.
53 Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 586 F.2d 300, 303 (1978).
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of a seniority system, section 703(h)'s exemption for seniority systems applied
only to those systems adopted before the effective date of the Act and to post-
Act applications of those systems."
A divided Supreme Court reversed. 35 Justice White delivered the opinion
for the majority, 36 which adopted the company's and union's position that sec-
tion 703(h)'s exemption for seniority systems does not distinguish between pre-
and post-Act seniority systems." In a dissent joined by Justices Marshall and
Blackmun," Justice Brennan concurred with the EEOC's position," and that
of the en bane Fourth Circuit, that section 703(h) applies to the pre-Act adoption
and post-Act application of a seniority system, but not to a post-Act adoption of
such a system." In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens urged that the seniority
system at issue was adopted in violation of the Act and therefore was not "bona
fide" within the meaning of section 703(h)."
The majority opinion followed three main lines of reasoning. First, the
Court found that the plain language of section 703(h) makes no distinction be-
tween the pre- and post-Act adoption of a seniority system." The Court ob-
served that Congress had gone to great lengths in drafting the section to insure
that its language was precise." Given Congress' meticulousness, the Court
reasoned, if Congress had intended to distinguish between pre- and post-Act
seniority systems, it would have employed an unambiguous savings or grand-
father clause as it had in other sections of the Act." The Court similarly found
that the position urged by the EEOC and Justice Brennan's dissent, which
distinguished between pre- and post-Act adoption and application of a seniori-
ty system, was equally unsupportable because, although section 703(h) allows
an employer to "apply" different conditions of employment under a seniority
system,'" the section makes no distinction about a system's adoption date."
Moreover, the Court stated, the EEOC's and dissent's proposed distinction
would create unusual results." The adoption of a seniority system which has
yet to be applied would not supply a cause of action, the Court reasoned,
34 Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 634 F.2d 744, 749 (1980).
" American Tobacco, 102 S. Ct. at 1537, 1542.
38 Justice White's majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices
Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor. Id. at 1534.
37 Id. at 1537, 1542.
38 Id. at 1542 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
39 See Id.; Id. at 1537 (opinion of the Court).
40 See Id. at 1542 (Brennan, J., dissenting); supra note 34 and accompanying text.
4 ' See American Tobacco, 102 S. Ct. at 1548-49 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
42 Id. at 4366 (opinion of the Court). See supra note 7.
43 American Tobacco, 102 S. Ct. at 1537. The Court quoted Senator Dirksen's statements
that the draft represented not merely weeks, but months of labor," and that "I doubt very
much whether in my whole legislative lifetime any measure has received so much meticulous at-
tention. We have tried to be mindful of every word, of every comma, and the shading of every
phrase." 110 CONG. REC. 11935 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Dirksen).
44 American Tobacco, 102 S. Ct. at 1537. See, e.g., 5 701(h), 42 U.S.C.	 2000e-(b)
(1976).
43 See supra note 7.
48 American Tobacco, 102 S. Ct. 1537-38.
47 Id. at 1538.
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because the requisite discriminatory effect under Griggs" would only arise
when the system is applied, and its subsequent application would be insulated
by section 703(h) in the absence of a discriminatory purpose." The Court
stated that another possible result of the EEOC' s theory would be to discourage
employers from modifying pre-Act seniority systems, even if the modification
benefited minorities, because the subsequent system would lose the protection
of section 703(h) and become subject to the more liberal Griggs standard. 5 °
Second, the Court found that, although its analysis of the statutory
language was dispositive of the issue," the legislative history of section 703(h)52
similarly reveals no indication that Congress intended to distinguish between
pre- and post-Act seniority systems, or between adoption and application of a
seniority system." The Court focussed on congressional statements which
categorically indicated that the Act would not, in any respect, affect seniority
rights. 54
 Congressional statements couched in terms of "vested," "existing,"
or "established" seniority rights," the Court stressed, were made in response
to specific charges that the bill would destroy existing seniority rights."
Accordingly, it found that such statements did not represent a congressional in-
tent to distinguish between pre- and post-Act seniority systems."
Third, the Court found that a distinction between pre- and post-Act
seniority systems would be inconsistent with its previous decisions." In
Teamsters, the Court noted, it had held that section 703(h) exempts from the Act
the disparate impact of pre-Act discriminatory practices. 59
 Similarly, the Court
observed, in United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans it had held that a discriminatory act
which is not complained of in a timely manner" is the equivalent of a
discriminatory act committed before the effective date of the Act.°' The Court
" See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (a prima facie violation of
the Act may be established by employment practices which are facially and intentially neutral but
nonetheless discriminatory in effect).
49 American Tobacco, 102 S. Ct. at 1538. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 353-54 (1977) (5 703(h) of the Act insulates bona fide seniority systems in
the absence of discriminatory intent).
5° American Tobacco, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4366. See supra note 48.
American Tobacco, 102 S. Ct. at 1538-39.
" See generally Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 431
(1966).
" American Tobacco, 102 S. Ct. at 1539.
54 Id. See 110 CONG. REC. 7207 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark); Id. at 7217 (letter from
Sen. Clark to Sen. Dirksen); Id. at 5423 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); Id. at 6564 (remarks of
Sen. Kuchel); Id. at 6665-66 (memorandum by House Republican sponsors); Id. 11768 (remarks
of Sen. McGovern); Id. at 14329 (letter from Sen. Dirksen to Sen. Williams); Id. at 14371
(remarks of Sen. Williams).
55 110 CONG. REC. 7207 (1964) (Justice Department memorandum); Id. at 7213
(memorandum by Sen.s Clark & Case).
56 American Tobacco, 102 S. Ct. at 1540.
57 Id.
55 Id. at 1541.
59 Id. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 353-54
(1977).
66 See 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-5(e) (1976).
61 American Tobacco, 102 S. Ct. at 1541. See United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S.
553, 558 (1977).
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added that this latter holding interpreted section 703(h) to protect seniority
systems that perpetuate post-Act discrimination. 62 The Court reasoned that
these two precedents taken together stand for the principle that section 703(h)
immunizes all bona fide seniority systems and does not distinguish between
their perpetuation of pre- and post-Act discriminatory effects. 63 Finally, the
Court emphasized that section 703(h) represents the balance Congress struck
between the Act's underlying policy of eliminating discrimination in employ-
ment and the policy of minimizing governmental supervision over the terms of
collective bargaining agreements." Given these considerations, the Court held
that if, on remand, the six lines of progression are found to be part of a seniori-
ty system, they must be sustained in the absence of proof of a discriminatory
purpose in formulating them."
In a dissent with which Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined, Justice
Brennan took the position that section 703(h) exempts only the application of a
seniority system adopted prior to the Act. 66 He noted that the provision allows
"an employer to apply different standards of compensation or different terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority .. .
system. . . "67 He asserted that this language limits the ambit of section
703(h) solely to the application of an existing seniority system." Moreover, he
reasoned, even if the statutory term "apply" were interpreted to include
"adopt," it could not be explained how a decision to adopt a seniority system
could be made "pursuant to" the same system. 69 Justice Brennan differed with
the Court's interpretation of the provision's legislative history, finding instead
that Congress intended only to protect employees' legitimate expectations of
the continued operation of an existing seniority system, and that a timely com-
plaint to a system's adoption would forestall discrimination before any
legitimate expectations arose. 7°
Justice Brennan also found that limiting section 703(h) to the application
of pre-Act seniority systems would not lead to unusual results : 7 ' For instance,
the mere adoption of a discriminatory seniority system would supply a cause of
action, he noted, because the cause of action arises upon the discriminatory
act, not when the consequences of the act is felt. 72 Finally, Justice Brennan
found that limiting the exemption under section 703(h) to the application of
62 American Tobacco, 102 S. Ct. at 1541.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 1542 & n.18. The en bane Fourth Circuit assumed but did not hold that the lines
of progression constituted part of a seniority system under 703(h). See American Tobacco Co. v.
Patterson, 634 F.2d 744, 749 & n.3 (1980).
" American Tobacco, 102 S. Ct. at 1542 (Brennan, J., dissenting),
67 47 U.S.C. 5 2000e-2(h) (1976) (emphasis supplied). See supra note 7.
68 American Tobacco, 102 S. Ct. at 1543 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
69
 Id.
7° Id. at 1544. Justice Brennan focussed on congressional statements which indicated
that existing job holders would not lose their jobs nor accrued seniority rights to minorities, see
110 CONG. REC. 11471 (1964) (statement of Sen. Davits), and that the effect of the Act in regard
to seniority rights "is prospective and not retrospective." Id. at 7213 (memorandum by Sews
Clark & Case). See also American Tobacco, 102 S. Ct. at 1544 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" American Tobacco, 102 S. Ct. at 1545-46 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
72 Id. (quoting Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980)). See also
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pre-Act seniority systems would not discourage employers from modifying
such systems in favor of minorities because only the modified provision would
be subject to the more liberal Griggs standard, thus requiring only a showing of
discriminatory impact to invalidate an otherwise neutral policy." Moreover,
he noted, under the decision in United Steel Workers of America v. Weber" efforts to
assist disadvantaged minorities do not violate any provision of the Act."
Modifications not protected by Weber and violative of Griggs, he urged, should
not be encouraged but discouraged." For these reasons, Justice Brennan
would invalidate the six lines of progression under the Griggs standard subject
to a determination, on remand, that the employees complained in a timely
manner."
Justice Stevens dissented separately on the grounds that, in the absence of
specific discriminatory intent, section 703(h) insulates only bona fide seniority
systems. 78 He asserted that the Court ignored the legislative and historical con-
text out of which the Act arose by treating the intent proviso as defining the ap-
propriate standard by which to measure any challenge to a seniority system."
Instead, he found that Congress intended only to protect pre-Act seniority
systems which were not the product of purposeful racial discrimination. 8 °
Under Griggs, he reasoned, a seniority system is not invalidated simply because
it has a discriminatory impact;" rather, he asserted, a seniority system is illegal
only if it has a disparate effect and is not related to a valid business purpose."
This application of Griggs, he observed, would not disrupt most seniority
systems. But, in this case, Stevens would hold that the six lines of progression,
even if part of a seniority system, were not justified by a legitimate business
purpose and, therefore, were not "bona-fide" within the meaning of section
703(h). 83
By holding that section 703(h) insulates all seniority systems from in-
validation in the absence of specific discriminatory intent," the Court in
American Tobacco extends the Teamsters decision85 by further limiting the ambit
of the Griggs standard" as it applies to seniority systems. Preceeding Teamsters,
in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co. , 87 the Court interpreted the section
Bartness v. Brewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186, 1188 (7th Cir. 1971) (current employees may
challenge discriminatory retirement plan).
" American Tobacco, 102 S. Ct. at 1546 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
74 433 U.S. 193 (1979).
" Id. at 200.
76
 American Tobacco, 102 S. Ct. at 1546 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
77 Id. 1546-47 & n.12.
78 Id. at 1547 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79 Id. at 1548.
80 Id .
81 Id.
82 Id. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) ("The touchstone is
business necessity"). Cf. New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979).
83 American Tobacco, 102 S. Ct. at 1548-49 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84 Id. at 1542 (opinion of the Court).
65 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 353-54 (1977).
86 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
87 424 U.S. 747 (1976). For a thorough discussion of Franks, see 17 B.C. IND. & Cont.
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703(h) exemption narrowly to allow an award of retroactive seniority dating
back to the original discrimination once post-Act discrimination has been
proved. 88 In that case, the Court found that section 703(h) is only "directed
toward defining what is and what is not an illegal discriminatory practice in in-
stances in which the post-Act operation of a seniority system is challenged as
perpetuating the effects of discrimination occurring prior to the effective date of
the Act."'" Given the broad remedial nature of the Act, the Court concluded
that an award of retroactive seniority is necessary to place victims of post-Act
discrimination in their deserved positions." Thus, in Franks, the Court reached
only the questions related to the remedial aspects of the Act, and did not ad-
dress the substantive reach of section 703(h)."
In Teamsters, the Court reached this substantive issue but in so doing it
departed from the approach taken in Franks by deemphasizing the underlying
remedial policy of the Act. Specifically, the Court held that section 703(h) does
not provide seniority relief to victims of pre-Act discrimination who had less ac-
crued seniority owing to that discrimination." Through this holding, the Court
overturned an important precedent upon which numerous courts and litigants
had relied to remedy the lingering effects of past discriminatory policies."
Thus, the decision in American Tobacco extends the Teamsters rationale and its at-
tendant consequences by making the effects of racial discrimination irrelevant
in evaluating a seniority system which perpetuates them, regardless of when
that system was adopted.
The Court's reasoning in American Tobacco relies heavily upon section
703(h)'s rather ambiguous language and legislative history. Greater attention
to the underlying policies of both the Act generally and section 703(h)
specifically may have provided clearer authority and a less harsh decision. As
the decision stands, disadvantaged minorities will find it increasingly difficult
to challenge negotiated seniority systems which cut against them. The decision
in American Tobacco leaves victims of seniority systems which are discriminatory
in effect in the position of proving that the system in question was not "bona
fide" within the meaning of section 703(h).
As in Teamsters, the Court in American Tobacco did not ascribe a great deal
of importance to the underlying remedial policy of the Act. Instead, it drew
support. from ambiguous statutory language and legislative history. The
L. REV, 1041, 1140 (1976).
88 Franks, 424 U.S. at 762-63.
89 Id. at 762.
9° Id. at 767-68.
9' See Discrimination in Employment Benefits: Seniority Systems, 20 B.C. L. REV. 169, 170-71
(1978).
" International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 353-54 (1977).
93 See Edwards, The Coming Age of the Burger Court: Labor Law Decisions of the Supreme Court
During the 1976 Term, 19 B.C. L. REV. 1, 7 (1977). Prior to the Teamsters decision, eight circuits
had held that $ 703(h) does not immunize those seniority systems which perpetuate the effects of
prior discriminatory policies. See cases cited at International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 378 n.2, 379 n.3 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting). These cases relied primarily
upon the reasoning of the district court in Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D.
Va. 1968), that a seniority system which has its genesis in racial discrimination could not be con-
sidered a bona fide system under the Act. Id. at 517. See Edwards, supra, at 7.
240	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 24:47
statutory language of section 703(h), for instance, does not explicitly establish a
distinction between the pre- and post-Act adoption of a seniority system."
Though, as Justice Brennan indicated, the provision does define its scope solely
in terms of the "application" of a seniority system," this observation provides
a tenuous basis for making a distinction between the post-Act application of
pre-Act seniority systems and the adoption or application of post-Act systems.
The legislative history is similarly unenlightening. Section 703(h) was adopted
during cloture and consequently scant legislative history exists." Both the
Court and Justice Brennan's dissent acknowledge that the limited legislative
history does not explicitly support either of their positions;" both instead rely
upon fragmentary congressional statements and the absence of specific
statements that expressly contradict their respective positions."
Given the ambiguity of the statutory language and legislative history of
section 703(h), reference to the underlying policy of the Act perhaps would
have provided a more justifiable basis on which to decide the case. Congress'
purpose in enacting the Act was to prohibit broadly and remedy racial
discrimination in employment." Since remedial statutes should be interpreted
broadly and exceptions to their rules constituted narrowly,'°° as Justice Bren-
nan urged, the seniority system exemption under section 703(h) should be con-
strued no more broadly than Congress intended.'°' If the exemption were in-
tended to protect employees' expectations of the continued operation of a
seniority system in which they had worked to accrue seniority rights,' 02 then
the exemption reasonably could be limited to seniority systems adopted prior to
the Act and their post-Act applications. Under this construction, post-Act
adoptions and applications of seniority systems which have a disparate impact
on minorities could be halted upon a timely challenge — within 180 days'" —
before legitimate expectations and stakes in those systems arose.'" In this man-
ner, the policy of protecting employee expectations could have been balanced
against the Act's broader policy of prohibiting and remedying discrimination
in employment.
As a practical consequence, the Court's decision in American Tobacco will
make it increasingly difficult for minority employees to contest negotiated
" See supra note 7.
95
 American Tobacco, 102 S. Ct. at 1543 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
96 See Vaas, supra note 52, at 449.
9' See American Tobacco, 102 S. Ct. at 1539 ("The most that can be said for the legislative
history of S 703(h) is that it is inconclusive with respect to the issue presented in this case."); Id.
at 1545 (Brennan, J.  dissenting) (the "legislative history does not contain any explicit reference
to the distinction between adoption and application. . .").
9° See Id. at 1539-40 (opinion of the Court); Id. at 1544-45 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
99 See Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976); Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974). Accord American Tobacco, 102 S. Ct. at 1543-44
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
'°° Cf. Piedmont & Northern R.R. Co. v. ICC, 286 U.S. 229, 311-12 (1932); Spokane
& Inland R.R. Co. v. United States, 241 U.S. 344, 350 (1916); United States v. Dickson, 15
Pet. 141, 165 (1841). Accord American Tobacco, 102 S. Ct. at 1544 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
i°' See American Tobacco, 102 S. Ct. at 1544 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
102 Id.
1 °' See 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-5(e) (1976).
104 American Tobacco, 102 S. Ct. at 1544 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
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seniority agreements which have the effect of favoring whites and males in job
security, promotions, and compensation. By removing even post-Act seniority
systems from the scope of the Griggs rationale, which requires only a showing of
disparate impact to establish a prima facie violation of the Act, the American
Tobacco decision places upon aggrieved employees the onerous burden of prov-
ing that a seniority system is either discriminatory on its face, purposefully
discriminatory, or not "bona fide" within the meaning of section 703(h).
Owing to the improbability of the first two alternatives, future complainants
are now most likely to challenge seniority systems on the basis that they are
neither bona fide, nor "substantially related to a valid business purpose. ,, I 05
Indeed, the victims of the six lines of progression at issu.e in the American Tobacco
may yet prevail on remand if it is determined that the lines of progression were
either not part of a seniority system or not bona fide within the meaning of sec-
tion 703(h). '°6
III. SEX DISCRIMINATION
A. * Wage Discrimination Under Title VII — Does the 'Equal Work' Standard Apply?
County of Washington v. Gunther'
In both the Equal Pay Act of 1963 2 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 3 Congress acted to prohibit discrimination in compensation on the basis
of sex. The Equal Pay Act explicitly prohibits employers from paying unequal
wages to men and women who perform equal work,'' but does not explicitly
prohibit unequal compensation in any other context. In addition, the statute
provides several affirmative defenses to a cause of action based on its prohibi-
tion of unequal pay for equal work.' Specifically, an employer may pay un-
equal wages to employees performing equal work if the payments are made
pursuant to a seniority system, a merit system, or a system which measures
earnings by the quantity or quality of work performed Moreover, the statute
105 See Id. at 1548 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer,
440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 353,
355-56 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
106 American Tobacco, 102 S.Ct. at 1542 n.18.
* By Janice Duffy, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
2 29 U.S.C. 5 206(d)(1) (1976).
42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976).
4 29 U.S.C. 206(d)(1) (1976). The statute provides:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall
discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed,
between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such
establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of
the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of
which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed
under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to
(i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings
by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any factor other
than sex
Id.
Id. See supra text of statute at note 4.
Id.
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contains a broad exception for wage differentials based on any factor other than
sex.' Title VII, in contrast to the Equal Pay Act, does not expressly limit claims
of discrimination in compensation to situations where an employer pays un-
equal wages for equal work. 8
 An amendment to Title VII, however, known as
the Bennett Amendment, 9 provides that any wage differentials authorized by
the Equal Pay Act shall not constitute an unlawful employment practice under
Title VII."' Therefore, while the Title VII prohibition on unequal compensa-
tion appears to be more inclusive than that of the Equal Pay Act, the Bennett
Amendment suggests that the wage discrimination prohibitions of Title VII
and the Equal Pay Act may be co-extensive. Consequently, the proper recon-
ciliation of the two statutes has been the subject of controversy in the federal
courts.
Attempts to harmonize the specific prohibition on unequal pay for equal
work contained in the Equal Pay Act and the broader prohibition on sex-based
wage discrimination of Title VII led to the development of two conflicting in-
terpretations of the Bennett Amendment. Some federal courts held that the
Amendment incorporates into Title VII not only the four specific exceptions to
the Equal Pay Act's equal pay for equal work standard but also the standard
itself." In these courts, a plaintiff was required to allege that she received un-
equal compensation for work equal to that performed by male employees in
order to state a claim under either the Equal Pay Act or Title VII." By con-
trast, in other courts, the Bennett Amendment was read to incorporate into
Title VII only the defenses to the Equal Pay Act's prohibition on unequal pay
for equal work." Under this interpretation, a plaintiff could assert a Title VII
claim of discrimination in compensation without first satisfying the equal work
7 Id,
Compare 29 U.S.C. S 206(d)(1) (1976) (mandating equal pay only for "equal work on
jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility .") with 42
U.S.C. S 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976) (making it an unlawful employment practice to "discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation .. because of such individual's ... sex
. "). In general, the 'equal work' standard of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. S 206(d)(1) (1976),
has been interpreted as requiring that the work performed require skill, effort and responsibility
of a substantially equal nature. See Ridgway v. United Hospitals-Miller Div., 563 F.2d 923, 926,
16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 345, 347 (8th Cir. 1977); Brennan v. Prince William Hospital
Corp., 503 F.2d 282, 9 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 979, 980 (4th Cir. 1974).
9 The amendment is named after its sponsor, Senator Wallace Foster Bennett,
Republican Senator from Utah. See 110 Cong, Rec. 13647 (1964).
i° 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(h) (1976). The amendment provides: "[lit shall not be an
unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any employer to differentiate upon the
basis of sex in determining the amount of wages or compensation paid or to he paid to employees
of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of section 206(d) of Title
29." Id.
" See, e.g., Lemons v. City and County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228, 229-30, 22 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 959, 960 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 244 (1981); Wetzel v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 449 F. Supp. 397, 400-01, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 232, 235
(W.D. Pa. 1978).
12 See cases cited supra at note 11.
" See, e.g., International Union of Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094, 1099, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 588, 592 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 3121-22 (1981); Gunther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882, 889, 20 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 792, 797 (9th Cir. 1979), supplemental opinion on denial of rehearing,
623 F.2d 1303, 1311 (1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 352 (1980).
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requirement of the Equal Pay Act." For example, in these jurisdictions, a
woman could state a claim under Title VII by alleging that her employer inten-
tionally paid lower wages for those types of work performed predominantly by
women than for those predominantly performed by men."
During the Survey year, the conflict in the federal courts caused by the
varying interpretations of the Bennett Amendment was resolved by the
Supreme Court. In County of Washington v. Gunther," the Court determined that
the Bennett Amendment does not limit wage discrimination claims cognizable
under Title VII to cases where the plaintiff alleges a violation of the equal pay
for equal work standard of the Equal Pay Act." The Court held, therefore, that
the plaintiffs' wage discrimination claims were not barred by the Bennett
Amendment solely because they did not perform work equal to that of male
employees."
The plaintiffs in Gunther were female guards who worked in the female sec-
tion of the county jail.' 9 They filed suit under Title VII," alleging that their
employer, the County of Washington, discriminated against female guards by
paying them wages which were significantly lower than those of male guards."
The female guards argued, first, that the County discriminated against them
by paying them lower wages for work substantially the same as that of male
guards. 22 In the alternative, the female guards contended that, even if their
work was not equal to that of male guards, the differential in wages paid by the
County to male and female guards was not justified by the differences in the
work they performed." The female guards asserted that a portion of the wage
differential resulted from intentional discrimination by the County." The
County, according to the female guards, intentionally discriminated against
them by setting the pay scale for female guards, but not male guards, at a level
lower than its own evaluation of the worth of the jobs would warrant."
After trial, the United States District Court for the district of Oregon
found that the female guards did not perform substantially the same work as
the male guards. 26 The district court concluded, therefore, that the plaintiffs
failed to prove their claim of discrimination based on unequal pay for equal
14 See id.
' 5 See International Union of Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 631 F.2d 1094, 1096, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 588, 589-90 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 3121-22 (1981).
16 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
" Id. at 181.
IS
 Id.
19 Id. at 165.
2° Id. The plaintiffs could not sue under the Equal Pay Act because it did not apply to
municipal employers until 1974. See id. at 164 n.3.





26 Gunther v. County of Washington, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 788, 791 (D.
Or. 1976). The district court noted that the male guards supervised more than ten times as many
prisoners as the female guards and that the female guards, therefore, devoted more time to less
valuable clerical duties. Id.
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work." In addition, the district court rejected the plaintiffs' alternative claim
that, although their work was not equal to that of male guards, the differential
in wages paid to male and female guards was in part the product of intentional
sex discrimination. 28 The district court held that, as a matter of law, a sex-
based wage discrimination claim could not be brought under Title VII unless it
satisfied the equal work standard of the Equal Pay Act."
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, while leaving undisturbed the
district court's finding that male and female guards did not perform equal
work, 30
 held that the female guards could nonetheless state a claim of wage
discrimination under Title VII. 3 ' In reaching this conclusion, the court re-
viewed the legislative history of the Bennett Amendment and determined that
the purpose of the amendment was merely to incorporate into Title VII the
affirmative defenses to claims of wage discrimination contained in the Equal
Pay Act. 32 In addition, the court relied on the broad remedial policy behind Ti-
tle VII as support for its conclusion that Title VII wage discrimination claims
are not limited to cases satisfying the equal work requirement of the Equal Pay
Act." The court of appeals therefore remanded the case to the district court
with instructions to allow the plaintiffs to present evidence to substantiate their
claim that the County intentionally discriminated against female guards in
establishing its pay scales."
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, affirmed the holding of the court of
appeals." At the outset, the majority emphasized the narrowness of the issue
before the Court. The Court noted that the female guards' claim was not based
on a theory of comparable worth. Such a claim, if established,would require
equal compensation for jobs which, although different, had the same intrinsic
value or difficulty." Instead, the Court stated, the plaintiffs sought to show by
direct evidence that their employer discriminated against them by setting the
wage rates for female employees, but not for male employees, at a level lower
than its own evaluation of the worth of the jobs would warrant. 37 The Court
declared that "the narrow question in this case is whether such a claim is
precluded by the . . . Bennett Amendment." 38
Having isolated the central issue in the case, the Court turned to con-




" Gunther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882, 887, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 792, 795 (9th Cir. 1979).
31 Id. at 891, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 798.
32 Id. at 889-90, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 797.
33 Id. at 890, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. (BNA) Cas. at 797-98.
34 Id. at 891, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. (BNA) Cas. at 798. For a comprehensive discussion
and analysis of the court of appeals decision in Gunther, see 22 B.C.L. REV. 184 (1980).
33 County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 181 (1981).
36 Id. at 166.
" Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 168-69.
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jority, the language of the amendment suggests that Congress intended only to
incorporate the affirmative defenses of the Equal Pay Act into Title VII." The
Court noted that the amendment bars sex-based wage discrimination claims
under Title VII where differences in compensation are "authorized" by the
Equal Pay Act. 41 According to the Court, the Equal Pay Act authorized wage
differentials only in those cases which fall within the Act's four affirmative
defenses: 42 The Court rejected the County's argument that this construction of
the Bennett Amendment would render it superfluous since all of the affirmative
defenses set out in the Equal Pay Act already appear in Title VII.° The Court
noted that despite the duplication of defenses in the two statutes, the Bennett
Amendment would still have meaning if it is viewed as a technical amendment,
designed to guarantee a consistent interpretation of the exceptions to the pro-
hibition on sex-based wage differentials regardless of whether the discrimina-
tion claim was brought under the Equal Pay Act or Title VII. 44 Further, the
Court noted, incorporation of the Equal Pay Act's fourth affirmative defense,
which permits wage differentials based on any factor other than sex, could have
a significant impact on Title VII litigation. 45 In this regard, the Court em-
phasized that Title VII's prohibition of discriminatory practices is broadly in-
clusive, prohibiting not only overt discrimination but also practices which,
while fair on their face, operate in a discriminatory manner. 46 In contrast, the
purpose of the fourth affirmative defense to the Equal Pay Act was, according
to the Court, to limit claims cognizable under the Act to those alleging that dif-
ferences in compensation are the result of overt sex discrimination. 47 Once the
fourth defense was incorporated in Title VII, therefore, claims based on
employment practices which require certain physical qualifications, which
although facially neutral, operate to exclude women ; would not be actionable
under Title VII. The Court suggested that some of the procedural rules
developed for Title VII litigation may have to be altered in order to accom-
modate the incorporation of the Equal Pay Act's narrower prohibition on wage
differentials." The Court did not decide precisely what effect the incorporation
of the Equal Pay Act's defenses would have on wage discrimination litigation
under Title VII. Nevertheless, the Court found the possibility that incorpora-
tion of the Equal Pay Act's affirmative defenses into Title VII would necessi-
tate changes in the structure of Title VII litigation gave the Bennett Amend-
ment significance beyond merely making the defenses available in Title VII
suits." Consequently, the Court determined that its interpretation of the Ben-
nett Amendment did not render the amendment meaningless even though
4° Id. at 168.
" Id. at 168-69.
" Id.
43 Id. at 169-70.




48 Id. at 170-71.
49 Id. at 171.
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Title VII already contained provisions creating defenses similar to those pro-
vided in the Equal Pay Act."
After concluding that the language of the Bennett Amendment supported
the interpretation that it was intended to incorporate only the Equal Pay Act's
affirmative defenses into Title VII, the Court reviewed the legislative history of
the amendment. 5 ' The Court noted that the sponsor of the amendment
characterized it as a "technical" amendment, designed to ensure that the pro-
visions of the Equal Pay Act were not nullified in the event of a conflict with
Title VII. 52
 According to the Court, these statements may be read as referring
to the Equal Pay Act's four affirmative defenses." The Court concluded that
this interpretation was more consistent with Senator Bennett's characterization
of the amendment as a technical provision than an interpretation making all of
the restrictions of the Equal Pay Act applicable to claims brought under Title
Although the Court found support for its interpretation of the Bennett
Amendment in the legislative history of the provision, it acknowledged that
there were also statements in the legislative history which would support an in-
terpretation of the Bennett Amendment as incorporating into Title VII both
the affirmative defenses and the substantive restrictions on wage discrimina-
tion claims contained in the Equal Pay Act." In addition, the majority
recognized that administrative interpretations of the Bennett Amendment by
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission have not been consistent."
The Court noted that the Commission's guidelines initially provided that the
Equal Pay Act's equal work standard was applicable to Title VII wage discrim-
ination claims." The Court noted, however, that this provision was later
deleted from the Commission guidelines" and that, in any event, the original
56 Id.
" Id. at 171-76.
" Id. at 173 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 13647 (1964)).
53 Id. at 174.
54 Id. at 174-75.
" Id. at 176. The Court specifically referred to a statement made by Representative
Celler when Title VII was under consideration by the House of Representatives. Id. Represent-
ative Celler explained each of the Senate's amendments to the House before the vote on the bill.
See 110 CONG. REC. 15896 (1964). He described the Bennett Amendment as providing that
"compliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act as amended Equal Pay Act satisfies the re-
quirements of the title barring discrimination because of sex." 110 CONG. REC. 15896 (1964).
According to the Gunther Court, this statement cannot be read literally because it would not only
restrict wage discrimination claims to those actionable under the Equal Pay Act, but would also
block all other sex discrimination claims as well. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S.
161, 176 (1981). The Court concluded, therefore, that Representative Celler's explanation was
not intended to be precise, and should be disregarded. Id.
36 Id. at 177-78.
57 Id. at 177 (quoting 29 C.F.R. 1604.7(a) (1966)). The guideline provided that "the
standards of 'equal pay for equal work' set forth in the Equal Pay Act for determining what is
unlawful discrimination in compensation are applicable to Title VII." 29 C.F.R. 5 1604.7(a)
(1966).
" County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 177 (1981). See 37 Fed. Reg. 6837
(1972). The current guideline provides only that the Equal Pay Act's defenses may be raised in a
Title VII action. 29 C.F.R. $ 1604.8 (1972).
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guideline was not followed consistently by the Commission." The Court
recognized that neither the legislative history nor the administrative interpreta-
tions of the Bennett Amendment were unambiguously consistent with its inter-
pretation of the amendment. 6° Nevertheless, the Court concluded that substan-
tial support existed for a reading of the amendment as incorporating only the
affirmative defenses of the Equal Pay Act into Title VII. 6 ' The majority
therefore determined that the lack of an explicit confirmation of its interpreta-
tion in the legislative history or of a consistently supportive administrative in-
terpretation should not prevent the adoption of what the Court found was the
most persuasive construction of the amendment. 62
The Court then stated that an interpretation of the Bennett Amendment
which does not restrict wage discrimination claims under Title VII to claims of
unequal pay for equal work is required in order to implement the broad
remedial purposes of Title VII. 63 The Court noted that if Title VII wage
discrimination claims were restricted by the equal work standard of the Equal
Pay Act, certain forms of wage discrimination would be rendered immune
from attack under Title VII." In addition, the Court pointed out that the
Equal Pay Act applies to a narrower range of employers than does Title VII. 63
Consequently, the Court noted, if all of the restrictions of the Equal Pay Act
were made applicable to wage discrimination claims under Title VII, the
coverage of Title VII would be limited to those employers covered by the Equal
Pay Act." The Court concluded that such a restriction on Title VII's protec-
tion against sex-based wage discrimination was impossible to reconcile with the
Court's past interpretations of Title VII as embodying Congressional intent to
"strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women
resulting from sex stereotypes. " 67 The Court, therefore, rejected an interpreta-
tion of the Bennett Amendment which would incorporate all of the restrictions
of the Equal Pay Act into Title VII."
Having concluded on the basis of the language and legislative history of
the Bennett Amendment, and the policy behind Title VII, that the amendment
59 County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 177 (1981). The Court noted that,
while the original guideline was in effect, the Commission frequently adopted the opposite posi-
tion in its opinions and decisions. Id. See, e.g., General Counsel Opinion, Oct. 12, 1965, reprinted
in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 1ST ANNUAL DIGEST OF LEGAL INTERPRETA-
TIONS, July 1965-66; E.E.O.C. Dec. No. 71-2629, June 25, 1971, 4 Fed. Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 250 (1971).
6° County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 176, 178 (1981).
61 Id.
62 Id.
65 Id. at 178.
64 Id. at 178-79. The Court noted that if the Bennett Amendment were interpreted as
restricting wage discrimination claims under Title VII to cases which satisfy the 'equal work'
standard, a woman who was discriminatorily underpaid would have no remedy unless her
employer also employed a man in an equal job in the same establishment at a higher rate of pay.
Id.
65 Id. at 179.
66
 Id.
67 Id. at 180 (quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,
707 n.13 (1978)).
66
 452 U.S. at 180.
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should not be read to restrict sex-based wage discrimination claims under Title
VII to cases cognizable under the equal work standard of the Equal Pay Act,
the Court held that the female guards' claim of intentional sex discrimination
was not barred merely because they failed to establish that they performed
work equal to that of male guards. 69 The Court therefore affirmed the holding
of the court of appeals that the plaintiffs must be given an opportunity to
demonstrate that the County intentionally discriminated on the basis of sex in
establishing its wage schedules."
In a dissenting opinion joined by three other Justices, Justice Rehnquist
rejected the majority's interpretation of the Bennett Amendment. 7 ' The
dissenters contended that the amendment was intended to incorporate into
Title VII the equal work standard of the Equal Pay Act." Under this inter-
pretation, a plaintiff cannot state a sex-based wage discrimination claim under
Title VII unless she can establish that she was paid less than male employees
who were performing the same work."
As did the majority, the dissenting Justices reviewed the legislative history
of the Equal Pay Act, Title VII, and the Bennett Amendment. 74 The dissenters
concluded that this history clearly established that Congress intended to
recognize wage discrimination claims only to the extent that they were prem-
ised on an allegation of unequal pay for equal work." The dissenting Justices
gave great weight to statements made during the debate on the Equal Pay Act
which emphasized that the provision prohibited sex-based wage differentials
only where male and female employees performed equal work." The dissenters
asserted that it 'defied common sense to believe that the same Congress .. .
intended . . . to abandon the limitations of the equal work approach just one
year later, when it enacted Title VII. "" Moreover, according to the
dissenters, nothing in the legislative history of Title VII or the Bennett Amend-
ment indicated that Congress intended to confine the application of the equal
work standard to Equal Pay Act actions." In fact, the dissenters argued, the
legislative history of the Bennett Amendment demonstrated that Congress in-
tended to make the equal work standard applicable to sex-based wage discrimi-
nation claims under Title VII." Specifically, the dissenting Justices pointed to
a statement by Senator Clark, floor manager of Title VII in the Senate, which
indicated that the equal work standard of the Equal Pay Act would apply to
69 Id. at 181.
7° Id.
" Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
72 Id.
" Id.
" Id. at 184-85.
" Id, at 198-99.
76 Id. at 184-87. The dissenters emphasized that the Equal Pay Act was initially drafted
to prohibit disparities in pay for men and women performing comparable work but that this for-
mulation was rejected in favor of the equal work standard. Id. at 186-87 (citing 109 CONG. REC.
9196-97 (1963)).
" 452 U.S. at 188.
79 Id. at 190, 193.
79 Id at 193.
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wage discrimination claims under Title VII. 80 In addition, the dissenters
disputed the majority's interpretation of Senator Bennett's statement that the
purpose of his amendment was to prevent the nullification of the provisions of
the Equal Pay Act in the event of a conflict with Title VII." Under the
dissenters' interpretation, Senator Bennett's reference was to all of the provi-
sions of the Equal Pay Act, including the equal work standard, and not just to
the Act's affirmative defenses."
The dissenters also noted that their interpretation of the Bennett Amend-
ment was consistent with the interpretation initially adopted by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission." According to the dissenters, great
weight should be accorded the guidelines originally promulgated by the Com-
mission, which stated that the standards of the Equal Pay Act were applicable
to Title VII wage discrimination claims." In contrast, the dissenters asserted,
the Commission's subsequent deletion of this statement from its guidelines was
not significant in the absence of new legislative history which would support the
change." Thus, on the basis of their reading of the legislative history and ad-
ministrative interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions, the dissenters
concluded that the Bennett Amendment incorporates the equal work standard
into Title VII. 86
In addition to disputing the majority's reading of the legislative history,
the dissenters asserted that the majority's interpretation of the Bennett Amend-
ment would render both the amendment and the Equal Pay Act meaningless."
The dissenters noted that the four affirmative defenses set out in the Equal Pay
Act which, under the majority's interpretation, are incorporated into Title VII
by the Bennett Amendment, already appear in Title VII. 88 In addition, the
dissenters asserted that since, under the majority's view, plaintiffs can state a
wage discrimination claim under Title VII regardless of whether they perform
work equal to that of male employees, the Equal Pay Act's limitation of sex-
based wage discrimination claims to allegations of unequal pay for equal work
is no longer of any consequence. 89 The dissenters argued that an interpretation
of the Bennett Amendment which has the effect of rendering either the Equal
Pay Act or the amendment itself superfluous violates longstanding principles of
statutory construction and should, therefore, be rejected. 9 °
Finally, the dissenters considered the policy justifications offered by the
majority to support its reading of the Bennett Amendment." The dissenters re-
" Id. at 191 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 7217 (1964)). The Gunther majority gave no
weight to this statement, noting that it was made prior to the adoption of the Bennett Amend-
ment and thus could have no bearing on the meaning of the amendment. 452 U.S. at 172 n.12.
8 ' Id. at 193.
02 Id.
81 Id. at 195-97.
" Id. at 195-96.
85 Id. at 197 n.9.
86 Id. at 198.
" Id. at 193, 199.
88 Id. at 199-200.
89 Id. at 193.
" Id. at 190-91, 200.
91 Id. at 201-03.
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jetted the majority's conclusion that limiting Title VII wage discrimination
claims to cases which satisfy the equal work standard would contravene the
broad remedial purposes of the statute. 92 The dissenters noted that under their
interpretation of the Bennett Amendment, the substantive provisions of the
Equal Pay Act, in particular the equal work standard, are incorporated into
Title VII but the provisions regarding the kinds of employers to whom the Act
applies are not. 99 The dissenters asserted, therefore, that the majority's fears
that the coverage of Title VII would be restricted by the adoption of the
dissenters' interpretation of the Bennett Amendment, were groundless." Ac-
cording to the dissenters, the only wage discrimination claims which would be
barred under their interpretation of the Bennett Amendment are those where
the plaintiff argues that she has been discriminated against because she was
paid less than a male employee for a job which was, although dissimilar, of
comparable intrinsic worth." The dissenters asserted that the absence of a
remedy for claims based on the theory of comparable worth is the result of an
explicit Congressional decision, embodied in the Equal Pay Act, not to
recognize such claims. 96 The dissenters argued that the subsequent enactment
of Title VII was not intended to override this earlier Congressional determina-
tion."
The dissenting Justices recognized that the majority opinion did not ap-
prove the theory of comparable worth as the basis for a claim of wage
discrimination under Title VII." In fact, accordirig to the dissenters, the nar-
rowness of the majority's holding may be its "saving feature." 99 The dissenters
emphasized, however, that under their reading of the Bennett Amendment, no
cause of action for sex-based wage discrimination should be permitted under
Title VII in the absence of proof of unequal pay for equal work)°°
The Gunther majority relied on the language of the Bennett Amendment,
its legislative history and that of Title VII as a whole, and the policy against sex
discrimination expressed by Congress in Title VII, to support its conclusion
that the Bennett Amendment should not be construed to restrict sex-based
discrimination claims under Title VII to claims involving unequal pay for
equal work. The dissenters, in contrast, considered the same evidence but
reached the opposite conclusion. Analysis of the statutes and their legislative
history, and consideration of the expressed Congressional purpose in enacting
Title VII compels the conclusion that the majority's position is the correct one.
First, the language of the Bennett Amendment provides that wage dif-
ferentials will not be unlawful under Title VII if they are "authorized" by the
92 Id. at 201.
93 Id. at 203.
94 id.
" Id.
" Id. at 202-03.
92 Id. at 203.
98 Id.
99 Id.
'°° Id. at 204.
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Equal Pay Act.'°' Under the Gunther majority's interpretation of this language,
the only differentials authorized by the Equal Pay Act are those which fall
within the Act's four affirmative defenses — those which result from the opera-
tion of seniority systems, merit systems, systems which measure compensation
by the quantity and quality of work performed, and systems based on any fac-
tor other than sex.'" In contrast, the dissent's interpretation of the language of
the Bennett Amendment would require that the Equal Pay Act be read to
"authorize" wage differentials not only in the four situations specifically ex-
empted from the statute's coverage, but also in any case where the plaintiff was
unable to establish that she performed work equal to that of more highly com-
pensated male employees. The Gunther majority would, therefore, define
"authorized" as requiring some affirmative sanction or exemption whereas,
under the dissenter's interpretation, any practice not specifically prohibited is
"authorized." The majority's view is more consonant with the ordinary mean-
ing of "authorized," which implies some kind of official sanction or
approval. 103 In the absence of any indication that Congress intended otherwise,
the ordinary meaning of words used in a statute should govern its interpreta-
tion.'" Thus, the most natural reading of the .Bennett Amendment would be
that it protects from challenge under Title VII only those wage differentials
which Congress affirmatively sanctioned in the Equal Pay Act. Under this
reading of the amendment, the Gunther majority was correct in its conclusion
that the Equal Pay Act does not authorize wage differentials in all cases which
fail to satisfy the equal work standard. Rather, the Equal Pay Act is simply in-
applicable to cases where the equal pay for equal work requirement is not at
issue.
Further, contrary to the Gunther dissenters' assertion, an interpretation of
the Bennett Amendment as incorporating only the affirmative defenses of the
Equal Pay Act into Title VII does not render the Bennett Amendment
superfluous. Although Tide VII does contain provisions which duplicate the
Equal Pay Act's defenses based on seniority, merit systems, or systems which
measure earnings by the quantity or quality of production,'" there is no
specific provision in Title VII which corresponds to the fourth affirmative
defense of the Equal Pay Act. This defense exempts from the Act's prohibition
on wage differentials any wage system based on a factor other than sex.'" The
Bennett Amendment was, therefore, necessary to ensure that all defenses
against claims of unequal pay for equal work under the Equal Pay Act would
be available in similar cases brought under Title VII. Moreover, since the
range of employers covered by the Equal Pay Act and Title VII are not iden-
'°' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976). See text of amendment supra at note 10.
142 See 29 U.S.C.	 206(d)(1) (1976).
"a See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 122 (rev. 5th ed. 1979); WEBSTER'S NEW COL-
LEGIATE DICTIONARY 75 (1979).
104 See Burns v. Akala, 420 U.S, 575, 580 (1975) ("(W]crds used in a statute are to be
given their ordinary meaning in the absence of persuasive reasons to the contrary. . . .").
"a See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(h) (1976).
"6 29 U.S.C. 5 206(d)(1)(iv) (1976).
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tical,'" the Bennett Amendment's provisions incorporating the Equal Pay
Act's affirmative defenses into Title VII was necessary to ensure that these
defenses would be available to employers not subject to an action under the
Equal Pay Act but falling within the broader coverage of Title VII. The Ben-
nett Amendment is thus not rendered superfluous by a construction which in-
terprets it as only incorporating into Title VII the Equal Pay Act's affirmative
defenses and not its substantive standards.
In addition, a construction of the Bennett Amendment as incorporating
into Title VII only the affirmative defenses to the Equal Pay Act and not its
equal work standard finds significant support in the legislative history of both
the Bennett Amendment and Title VII. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 was intended as a sweeping prohibition on discrimination in employment.
The broad language of the statute indicates that Congress intended to
eliminate all forms of employment discrimination.'" Initially, Title VII did
not include any references to sex in its provisions prohibiting discrimination in
employment.'" Shortly before the bill was passed by the House of Represent-
atives, however, an amendment was proposed to add sex to the list of pro-
hibited bases of discrimination in Title VII."° Statements made during the
brief debate on this amendment indicate that its purpose was to ensure that
women were given protection against discrimination equivalent to that af-
forded to other disadvantaged groups by the statute."'
Further, the sparse legislative history of the Bennett Amendment does not
support the conclusion that it was intended to impose any substantial restric-
tions on the protection afforded to women by Title VII. The Bennett Amend-
ment was proposed as a "technical" provision, for the purpose of clarifying the
relationship between Title VII and the Equal Pay Act.'" The sponsor's
characterization of the amendment as only a technical correction of Title VII is
more consistent with a construction of the Bennett Amendment as incor-
porating only the Equal Pay Act's affirmative defenses. If the purpose of the
amendment was to incorporate into Title VII not only the affirmative defenses
of the Equal Pay Act, but also all of its substantive provisions, the amendment
could not fairly be characterized as merely a technical correction of Title VII.
107 The Equal Pay Act is part of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. (1976 and
Supp. III). The Act does not apply to employers operating certain retail sales, agriculture,
fishing, and newspaper publishing businesses. See 29 U.S.C. §5 203(s), 213(a) (1976 and Supp.
III). In contrast, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §5 2000e-1 to 17 (1976), applies to employers with 15 or
more employees. 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-1(b) (1976).
1 " Id. 5 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976). See text of statute supra at note 10. The Supreme Court
has repeatedly recognized that Congress intended, in enacting Title VII, to strike broadly at all
forms of employment discrimination7See, e.g., Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart,
435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
109 See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1963).
110 See 110 CoNG. REC. 2577 (1964).
1 " See id. (statement of Senator Smith); Id. at 2578 (statement of Senator Griffiths); Id.
at 2579 (statement of Senator Griffiths); Id. at 2582 (statement of Senator May); Id. at 2583
(statement of Senator Kelly); Id. at 2584 (statement of Senator Gathings).
112 See id. at 13647 (1964) (statement of Senator Bennett).
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In addition, the only speaker in support of the Bennett Amendment in the
Senate who addressed the content of the amendment stated that "all that the
pending amendment does is recognize those exceptions, that are carried in the
[Equal Pay Act]. '" 12 Significantly, Senator Bennett did not dispute this
characterization of his amendment. ' 4 The limited legislative history of the
Bennett Amendment, therefore, supports the Gunther majority's interpretation
of the amendment as incorporating into Title VII only the affirmative defenses
of the Equal Pay Act.'"
As the Gunther dissenters point out, there exists some subsequent
legislative history which would support a finding of Congressional intent to
make both the affirmative defenses and the substantive standards of the Equal
Pay Act applicable to Title VII litigation. A year after the adoption of the
amendment, Senator Bennett inserted in the Congressional Record a state-
ment which explained that his amendment "means that discrimination in com-
pensation on account of sex does not violate Title VII unless it also violates the
Equal Pay Act. '"' 6 The Gunther majority did not give great weight to this state-
ment, noting that the Court has traditionally been reluctant to ascribe much
significance to statements made after the passage of legislation."' The Gunther
majority's position on the weight to be given to subsequent legislative history is
indeed consistent with past Court practice.'" Further, even if the statements of
Senator Bennett as to his intent in proposing the amendment were considered
significant, they would not necessarily resolve the issue of the intent of Con-
gress as a whole when it passed the amendment. In this regard, it should be
noted that after Senator Bennett inserted his interpretation of the amendment
in the Congressional Record, Senator Clark, floor manager of Title VII in the
Senate, inserted in the Record a statement characterizing Senator Bennett's
remarks as "a drastic reinterpretation of the amendment." 19 Furthermore, he
expressed doubt that Congress would have enacted the amendment if Senator
Bennett had offered this interpretation while the amendment was under con-
sideration in the Senate.' 2° In view of the lack of consensus in this subsequent
legislative history as to what the Congress believed it was enacting, the Gunther
majority was justified in giving it no weight."' Thus, although the legislative
1 " 110 CONG. REC. 13647 (1964) (statement of Senator Dirksen).
"4 See 110 CONG. REC. 13647 (1964).
"" The Gunther majority noted that, when Title VII, as amended by the Senate, was
returned to the House of Representatives, Representative Celler offered an explanation of the
Bennett Amendment which described it as providing that compliance with the Equal Pay Act
would also constitute compliance with Title VII. See supra note 56. As the Gunther majority
correctly recognized, however, this statement cannot be taken at face value, since it would im-
munize from attack under Title VII not only wage discrimination claims which failed to qualify
under the 'equal work' standard but also discriminatory employment practices involving hiring
or promotion policies because the Equal Pay Act applies only to discrimination in compensation.
See 29 U.S.C. 206(d)(1) (1976).
" 6 111 CONG. REC. 13359 (1965).
" 7 County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 176 n.16 (1981).
See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 354 n.39 (1977).
19 111 CONG. REC. 18263 (1965).
no Id.
"' Similarly, the Gunther majority was justified in ascribing little force to the inconsistent
254	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 24:47
history of the Bennett Amendment is not entirely unambiguous, it does contain
significant support for the Gunther majority's interpretation of the Bennett
Amendment.
The Gunther majority's interpretation of the Bennett Amendment,
moreover, is consistent with the broad remedial objectives Congress espoused
in enacting Title VII.' 22 Under the Gunther Court's interpretation, a Title VII
action will be available to women who, although unable to demonstrate that
they performed work equal to that of male employees, can present evidence
that their employer intentionally discriminated on the basis of sex in setting
wage rates. In contrast, an interpretation limiting sex-based compensation
claims cognizable under Title VII to cases where the plaintiff could satisfy the
equal work standard of the Equal Pay Act would effectively insulate from at-
tack several forms of intentional sex discrimination in compensation. In order
to state a claim under the Equal Pay Act, a plaintiff must show that she re-
ceived compensation lower than that paid to a male employee in the same
establishment who performed the same work.' 23
 Thus, if a woman were hired
for a position which had never been occupied by a male and was told by her
employer that she would receive higher compensation if she were male, she
would be unable to state a claim under the Equal Pay Act since she could not
demonstrate that a male employee had ever been compensated at a higher level
for performing the same work. 124
 If the equal work standard were incorporated
into Title VII, a plaintiff in this situation would have no cause of action under
either statute and would, therefore, have no recourse against this arguably bla-
tant discriminatory practice. Similarly, in cases where the employer inten-
tionally discriminated against women in setting wage levels, and there were no
women holding positions equal to those held by men, there would be no cause
of action under the Equal Pay Act and, if the equal work standard were held to
apply to Title VII actions no claim under Title VII.'" The insulation of these
practices from attack under Title VII cannot be reconciled with the expressed
intent of Congress to eliminate all forms of discrimination in employment.
interpretations of the Bennett Amendment by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text. In general, interpretations of legislation by the ad-
ministrative agency charged with its implementation are entitled to deference. See Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971). In view of the EEOC's failure to consistently imple-
ment its 1965 guideline requiring Title VII plaintiffs to satisfy the 'equal work' standard,
however, and the Commission's later deletion of this provision from its guidelines, see supra notes
58.59 and accompanying text. The Gunther Court was warranted in giving the earlier interpreta-
tion less weight. See Skidmore v. Swift Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
' 22 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
123 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
' 2+ See Rinkel v. Associated Pipeline Contractors, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 224
(D. Alaska 1978), where the court held that "[w]hile the practice of paying a uniquely situated
employee less than would be paid a member of the opposite sex in the same position may be a
violation of certain laws and reprehensible, it does not violate this Equal Pay Act. . . ." Id. at
226.
123
 See Gunther v. County of Washington, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 788 (D. Or.
1976), where the district court, which interpreted the Bennett Amendment as making the 'equal
work' standard applicable to Title VII, stated that "if the jobs are substantially dissimilar, that is
the end of the inquiry." Id. at 791.
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Further, an interpretation of the Bennett Amendment which limited the
availability of a remedy for sex-based wage discrimination to cases of unequal
pay for equal work would contravene the Congressional purpose in including
sex as a prohibited basis for discrimination in Title VII. As previously noted,
the legislative history of Title VII demonstrates that Congress intended to af-
ford women the same degree of protection against discrimination as the other
disadvantaged groups covered by the act.' 26 The adoption of an interpretation
of the Bennett Amendment which would deny a Title VII action to women who
could not meet the equal work standard would be inconsistent with this inten-
tion since there is no similar restriction on the availability of Title VII actions
to redress intentional discrimination on the basis of race, religion, or national
origin.'" Thus, if the employer in Gunther had established a wage schedule
which intentionally discriminated against black employees by paying them less
than the employer's independent evaluation of their worth would warrant,
while paying white employees 100% of their evaluated worth, the minority
employees would have a cause of action under Title VII regardless of whether
they performed work equal to that of white employees. If, however, the equal
work standard of the Equal Pay Act were incorporated into Title VII, female
employees, on the same facts, would be barred from recovery under Title VII if
they could not show that they performed work equal to that of male employees.
This result cannot be reconciled with the express Congressional intent to afford
women protection equivalent to that provided for other traditionally disadvan-
taged groups by Title VII. The Gunther majority's interpretation of the Bennett
Amendment as incorporating into Title VII only the Equal Pay Act's affirm-
ative defenses, and not the equal work standard, avoids this inconsistency. The
Gunther majority's interpretation is, therefore, consonant with the broad policy
objectives of Title VII.
As the preceding analysis demonstrates, the Gunther majority's interpreta-
tion of the Bennett Amendment is consistent with the language and legislative
history of both the Bennett Amendment and Title VII. In addition, the Gunther
Court's refusal to read the amendment as imposing a substantial restriction on
the availability of Title VII actions to redress discrimination in compensation
on the basis of sex is consistent with the broad policy objectives of Title VII. It
should be emphasized, however, that in holding that a plaintiff may state a
claim under Title VII without first satisfying the equal work standard of the
Equal Pay Act, the Gunther Court did not sanction claims based on the theory of
comparable worth. 128 Rather, the Court held only that Title VII claims of sex-
based discrimination in compensation are not barred solely because the plain-
08 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
L" See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) (1976).
128 See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. The theory of 'comparable worth' as a
basis for claims of wage discrimination has occasioned much commentary. For a comprehensive
presentation of the argument in favor of recognizing the 'comparable worth' theory, see R.
Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 121 L.
REF. 399 (1979). A rebuttal to the Blumrosen article, presenting arguments against the adoption
of the "comparable worth" theory, appears in B. Nelson, E. Opton, Jr., T. Wilson, Wage
Discrimination and the "Comparable Worth" Theory in Perspective, 131 L. REF. 233 (1980).
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tiffs cannot prove that they performed work equal to that of male employees.'"
As the Gunther Court acknowledged, the precise contours of lawsuits permitted
under Title VII as a result of its decision remain to be determined.'"
B. * Customer Preference and the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification:
Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co.'
Under section 703 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the Act)
discrimination by an employer against an employee with respect to "compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" on the basis of sex is
unlawful.' This broad prohibition against sex discrimination, however, is
qualified by section 703(e)(1) of the Act which permits an employer to
discriminate "in those certain instances where . . . sex ... is a bona fide oc-
cupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation" of a
business.' In delineating the situations in which the bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ) exception entitles an employer to engage in sex
discrimination, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the Com-
mission) and the courts have confronted the issue of whether customer
preference can convert the sex of an employee into a bona fide occupational
qualification.*
129 County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 181 (1981).
"° Id.
By Janet Claire Corcoran, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
653 F.2d 1273, 26 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) 815 (9th Cir. 1981).
2 42 U.S.C. $ 2000e-2(a) (1976). Section 703 provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer — (1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation terms, conditions, or privileges or
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.. . .
For a detailed review of sex discrimination in the employment context, see Taub, Keeping
Women in Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se as a Form of Employment Discrimination, 21 B.C. L. REV. 345
(1980).
42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(a) (1976). For a thorough discussion of the legislative history
and judicial interpretations of the bona fide occupational qualification exception to Title V11, see
Sirota, Sex Discrimination: Title VII and the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification, 55 TEx. L. REV.
1025, 1027-33, 1042-51 (1977).
4 Among the Commission decisions addressing the impact of customer preference on
the determination of whether a bona fide occupational qualification existed to justify an otherwise
discriminatory employment practice are EEOC Decision No. 71-2338, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1249 (June 2, 1971) (belief that customers would not go on hunting trips with females did
not qualify male gender as a bona fide occupational qualification for a managerial position that
involved taking customers to football games, to dinner, and on hunting trips), and EEOC Deci-
sion No. 70-11, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 118, 119 (July 8, 1969) (belief allegedly held by
customers of a firm providing courier services that females could not provide adequate security as
guards was insufficient to qualify sex as a bona fide occupational qualification for the position).
See EEOC Decision No. 72-0697, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 444, 445 (December 27, 1971)
(need to accommodate racially discriminatory policies of other nations cannot be the basis of a
valid BFOQ exception).
The leading court decision holding that stereotyped customer preference does not justify
a sexually discriminatory employment practice is Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442
F.2d 385, 389, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 337, 340 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950
(1971). The Seventh Circuit is the only other circuit court that has addressed whether customer
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The Commission has consistently maintained that effective implementa-
tion of Title VIPs general ban on sex discrimination requires a narrow con-
struction of the bona fide occupational qualification exception.' Accordingly,
the only circumstances in which Commission guidelines permit customer
preference to create a bona fide occupational qualification is where one is
"necessary for the purpose of authenticity or genuineness . . . e.g., an actor
or actress. "s Similarly, federal courts considering whether customer preference
can qualify sex as a bona fide occupational qualification have refused to adopt a
broad construction of the BFOQ exception.? In the leading decision, Diaz v.
preference can qualify sex as a bona fide occupational qualification. Sprogis v. United Air Lines,
444 F.2d 1194, 1199, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 621, 625 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
991 (1971).
EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. 1604.2(a) (1981).
The legislative history of Title VII supports the Commission's narrow construction of the BFOQ
exception. In an Interpretative Memorandum submitted to the Senate during debate on Tide
VII, the floor managers indicated that "[T]his exception is a limited right to discriminate on the
basis of . sex ... where the reason is a bona fide occupational qualification." (emphasis
added). 110 CoNG. REC. 7212, 7213 (1964).
The federal courts generally have agreed with the Commission's narrow construction of
the BFOQ exception, See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333-34, 15 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 10, 16 (1977). The Supreme Court has declared that the Commission's Guidelines, while
not binding on courts, should be shown great deference. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 433-34, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 175, 179 (1971). In Eothard, the Court approved the
portion of the guidelines (29 C. F .R. § 1604.2(A)) relating to the bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. at 334 n.19, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 16 n.19.
The Court there stated: The EEOC issued guidelines on sex discrimination in 1965 reflecting
its position that the bona fide occupational qualification as to sex shall be interpreted narrowly'
... It has adhered to that principle consistently, and its construction of the statute can according-
ly be given weight." Id., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 16 n.19.
The circuit courts, as well, have given substantial weight to the Commission's narrow
construction of the statute. The uniform view of' the federal courts which have construed §
703(e)(1) is that it was meant to be an extremely narrow exception to Title VII's general rule re-
quiring equality of employment opportunities. See, e.g., In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings
in the Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142, 1145-46, 17 Fair Ernpl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 1513, 1516 (7th
Cir. 1978) (adopting the Rosenfeld construction of the BFOQ exception); Diaz v. Pan Am. World
Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 387, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 337, 338 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 950 (1971) ("[W]e adopt the EEOC guidelines which state that 'the Commission
believes that the bona fide occupational qualification as to sex should be interpreted
narrowly.' "); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1224-25, 3 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 604, 608 (9th Cir. 1971) (court adopted the Commission's determination that the
BFOQ establishes a narrow exception); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228,
235, 1 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 656, 660-61 (5th Cir. 1969) (Commission's guidelines
relating to the bona fide occupational qualification are "entitled to considerable weight.").
29 C.F.R. 5 1604.2(a)(iii) (1981). The Commission guidelines provide in relevant
part:
(1) The Commission will find the following situations do :not warrant the applica-
tion of the bona fide occupational qualification exception. . .
(iii) The refusal to hire an individual because of the preferences of coworkers, the
employer, clients or customers except as covered specifically in subparagraph
(a)(2) of this section.
(2) Where it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity or genuineness, the Com-
mission will consider sex to be a bona fide occupational qualification, e.g., an ac-
tor or actress.
Id.
7 Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
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Pan American World Airways, Inc., 8 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-
jected an argument that female sex was a bona fide occupational qualification
for a flight cabin attendant.° In determining whether the preferences of cus-
tomers for female flight cabin attendants could justify the airline's discrimina-
tory hiring policy, the court adopted an "essence of the business" test.'° Under
the Diaz "essence" test, focus is placed on whether the abilities upon which the
employer justifies a discriminatory practice are necessary or merely "tangen-
tial" to the essence of the business involved." A bona fide occupational
qualification exists only when an employer demonstrates that "the essence of
the business operation would be undermined" by hiring members of the ex-
cluded sex." The Fifth Circuit concluded that unless a customer preference is
actually based on a company's inability to perform the primary function or
service it offers, that preference is irrelevant to the determination of whether a
discriminatory employment practice is valid. 13 Despite this well defined test for
determining whether customer preference converts the sex of an employee into
(BNA) 337, 340 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444
F.2d 1194, 1199, 3 Fair Empl. Prae. Cas. (BNA) 621, 625 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991
(1971).
In Diaz, the Fifth Circuit ruled that customer preference for female flight cabin attend-
ants and the assumed superior abilities of females to perform the non-mechanical aspects of the
job did not qualify female gender as a bona fide occupational qualification. 442 F.2d at 388-89, 3
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 339-40. Similarly in Sprogis, the Seventh Circuit found no bona
fide occupational qualification in a rule requiring stewardesses (but not stewards) to be unmar-
ried. 444 F.2d at 1199, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 625. "The marital status of a
stewardess cannot be said to affect the individual woman's ability to create the proper
psychological climate of comfort, safety, and security for passengers. Nor does any passenger
preference for single stewardesses provide a valid reason for invoking the rule." Id.
8
 444 F.2d 385, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 337 (5th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 388, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 339. The defendant airline argued that
being female was a bona fide occupational qualification for the position of flight cabin attendant
because females performed the non-mechanical functions associated with the job in a more effec-
tive manner than males. Id.
" Id. at 388-89, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 339-40. In Diaz, the Ninth Circuit
refined an earlier test it had adopted for determining whether a discriminatory employment prac-
tice was valid under the BFOQ exception. In Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 408
F.2d 228, 1 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 656 (5th Cir. 1969), the court held that the test of
whether a bona fide occupational qualification exists is whether there is a "reasonable basis to
believe, that is, a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all women would be unable to
perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved." Id. at 235, 1 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 661. To avail itself of the BFOQ exception, an employer had to establish a basis in fact
for its belief that no members of the excluded sex could perform the job in question. Id. at 235, 1
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, (BNA) at 660-61, The court reasoned that were it to permit stereotyped
characterizations to support the exclusion of all members of one sex from consideration for a posi-
tion, the exception would "swallow the rule" against discrimination. Id.
" 442 F.2d at 388-89, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 339-40. The court defined
"essence" as the primary function of the business engaged in by an employer. Id. at 388, 3 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 339.
" Id. at 388, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 339.
" Id. at 389, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 340. While acknowledging that the
public's expectation of finding one sex in a particular role might cause some initial difficulty for
an employer, customer preference had no impact on the court's conclusion that female gender
was not a bona fide occupational qualification for a flight cabin attendant. Id. See infra note 67.
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a bona fide occupational qualification," the impact a customer preference on
this determination continues to trouble the courts.
During the Survey year, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ad-
dressed whether a customer preference which prevents customers from dealing
with an employer can constitute the basis of a valid bona fide occupational
qualif'ication. 15 In Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 16 the court held that preferences :of
foreign customers based on sexual stereotype cannot qualify as a bona fide oc-
cupational qualification even if those preferences would prevent customers
from dealing with an employer." The Fernandez decision is significant in two
respects. First, the decision clarifies the kind of evidence an employer must of-
fer to satisfy the Diaz "essence" test. To justify a discriminatory employment
practice under the BFOQ exception, an employer must offer proof both that
gender is a necessary factor in successful job performance and that hiring
members of the excluded sex for the position at issue would therefore under-
mine the essence of its business. Second, Fernandez clarifies the law concerning
customer preference and the bona fide occupational qualification. Although
Diaz had previously held that customer preference based on sexual stereotype
cannot qualify gender as a bona fide occupational qualification, the Ninth Cir-
cuit's ruling is novel in holding that such preferences are irrelevant to the
determination of whether a valid BFOQ exception exists even where Customers
would refuse to deal with an employer if employees were not of a certain sex.
The plaintiff in Fernandez, a female, was employed at Wynn Oil Company,
an international petro-chemical manufacturer, for nine years." During this
time the plaintiff held various positions, including that of administrative assist-
ant to Louis Dashwood, the vice-president of the International Operations
Division. 19 Although Fernandez performed many functions of Dashwood's job,
he chose not to promote her." His decision was based upon her value to him as
an assistant and upon his belief that defendant's customers and distributors,
many of whom were in Latin America and South America, would react
negatively to dealing with a woman in a high level management position." In
14 The Supreme Court employed the Diaz "essence" test in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 10 (1977), where the Court held that being male was
a bona fide occupational qualification for the position of correctional counselor in an all male,
maximum security prison.
Numerous federal courts have relied upon the Diaz test in determining whether gender
constitutes a bona fide occupational qualification. See; e.g., Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595
F.2d 1367, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1441 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928
(1980); Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1087, 21 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1031, 1036 (8th Cir. 1980); Smith v. Olin Chem. Co., 555 F.2d 1283, 1286, 15 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 290, 293 (5th Cir. 1977); Manhart v. City of Los Angeles Dep't of
Water, 553 F.2d 581, 587, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 11525, 1629 (9th Cir. 1976); Sprogis
v. United Airlines, 444 F.2d 1194, 1199, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 621, 625 (7th Cir.
1971).
15 Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 26 Fair Empl. Frac. Cas. (BNA) at 818.
" Id.
" Id. at 1277, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 818.
18 Id. at 1274, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 316.
18 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. Based on Dashwood's testimony, the trial court found that "many of Wynn's
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October, 1975, Dashwood's employment terminated and Joseph Borello,
formerly the Director of International Operations (DIO) became vice-
president of Worldwide Marketing. 22 Within three days, Borello informed Fer-
nandez of plans to terminate her administrative assistant position." In March,
1976, Borello hired Arturo Matthews to fill the position of DIO, although Fer-
nandez had requested consideration for the job. 24 In April, she accepted an
assignment as manager of a different division and remained employed by
Wynn until her discharge in February, 1977. 25
After her discharge, Fernandez filed an action with the federal district
court alleging that the refusal of her employer, the Wynn Oil Company, to pro-
mote her to the position of DIO was an act of sex discrimination in violation of
Title VII." The district court held for Wynn on two alternative grounds. First,
the court determined that Wynn's decision not to promote Fernandez was
based on her lack of qualifications rather than her sex, and, consequently, was
justified by a valid business purpose. 27 Second, the district court held that
Wynn was legally entitled to discriminate on the basis of sex in hiring a DIO
because sex was a bona fide occupational qualification for the position." Wynn
employees had testified that prevailing cultural customs and mores in Latin
America and South America would prevent customers there from doing
business with a female DIO. 29 The court acknowledged that customer
preferences should not be "bootstrapped to the level of business necessity.""
Nevertheless, the court held that customer preferences rise to ihe dignity of a
bona fide occupational qualification if "no customer will do business with a
member of one sex either because it would destroy the essence of the business
or would create serious safety and efficacy problems." 3 ' On this basis, the
district court found the preferences of Wynn's customers a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification."
South American distributors and customers, for instance, would be offended by a woman con-
ducting business in her hotel room. The offensive nature of this apparently innocuous conduct
stems from prevailing cultural customs and mores in Latin America." Fernandez v. Wynn Oil
Co., 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1162, 1164 (C.D.C. 1979).
The district court opinion frequently confuses South America with Latin America,
22




26 Id. at 1275, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 816. Fernandez sought injunctive
and declaratory relief, damages, and back pay against Wynn. 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at
1162.
27 653 F.2d at 1274, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 816. The district court found
that Fernandez failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she did not
demonstrate that she was qualified for the D10 position. Id. at 1275, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 817. Furthermore, even if she had been able to make out a prima facie case, the court
found that Wynn had a legitimate non-discriminatory purpose in preferring to hire Matthews:
his qualifications were far superior to those of Fernandez for the position of DIO. Id. at 1276, 26
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 817.
" 653 F.2d at 1274, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 816.
29 Id. at 1276, 26 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 817.
'° U. at 1276, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 818.
51 Id.
22 Id.
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The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision that no Title VII violation existed because sex was not a factor in
Wynn's refusal to promote Fernandez. 33 The court, however, rejected the
lower court's analysis of the bona fide occupational qualification issue. 34 The
court noted that in finding male gender a bona fide occupational qualification
for the position of DIO, the district court erred in both its factual findings and
its interpretation of Title VII."
The Ninth Circuit determined that the district court's finding that male
gender was a bona fide occupational qualification was factually erroneous
because no evidence had been presented establishing a factual basis for linking
sex with job performance." While acknowledging the testimony by Wynn
employees that a female DIO would have difficulty in conducting business in
South America from a hotel room, the court observed that no proof had been
offered that the position even required work of this nature." Furthermore, the
record provided no basis for the district court's findings that promoting Fer-
nandez to the position of DIO would "destroy the essence" of Wynn's
business or "create serious safety and efficacy problems.""
Finding incorrect the district court's factual determination that gender is a
bona fide occupational qualification for the DIO position, the circuit court
turned to the legal conclusions of the district court regarding the applicability of
the bona fide occupational qualification to the position of DIO. The court con-
cluded that the district court had erroneously interpreted Title VII." The court
found that the district court's interpretation allowed customer preference to
qualify as a bona fide occupational qualification when those preferences pre-
vent customers from dealing with an employer." In rejecting this interpreta-
tion of the BFOQ exception, the circuit court advanced three arguments. First,
the court considered several cases construing the statutory exception to Title
VII's ban on sex discrimination.'" Based on its reading of those decisions, the
33
 Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d at 1275, 1276, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 817, 818. Wynn argued that the district court decision was correct, but requested that
the Ninth Circuit abandon the district court discussion of the bona fide occupational qualification
defense because sex was not a factor in the refusal to promote Fernandez. Id., 26 Fair Empl,
Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 816.
The American Jewish Congress, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc., the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Women's Equal Right
Legal Defense and Education Fund presented amicus briefs in opposition to the district court's
bona fide occupational qualification determination. Id.
" 653 F.2d at 1276, 1277, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 817, 818.
" Id. at 1276, 26 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 817.
36 Id.
37 Id.
" Id. The circuit court apparently adopted this language from the Weeks and Diaz deci-
sions which established these limits to when gender qualifies as a bona fide occupational
qualification. Sce supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
39 653 F.2d at 1276, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 817, where the court states:
"Even if the record supported the district court's factual conclusion, we would be compelled to
reject the BFOQ finding in this case because it is based on an erroneous interpretation of Title
VII. "
4° Id., 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 818.
41 Id. (citing City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707, 17
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court concluded that "stereotypic impressions of male and female roles" did
not bring gender within the scope of the bona fide occupational qualification."
Second, the court considered the impact of customer preference on the deter-
mination of whether sex was a bona fide occupational qualification for a posi-
tion." Adopting the Fifth Circuit's treatment of this issue in Diaz v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc., 44 the court reasoned that stereotyped customer
preferences could not justify a sexually discriminatory employment practice."
Third, the court considered the position of the Commission regarding customer
preference and the bona fide occupational qualification." Two Commission
pronouncements supported the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that male gender
was not a bona fide occupational qualification for a position which required
dealings with foreign clients who might refuse to transact business with
women. The Commission, the court noted, had held that the racially
discriminatory practices of other countries could not be the basis of a bona fide
occupational qualification." In rejecting the defendant's contention that a
separate rule for customer preference should apply in international contexts,
the court apparently relied on this Commission decision. 48 The court also
observed that the Commission guidelines expressly provide that the only
customer preference allowed as a bona fide occupational qualification is one
necessary for the purpose of genuineness or authenticity." Based upon its con-
sideration of cases and Commission decisions construing the BFOQ exception,
the Ninth Circuit rejected the district court's analysis of the bona fide occupa-
tional qualification issue and held that customer preference based on sexual
stereotype cannot bring a position within the scope of the statutory exception,
even if that preference prevents customers from dealing with an employer. 50
The Ninth Circuit was correct in concluding that Wynn had failed to
demonstrate that the position of DIO fell within the BFOQ exception. In re-
quiring proof that hiring a female for a particular position would under-
mine the essence of Wynn's business, the court's opinion indicates that
the federal courts continue to regard Diaz as a valid test for determining when
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 395 (1978); Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 19 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1441 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928, 22 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 973 (1980)).
42 653 F.2d at 1276, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 818.
" Id. at 1276-77, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 818.
44 442 F.2d 385, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 337 (5th Cir. 1971).
" 653 F.2d at 1276-77, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 818.
46
 Id. at 1277, 26 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 818.
47 Id. (citing EEOC Decision No. 72-0697, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 444
(December 27, 1971)).
49 653 F.2d at 1277, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 818. In rejecting Wynn's argu-
ment that the Diaz rule should not apply in an international context, the Ninth Circuit stated:
"Though the United States cannot impose standards of nondiscriminatory conduct on other na-
tions through its legal system, the district court's rule would allow other nations to dictate
discrimination in this country. No foreign nation can compel the non-enforcement of Title VII
here." Id. (footnote omitted).
49 653 F.2d at 1277, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 818.
5° Id.
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gender constitutes a bona fide occupational qualification." The Ninth
Circuit's criticism of the factual findings on which the district court based its
bona fide occupational qualification determination highlights the quality of the
evidence which an employer must produce to satisfy the Diaz test. More par-
ticularly, the court's review of the district court's factual findings indicates that
evidence of customer preference is insufficient to establish a link between.
gender and job performance where there has been no showing that the essence
of a business would actually be undermined by hiring members of the excluded
sex. 52
Under the Diaz "essence" test, gender constitutes a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification for a position "only when the essence of the business opera-
tion would be undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively. "53 As
applied in Diaz, under the "essence" test the court focuses on the essence of the
employer's total business operation, examining both the primary function of
the business and whether the abilities upon which the employer justifies its
discriminatory practice are necessary or merely "tangential" to the essence of
the business. 54
Fernandez clarifies the proof which an employer must offer under the
"essence" test to substantiate a claim that sex constitutes a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification for a position. The Ninth Circuit noted that there must be a
factual basis for linking sex with successful job performance." For the court to
assess adequately the relevance of gender to performance in the position at
issue, an employer must provide evidence of the primary function of its
business and of the duties associated with the position. 56 Furthermore, the
court required proof that the abilities upon which an employer justifies a
discriminatory employment practice are actually necessary to the business in-
volved." An employer must therefore demonstrate that hiring members of the
5 ' See supra note 14.
" See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
" 442 F.2d at 388, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 339. See supra notes 8-13 and ac-
companying text.
" 444 F.2d at 388, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 339. In commenting upon the
lack of a relationship between the primary function of the defendant airline and the apparent
superior ability of females to perform the job of flight cabin attendant, the Fifth Circuit stated:
The primary function of an airline is to transport passengers safely from one point
to another. While a pleasant environment, enhanced by the obvious cosmetic ef-
fect that female stewardesses provide as well as, ... their apparent ability to per-
form the non-mechanical functions of the job in a more effective manner than most
men, may all be important, they are tangential to the essence of the business in-
volved. No one has suggested that having male stewards will so seriously affect the
operation of an airline as to jeopardize or even minimize its ability to provide safe
transportation from one place to another.
Id.
55 Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d at 1276, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
at 817.
56 As the Ninth Circuit noted, although the district court in Fernandez purported to ap-
ply the Diaz test, there was no factual basis presented for linking sex with successful performance
as a DIO. Id. The district court failed to consider the primary function of Wynn's business, the
duties of the DIO, and whether gender was a relevant factor in the successful performance of
those duties. Id.
" Id.
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excluded sex for the position would undermine its entire business operation by
interfering with performance of the primary function of the business or by
creating serious safety and efficacy problems." By placing this heavy burden of
proof on an employer, the Ninth Circuit limited the availability of the BFOQ
exception to those employers for whom sex discrimination is a real business
necessity, and not simply a matter of convenience for itself and its customers.
In addition to ensuring strict compliance with Title VII, the circuit court's ap-
plication of the Diaz test effectuates one purpose of the Act, eliminating sexual
stereotyping from the employment setting." By contrast, the district court's
approach to the BFOQ exception would have defeated that aim by permitting
the stereotyped impressions of customers to determine the validity of a
discriminatory employment practice."
The position adopted by the Ninth Circuit, that customer preference
based on sexual stereotype cannot justify discriminatory conduct, is supported
by both Commission and judicial decisions construing the BFOQ exception to
Title VII. Consistent with its position that the BFOQ exception should be nar-
rowly construed to effectuate Title VII's general prohibition of sex discrimina-
tion, the Commission guidelines recognize customer preference as a bona fide
occupational qualification only "where it is necessary for the purpose of
authenticity or genuineness."" Under this construction of the exception a
bona fide occupational qualification attaches only to those jobs which require
specific physical characteristics possessed by only one sex." For example, the
Commission rejected an employer's claim that being male was a bona fide oc-
cupational qualification for the position of courier guard." The Commission
found no merit in the employer's argument that loss of customer confidence in
the company's ability to provide security services established a bona fide oc-
cupational qualification." Finally, the Commission has been unwilling to ap-
ply a separate rule regarding customer preference in international contexts."
The Ninth Circuit's response to the issue of customer preference present
in Fernandez is consistent with and supported by the Diaz rationale. In Diaz, the
36 Id. Commenting on the inadequacy of the district court's factual findings, the Ninth
Circuit stated: "Nor does the record provide any basis for the district court's findings that hiring
Fernandez would 'destroy the essence' of Wynn's business or 'create serious safety and efficacy
problems.' " Id,
59 See, e.g., In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airlines Cases, 582 F.2d
1142, 1146, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1513, 1516 (7th Cir. 1978) where the court notes
Title VII seeks to eliminate sex stereotyping from the employment setting; Sprogis v. United
Airlines, 444 F.2d 1194, 1198, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 621, 624 (7th Cir. 1971) ("5
703(a)(1) subjects to scrutiny and eliminates such irrational impediments to job opportunities
and enjoyment which have plagued women in the past.").
60 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1162, 1165 (C.D.C. 1979).
61 29 C.F.R. 4 1604.2(a)(1)(iii) (1981).
62
 For Commission decisions construing the BFOQ exception, see supra note 4.
63 EEOC Decision No. 71-2338, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1249 (June 2, 1971).
64 Id. at 119, where the Commission states: "[T]flis argument is, in law, without merit,
since it presumes that customers' desires may be accommodated even at the price of rendering
nugatory the will of Congress."
63 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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Fifth Circuit concluded that customer preference for female flight cabin attend-
ants was not a justification for an airline's discriminatory employment prac-
tice." In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that it would be
"anomalous" to allow customer preferences and prejudices to determine the
validity of a BFOQ claim, when it was to a large extent these very prejudices
Title VII was meant to overcome. 67 In adopting the Diaz court's conclusion
that stereotyped customer preference cannot justify a sexually discriminatory
employment practice," the Ninth Circuit implicitly recognized the validity of
the Diaz rationale.
Both the Fernandez and Diaz courts' treatment of the issue of customer
preference recognized a distinction between a rational customer preference and
customer preference based on sexual stereotype. In rejecting the district court's
interpretation of Title VII, the Ninth Circuit implicitly acknowledged that the
customer preference in Fernandez did not satisfy the Diaz test: 69 there was no
showing that the preference of Wynn's foreign customers was rationally based
on the company's inability to perform its primary functions. Rather, as the
district court's findings suggest, Wynn's foreign customers refused to accept a
female in the position of DIO because of prevailing mores relating to the proper
role of women in their countries." The Ninth Circuit noted that while
customer preference based on sexual stereotype may prevent customers from
dealing with an employer, that fact does not qualify those preferences as a bona
fide occupational qualification." The Ninth Circuit correctly concluded that
rather than constituting an actual business necessity, Wynn's BFOQ claim was
66 Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d at 389, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 340 (5th Cir. 1971).
67 Id., where the court states: "[I]t would be totally anomalous if we were to allow the
preferences and prejudices of the customers to determine whether the sex discrimination was
valid. Indeed, it was to a large extent, these very prejudices the Act was meant to overcome."
69 Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d at 1276-77, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
at 818 (9th Cir. 1981).
69 See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
70 653 F.2d at 1276, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 817.
" Id. at 1277, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 818.
Beyond the realm of customer preference, many decisions construing the BFOQ excep-
tion have rejected the contention that stereotypic impressions of male and female gender qualify
as a bona fide occupational qualification. The Ninth Circuit adopted this position itself in a 1971
decision, Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, , 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 606,
where it rejected an employer's claim that the strenuous physical, demands of a position rendered
sex a bona fide occupational qualification. In Rosenfeld, the court stated that the basis for the ap-
plication of the bona fide occupational qualification is "sexual characteristics rather than
characteristics that might, to one degree or another, correlate with a particular sex." Id. at 1225,
3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 608. Applying this test, the court observed that instead of
demonstrating a link between the sexual characteristics of an employee and successful job
performance, the company attempted to raise a "commonly accepted characterization of women
as the 'weaker sex' to the level of a bona fide occupational qualification." Id. at 1224, 3 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 608. The court concluded that the bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion is inapplicable where employment opportunities are denied on the basis of a general assump-
tion regarding the physical capabilities of female employees. Id. at 1224-25, 3 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) at 608.
See, e.g., City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 17 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 395, 398 (1978) ("[i]t is now well recognized that employment decisions can-
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for the convenience of itself and its customers and should therefore have been
rejected by the district court. 72
In sum, the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the BFOQ exception
highlights that there are only limited circumstances in which an employer will
be permitted to rely upon customer preference as support for a BFOQ defense.
Fernandez clarifies the proof which an employer must offer under the Diaz
"essence" test to substantiate a claim that gender constitutes a bona fide oc-
cupational qualification for a position. An employer must demonstrate both
that gender is a necessary factor in successful job performance and that its
business would therefore be undermined if a member of the excluded sex were
to occupy the position at issue. Accordingly, Fernandez indicates that customer
preference that members of one sex serve in a particular position should be
considered by a court only when the possession of unique sexual characteristics
is shown to be essential to the performance of the primary function of a
business. By placing this heavy burden of proof on an employer, the courts
have limited the availability of the BFOQ defense to those employers for whom
sex discrimination is a real business necessity, and not simply a matter of
preference for itself and its customers.
C. * Transsexuals and Title VII:
Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc.'
Section 2000e-2(a)(1) of Title VII 2 prohibits an employer from dis-
criminating against any employee on the basis of sex. 3 The scope of the class
protected by this prohibition is a question that has commanded the attention of
the federal courts.' Several transsexuals 5 have argued that the meaning of the
not be predicated on mere 'stereotyped' impressions about the characteristics of males or
females. Myths and purely habitual assumptions about a woman's ability to perform certain
kinds of work are no longer acceptable reasons for refusing to employ qualified individuals."); In
re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airlines Cases, 582 F.2d 1142, 1146, 17 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1513, 1516 (7th Cir. 1978) ("attributes that are culturally more common to
one sex than the other are an insufficient basis for a bona fide occupational qualification.
Cultural stereotypes should not be employed to justify sex discrimination."); see also Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 10 (1977); Blake v. City of Los
Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1441 (9th Cir. 1979); Long v. Sapp, 8
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1079 (5th Cir. 1974); Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 442 F.2d
1194, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 621 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991, 4 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37 (1971).
" 653 F.2d at 1276-77, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 817-18.
* By Jo M. Katz, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982).
2 42 U.S.C. .5,5 2000e-2000e-17 (1976).
42 U.S.C. $§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976).
' See, e.g., DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 331-32 (9th Cir. 1979)
(lesbians and homosexuals claiming protection); Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325,
326-27 (5th Cir. 1978) (effeminate behavior claimed as protected); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen
& Co., 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977) (transsexual claiming protection).
5 A currently acceptable definition of transsexualism is that it is a dis-
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word "sex" under Title VII should be expanded beyond its traditional con-
notation of male or female gender alone to include transsexual individuals.'
Courts uniformly have rejected this argument.' The courts have indicated that,
absent evidence of congressional intent to the contrary, they are unwilling to
include within the meaning of the term "sex" anything beyond the traditional
sexual categories male and female.'
During the Survey year, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals joined the
growing number of courts that have rejected claims by transsexuals for protec-
tion under Title VII. 9 In Sommers v. Budget, Inc.,'° the court held that Title
VII's ban on sex discrimination in employment practices does not encompass
discrimination against transsexuals." Without engaging in a detailed analysis,
the court based its result on two factors. First, the court observed, the
legislative history of Title VII failed to indicate specific congressional intent to
include transsexuals within Title VII's protective sweep." Second, the court
understood the major purpose of the reference to "sex" in Title VII to be the
assurance of equal opportunity for women." Therefore, the court concluded,
that claims by transsexuals for protection under Title VII are contrary to the
legislative history and policy of the Act and, therefore, a transsexual cannot
claim such protection from discriminatory practices.'"
The appellant in Sommers claimed to be a " 'female with the anatomical
body of a male.' " Is Sommers was hired by Budget Marketing, Inc., on April
22, 1980 to perform clerical duties." Two days later, she" was discharged.'$
Budget maintained that Sommer's employment was terminated because she
had misrepresented herself as an anatomical female when she applied for the
turbance of gender identity in which the person manifests, with constant and per-
sistent conviction, the desire to live as a member of the opposite sex, and pro-
gressively takes steps to live in the opposite sex role on a full-time basis.
Money & Gaskin, Sex Reassignment, 9 Intl J. Psychiatry 249, 266 (1970), cited in Wein & Rem-
mers, Employment Protection and Gender Dysphoria; Legal Definitions of Unequal Treatment on the Basis of
Sex and Disability, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1075, 1076 n.5 (1979).
6 See, e.g., Powell v. Read's Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369, 370 (D.Md. 1977); Voyles v.
Ralph K. Davies Medical Center, 403 F. Supp. 456, 457 (N.D. Cal. 1975), aff'd 570 F.2d 354
(9th Cir. 1978); Grossman v. Bernard Township Bd. of Educ., 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1196, 1197 (D.N. J. 1975), aff'd 538 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 897 (1976).
See, e.g., Powell v. Read's Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369 at 371; Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies
Medical Center, 403 F. Supp. 456 at 457; Grossman v. Bernard Township Bd. of Educ., 11 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1196 at 1199.
See supra cases cited in note 7.
9 See Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977); Powell
v. Read's, Inc., 456 F. Supp. at 371; Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Medical Center, 403 F. Supp.
at 457; Grossman v. Bernards Township Bd. of Educ., 11 Fair Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1199.
' 6 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982).




" Id. at 748.
16 Id,
" Because Sommers referred to herself in the feminine gender, the court did likewise.
Id. at 748. Therefore, so shall this note.
is Id.
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job, and that this misrepresentation led to a disruption of the company work
routine when the female employees indicated they would quit if Sommers were
allowed the use of their restroom.° Sommers filed suit in the U.S. District
Court of the Southern District of Iowa, alleging that she had been discharged
on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII."
Budget moved to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim and lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that Title VII provided no relief for
transsexuals." In the alternative, it requested a more definitive statement of
the basis for the plaintiff's claim of discriminatory treatment." In response to a
court order, Sommers submitted an amended complaint alleging that she had
been discriminated against because of her "status as a female. " 23 In this
amended complaint Sommers admitted that sexual conversion surgery had not
been performed."
The district court treated Budget's motion to dismiss as one for summary
judgment. 25 Previous decisions in other jurisdictions, the court noted, had
ruled that Title VII did not protect against discrimination on the basis of
transsexuality. 26 Following these decisions, the district court determined that,
for the purposes of Title VII, Sommers was male because she was anatomically
male. 27 Because this anatomical fact was not disputed, the court concluded that
there existed no genuine issue of material fact, 28 and entered summary judg-
ment in favor of Budget. 29
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Sommers argued that
the court below had erred in concluding that Title VII did not prohibit
discrimination against transsexuals. 3° In rejecting this contention, the court
focused primarily on the lack of legislative history evidencing a congressional
intent to include transsexuals in Title VII. 3 ' The term "sex," the court noted,
was added to Title VII by an amendment adopted just one day prior to passage
by the House of the full Act." The Eighth Circuit found no indication in the
legislative history that Congress intended to extend Title VII coverage to
transsexuals. 33 Relying on precedent decision in the area, the court declared
19 Id.









 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary judgment when the court
finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
29
 Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d at 749.
'° Id.
3 ' Id. at 750.
" Id.
33
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that the primary purpose of the amendment was to ensure the provision of
equal opportunity for women."
The court derived additional support for its conclusion that transsexuals
were not included in Title VII's coverage from the consistent defeat of pro-
posals to amend the Civil Rights Act to prohibit discrimination on the basis of
sexual preference." Although the court acknowledged that Sommers's claim
was not one of discrimination on these grounds, 36 it nonetheless reasoned that
the failure to pass any of the "sexual preference" amendments indicated that
Congress intended the term "sex" to be given its traditional connotation of
male or female gender alone. 37 The court observed that it was aware of the
peculiar problem confronting both Sommers and Budget," and expressed the
hope that "some reasonable accommodation could , be worked out between the
parties."" It went on to conclude, however, that "the issue before this court is
not whether such an accommodation can be reached. Rather, the issue is
whether Congress intended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to protect
transsexuals from discrimination . . .. [W]e hold that such discrimination is
not within the ambit of the Act.""
By restrictively interpreting the term "sex" for the purposes of Title VII,
and thereby concluding that transsexuals are not afforded Title VIPs protec-
tion, the Eighth Circuit followed the trend of other courts considering whether
the protective sweep of Title VII extends to transsexual individuals. 4 ' The
court's reasoning, resting primarily on the lack of legislative history revealing
congressional intent to include transsexuals within the class of individuals pro-
tected by Title VII, is virtually identical to that used in four previous decisions
rendered in this area." Because the legislative history so dominates these cases,
a closer inspection of that history is warranted to determine whether Congress
indeed intended to exclude from the protective sweep of Title VII employees
discriminated against because they are transsexual.
Whereas the amendment adding the term "sex" to Title VII was adopted
with no prior legislative hearings," evidence of the purpose and intended effect
of the amendment must be found in what little debate took place when the
34 Id., (citing Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 896 (9th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1046 (1975); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir.
1971); Diaz v. Pan Am., 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir. 1971)).
35 Id.
36 Id. Sommers submitted a medical affidavit specifically stating "that transsexualism is
not voluntarily assumed and is not a matter of sexual preference,." Id. at 748 n.2.
" Id. at 750.
36 We are not unmindful of the problem Sommers faces. On the other hand,
Budget faces a problem in protecting the privacy interests of its female
employees. . . . The appropriate remedy is not immediately apparent to this
court. Should Budget allow Sommers to use the female restroom, the male




4 ' See supra cases cited at note 8.
42 Id.
43 Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d at 750; see also Note, Developments in the
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amendment was introduced. In his introductory remarks, the amendment's
sponsor emphasized that its purpose was to prevent discrimination against
women. He stated:
Mr. Chairman, this amendment is offered to the fair employment
practices of this bill to include within our desire to prevent
discrimination against another minority group, the women, but a
very essential minority group .. . . [I]t is an indisputable fact that all
throughout industry women are discriminated against in that just
generally speaking they do not get as high compensation for their
work as do the majority sex. Now, if that is true, I hope the commit-
tee chairman will accept this amendment."
The comments of the amendment's sponsor therefore reflect a concern with
discrimination against women alone. The ensuing debate underscores this con-
cern."
To the extent, then, that the actual words spoken in congressional debate
over the "sex" amendment to Title VII exclusively govern judicial interpreta-
tion of the Act, the cases preceding and including Sommers v. Budget Marketing,
Inc. were correctly decided. There are, however, several arguments against
allowing congressional silence regarding protection for transsexuals under
Title VII to be the sole consideration in judicial review of the issue." First,
even if discrimination against women alone prompted passage of the "sex"
amendment, federal courts have since found that Title VII was intended to
cover all individuals discriminated against because of their sex, not just
women.'" Second, it is unrealistic to demand that legislators contemplate and
debate every possible circumstance that may arise under any given statute."
Finally, and perhaps most compellingly, "judicial denial of Title VII relief to
transsexuals is tantamount to a denial of access to the private job market sim-
ply because of a status created by an accident of birth." 49
Beyond the concerns outlined above lies another difficulty in exclusive
reliance on the conventional meaning of the term "sex" in analyzing transsex-
uals' claims under Title VII. Such reliance may require courts to draw a
tenuous distinction between the validity of claims based on the transsexual's
interim status as a transsexual and the transsexual's ultimate status as a
member of either gender. The Ninth Circuit drew such a distinction in
Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co."
Law — Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV.
1109, 1167 (1971).
44 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964) (Statement by Rep. Smith).
45 110 CONG. REC. 2577-2584 (1964).
46 See Wein & Remmers, supra note 5, at 1075.
47 Id. at 1105 and n.187 (citing Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971)).
48
 Wein & Remmers, supra note 5, at 1106 and n.190 (citing Portland Cement Ass'n v.
Ruckleshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974); Montana Power
Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 445 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1013
(1971); District of Columbia v. Orleans, 406 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1968)).
49
 Wein & Remmers, supra note 5, at 1008.
99 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977).
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The appellant in Holloway was male when first employed by the appellee:"
The following year she began receiving female hormone treatments, and four
years later informed her supervisor that she was in the process of preparing for
sex change surgery." Several months later, she requested that the company's
records- be changed to reflect her new female first name." Shortly thereafter,
she was fired:54 The Holloway majority concluded that she would have had a
cause of action under Title VII if she had claimed discrimination on the basis of
being female. 55 Because, however, her claim was based on the fact that she was
transsexual and had chosen to change her sex, she was denied relief under Title
VII."
In his dissent, Judge Goodwin discussed the logical inconsistency in the
majority's opinion, and set forth his reasons for believing that transsexuals
have a cause of action under Title VII. 57 In his view, the issue revolved around
the fact that the appellant's condition had not become stationary at the time her
employment was terminated." He suggested that under the majority's reason-
ing, a transsexual that had already completed sex change surgery could bring a
Title VII claim on the grounds that the discharge was based on sex. A transsex-
ual, however, who was about to undergo or was undergoing surgery could
not."
It seems to me irrelevant under Title VII whether the plaintiff was
born female or was born ambiguous and chose to become female.
The relevant fact is that she was, on the day she was fired, a pur-
ported female. She says she was fired for having become female
under controversial circumstances. The employer says these cir-
cumstances are disconcerting for other employees. . . . [T]hose are
questions that ought to be answered in court, in a trial. . . . 60
Inasmuch as no sex change operation had been or, as far as the opinion in-
dicates, was about to be performed on the appellant in Sommers61 it is doubtful
whether the Holloway decision, if invoked, would have affected the result in that
case.
In summary, arguments can be raised in support of allowing transsexuals
a cause of action under Title VII. Judge Goodwin's criticism of the distinction
made between pre- and post-operative transsexuals in Holloway v. Arthur
Andersen & Co. appears particularly worthy of further study. Despite the validi-
ty of these arguments, the Sommers court's refusal to allow transsexuals a cause
of action under Title VII makes it clear that — at least for the foreseeable




" Id. at 664.
56 Id
" Id. at 664-65 (Goodwin, J., dissenting).
5° Id. at 664.
59 Id.
6° Id.
61 Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d at 749.
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future — transsexuals will have to look elsewhere for protection from employ-
ment discrimination. Title VII will provide them with no relief.
IV. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
A. Religious Discrimination and Union Accommodation:
Tooley v. Martin Marietta Corp.'
Section 703 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 2 prohibits employ-
ment discrimination because of religion by employers3 and labor organiza-
tions.* In 1967, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
amended previously issued guidelines concerning religious discrimination in
employment. 5
 The present guidelines establish a new standard of admin-
' By Kevin Dennis, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
648 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1981).
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2000e-17 (1976). Section 703 is codified
at 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-2 (1976).
42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(a) (1976), which covers employers, provides:
(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer —
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such in-
dividual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.
* Labor organizations are covered by 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(c) (1976). This section pro-
vides:
(c) Labor organization practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization —
(1) to exclude or expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate
against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for member-
ship, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual,
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee or as an applicant for employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an in-
dividual in violation of this section.
42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-2(c) (1976). See generally Frantz, Religious Discrimination in Employment — An Ex-
amination of the Employer's Duty to Accommodate, 1979 C.L. REV. 205 (1979); Comment, Religious
Discrimination in Employment — The Undoing of Title VIPs Reasonable Accommodation Standard, 44
BROOKLYN L. REV. 598 (1978).
The first set of guidelines, issued in 1966, read as follows:
[T]he Employer may prescribe the normal work week and foreseeable overtime re-
quirements, and, absent an intent on the part of the employer to discriminate on
religious grounds, a job applicant or employee who accepted the job knowing or
having reason to believe that such requirements would conflict with his religious
obligations is not entitled to demand any alterations in such requirements to ac-
commodate his religious needs. 29 C.F.R. S 1605.1(b)(3).
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istrative and judicial review for employment arising out of religion based
discrimination. 6
 This new standard imposes an affirmative action duty on
employers to accommodate reasonably the religious beliefs of employees, pro-
vided such reasonable accommodation would not cause undue hardship for the
employer.' The two principles of "reasonable accommodation" and "undue
hardship" were incorporated into the language of Title VII through section
701(j) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 8 Despite congressional incorporation of
the principles of "reasonable accommodation" and "undue hardship" into the
language of Title VII, however, courts have been unable to reach a consensus
on exactly what constitutes religious discrimination in employment. 9 In 1977,
the Supreme Court decided its only major religion based discrimination case
since the passage of section 701(j) and, in doing so, construed the principles of
"undue hardship" and "reasonable accommodation. '"° In Trans World Air-
lines, Inc. v. Hardison," the Court adopted two guidelines for interpreting the
terms "reasonable accommodation" and "undue hardship" .' 3 First, it
established that reasonable accommodation did not mean that a seniority
system should be changed to accommodate an employee's religious beliefs.' 4
Second, the Court stated that for an employer to bear more than a "de
minimis" cost in order to accommodate the employee could constitute undue
hardship to the employer.' 5 Yet, the Supreme Court's construction of
"reasonable accommodation" and "undue hardship" in Hardison left a num-
ber of issues arising in the context of religion based employment discrimination
The new guidelines are at 29 C.F.R. 1605 (1981).
6 Id. The guidelines established by the EEOC are not binding on the courts but the
position of the Supreme Court has been that they are entitled to great deference. Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1979).
' 29 C.F.R. 5 1605.2(a)-(c) (1981).
6 42 U.S.C. 5 2000-e(j) (1976). Section 701(j), which defines the term "religion"
under Title VII, reads as follows:
The term "religion" includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as
well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably ac-
commodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religion observance or
practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.
Id.
9 See, e.g., Draper v. United States Pipe and Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515 (6th Cir.
1976); United States v. Albuquerque, 545 F.2d 110 (10th Cir. 1976); Williams v. Southern
Union Gas Co., 529 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 959 (1976); Reid v. Mem-
phis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.- denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976), reh. denied,
433 U.S. 915 (1977); Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 497 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1974); Riley
v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972); Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324
(6th Cir. 1970); Dixon v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 385 F. Supp. 1382 (D.C. Neb. 1974);
Claybaugh v. Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. I (D.C. Ore. 1973); Roberts v. Heritage
Cotton Mills, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 315 (D.C.S.C. 1973).
t° Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
" Id. at 63.
12 Id. at 79.
' Id. at 84.
14 Id. at 79. The court stated that without a clear and express indication from Congress,
it could not agree with Hardison and the EEOC that an agreed-upon seniority system must give
Way when necessary to accommodate religious observances. Id.
16 Id. at 84. "To require TWA to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to give Har-
dison Saturdays off is an undue hardship."
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unresoIved.' 6 Two issues in particular were not addressed by the Supreme
Court — the duty of a union to accommodate the religious beliefs of an
employed" and the constitutionality of section 701(j)."
16 Id. Since Hardison, even when presented with factual patterns similar to that
presented in Hardison, the circuit courts have failed to present a unified answer as to what con-
stitutes religious discrimination. See generally Howard v. Haverty Furniture Co., 615 F.2d 203
(5th Cir. 1980); Brown v. Gen. Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956 (8th Cir. 1979); Wren v.
T. I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 595 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1979); Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897 (7th
Cir. 1978); Chrysler Corp. v. Mann, 561 F.2d 1282 (8th Cir. 1977); Huston v. Local No. 93, In-
ternational Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Indep. Workers of Am.,
559 F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1977); Jordan v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 565 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1977).
" See Trans World Airline's, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 70 n.5 (1977). Hardison's
original suit was against both the union and TWA. Id. at 69. The district court decided in favor
of both the union and TWA. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 877, 891
(W.D. Mo. 1974). On appeal to the 8th Circuit, Hardison did not attack the ruling in favor of
the union, but the court affirmed that judgment without ruling on the merits. Hardison v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d 33, 42-43 (8th Cir. 1975). At the Supreme Court level, Hardison
did not file a petition for certiorari seeking to change the ruling in favor of the union. Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63,70 n,5 (1977). The Supreme Court, however,
granted the union's petition for certiorari apparently because the Court felt that union interests
were seriously involved. Id. The Court decided, "[s]ince we reverse the judgment against TWA,
we need not pursue further the union's status in this Court." Id. The Court did make one state-
ment with regard to the union which may be indicative of what would constitute undue hardship
for the union. In describing the facts, the Court stated, "the union was unwilling to entertain a
variance [of the seniority system] over the objections of men senior to Hardison; and for TWA to
have arranged unilaterally for a swap would have amounted to a breach of the collective-
bargaining agreement." Id. at 79.
The duty of a union to accommodate an employee's religious belief has become an im-
portant issue in cases involving religious discrimination in employment. See, e.g. Tooley v.
Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3465 (1981);
Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 602 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928
(1980); Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 589 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979); Burns v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979); McDaniel v. Essex Int'l Inc., 571 F.2d 338 (6th Cir.
1978); Cooper v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., Fort Worth Operation, 533 F.2d
163 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977). When the existence of this union duty is at
issue, one frequently debated question is whether a worker must join a union and pay dues to
that union. Seventh Day Adventists, for example, prohibit membership in and payment of dues
to a union. See Anderson v. Gen. Dynamics, Convair Aerospace Div., 589 F,2d 397, 399 (9th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979).
In some employment situations, however, the collective bargaining agreement between
an employer and the union includes a union shop clause which requires that all employees be
members of the union as a condition of employment. Union shop clauses are protected by 29
U.S.C. 158(a)(3), (b)(2) (1976).
While Title VII generally prohibits employment discrimination by a labor organization
on the basis of religion, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1976), there are arguments that indicate unions
would not be covered by 701(j). The specific language of section 701(j), which creates the
reasonable accommodation and undue hardship test, refers only to employers and not to labor
organizations. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1976). In addition, under provisions of the Taft-Hartley
Act, union shops are permitted. 29 U.S.C. 5 158(a)(3) (1976). Despite these arguments, all the
circuit courts that have decided the issue of union accommodation have determined that unions
generally should be held to the standards of reasonable accommodation and undue hardship in
much the same manner as employers. See Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 602 F.2d 904, 909
(9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980); Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair
Aerospace Div., 589 F.2d 397, 400-401 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979); Burns
v. Southern Pac. Trans. Co., 589 F.2d 403, 405 (9th Cir. 1978).
" Both the union and TWA in Hardison contended that the applicable section of Title
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During the Survey year the Ninth Circuit directly considered both the con-
stitutionality of section 701(j), and the proper scope of union accommodation
under Title VII. In Tooley v. Martin Marietta Corporation° the circuit court de-
cided that unions, as well as employers, must reasonably accommodate an
employee's religious beliefs, and that allowing an employee to pay an amount
equal to union dues to a mutually acceptable charity does not cause undue
hardship for the union." After so holding, the court went on to determine that
section 701(j) is constitutional. 21
In Tooley the three plaintiffs were members of the Seventh Day Adventist
Church, a religion which bars followers from paying union dues or belonging
to an employment union. 22 In 1976 a collective bargaining agreement was
entered into by the plaintiffs' employer, Martin-Marietta Corporation, and the
union, Steelworkers Local 481. 23 This agreement included a union shop clause
which obligated the company to discharge any employee who did not join the
union. 24 In accordance with their religious beliefs, the plaintiffs refused to com-
ply with the union membership clause of the collective bargaining agreement
but instead offered to pay an amount equal to union dues to a mutually accept-
able charity." The union refused the plaintiffs' proposal, and they were dis-
VII potentially conflicted with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and therefore
was unconstitutional. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 70 (1977).
However, since the Court decided in favor of TWA on statutory grounds, the constitutional
claims were not considered. Id.
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits Congress from enacting
legislation respecting an establishment of religion. The Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment reads, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof . . . ." U.S. Const. amend. I. Given the Constitution's strong prohibi-
tion of government-supported religion, section 701(j) may violate the Establishment Clause since
the section would seem to support religion. The federal courts that have considered this issue
have not reached a complete consensus on whether 701(j) is constitutional. For cases that have
decided 701(j) is constitutional, see Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975);
McDaniel v. Essex Intl, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 1055 (W.D. Mich. 1981), on remand from 571 F.2d
338 (6th Cir. 1978); Brown v. General Motors Corp., 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 88 (W.D.
Mo. 1978), void on other grounds, 601 F.2d 956 (8th Cir. 1979); Jordan v. North Carolina Nat'l
Bank, 399 F. Supp. 172 (W.D. N.C. 1975). For cases that have decided 701(j) is unconstitu-
tional, see Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 428 F. Supp. 763 (C.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd on other
grounds, 602 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980). One district court deter-
mined that 701(j) was unconstitutional but was overturned by the circuit courts: see Gavin v.
Peoples Nat'l Gas Co., 464 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Pa. 1979), vacated and remanded, 613 F.2d 482 (3d
Cir. 1980).
19 648 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1981). Also during the Survey Year the Seventh Circuit de-
cided an identical case, Nottelson v. A.O. Smith Corp., 643 F,2d 445 (7th Cir. 1981). Only the
ninth circuit case, Tooley, is analyzed in this Chapter. The factual patterns, issues presented and
the analysis of the two cases are nearly identical. This similarity obviates the need for an analysis
of both cases. The factual situation of Nottelson is set forth infra in note 47.
20 Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F,2d 1239, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 1981).
21 Id. at 1244-46. On the same day that the ninth circuit decided Tooley, the court
reversed the lower court's ruling in Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 489
F. Supp. 782 (S.D. Cal. 1980), that 701(j) is unconstitutional. Tooley, 648 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir.
1981).
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charged. Consequently, the plaintiffs sought reinstatement through adminis-
trative remedies. 26 Having unsuccessfully exhausted their administrative reme-
dies, the plaintiffs brought suit against the union and the employer in federal
court. 27 The plaintiffs complained that religious discrimination had occurred in
violation of Title VII 28 and that the union and the company had failed to ac-
commodate reasonably their religious beliefs under section 701(j)." The
district court enjoined the union and the company from discharging the plain-
tiffs as long as each one made contributions equal to union dues to a mutually
acceptable charity. 30
In affirming the district court's opinion, the Ninth Circuit concentrated
on two issues: the duty of a union to accommodate the religious beliefs of an
employee and the constitutionality of 701(j)." Relying on an earlier decision in
the circuit, 32
 the court decided that section 701(j) applied to unions." Follow-
ing the approach of the Supreme Court in Hardison, the court used a reasonable
accommodation-undue hardship analysis." In deciding that the union should
have reasonably accommodated the plaintiffs by allowing them to give to chari-
ty in lieu of paying union dues, the court rejected the union's contention that
the provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act, which allow for union shops, should
control. 35 Instead, the court held that section 701(j) should govern the degree of
reasonable accommodation which should be afforded employees who refuse to
pay union dues for religious reasons." This holding, the court noted, was in
zs Id.
27 Id.
" Id. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed violations of 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(a) (1976) and
42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(c) (1976). See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
29 Tooley, 648 F.2d 1241. The facts of the Nottelson case are very similar to those of the
Tooley case. A union shop clause was adopted by the union and employer. Nottelson v. A.O.
Smith Corp., 643 F.2d 445, 448 (7th Cir. 1981). As a result, Nottelson, a Seventh Day Ad-
ventist, stated he could not pay dues to the union and requested that he be allowed to pay an
equivalent amount to a charity. Id. The union refused to accommodate Nottelson, and he was
discharged by the employer. Id. Nottelson instituted an action against the employer and the
union alleging religious discrimination in violation of Title VII. Id.
" Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 476 F. Supp. 1027, 1031 (D.C. Or. 1979).
" Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1242-46 (9th Cir. 1981). The
plaintiffs sued the employer also, but since it was the union that had refused the plaintiffs' pro-
posal, the court concentrated primarily on the duty of the union to accommodate the plaintiffs'
religious beliefs. In Nottelson, the court discussed at greater length the position of the employer.
Nottelson v. A.O. Smith Corp., 643 F.2d 445, 452-53 (7th Cir. 1981). See infra note 79.
°° The court relied on You v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 602 F.2d 904, 909 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980). Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1241
(9th Cir. 1981).
" Tooley, 648 F,2d at 1241.
" Id. at 1242-43. The court relied heavily on four previous opinions of the ninth circuit
which also had dealt with religious objectors to mandatory union dues. These decisions were Yott
v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 602 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1979); Anderson v. General Dynamics
Convair Aerospace Div., 589 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979); Burns v.
Southern Pac. Trans. Co., 589 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979); You
v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 501 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1974).
35
 Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1242 (9th Cir. 1981). The union
was arguing under 29 U.S.C: 5 158(a)(3) (1976).
36 Tool g, 648 F.2d at 1242.
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accord with a recent amendment to the National Labor Relations Act 37 requir-
ing accommodation identical to that requested by plaintiffs." In addition, the
court stated that having an employee contribute money to a charity is a
reasonable accommodation to the plaintiff's religious beliefs in the sense that
all workers would then suffer the same economic loss." Finally, the court held
that, in view of the facts of this case, the financial loss of the union that would
result from the accommodation would be de minimis. 4° Therefore, under the
Supreme Court's construction of undue hardship as a more than de minimis
cost, in Hardison, the accommodation would not cause undue hardship to the
union."
Having determined that on a statutory basis the plaintiffs were entitled to
relief, the court had to respond to the union's argument that section 701(j) was
unconstitutional. Despite recognizing that the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment requires government neutrality in religion, 42 the court held
that section 701(j) was constitutional.'" The primary basis" for this decision
was an application of the test enunciated by the Supreme Court in Committee for
Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist. 43 In Nyquist, the court applied the
following three-prong test to determine whether a piece of legislation can with-
stand judicial scrutiny under the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment:
First, [the legislation] must reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose . . . ,
second, [it] must have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion . . . , and, third, [it] must avoid excessive government entangle-
ment with religion."
In applying the Nyquist test, the Tooley court determined that section 701(j) met
all three standards." The court stated that the secular purpose of section 701(j)
" Id.
33 Id. The amendment to the National Labor Relations Act is Act of December 24,
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-593, 94 Stat. 3452 (1980). It reads in pertinent part:
Any employee who is a member of and adheres to established and traditional
tenets or teachings of a bona fide religion, body, or sect which has historically held
conscientious objections to joining or financially supporting labor organizations
shall not be required to join or financially support any labor organization as a con-
dition of employment; except that such employee may be required in a contract
between such employees' employer and a labor organization in lieu of periodic
dues and initiation fees, to pay sums equal to such dues and initiation fees to a
nonreligious, nonlabor organization charitable fund . 	 .
Id.
Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1243 (9th Cir. 1981).
40 Id. at 1243-44.
41 Id.
42 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
43 Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1244-46 (9th Cir. 1981).
44 The court also stressed that the Establishment Clause did not require absolute
neutrality in the government's attitude towards religion. Id. at 1244-45. The court relied on the
following cases for support: Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664 (1970); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
44 413 U.S. 756, 772-73 (1973).
46 Id. at 773 (citations omitted).
Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1245-46 (9th Cir. 1981).
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is to prohibit discrimination in employment," that the primary effect of the sec-
tion is not to advance the religion of the plaintiffs," and that the necessary ad-
ministration by the government under section 701(j) does not constitute ex-
cessive government entanglement with religion. 50
An analysis of the Tooley decision reveals that the court was correct in its
conclusions that the union was obligated to accommodate reasonably the
religious beliefs of the plaintiffs by allowing them to contribute an amount
equal to union dues to a charity and that 701(j) is constitutional. This chapter,
however, will suggest that the analysis by which the court reached its conclu-
sion regarding the constitutionality of section 701(j) is by no means exhaustive.
The Nyquist test should be applied in judging the constitutionality of section
701(j), but this test should not be solely determinative of this issue. In its brief
application of the Nyquist test, the court disregarded complexities that raise
doubts about the constitutionality of section 701(j). Other factors in addition to
the Nyquist three-factor test should be recognized to completely support the
constitutionality of section 701(j).
In the logical first step of applying Title VII to the facts of Tooley, the court
correctly decided that section 701(j) should apply to unions as well as
employers." Although the concept that 701(j) should apply to unions has been
accepted consistently by the courts, there is surprisingly little discussion of the
matter in the cases." The principal reason that there is a question about
whether a union has a duty to accommodate the religious beliefs of an
employee is that the language of section 701(j) makes no reference to unions. 53
This fact, however, should not dictate that unions are exempt from the applica-
tion of section 701(j). 54
 There are two reasons why 701(j) should apply to
unions. First, the connections between the union and the employers are ex-
tremely close in the industrial setting, and it would be inappropriate to subject
the employer to the reasonable accommodation and undue hardship standards
but allow the union to escape such review." Second, a close statutory analysis
" Id. at 1245. The court relied on McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) and
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 1104 (1980).
4° Tooley, 648 F.2d at 1245-46. The court relied on Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S.
437 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); and Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Mkt.,
366 U.S. 617 (1961).
5° Tooley, 648 F.2d at 1246. The court relied on Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971) and Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
51 Tooley, 648 F.2d at 1241.
52 See supra note 24 for cases that have held that section 701(j) should apply to unions.
The Tooley court relied on its discussion of this matter in the Yott case. However, in Yott, the court
did little more than state, "Title VII clearly imposes the same duty not to discriminate on a
union as it does the employer." Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 602 F.2d 904, 909 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980).
53 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
54 See Cooper v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 533 F.2d 163, 170-71 (5th
Cir. 1976) for one of the few opinions in which the language of 701(j) was interpreted narrowly to
free the union of any reasonable accommodation duty. The majority of the court ruled that the
union had such a duty. Id. at 165-69.
" This strong connection between the union and employer was recognized by the ma-
jority of the court in Cooper v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div. Id. at 163. The court
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of Title VII, and specifically of the interrelationship of section 701(j) to other
provisions of Title VII, indicates that section 701(j) should apply to unions as
well as employers. Section 701(j) defines religion and is included in the defini-
tional section of Title VII." The term "religion" as used throughout Title VII
must be applied as defined in section 701(j)." Therefore, in the section of Title
VII prohibiting religious discrimination by a union, 38 the term "religion" is
defined by 701(j) a definition which by reference includes the concepts of
reasonable accommodation and undue hardship." Thus, both common sense
and statutory analysis dictate that 701(j) should apply to unions.
Having determined that 701(j) applies to unions, the Tooley court reached
the proper result in applying the statutory standards of reasonable accom-
modation and undue hardship found in section 701(j) to the union." The
union argued that there were two reasons why the substituted charity request
of the plaintiffs would not pass the reasonable accommodation-undue hardship
test of section 701(j): first, that the provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act" which
protect union shops should contro1, 82 and, second, that undue hardship to the
union could result from allowing the plaintiffs to work in a union shop but not
pay dues to the union. 63 The court correctly rejected both arguments.
The union's argument that the Taft-Hartley Act's protection of union
shops" should negate the effect of the reasonable accommodation requirement
of section 701(j) fails when subjected to close analysis. Section 701(j), in spite of
the provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act, requires that there be an attempt to
make a reasonable accommodation to the religious beliefs of the employees."
stated in reference to this issue that "Congress could not have thought that for two parties under
the same stringent substantive prohibition one has an escape hatch of undue hardship denied to
the other growing out of the common industrial setting." Id. at 172.
56 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e(j) (1976).
37 The beginning of 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e (1976) states, "Definitions — For the purposes of
this sub-chapter — ..."
" 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-2(c) (1976). See supra note 4.
" See Cooper v. Gen. Dynamics, Convair Aerospace Div., Fort Worth Operation, 533
F.2d 163, 172 n.1 (5th Cir. 1976).
6° Even though the plaintiffs in Tooley sued both the union and the employer, the real
issue when a substituted charity request is made is whether the union has a duty to accom-
modate. For the employer unilaterally to endorse such a request from an employee would be to
put itself in violation of the collective bargaining agreement. The union shop clauses are for the
benefit of the union and thus are included in a collective bargaining agreement at the request of
the union. The union is the party that must be ordered to accept the request of the employee. The
Tooley court failed to directly address the situation of the employer in this factual situation. In
Nottelson, this issue was discussed. Nottelson v. A.O. Smith Corp., 643 F.2d 445, 452-53 (7th
Cir. 1981). Despite recognizing that the employer "was caught between a rock and a hard
place," the court determined that the employer had violated Tide VII. Id. at 453. The Nottelson
court determined that it was the employer's duty to pursue grievance proceedings against the
union once the union would not accommodate Nottelson. Id. This result seems harsh for the
basic issue is really between the employee and the union. That issue should be settled, and then
the employer should be ordered to act accordingly.
61 Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1242 (9th Cir. 1981). See 29
U.S.C. SS 158(a)(3), (b)(2) (1976).
62 Tooley, 648 F.2d at 1242.
63 Id. at 1243.
64 29 U.S.C. 55 158(a)(3), (b)(2) (1976).
65 See supra note 8.
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No provision of the Taft-Hartley Act, nor the legislative history of the Act, pro-
hibits union shops from being reasonably altered to allow for religious
freedom. 66
 With the exception of the few employees qualifying for the
substituted charity treatment, the union still benefits from the union shop
clause." As the court stated, the union's position as sole representative of the
workers is not harmed, and the plaintiffs are allowed to maintain their jobs and
religious freedom."
An additional argument, noted by the Tooley court, which provides strong
support for the position that the Taft-Hartley Act provisions which protect
union shops should not control, centers on the recent amendment to the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA)." This 1980 amendment requires union
accommodation of employees who for religious reasons refuse to pay dues to a
union." It allows for payment of an amount equal to union dues to a non-
religious, non-labor charity." Thus, the accommodation requested by the
plaintiff in Tooley has become federal law as part of the NLRA, effective
December 1980. 72
66
 There is support for this argument in other cases. See Nottelson v. A.O. Smith Corp.,
643 F.2d 445, 450 (7th Cir. 1981); McDaniel v. Essex Int'l, Inc., 571 F.2d 338, 343 (6th Cir.
1978); and Cooper v. Gen. Dynamics, Convair Aerospace Div., Fort Worth Operation, 533
F.2d 163, 169 (5th Cir. 1976).
67
 Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1242 (9th Cir. 1981).
66
 Id. Another argument that could have been presented by the union, but apparently
was not, involves an analogy to the Hardison decision. In Hardison, the United States Supreme
Court decided that because seniority systems were protected by a provision of Title VII (42
U.S.C. 2000e-2(h) (1976)), the reasonable accommodation of religious beliefs did not extend to
changing the terms of seniority provisions in the collective bargaining agreement. Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 79 (1977). Applying this rationale to the factual situa-
tion in Tooley, it could be argued that the union shop clause of the collective bargaining agree-
ment, which is protected by statute 29 U.S.C. $5 158(a)(3), (b)(2), should not be altered due to
the need to reasonably accommodate religious beliefs of employees. This analogy, however, must
fail for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court in Hardison based much of its argument in defense
of the seniority system on the fact that alteration of seniority rights to favor the plaintiff would
hurt other employees. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 80. Other employees would have to replace Hardi-
son on an undesirable shift, and thus, their seniority rights would be infringed upon. Id. This
direct harm to other employees would not be present in Tooley if the plaintiffs gave to a charity an
amount equal to union dues. Second, the protection that Congress provided for seniority systems
was purposely included within Tide VII so that other provisions of Title VII could not be inter-
preted to prohibit such systems. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
352 (1977). Comparable protection for union shop agreements was not provided by Title VII. See
Nottelson v. A.O. Smith Corp., 643 F.2d 445, 452-53 (7th Cir. 1981).
69
 Act of December 24, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-593, 94 Stat. 3452 (1980).
7° Id.
" Id.
72 Id. As the Tooley court indicated, 648 F.2d at 1242, the legislative history of the
amendment indicates that it was thought to be both a reasonable accommodation under 701(j)
and a reasonable balance between the NLRA and Title VII. 126 CONG. REC. H760 (daily ed.
Feb. 11, 1980); 126 CONG. REG. H763 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1980).
Although after December of 1980 the employee who, like the employees in Tooley, for
religious reasons, gives to a charity in lieu of paying union dues, will be protected by this amend-
ment, the Tooley court's application of section 701(j)'s principles of reasonable accommodation
and undue hardship has continued relevance for the practitioner. The amendment will not be
dispositive of all factual patterns similar to the one in Tooley. First, the amendment governs only
union action after December of 1980. Thus, demands made by an employee prior to December
1980 to pay an amount equal to union dues to charity, which have resulted in a lawsuit, would
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The second argument made by the union in an attempt to prove that the
substituted charity request did not meet the reasonable accommodation-undue
hardship test of 701(j) was that compliance with that request caused undue
financial hardship to the union." In rejecting this claim, the Tooley court prop-
erly applied the de minimis cost test of Hardison. 7+ What constitutes de minimis
cost to an employer or union will vary, of course, depending on the factual
situation." Accordingly, unions will be quick to assert that the harm likely to
be caused by failure to collect dues from all employees in a union shop will be
devastating." If a substantial number of employees in a union shop had
legitimate religious claims under Title VII, there is no doubt the harm to the
union would not be de minimis. As the Tooley court stressed, however, courts
should demand that the union demonstrate the likelihood of real harm
resulting from the absence of dues income." If this harm exceeds a de minimis
cost, then a declaration of undue hardship to the union would be appropriate.
This was not the situation in the Tooley case. The factual evidence presented to
the district court showed that "[Title likelihood that the union will ever be
burdened by the few members who refuse to pay union dues because of
religious beliefs is remote."" The financial figures demonstrated that, despite
the plaintiff's failure to pay dues directly to the union, there would continue to
be a surplus in the union budget." Under the de minimis standard of the Har-
dison case, the union clearly could not prove more , than a de minimis cost. 8°
still be controlled by the reasonable accommodation-undue hardship principles of section 701(j).
Second, the amendment includes specific requirements: (1) the payment of money in lieu of
union dues must be to a specific type of charity; and (2) if the employee making such a payment
wishes to use the union's grievance-arbitration procedure, he must pay for that service.
Therefore, if a situation arises where an employee both refuses to pay union dues for religious
reasons and also refuses to comply with these specific requirements of the statute, his request
would still be evaluated by the courts under the principles of section 701(j).
" Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1243 (9th Cir. 1981).
74 Id. at 1243-44.
as There cannot be one definition of "de minimis" cost in connection with undue hard-
ship, for it will depend on the facts of each case. In Hardison, the majority stated that having to
pay another employee more or having to hire a replacement to replace the plaintiff on Saturday
would be above de minimis costs. Transworld Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84-85
(1977). The dissent in Hardison argued that this extra amount spent would have been within the
limits of de minimis. Id. at 92. But the majority countered with the observation that the district
court had found that these solutions would create undue hardship for TWA. Id. at 84, n.15. This
circular logic does little to clear up the confusion concerning what de minimit really means.
76 See Anderson v. Gen. Dynamics, Convair Aerospace Div., 589 F.2d 397, 406-07 (9th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979).
" Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1243 (9th Cir. 1981). See also
Anderson v. General Dynamics, Convair Aerospace Div., 589 F.2d 397, 406-07 (9th Cir. 1978);
McDaniel v. Essex Intl, Inc., 571 F.2d 338, 343 (6th Cir. 1978); Draper v. United States Pipe
and Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 520 (6th Cir. 1975).
Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 476 F. Supp. 1027, 1030-31 (D. Or. 1979).
79 Id. at 1030. Union dues for the three plaintiffs would be less than $600 per year. Id.
In 1978 the union income was $46,000, which created a surplus of $4,300 above expenses. Id.
96 Another method the courts use to analyze whether the loss of dues is de minimis or not
is to indicate the amount co-workers' dues would increase to compensate for the drop in total
dues collected. In Burns v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978), the court
decided that, at the most, allowing the plaintiffs not to pay dues directly to the union would in-
crease co-workers' dues by 24 cents per year. Id. at 407. In the Bums court's view, this was a de
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The above analysis suggests that the Too ley court reached the proper con-
clusion in applying the statutory standards of "reasonable accommodation"
and "undue hardship" to the request by the plaintiffs to pay an amount equal
to union dues to a charity. Having decided the statutory issue, the Tooley court
decided a second broad issue, the constitutionality of section 701(j). 8 ' A close
analysis of the case demonstrates that the court's decision that section 701(j) is
constitutional is correct, but that the court's approach to the issue was too
simplistic. Inasmuch as the Nyquist test" presents the established guidelines
with which to determine the constitutionality of section 701(j)," the court in
Tooley cannot be faulted applying Nyquist to the case before it. The mere ap-
plication, however, of the literal terms of the three standards of the test — that
the legislation must have a primarily secular purpose, that the primary effect of
the legislation must neither advance nor inhibit religion, and that the legisla-
tion not involve excessive government entanglement with religion -84 to deter-
mine whether 701(j) conflicts with the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment fails to present a clear answer in this case. Indeed, there are sim-
ple but compelling arguments under the literal terms of the Nyquist test which
suggest the unconstitutionality of 701(j). A more comprehensive analysis of
that section's constitutionality would require a court to engage in an additional
step — an examination of 701(j) to determine whether that section is consonant
with both the policies underlying Title VII and those underlying the Establish-
ment Clause. The importance of Title VII and the utility of some limited
government support for religion both provide crucial support for the constitu-
tionality of section 701(j). Combining these policy considerations with the Ny-
quist test analysis presented by the Tooley court leaves little doubt that section
701(j) is constitutional.
Consideration of the meaning of the Establishment Clause necessarily
must precede an application of the Nyquist test to section 701(j)." The Supreme
Court has stated that the purpose of the Establishment Clause was to insure
that the Church and the State remained separate entities. 86 The Court has
minimis cost. Id. In Nottelson, 643 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1981), the figure was 2.4 cents per year, and
the court decided this amount to be de minimis. Id. at 452. In Tooley, at least for the present time
period, there was no indication that there would be an increase. Tooley v. Martin-Marietta
Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1243 (9th Cir. 1981).
" Took)), 648 F.2d at 1244-46. See generally Comment, Title VII and Religious Disaimina-
dm Is Any Accommodation Reasonable Under the Constitution?, 9 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 413 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Tide VII and Religious Discrimination]; Case Comment, Cummins
v. Parker Seal Co.: Can the Government Require Accommodation of Religion at the Private Job Site?, 62
VA. L. REV, 237 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Case Comment, Can the Government Require Accom-
modation?].
82 See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text,
83 As the Supreme Court stated in Nyquist in reference to the test, "[f]or the now well-
defined three-part test that has emerged from our decisions is a product of consideration derived
from the full sweep of the Establishment Clause cases." Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772 (1973).
" Id. at 773.
85 In Tooley the court correctly recognized that the meaning of the Establishment Clause
has been determined through repeated judicial interpretation. Tooley v, Martin-Marietta Corp.,
648 F.2d 1239, 1244 (9th Cir. 1981).
86 Emerson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). In this case, the Supreme Court
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recognized, however, that there cannot, and should not, be a total separation
of Church and State." The Supreme Court has struggled with determining the
appropriate degree of contact between Church and State, but, understandably,
has not reached a definitve conclusion on the mater." Accordingly, the Tooley
court correctly characterized government's relationship to religion as one that
is short of absolute neutrality. 89 Thus, the development of the Nyquist test is an
attempt to define the degree of neutrality the government should maintain
toward religion.
In applying Nyquist's first prong under which the statute's purpose must
be clearly secular, the Tooley court rejected the union's argument that section
701(j) was unconstitutional because its purpose was to favor religion. 90 Relying
on Supreme Court cases," the court felt that the policy of Title VII — to pro-
hibit employment discrimination — outweighed the fact that section 701(j)
tended to favor certain employees because of their religion." In addition, the
court reasoned that 701(j) was intended primarily to prohibit religious dis-
crimination, not to favor employment. 93
Section 701(j), however, explicitly dictates that a direct benefit is to be
granted to certain employees on religious grounds." In fact, the key sponsor of
section 701(j) left no doubt that a primary purpose of the legislation was to
assist religious groups. 95 Thus, if the constitutionality of section 701(j) is to be
stated:
The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor a Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion over another . . . In the words of Jefferson, the
clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of
separation between Church and State.'
Id. at 15-16 (quoting from Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 143 (1878)).
" In Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), the Supreme Court stated: "this Nation's history
has not been one of entirely sanitized separation between Church and State. It has never been
thought either possible or desirable to enforce a regime of total separation. . . ." Id. at 760. See
also Lemon v. Kartzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
BB The following Supreme Court cases have dealt with this issue: Stone v. Graham, 449
U.S. 39 (1980); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971); Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); and Zorach v.
Clausen, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
" Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1244 (9th Cir. 1981). See also
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 449 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669
(1970); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 422 (1963); and Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306, 313
(1952).
99 Tooley, 648 F.2d at 1245. The court properly decided that a review of the constitu-
tionality of just section 701(j) instead of the whole Act was appropriate because of the unique
operation of the reasonable accommodation and undue hardship test. Id. n.9. The "legislative
purpose" prong of the three-part test first appeared in Emerson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,
15-18 (1947).
91 Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 43 (1980); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
445 (1961).
92 Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1245 (9th Cir. 1981).
" Id.
94 See Comment, Title VII and Religious Discrimination, supra note 81, at 421-23.
95 118 CONG. REC. 705 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1972) (remarks of Senator Randolph).
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judged on the basis of whether the legislative purpose of the section was to
benefit religion, it is questionable whether the section is constitutional.
An application of the second prong of the Nyquist test — that the primary
effect of the legislation should be secular — also fails to produce a clear answer,
as to the constitutionality of 701(j). The Tooley court, citing Supreme Court
cases," decided that the primary effect of the legislation was not to favor
religious groups." The court stated that the effect of section 701(j) in the
religious groups it aided was neither substantial nor direct and that therefore
section 701(j) is constitutional." A closer examination of section 701(j),
however, reveals that its effect in fact may be to favor religion. It cannot be
disputed that one major effect of section 701(j), if not the primary effect, is to
give preferential treatment to employees who are members of certain religions
and to particular religious groups." While the Supreme Court has stated that
one of the effects of a statute maybe to aid religion, the Court has not gone so
far as to permit the primary purpose of a statute to be to favor religion. 100
Thus, should the primary purpose of section 701(j) be to favor religion, then
under the Nyquist test, the statute would appear to be unconstitutional.
The third prong of the Nyquist test — that the legislation, to be constitu-
tional, must not require that the government become excessively entangled
with religion — also fails to provide a decisive conclusion as to the constitu-
tionality of section 701(j). The Supreme Court has developed a general
guideline to be used in the application of this part of the Nyquist test. Under this
guideline, legislation could be constitutional if it does not require "comprehen-
sive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance" to ensure that First
Amendment religious freedoms are respected."D 1
 In addressing this issue, the
Tooley court summarily stated that the determination of the seriousness of the
employee's religious beliefs and the administration of reasonable accommoda-
tion standards "requires a minimal amount of supervision and administrative
cost' 102
 on the government's part. This conclusion, however, is questionable.
Religious discrimination is often difficult to detect, and "religion" can be diffi-
cult to define.'" Both of these factors can contribute to involved investigations
96
 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437,
452 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Mkt., 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
97
 Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1246 (9th Cir. 1981).
98 Id.
99 See Comment, Title VII and Religious Discrimination, supra note 81, at 424-28.
100 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (conscientious objectors to military in-
scription are allowed special status); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (special tax
status is constitutional for religious, educational and charitable organization); and Gallagher v.
Crown Kosher Mkt., 366 U.S. 617 (1961) (Sunday Blue Laws upheld).
"n Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971). This test has evolved from the
following cases: Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349, 362-72 (1975); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672, 684-89 (1971); and Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
102
 Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1246 (9th Cir, 1981). The court
relied on Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
103 See, e.g., Comment, Title VII and Religious Discrimination, supra note 81, at 430-31.
Under section 701(j), "religion" is defined very broadly. The section states that the term in-
cludes "all aspects of religious observances, practice and belief." 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e(j) (1976).
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by the EEOC of religious discrimination charges and consequently, may con-
stitute the type of "surveillance" contemplated by the Supreme Court. 1°' The
many attempts by the judicial system to resolve these same charges of religious
discrimination increase the government "entanglement" with religion in this
area and result in what could be called comprehensive, discriminating, and
continuing involvement."'
Thus, an application of the literal terms of the Nyquist test to section 701(j)
fails to produce conclusive answers as to whether the section is constitutional.
There are strong arguments under the Nyquist test that 701(j) is constitutional,
but the above analysis demonstrates that counter arguments do exist. Yet, the
court in Tooley was content to apply Aryquist's three-pronged test without ad-
dressing the complexities inherent in the application of that test. While the
Nyquist test is uniformity adopted in cases such as Tooley, what intuitively
seemed to be the deciding factor in Tooley are two important but unstated policy
considerations — the importance of section 701(j) to the fight against dis-
crimination and the interest of the government in supporting religion.
Title VII attempts to insure that employees and potential employees are
judged by employers independently of race, religion, sex, and national origin.
The tremendous importance of Title VII and its goals has been repeatedly
recognized by the Supreme Court.'" Although the majority of Title VII cases
considered by the Court have concerned racial discrimination,'" there has
been no indication that the other forms of discrimination prohibited by Title
VII are not equally important.'"
The second factor that should have been incorporated into the Nyquist test
by the Tooley court in order to reach the conclusion that section 701(j) is con-
stitutional involves the beneficial aspects of connections between Church and
State. The court in Tooley did recognize that the separation of religion and
This broad definition, when combined with case law definitions, becomes very vague. Welsh v.
United States, 398 U,S. 333 (1970) (Religion could include moral and ethical beliefs as well);
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) ("sincere and meaningful feelings which occupy in
the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by ... God." Id. at 176).
1 " The EEOC has this power under 42 U.S.C. 2000e(5) (1976),
See supra note 101.
106 Frank v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 757-62 (1976); Alexander v.
Gardner-Dewey Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47-49 (1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 798-800 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429.33 (1971).
i 0' See cases cited supra at note 106.
"8 In Hardison, the Supreme Court applied racial discrimination standards under Title
VII in a religious discrimination context and, in doing so, the Court potentially provided limits
on the scope of valid religious discrimination charges. Specifically, the Hardison court noted that
religious discrimination charges cannot alter a bona fide facially neutral seniority system. Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 79 (1977). This could be interpreted to mean that
religious discrimination is not viewed by the Court as an important aspect of Title VII. The pro-
tection given to seniority systems in Hardison, however, also has been provided to seniority
systems in racial discrimination cases. See International Bhd, of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324 (1977). Thus, this potentially limiting decision by the Supreme Court in Hardison is not
an indication by the Court that religious discrimination is not a crucial aspect of Title VII. In-
deed, even though the Court ruled that application of the reasonable accommodation-undue
hardship test would not help Hardison, the Court emphasized the importance of section 701(j).
Hardison, 432 U.S. at 75.
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government cannot be complete but essentially analyzed section 701(j) on the
basis that the government can only "accommodate" religion.' 09 A review of
United States Supreme Court decisions indicates that it is appropriate for
government to actually encourage religion.'" Specifically, in Gillette v. United
States, " 1 the Court recognized the need for conscientious action and the impor-
tance of "the principle of supremacy of conscience. "" 2 This rationale, which
explicitly encouraged religion, provided crucial support for legislation that per-
mits citizens, due to their religious beliefs, legally to obtain conscientious objec-
tor status to participation in the United States armed forces. 13 In Zorach v.
Claus, "'Justice Douglas captured the essence of this concept that government
should support religion when - he stated, "We are a religious people whose in-
stitutions presuppose a Supreme Being . . . . When the state encourages
religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities . . . it follows the
best of our traditions.'" Thus, that section 701(j) provides limited govern-
mental support for religion should be viewed as a positive aspect of the statute.
The above analysis indicates that the Tooley court reached the correct con-
clusions on the two primary issues before the court. First, it determined that
section 701(j) applied to unions and that the substituted charity remedy is valid
under section 701(j). Secondly, the court decided that section 701(j) is constitu-
tional.
Despite deciding the constitutional question correctly, the court failed to
fully address all the pertinent issues on this matter. The Nyquist test should be
applied in determining whether section 701(j) is constitutional, but included in
this analysis should be recognition of the importance of Title VII and the fact
that government can act benevolently towards religion.
V. ATTORNEY'S FEES
A. * Attorney's Fees for Proceedings not Mandated by Title VII:
Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc.'
In New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v Carey' the Supreme Court held that section
706(k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' authorizes the award of at-
109 Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1243 (9th Cir. 1981).
11 ° See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 453 (1971); Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S.
306, 313-14 (1952).
"' 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
"2 Id. at 453.	 •
1'3 Id. Other cases in which the Supreme Court has applied the Nyquist standards in-
dicate religion should be supported by the state. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (ex-
emption of Amish children from mandatory state education laws); Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the
City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (tax benefit allowed for religious organizations).
1 " 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
115 Id. at 313-14.
* By Barbara J. Egan, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
670 F.2d 760 (7th Cir. 1982).
2 447 U.S. 54 (1980). See the following chapter of this Sumo).
42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-5(k) (1976).
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torney's fees to prevailing Title VII plaintiffs for work done in administrative
and judicial proceedings at the state and local level.' The purpose behind the
enactment of section 706(k), the Court held, was to encourage plaintiffs of
limited means to bring meritorious complaints of employment discrimination.'
The Court concluded that promotion of this purpose required the award of at-
torney's fees for work done in state and local proceedings which Title VII
plaintiffs must institute as a prerequisite to being heard in a federal forum. 6
The Carey Court did not address, however, the issue of whether section
706(k) permitted the award of attorney's fees for work done in proceedings
which, while not required by Title VII, are helpful to the plaintiff's case. Dur-
ing the Survey year, this question was answered affirmatively by the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc.' The Chrapliwy
court held that the award of reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing Title
VII claimants should include fees for time the plaintiffs' attorney spent per-
suading the federal government to debar the defendant from its federal con-
tracts. 9 The court stated that this result was consistent both with section 706(k)
and with the Carey decision since the debarment proceedings contributed to the
ultimate resolution of the Title VII action. 9
In Chrapliwy a Title VII class action suit was filed in 1972 by female em-
ployees who alleged that their employer, a federal contractor, had dis-
criminated against them on the basis of sex by using a segregated hiring and
seniority system." In 1974, the Federal District Court for the Northern District
of Indiana granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on the
liability issues because the employer continuously failed to respond to requests
for admissions." This decision established the employer's general liability for
sex discrimination." Three months after the order for partial summary judg-
ment, the federal judge who had been hearing the case died, and the pro-
ceedings in the case consequently were delayed." The employer took advan-
tage of this situation by failing to provide relief for the plaintiffs, even though
the employer's liability under Title VII had been determined."
To avoid further delay, the plaintiffs' attorney sought to persuade the
federal government to take action against Uniroyal." The plaintiffs' attorney
argued before the Department of the Interior that the employer's dis-
criminatory practices violated Executive Order 11246. 16 Executive Order
11246 prohibits federal contractors from discriminating against employees on
4 447 US. at 71.
Id. at 63.
6 Id.
670 F.2d 760 (7th Cir. 1982).
8 Id. at 767.
9 Id. at 766-67.
10 Id. at 762-63.
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the basis of sex, race, or other impermissible grounds and permits the federal
government to debar violators from their federal contracts and declare them in-
eligible for future contracts." The Department of the Interior initially agreed
with Uniroyal's contention that the Department should defer any proceedings
while the Title VII suit was pending in federal court."
The plaintiffs filed suit in federal court against the Secretaries of Labor,
Defense and the Interior to compel the government to enforce Executive Order
11246. 19
 With court approval, the government officials agreed to conduct an
investigation of Uniroyal and to enforce Executive Order 11246 if any viola-
tions were found. 2° After a series of judicial and administrative proceedings ,21
the plaintiffs and Uniroyal ultimately settled the Title VII suit in 1979, less
than a week before the government was going to debar the employer from a
large federal contract." The employer admitted that it would not have settled
the suit had it not been for the debarment proceedings. 23
In calculating the award of attorney's fees under section 706(k) the district
court held that, as a matter of law, the award could not include fees for time
spent seeking the employer's debarment from federal contracts. 24 Both the
language of section 706(k), which authorizes fees for actions or proceedings
"under this subchapter,”" and the recent Carey decision convinced the district
court that section 706(k) permitted fees only for proceedings mandated directly
or indirectly by Title VII. 26 Since the plaintiffs' attorney's efforts to persuade
the government to enforce Executive Order 11246 were not required by Title
VII, and since the Executive Order itself contains no private right of action or
attorney's fees provision, attorney's fees could not be awarded for the debar-
ment efforts."
" 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (1965).
'a 670 F.2d 760, 763 (7th Cir. 1982).
Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 442, 446, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 445, 448 (N.D. Ind. 1981).
20 Id.
" Id. at 446-48, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 448-50. These proceedings included:
an administrative action in which the Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract Com-
pliance Programs (OFCCP) sought to debar Uniroyal, see Department of Labor, OFCCP v.
Uniroyal, No. OFCCP-1977-1; Uniroyal's request for a declaratory judgment that the Labor
Department Rules for sanction hearings were void, which was dismissed since Uniroyal had not
exhausted its administrative remedies, see Uniroyal, Inc. v. Marshall, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 417 (N.D. Ind. 1977); the issuance of a Decision and Administrative Order by Secretary
of Labor Marshall, canceling Uniroyal's present government contracts and declaring Uniroyal
ineligible for new contracts, see Department of Labor, OFCCP v. Uniroyal, 20 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 419 (1979); a court ruling which upheld Secretary of Labor Marshall's Decision and
Administrative Order, see Uniroyal, Inc. v. Marshall, 482 F. Supp. 364, 20 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 137, (D.D.C. 1979).
22
 Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 442, 448, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 445, 450 (N.D. Ind. 1981).
23 Id. at 451, 25 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 452.
24 Id.
25 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k) (1976).
26 509 F. Supp. 442, 451-52, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 445, 452-53.
27 Id. at 452-53, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 453.
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The Circuit Court for the Seventh Circuit overruled the district court's
holding with regard to attorney's fees for the debarment proceedings. 28 The
circuit court held that Carey did not preclude the award of attorney's fees for ef-
forts aimed at achieving the ultimate goal of relief in a Title VII suit. 29 The
court read Carey as indicating that section 706(k) was to be construed liberally
rather than restrictively "with respect to fees for services not performed, in the
ordinary sense, in proceedings before the Title VII court. " 80 A liberal con-
struction of section 706(k), the Chrapliwy court stated, would further Congress'
purpose of encouraging plaintiffs of limited means to bring meritorious
discrimination complaints. 3 '
The circuit court also held that the district court had interpreted section
706(k) too narrowly as authorizing fees only for efforts mandated directly or in-
directly by Title VII. 32 Since the plaintiffs' efforts to have the employer de-
barred contributed to the ultimate termination of the Title VII suit, the circuit
court held that these efforts were within the Title VII action." Thus, the court
concluded that neither the language of section 706(k) nor the Carey decision
precluded the award of attorney's fees for the debarment efforts."
The decision of the district court in Chrapliwy represents a more
reasonable interpretation of section 706(k) and of Carey than does the decision
of the circuit court. The language of section 706(k) authorizes fees for "any ac-
tion or proceeding under this sub-chapter."" It seems unlikely that Congress
intended these words to encompass any proceedings which contributed to the
ultimate termination of a Title VII suit. The efforts of the plaintiffs' attorney to
have the employer debarred from his federal contracts were clearly separate
from the procedures which the plaintiffs followed pursuant to Title VII. Both
Title VII and Executive Order 11246 are aimed at eliminating employment
discrimination, yet the two provisions have distinct functions. 36 Title VII is to
be enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, while Ex-
ecutive Order 11246 is to be enforced through the administering of the federal
contract compliance program by the Department of Labor's Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs. 37 Moreover, Executive Order 11246 was in-
tended to be enforced by the federal government, rather than through private
civil actions." Thus, while the plaintiffs' efforts to have the Executive Order
enforced were helpful to their Title VII suit, these efforts did not constitute pro-
ceedings "under" Title VII.
28 Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 670 F.2d 760, 766-67 (7th Cir. 1982).
29 Id. at 766.
'° Id. at 766-67.
31 Id. at 767.
32 Id.
" Id.
34 Id. at 766-67.
35 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(k) (1976).
36 Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 442, 452, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 445, 453 (N.D. Ind. 1981).
" Id.
38 Id.
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In addition to misconstruing section 706(k), the circuit court in Chrapliwy
also misread the Carey decision. Carey does not support the award of attorney's
fees for the plaintiffs' debarment efforts. In granting attorney's fees for state
administrative and judicial proceedings under Title VII, the Carey Court em-
phasized the mandatory nature of such proceedings. 39 The Court stated that
Congress had established a system of referral and deferral in which Title VII
plaintiffs must resort initially to available state and local avenues of relief for
employment discrimination." The development of such a system indicated to
the Court that the state and local proceedings to which Title VII refers
claimants constituted actions or proceedings under Title VII.*'
Unlike the state and local proceedings involved in Carey, the efforts made
by the plaintiffs in Chrapliwy to have their employer debarred from its federal
contracts were not mandated by Title VII or by related and required pro-
cedures. Thus, the debarment procedures played no role in the system of refer-
ral and deferral established by Congress in Title VII. The language in Carey in-
dicates that since the plaintiffs' debarment efforts were not mandated by either
Title VII or by procedures related to and required by Title VII, such efforts are
not proceedings "under" Title VII for which attorney's fees can be awarded."
In addition, withholding attorney's fees for the debarment proceedings in
Chrapliwy would not cause the interference with the purpose behind section
706(k) that a contrary result in Carey would have caused.'" Since Title VII does
not require claimants to pursue debarment of employers which have federal
contracts, withholding attorney's fees for debarment proceedings will not place
a financial obstacle before Title VII plaintiffs of limited means. The plaintiffs
in Chrapliwy could have obtained complete relief under Title VII even if they
had not tried to have their employer debarred from its federal contracts.** Ad-
mittedly, the debarment procedures hastened the plaintiffs' success in their
39 447 U.S. at 62-65.
In Spancrete Northeast, Inc. a. International Ass 'n of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron-
workers, the federal district court interpreted the Carey decision as based on the mandatory prior
resort to the state and local procedures. 514 F. Supp. 326, 334 (N.D.N.Y. 1981). Spancrete in-
volved a request for attorney's fees under S 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. SS 141-187, at S 187. Since 5 303 does not mandate prior resort to the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) before a plaintiff can proceed in federal court, the court held that Carey
did not support the award of attorney's fees for costs incurred in the NLRB proceedings. Id. at
334.
See also Kennedy v, Whitehurst, 509 F. Supp. 226, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 362
(D.D.C. 1981), involving a request for attorney's fees under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. S 621 (1976). In denying attorney's fees for administrative pro-
ceedings, the court distinguished the Carey case on the basis that Cary., involved administrative
proceedings required by Title VII, while actions under the ADEA include no such mandatory
administrative proceedings. Id. at 231, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 365.
4°
 447 U.S. at 62.
4' Id. at 65.
42
 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
49 The Carey Court stated that "a contrary rule would force the complainant to bear the
costs of mandatory state and local proceedings and thereby would inhibit the enforcement of a
meritorious discrimination claim." 447 U.S. at 63.
44 Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 442, 451, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 445, 452 (N.D. Ind. 1981).
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Title VII suit." Such procedures, however, were riot necessary to the plain-
tiffs' success.
While awarding attorney's fees for proceedings such as the debarment ef-
forts in Chrapliwy undoubtedly benefits Title VII plaintiffs, neither the
language of section 706(k) nor the Supreme Court's decision in Carey warrants
such awards. Moreover, the approach adopted by the circuit court in Chrapliwy
has no clear limits. The Chrapliwy approach broadly sanctions the award of at-
torney's fees for any efforts which contribute to the termination of the Title VII
suit." This approach exceeds Congress' intent in enacting section 706(k). It re-
mains to be seen whether other courts will adopt this approach and what limits,
if any, they will place on it. Practitioners in circuits other than the seventh cir-
cuit therefore should not presume that they will be awarded fees under section
706(k) for proceedings which, while helpful to the plaintiff's Title VII suit, are
not required by Title VII or by related and required proceedings.
B. Attorney's Fee Awards Under Title VII fir Mandatory State
and Local Proceedings: New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey'
Section 706(k) of Title VII provides that, "in any action or proceeding"
under Title VII, the court has discretion to grant reasonable attorney's fees to a
prevailing party.' This section, however, does not state whether the words 'ac-
tion or proceeding" were meant to apply exclusively to judicial proceedings in
the federal courts or whether they apply to federal administrative and state
judicial and administrative proceedings as well. Because section 706(c) of Title
VII mandates the pursuit of state and local remedies as a prerequisite to the
commencement of the proceedings authorized by the statute,' the Title VII
claimant may incur considerable attorney's costs before his claim is heard by a
federal court. In fact, the claimant may prevail in state proceedings before his
claim is either commenced or adjudicated in the federal courts. 4 The federal
courts thus have had to decide whether Congress authorized them to award at-
torney's fees for costs incurred by litigants in federal administrative pro-
ceedings and in state judicial and administrative proceedings.'
45 Id.
46 670 F.2d 760, 767 (7th Cir. 1982).
• By Barbara J. Egan, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
447 U.S. 54 (1980).
42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(k) (1976). Section 706(k) provides in full:
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United
States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.
See infra note 5.
4 See infra note 5.
5 Title VII claimants generally are required to assert their claims before federal ad-
ministrative and state judicial and administrative bodies before being entitled to bring suit in
federal court. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(c)-2000e-5(f) (1976). This requirement does not apply to
claimants who are federal employees. Federal employees may file suit in federal court within 30
days after a final decision is made on their discrimination complaint either by the federal depart-
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During the Survey year, the United States Supreme Court, in New York
Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 6 held in a seven to two decision that section 706(k)
permitted the prevailing plaintiff to obtain attorney's fees for administrative
and judicial proceedings at the state and local level.' The Court, in an opinion
by Justice Blackmun, found that Congress intended the words "action or pro-
ceeding" in section 706(k) to encompass judicial and administrative pro-
ceedings at the federal, state and local levels. 9 Congress had intended such a
result, the Court reasoned, because the congressional policy of encouraging
private parties to bring meritorious discrimination complaints would be
obstructed if claimants who are required by Title VII to initiate their claims at
the state level are denied attorney's fees for the state proceedings. 9
This Chapter will analyze the Court's holding and rationale in Carey in
light of the legislative purposes behind section 706(k) and Title VII. Congress
enacted 706(k) to encourage the bringing of meritorious Title VII suits by
plaintiffs of limited means."' Congress also wished to establish through Title
VII a scheme of deferral to state and local remedies for employment dis-
crimination." This Chapter will conclude that the Carey decision furthers both
of these congressional purposes." The Court therefore was correct in holding
that Section 706(k) permits prevailing plaintiffs to obtain attorney's fees for
work done in administrative and judicial proceedings at the state and local
level.
ment or agency involved or, upon an appeal from the decision of the department or agency, by
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). One hundred and eighty days after
the filing of the initial charge with the department or agency or with the EEOC upon appeal from
the decision of the department or agency, the employee may file a civil suit in federal court if he is
aggrieved by the final disposition of his complaint or the failure to take action on his complaint.
Id. at S 2000e-16(c) (Supp. IV 1980).
For non-federal employees, if the state in which the litigants reside has enacted its own
employment discrimination laws, Title VII requires claimants to commence proceedings before
appropriate state or local judicial or administrative bodies before seeking federal relief. Id. at ,§
2000e-5(c). Sixty days after the commencement of such state or local proceedings, the claimant
may file charges with the EEOC. Id. The EEOC investigates the claim and dismisses it if the
charge is unfounded. Id. at 5 2000e-5(b). If reasonable cause exists to believe that the charge is
valid, however, the EEOC must first try through conciliation to persuade the violator to
eliminate the unlawful employment practice. Id. When the conciliation process fails, the EEOC
may bring suit in federal court. Id. at 5 2000e-5(f)(1). If the EEOC does not bring a civil action
within 180 days of the claimant's filing of charges, however, the EEOC must issue to the claim-
ant a right-to-sue letter. Id. Thus, some controversy has developed over which avenues of relief
specified in Title VII constitute "actions or proceedings" under Title Vii for which attorney's
fees can be awarded.
6
 447 U.S. 54 (1980).
Id. at 71. Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Bren-
nan, Stewart, Marshall and Powell joined. Chief Justice Burger joined also, but wrote separately
to state that he did not agree with the statements made in footnote 6 of the opinion of the Court.
Id. at 71. See infra note 57. Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion, id. at 71-73, and Justices
White and Rehnquist dissented. Id. at 71.
8 Id. at 60-63.
9 Id. at 63.
'° See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 77-83 and accompanying text,
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Cidni Carey, the plaintiff in Carey, had been refused a job as a waitress at
the New York Gaslight Club (Club) because she was black." Carey initially
filed a charge with the EEOC . 14 The EEOC forwarded her complaint to the
New York State Division of Human Rights (Division)," as required by section
706(c) of Title VII." The Division conducted an investigation and found
reasonable cause to believe the charge was valid. 12 Efforts at conciliation failed
and the Division recommended that a public hearing be held." At this time,
Carey's attorney advised the EEOC of the status of the proceedings." He also
requested that the EEOC reassume jurisdiction over the complaint so that
Carey could later obtain a right-to-sue letter if it became necessary to sue in
federal court." The EEOC agreed to assign an investigator to the case as soon
as possible. 21
A few months after the state administrative hearing, the hearing examiner
decided in Carey's favor. 22 While various forms of relief were ordered, Carey
was awarded no attorney's fees. 23 While the parties were awaiting the ex-
aminer's decision, the EEOC began its investigation and found reasonable
cause to believe Carey's charges were valid. 24 When the EEOC 's efforts at con-
ciliation failed and the EEOC chose not to sue the Club, the EEOC issued
Carey a right-to-sue letter." This right-to-sue letter gave her ninety days to
decide whether to file suit in federal court. 26
The Club appealed the examiner's decision to the New York State
Human Rights Appeal Board." The Appeal Board confirmed the Division's
order and the Club appealed this decision to the New York Supreme Court."
The New York Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Board, 29
and the Club then filed a motion with the New York Court of Appeals for leave
to appea1. 3 ° The motion was denied."
While the Club's appeal was pending before the New York Supreme
Court, Carey filed suit in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of
New York, seeking relief which included attorney's fees under section 706(k). 32
13
 447 U.S. 54, 56 (1980).
14 Id.
" Id. at 56-57.
16
 42 U.S.C. 5 2000c-5(c) (1976).











" Id. at 57.
28 Id. at 58.
28 New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 59
A.D.2d 852, 399 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1977).
3° 447 U.S. at 58.
31 Id. at 59 (citing 43 N.Y.2d 951 (1978)).
32 447 U.S. at 58.
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The Club denied all of Carey's allegations and cited the pendency of the state
proceedings as an affirmative defense." In a pretrial conference held by the
federal district court, the Club agreed that it would comply with the Division's
order if the state court denied its motion for leave to appeal." When the state
court denied the motion for leave to appeal, the federal action was dismissed
except for Carey's request for attorney's fees for work done in the state ad-
ministrative and judicial proceedings, the EEOC proceedings, and the federal
court proceedings."
The federal district court denied Carey's request for attorney's fees,
holding that the mere filing of a suit in federal court did not warrant the
allowance of fees for the state proceedings." Moreover, the court found that
Carey need not have incurred any legal expenses in the state proceedings since
a Division attorney could have presented the case to the hearing examiner. 37
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court, ruling
that "[a] complaining party who is successful in state administrative pro-
ceedings after having her complaint under Title VII referred to a state agency
in accordance with the statutory scheme of that Title is entitled to recover at-
torney's fees in the same manner as a party who prevails in federal court.'"38
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals." The
Court first examined the language of section 706(k) and interpreted the words
"action or proceeding" to include administrative as well as judicial pro-
ceedings." This interpretation, the Court observed, was supported by a com-
parison of section 706(k) with the attorney's fees provision of Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. 4 ' The Court noted that the two provisions were en-
acted contemporaneously, yet the Title II attorney's fees provision, in contrast
to 706(k), contained no reference to "proceedings. "42 This omission indicated
to the Court that Congress contemplated both judicial and administrative pro-
ceedings under Title VII when it used the phrase "action or proceeding" in
706(k). 43 Furthermore, the Court found nothing in Title VII to indicate that
Congress intended to allow fee awards only for work done in federal ad-
ministrative and judicial proceedings." Section 706(k) refers to any proceeding
" Id.
34 Id. at 59.
35 Id.
36
 Carey v. New York Gaslight Club, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 79, 80, 18 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 721, 723 (S.D. N.Y. 1978).
37 Id. at 81, 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 724.
as Carey v. New York Gaslight Club, Inc., 598 F.2d 1253, 1260, 19 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1979).
39 447 U.S. 54, 71 (1980).
4° Id. at 61.
" 42 U.S.C. $ 2000a-3(b) (1976).
42 447 U.S. at 61 (citing 42 U.S.C. $ 2000a-3(b) (1976)).
" 447 U.S. at 61.
" Id. at 61-62. The Court noted that "Nil cases involving federal employees, all the
Courts of Appeals that have considered the question have upheld fee awards under 5 706(k) for
work done in federal administrative proceedings that must be exhausted as a condition to filing
an action in federal court." Id. at 61 n.2. See, e.g., Brown v. Bathke, 588 F.2d 634, 638 (8th Cir.
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under Title VII, the Court noted, and the statute expressly requires deferral to
state and local remedies. 45 Moreover, the Court observed that the word "pro-
ceeding" is used throughout Title VII to refer to all of the different types of ad-
ministrative and judicial proceedings, both state and federal, through which
Title VII is enforced."
An examination of the purpose of section 706(k) also provided support for
the Court's conclusion that attorney's fees could be awarded for state and local
proceedings. Citing Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 47 the Court observed
that one of the primary purposes behind the enactment of 706(k) was to
facilitate the bringing of meritorious discrimination claims by plaintiffs of
limited means." In Christiansburg, the Court had referred to Title VII plaintiffs
as private attorneys general vindicating an important policy and deserving of
attorney's fees." The Carey Court therefore approved the statement in Chris-
tiansburg that, absent special circumstances, a prevailing Title VII plaintiff is
entitled to attorney's fees." The Court claimed that "a contrary rule would
force the complainant to bear the costs of mandatory state and local pro-
ceedings and thereby would inhibit the enforcement of a meritorious dis-
crimination claim.' ' 51
The Court also regarded the statutory requirement that Title VII
claimants initiate their claims in state or local forums as an indication that at-
torney's fees are permitted for work done in state and local proceedings. 52
While acknowledging that the federal courts retain the ultimate authority for
enforcing Title VII," the Court concluded that Congress intended the EEOC
and federal court proceedings to supplement available state and local remedies
for employment discrimination. 54 The withholding of attorney's fees for work
done in state and local proceedings would hinder the effectuation of Congress'
scheme, the Court feared, since plaintiffs would have no incentive to exhaust
state remedies prior to filing suit in federal court." Instead, they probably
would abandon the state proceedings and file suit in federal court as soon as the
statutory sixty day time limit had elapsed, thus "undermin[ing] Congress' in-
tent to encourage full use of state remedies." 56 In what arguably was dictum,
the Court concluded that a plaintiff who prevailed in state or local proceedings
could file suit in federal court solely to recover attorney's fees for the pro-
ceedings."
1978); Fischer v. Adams, 572 F.2d 406, 410, 18 Fair Env]. Prat. Cas. (BNA) 667, 670 (1st Cir.
1978).
45
 447 U.S. at 62.
46 Id. at 62-63.
47 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
46 447 U.S. at 63 (citing 434 U.S. 412, 420 (1978)).
49 434 U.S. at 416.
5° 447 U.S. at 63 (citing 434 U.S. at 417).
51 447 U.S. at 63.
52
 Id. at 63-65.
" Id. at 64.
54 Id. at 65.
5' Id. at 66 n.6.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 66. Chief Justice Burger joined the Court's opinion but wrote separately to ex-
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The Court rejected the Club's argument that the award of attorney's fees
for the state proceedings violated the tenth amendment because the state did
not authorize such an award." Any interest the state had in withholding these
fees, the Court held, was overridden by Congress' power under section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment. 59 Noting that section 706(k) was intended to supple-
ment rather than pre-empt state law, the Court also rejected as inapposite the
Club's argument that Congress had not clearly expressed an intention to pre-
empt state regulation of state proceedings. 6° Since Congress had established at-
torney's fees as a necessary aspect of complete relief under Title VII, plaintiffs
in states which do not authorize attorney's fee awards could supplement the
relief granted under state law by obtaining attorney's fees under federal law in
federal court."
Finally, the Court found unpersuasive the Club's contention that it was
within the district court's discretion to deny an award of attorney's fees." The
Court noted that Christiansburg had established that a court's discretion to deny
a fee award to Title VII plaintiffs is limited to those cases in which special cir-
cumstances exist." According to the Court, the availability of a Division at-
torney to present a claimant's case did not constitute a special circumstance."
The Division attorney was not available at all levels of the state proceedings,
and, even where the attorney was available, there was a possibility that he or
she could take a position adverse to that of the claimant." Thus, since the Divi-
sion attorney had no obligation to the claimant as a client, the Court asserted
that "[w]ithout doubt, the private attorney has an important role to play in
preserving and protecting federal rights and interests during the state pro-
ceedings. "66 Since no special circumstances existed in Carey, the Court held
that Title VII authorized the federal court to grant attorney's fees for work
done in state proceedings to which the claimant was required to resort."
Justices White and Rehnquist dissented from the Court's opinion for the
reasons expressed by Judge Mulligan in his dissent from the opinion of the
Court of Appeals." Judge Mulligan had contended that state law should
press his belief that it was unnecessary to resolve the issue of whether a claimant could bring a
Title VII suit in federal court solely to recover attorney's fees for work done in state proceedings in
which the claimant had prevailed. Id. at 71 (Burger, CJ., concurring). Justice Stevens also wrote
separately to state that the facts of the case did not warrant a decision on whether a claimant who
prevailed at the state level could file a federal suit merely to recover attorneys fees for the state
proceedings. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). The issue did not arise in this case, stated Stevens,
because Carey had filed suit in federal court for a decision on the merits while the state pro-
ceedings were pending. Id. at 72. Thus, the federal court had jurisdiction to grant attorney's fees
though the state proceedings ultimately had resolved all other questions in the case. Id.
" Id. at 67.
59 Id. Section 5 gives Congress the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment.
60 447 U.S. at 67.
61
 Id. at 67-68.
62 Id. at 68.
63 Id. (citing 434 U.S. at 416-17).
64 447 U.S. at 68-71.
65 Id,
66 Id. at 70.
" Id. at 71.
66
 Id. (Rehnquist, J., and White, J., dissenting).
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govern the issue of whether to award attorney's fees for state proceedings.° He
also emphasized the availability of assistance provided to Carey by a Division
attorney," and observed that no evidence existed which suggested the Division
attorney at any time took a position adverse to Carey's interests." Moreover,
he argued that granting attorney's fees in federal court for work done in state
proceedings would promote litigation in federal courts, a result contrary to
Congress' purpose in requiring plaintiffs to resort first to state and local
remedies." Every plaintiff who prevailed in proceedings in a state which did
not authorize fee awards would pursue such an award in federal court."
Judge Mulligan further maintained that denial of attorney's fees for the state
proceedings need not cause plaintiffs to abandon state proceedings as soon as
they could obtain a federal forum, since the federal courts could discourage
such a strategy by staying federal proceeding pending resolution of the state
proceedings. 74 Finally, Judge Mulligan considered unrealistic the argument
that denial of fees for state proceedings would induce plaintiffs to present a
weak case at the state proceedings so they would lose at that level and thus gain
access to a federal forum where a fee award was permissible." For these
reasons, and because he found no evidence in Title VII that Congress intended
the federal courts to award attorney's fees to a claimant who prevailed in state
proceedings," Judge Mulligan dissented.
The Supreme Court's decision in Carey is correct for two reasons. First,
the Court's interpretation of section 706(k) will effectuate the purpose of that
section. Second, a contrary decision in Carey would have disrupted the congres-
sional scheme in Title VII of promoting deferral to state and local remedies for
employment discrimination.
The legislative history of section 706(k), though scant, indicates that one
purpose behind the provision was to facilitate the bringing of meritorious suits
by plaintiffs of limited means. 77 The withholding of attorney's fees for work
done in state and local proceedings, however, would almost certainly obstruct
effectuation of this purpose. Title VII plaintiffs initially must seek relief in
available state or local proceedings, and a plaintiff with a meritorious discrimi-
nation complaint should succeed at this level. Thus the attorney's fees provi-
sion will have done nothing to aid or encourage the claimant to institute these
proceedings if a fee award is not available for work done in these proceedings.
It would be inconsistent if Congress enacted the fee provision to encourage
plaintiffs of limited means to bring meritorious discrimination complaints,
69 Carey v. New York Gaslight Club, Inc., 598 F.2d at 1261, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 922-23 (2d Cir. 1979) (Mulligan, J., dissenting).
7° Id. at 1261, 1262-63, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 923-24.
71 Id. at 1261, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 923.
72 Id. at 1262, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 923.
" Id. at 1263 n.7, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 924 n.7.
74 Id. at 1263, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 925.
75 Id. at 1263-64, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 925.
76 Id. at 1262, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 923.
" See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
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while requiring these plaintiffs to resort first to proceedings for which fees
might not be awarded.
The Court's indication that plaintiffs could file a Title VI] suit in federal
court solely to recover attorney's fees" also conforms with the purpose of sec-
tion 706(k). The facts of Carey did not necessitate resolution of the issue, as
Justice Stevens noted in his concurring opinion," since Carey already had filed
suit in federal court for a decision on the merits of her claim while the state pro-
ceedings were pending." The purpose of section 706(k) would not be served,
however, by awarding attorney's fees only to plaintiffs who fortuitously had
been able to institute federal proceedings prior to completion of state pro-
ceedings. The effect of such a distinction might be to penalize those plaintiffs
who had been blatantly discriminated against." The strength of their claims
could hasten the conclusion of state proceedings within sixty days and hence
could preclude these plaintiffs from filing suit in federal court.
The second reason why the Carey decision is correct is that a narrow con-
struction of section 706(k) would interfere with the system of deferral to state
and local remedies which Congress intended as part of the enforcement scheme
of Title VII." Even plaintiffs with strong claims would institute federal pro-
ceedings as soon as possible under Title VII, while state proceedings were still
pending, to insure an award of attorney's fees for work done in the state pro-
ceedings. Thus, where state proceedings were lengthy, the federal court
ultimately would have to assume jurisdiction of the merits of the case, leading
to duplicative litigation." Permitting plaintiffs who prevailed in state pro-
ceedings to sue in federal court solely to obtain attorney's fees likewise will
result in dual proceedings, but the federal court at least need not adjudicate the
merits.
In holding that prevailing Title VII plaintiffs can obtain attorney's fees for
administrative and judicial proceedings at the state and local level, the Carey
Court left two issues unanswered. The first involved the determination of when
the provision by the state proceedings constitutes a special circumstance such
that the federal court may not award attorney's fees for work done during those
proceedings by a privately retained attorney. The Carey Court stressed the lack
78 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
78 See supra note 57.
80 447 U.S. 54, 58 (1980).
81 The plaintiffs suffering the most blatant discrimination would be likely to win rapidly
in the state proceedings and never find it necessary to file in federal court.
82 Id. at 62-65.
83
 The plaintiff might instead abandon the state proceedings after the federal court
assumes jurisdiction, which would thwart Congress' purpose of encouraging deferral to state
remedies. Judge Mulligan suggested that the federal courts could defeat this strategy by staying
the federal proceedings while the state proceedings were pending. 598 F.2d at 1263, 19 Fair
Empl, Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 925 (Mulligan, J., dissenting). See supra note 74 and accompanying
text. As the Supreme Court observed, however, there is a definite maximum period of time dur-
ing which the federal court can stay the proceedings, and the state proceedings may still be pend-
ing after this period has elapsed. 447 U.S. at 66 n.6. Thus, the plaintiff ultimately would be able
to abandon the state proceedings, or to pursue dual proceedings in state and federal forums.
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of an obligation owed by the Division attorney to the claimant, and the
unavailability of a Division attorney during the part of the state proceedings."
Had the state provided an attorney who was to represent Carey's interests
alone and who was available at every stage of the state proceedings, the Court
very well might have deemed this a special circumstance calling for denial of at-
torney's fees for Carey's private attorney. In deciding whether the provision of
an attorney is a special circumstance,, should examine the type and ex-
tent of services which the attorney is authorized to provide. It seems logical to
award attorney's fees for work which the state attorney was unauthorized to
do. Where the state attorney provides adequate assistance, however, and the
private attorney provides services which, while helpful, are unnecessary to the
presentation of the plaintiff's case, a fee award would seem unwarranted. This
issue remains to be resolved in future cases.
The second issue which the Court did not address concerns the recovery of
fees for work done in proceedings which, while not mandated by either Title
VII or state or local rules, are helpful to the claimant's case. Resolution of this
issue will involve a balancing of the important policy of eradicating employ-
ment discrimination with the equally important policy of not exceeding Con-
gress' intent in enacting section 706(k).
In sum, the decision in Carey represents an important and necessary step
in the enforcement of Title VII. Awarding attorney's fees for work done in
state proceedings under Title VII will further the purpose behind 706(k) by
aiding plaintiffs of limited means bringing discrimination complaints and by
encouraging the deferral to state and local remedies intended by Congress.
44 See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
